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Abstract

Analysis o f southern naval stores production, an industry in many respects more
representative o f southern economic development than cotton textiles, reveals a pattern of
continuity between the antebellum and post-war South. Naval stores manufacturing began in the
colonial era but languished as a marginally-profitable business until the 1830s when new uses for
spirits o f turpentine resulted in increased demand and higher prices. Large turpentine operations
developed almost exclusively in eastern North Carolina and the slaves, who performed most of
the work, experienced distinct work patterns. By the 1850s, destructive gum-harvesting methods
led to the depletion o f North Carolina’s iongleaf pine forests; producers determined to continue
in the business moved their operations and slaves into fresh pine tracts in South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama.
The antebellum industry’s trends—large-scale production, primitive harvesting methods
that wounded the trees, and reliance on forced labor—continued after the Civil War. Producers
continued moving into the deep South and solved the problem o f labor shortages with convict
leasing and peonage. Intensive work routines and difficult conditions in isolated forest camps
also persisted, despite attacks on the industry’s labor practices in the early twentieth century.
Moreover, producers continued to migrate through the South as gum collection devastated pine
stands. Progressive-era initiatives did bring moderately successful efforts to introduce less
destructive harvesting methods than those in use since the 1700s. However, two new problems
plagued the industry in the first half of the century: the rapid rise o f production costs and
competition from both foreign gum naval stores producers and the rapidly growing wood naval

xi
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stores industry. These rivals, combined with the economic and social changes that affected the
South in the 1930s and 1940s, brought the gum naval stores industry to virtual collapse, despite
federal assistance through New Deal farm programs. The wood naval stores industry, which
relied on heavy mechanization and a small number of well-trained technicians, made gains at the
expense of the gum industry. That naval stores production did not modernize until World War II,
demonstrates that a significant portion of post-Civil War southern development represented a
continuation o f antebellum patterns.

xii
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Introduction

The southern naval stores industry relied on forced labor and primitive production and
marketing techniques from the eariy-nineteenth century into the first half of the twentieth
century. It presents an alternative view of southern economic development than that usually
provided by historians who have focused on antebellum cotton cultivation and post-war textile
manufacturing. Such scholars find a dramatic difference between the Old South and the New.
They describe a region emerging from the ravages of the Civil War ready to cast off its
dedication to forced labor, agriculture, and the underdevelopment these two factors spawned and
shift its resources toward the construction of factories, located in towns, and employing free, if
inadequately-paid, wage laborers. Although largely ignored, naval stores production, the South’s
oldest industry with deep roots in the antebellum and even colonial eras, perhaps reflects the
nature of development in the region better than any other form of manufacturing. It thus serves
as a vehicle through which to explore several broad issues regarding the South’s development
both before and after the Civil War-economic growth, industrial expansion, the transition from
slave labor to free labor, environmental alterations, twentieth-century reform efforts, and changes
in the rural countryside—and the degree of continuity in these elements from the antebellum to
postbellum years.
Despite the importance of naval stores to the history of the South, few people today even
know what naval stores are. Since ancient times, naval stores have been vital commodities for
shipbuilding: Originally defined to include all materials used in ship construction and
maintenance-hemp, flax, masts, spars, planking, tar, and pitch—the term “naval stores” by 1800

1
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2
referred only to tar, raw turpentine, and their derivatives—spirits o f turpentine, rosin, and pitch.
Tar, produced by firing pine branches and logs in slow-burning kilns, and pitch, made by boiling
tar, were used primarily for nautical purposes. To reduce decay, seamen slathered heavy
applications of tar on the standing rigging that held masts in place and painted lighter coats on
the running rigging used for raising and adjusting sails. Tar was also used as an axle grease for
wheeled vehicles, a rust protective for cannons, and a preservative for fence posts. Livestock
wounds that received an application of tar stood a lower chance o f infection and seeds coated
with the sticky, resinous substance proved less appetizing to hungry birds and rodents. Pitch,
applied to the sides and bottoms o f wooden ships, prevented leakage. The other principal naval
stores product, raw turpentine, a substance secreted by living conifer trees to protect wounds to
their trunks and also known as resin or gum, had minimum uses before the nineteenth century. It
was an ingredient in the paint that coated the sides o f ships above the water line and was also
employed for a variety o f medicinal purposes—as an external rub, a laxative, and a flea repellent.
Turpentine also served to waterproof leather and cloth. The residue that remained in the still
after the raw turpentine finished distilling, called rosin, possessed few applications before 1800.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, turpentine and rosin came to be used for a
multitude of purposes. Spirits of turpentine became an important solvent in the growing rubber
industry and an essential ingredient in a widely popular lamp oil. It was also employed in the
manufacture of such diverse products as adhesives, pharmaceuticals, disinfectants, and shoe
polish. Rosin was used as paper sizing and in the production o f soap, floor covering, and paving
material. These new applications expanded the demand for turpentine and rosin and spurred the
naval stores industry’s rapid expansion across the South during the nineteenth and early part of
the twentieth centuries.1
1 Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 83; Carroll B. Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines: Naval
Stores (Shalimar, Florida: Tarkel Publishing, 1998), 3; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores
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Because o f its primitive production characteristics, disagreement has persisted as to
whether naval stores operations constituted industry or an unusual form o f agriculture.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States government classified naval stores products
as a manufactured commodities, but in the 1930s it reversed itself and designated them as
agricultural products. The a m b i g u i t y persisted. For example, in the Encyclopedia of Southern
Culture, published in 1989, Percival Perry’s article, “Naval Stores,” appears in the section on
agriculture but the topic is also discussed in Roland L. Lewis’s article on “Antebellum Industry”
and Thomas F. Armstrong’s piece on the “Timber Industry.”2 The confusion arose because the
techniques for refining turpentine closely mirrored manufacturing, but the schedule and methods
o f harvesting raw turpentine resembled those in agriculture. Naval stores production first
demanded multiple and systematic sweeps through pine forests to prepare trees for the collection
of raw turpentine and to keep the resin flowing during the harvest season, just as agricultural
fields required periodic trips through them for plowing, planting, and hoeing. Moreover, the
harvest of raw turpentine involved several operations on the same tree each season, just as
tobacco harvests involved picking leaves from the same stalk at different times. The complicated
distilling process to refine the raw turpentine did not transform the gum’s chemical properties,
but simply separated the spirits from the rosin. A turpentine enterprise is perhaps best compared
to a better-known southern industry, sugar production. In her analysis o f slave use in the midnineteenth-century Cuban sugar industry, Rebecca Scott explains that mills “were integrated
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 200-201;
Melvin G. Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial Georgia,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 52
(December 1968): 426; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,”
The Journal o f Southern History 34 (November 1968): 511.
2 Charles Reagan Wilson and William Ferris, eds., Encyclopedia o f Southern Culture
(Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1989), s.v. “naval stores,” “antebellum
industry,” and “timber industry;” Robert S. Starobin, Industrial Slavery in the Old South (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 10; Peter Kolchin. American Slavery. 1619-1877 (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 176.
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4
units, combining the growing o f cane and the manufacture o f sugar from its juice. Work on a
sugar plantation involved elements o f both field and factory but differed from other forms of
agriculture and industrial work.”3 Most laborers worked in the “agricultural” sector of the
operation. Like raw turpentine or resin, which had to be collected and distilled, sugar cane had
to be cut, gathered, and hauled to the sugar house where it was processed. As with sugar
production, naval stores manufacturing had an “industrial” phase, which employed a minority of
the total number of laborers involved in the enterprise.4 As a hybrid of agriculture and
manufacturing, it typified rural-based industries common in the antebellum and postbellum
South.
Ignoring such ambiguous forms of industry, many historians argue that antebellum
Southerners were either incapable of, uninterested in, or antagonistic toward establishing
manufacturing.5 That the South failed to fund industrialization to the extent that the North did is

3 Rebecca J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor. 18601899 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24.
4 Roderick A. McDonald, The Economy and Material Culture of Slaves: Goods and
Chattels on the Sugar Plantations o f Jamaica and Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1993), 11-14; J. Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country: The Cane Sugar Industry in
the South. 1753-1950 (Lexington: University Press o f Kentucky, 1953), 134-44; Scott, Slave
Emancipation in Cuba. 28; List o f Negroes belonging to Mr John W. Grist Worked by Grist +
Striknev during the year o f 1860. James Redding Grist Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke
University, Durham, North Carolina.
5 Stephen J. Goldfarb, who studies southern textile production, maintains that industry
was handicapped by the absence of efficient transportation in areas with water sources powerful
enough to run a mill. He points out that the four southern counties with the largest textile
production in the antebellum years were those that possessed both rail and water transportation
routes. Only after the Civil War, when railroad expansion linked areas with falling water to
markets, did the South’s mills begin their rise. “The South had to overcome geographical
obstacles,” Goldfarb concludes, “before it could begin on that long road to an industrial
economy.” Harold Woodman contends that southerners invested their money in agricultural
instead of industrial pursuits because they believed that the most reliable and best returns lay in
planting. Southern farmers, he adds, also lacked the capital necessary to develop manufacturing.
Eugene D. Genovese argues that the South failed to industrialize because the slaveholding class,
which exercised economic and political power in the region, “feared a strong urban bourgeoisie,
which might make common cause with its Northern counterpart. They feared a white urban
working class o f unpredictable social tendencies.” Stephen J. Golfarb, “A Note on Limits to the
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clear. On the eve of the Civil War the South produced only fifteen percent of the value o f
manufactured goods in the United States. Yet southerners did not ignore industrialization and
during the late antebellum period they began significant initiatives into economic development
outside of agriculture. Spurred by the Panic o f 1837, which depressed cotton prices until the
mid-1840s, investment in manufacturing rose from $53 million in 1840 to $93.6 million in 1850
and jumped to $163.7 million by 1860. Between 1850 and 1860 the value of manufactured
output rose seventy-nine percent. Southern industrialists built railroads, operated ironworks, and
wove textiles, but most o f them extracted and processed raw materials or agricultural products.
They established and operated rice, sugar, wheat, and com mills, saw mills, cotton gins, tobacco
factories, hemp factories, salt works, coal mines, and turpentine operations.
A few scholars have recognized these activities. In her study o f Confederate
entrepreneurs in Georgia, Mary DeCredico finds that southerners, even planters, supported
economic diversification, internal improvements, and industrial expansion. Driven by the
depression of the late 1830s, Georgia’s boosters and political leaders encouraged manufacturing
and the exploitation o f natural resources. Although Georgia’s manufacturing, like the rest of the
South’s, primarily involved the processing and refining o f raw materials—cotton, lumber, flour,
meal—the increase was significant. Between 1850 and 1860 manufacturing output per capita
increased 104 percent and capital investment rose 71 percent. The trend toward economic
diversification, DeCredico believes, also occurred in other regions of the South in the late
antebellum period. Fred Bateman, James Foust, and Thomas Weiss present evidence that
supports her suspicions and find that planters were responsible for much o f the investment in

Growth of the Cotton-Textile Industry in the Old South,” The Journal o f Southern History 48
(November 1982): 545-549, 557-558; Harold Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers:
Financing and Marketing the Cotton Crop o f the South. 1800-1925 (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 1968; reprint, Columbia, SC: University o f South Carolina Press, 1990), 147, 150;
Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy o f Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society o f
the Slave South (Middletown. CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 24.
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industry. Although “manufacturing development was retarded by an inability to transfer
resources, primarily capital, out of agriculture,” they argue, planters still supported industry.
Indeed, large planters controlled a significant percentage o f the South’s new industry; twenty
percent o f manufacturers owned more slaves than the average slaveholder. Although such large
slavehoiding investors were a small minority o f planters, only six percent, they controlled
twenty-three percent o f manufacturing capital. In North Carolina, where the naval stores
industry first developed on a large scale, planters enthusiastically invested in manufacturing and,
in fact, represented the majority of backers. In the Tar Heel State, thirty-three percent of
manufacturers owned more slaves than average slaveholders, and many owned two to three times
as many bondsmen. Much o f North Carolina’s high rate o f planter investment in industry was a
result o f the state’s prominence in naval stores production. In 1860, North Carolina’s total
capital investment in industry amounted to $9,693,703 o f which $2,059,780, or a little more than
twenty-one percent, was in naval stores production. That same year the state produced
$16,678,698 in manufactured goods o f which $5,355,780, or thirty-two percent, was naval stores.
Moreover, forty-two percent of the state’s manufacturing establishments made these products.6
Not only was naval stores production a prominent antebellum southern industry, it also
possessed the general characteristics typical of southern manufacturing after the Civil War, much
more so than textile production. James C. Cobb explains that most industries in the postbellum
South, like those before the war, comprised industries that were largely undercapitalized and

6 William J. Cooper, Jr. and Thomas E. Terrill, The American South: A History (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 323; Fred Bateman, James Foust, and Thomas Weiss, “The
Participation o f Planters in Manufacturing in the Antebellum South.” Agricultural History 68
(April 1974): 279-280.284,286-290,292, 294,296-297; James C. Cobb, Industrialization and
Southern Society. 1877-1984 (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1984), 5; Mary A. DeCredico,
Patriotism for Profit: Georgia’s Urban Entrepreneurs and the Confederate War Effort (Chapel
Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1990), 1-2, 10-12, 16, 18-20; United States
Department o f the Interior, Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington, DC: 1865),
437-438.
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involved extracting and processing agricultural products and raw materials—such as gum
turpentine. Cobb also notes that southern industry shared these characteristics with southern
agriculture. They “remained locked in a mutually dependent relationship in which the weakness
of one reinforced the weaknesses of the other.”7 David Carlton finds that the New South did not
conform to the prevailing image o f an industrial society, but rather remained predominantly rural
and relied on Iow-wage and ununionized labor—again, both common in the naval stores industry.
F. Ray Marshall argues that the lives of agricultural and industrial workers in the South,
especially those involved in forest industries, usually diverged very little. Both lived and worked
in rural areas, inhabited similar houses, labored for paternalistic bosses, and received company
scripts which they spent in company stores. Although the textile industry used the South’s most
important raw commodity and employed low-skilled workers, it did not extract or process the
fiber but rather produced a finished product in a highly-mechanized facility typically located in at
least a moderate-size town. These characteristics offered by Cobb, Carlton, and Marshall do not
fully apply to cotton textile production. These traits, however, describe naval stores
manufacturing. It typically took place in rural areas where few other opportunities for economic
development existed, where capital commanded a high price, and where pines grew in abundance
and sold for little. The industry used crude techniques that maximized the short-term returns of
both capital and labor and employed methods and work rhythms that in many ways resembled
agriculture more than industry. Furthermore, naval stores production relied on a variety of
systems of forced labor, which supports recent scholarship that argues that slavery, peonage, and
convict leasing, rather than serving as drags on the southern economy, helped to modernize it.
Turpentining can therefore be studied as a prototypical southern industry.8
7 Cobb, Industrialization and Southern Society. 11, 16.
8 David L. Carlton, “The Revolution from Above: The National Market and the
Beginnings of Industrialization in North Carolina,” The Journal o f American History 77
(September 1990): 446; F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South. (Cambridge: Harvard University
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It certainly provides a better means o f examining the region’s growth than does cotton
textile production, which was not only unrepresentative of most southern industry but was not
even the New South’s most important industry until after the First World War. Edward Ayers
maintains that “while the cigarette, furniture, and textile industries made impressive strides in the
New South, most Southern industrial workers labored in forests and mines rather than in
factories. Those extractive industries became increasingly dominate throughout the New South
era, outstripping the growth of more heavily mechanized enterprises.”9 Economist Gavin Wright
finds that, until 1920, the South’s timber products industry—raw timber, lumber, and naval stores-was the region’s largest in terms o f both employment and value added. Indeed, a map of
southern industry in 1900 included in Ayers’ The Promise of the New South reveals that the
percentage of families with a member engaged in manufacturing was the highest and most
widespread across the rural pine region of south Georgia, Florida, and the Gulf coast of Alabama
and Mississippi—where the timber products industry was most concentrated—not in the more
town-oriented Carolina piedmont, which possessed most of the South’s textile mills. Naval
stores and other timber products production has received little attention in studies o f the South,
even though, as Ayers argues, “lumber, more than any other industry, captures the full scope of
economic change in the New South, its limitations as well as its impact.” 10 Wright believes that
scholars have largely ignored the rural-based timber industry because it was o f an extractive and
therefore transient nature and, in most areas o f the South, consequently made no lasting
Press, 1967), 87; Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19thCentury American South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Alex Lichtenstein, Twice
the Work of Free Labor The Political Economy o f Convict Labor in the New South (New York:
Verso, 1996); Michael David Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern
Turpentine Industry, 1900-1930,” (Ph.D. diss., The University o f Florida, 1996).
9 Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 105.
10 Ibid., 123.
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contributions to local development11 But in a significant portion o f die South, timber and naval
stores operations were—despite their mobility—the largest and most influential businesses for half
a century. Furthermore, their failure to bring lasting development to rural areas constitutes an
important legacy and helps explain why the southern pine belt remains relatively devoid of
industry and towns today. Naval stores alone, it must be admitted, did not represent the most
important industry in even the piney woods South. But as a part o f the larger timber products
trade, with which it shared common characteristics, the naval stores industry serves as a superior
example o f southern economic development.12
In examining three interrelated dimensions o f the southern naval stores industry—
business, labor, and environment—this study addresses some o f the issues Gerald Nash asked
historians o f the South to consider over three decades ago. Nash believed that ‘‘the growth of
business and industry, readjustments in agriculture, the changing nature o f the South’s
transportation system, its financial institutions, and its labor force all require further detailed
investigation before we obtain a clearer conception o f the tortuous course o f industrialization in
the twentieth-century South.” Nash also argued that the region’s timber industry, the role of
government in the process o f industrialization, and the use o f applied science also deserved
attention.13 By also exploring the human dimension of the naval stores industry’s development,
especially the experiences o f laborers, this work adopts an approach advocated by Edward Ayers
and Thomas F. Armstrong. Ayers argues that despite industry’s failure to meet the claims of
southern boosters, it did indeed shape the lives of a significant number o f people whose existence
11 Gavin Wright, Old South. New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the
Civil War (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), 159, 161.
12 Ibid., 159; Ayers, Promise of the New South. 23; For comparative figures of cotton,
timber product, and naval stores production see Appendix A.
13 Gerald D. Nash, “Research Opportunities in the Economic History o f the South After
1880,” The Journal o f Southern History 32 (August 1966): 314, 320-321.
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deserves attention.14 Armstrong employs such an examination in his study o f the work
experience and residential and family patterns of Georgia lumber workers. Armstrong admits
that, for the historian, such issues might seem mundane topics, but “for the workers these were
often the questions which had daily meaning in their lives.”1* Finally, as advocated by Alan
Taylor, this study explores the part the environment played in shaping the naval stores industry
and the lives o f those involved in it, and, in turn, the role the industry and its workers played in
altering the environment. Taylor finds that social historians typically concentrate on human
interrelationships and treat “the natural context” as an “unexplored backdrop.” On the other
hand, environmental historians, he charges, commonly “describe societies and cultures as
homogeneous wholes.” But in fact, Taylor argues, “social and environmental history are
fundamentally compatible and mutually reinforcing” and together can show the “systematically
unequal distribution o f the rewards and burdens extracted from the environment.”16 Such a
pattern was deeply rooted in the southern naval stores industry’s colonial past and persisted well
into the twentieth century.

14 Ayers, Promise o f the New South. 105.
15 Thomas F Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers, 1880-1917: The Social Implications
of Work,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 67 (Winter 1983): 436.
16 Alan Taylor, “Unnatural Inequalities: Social and Environmental Histories,”
Environmental History 1 (October 1996): 7-8, 16.
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Chapter One
The Rise o f the Tar Heel State:
Early American Naval Stores Production

Over the course o f the eighteenth century, North Carolina developed into the largest
colonial producer and Britain’s principal supplier o f naval stores. England had manufactured its
own naval stores supplies since the Middle Ages, but, no longer able to do so in the seventeenth
century, turned to other Western European sources for tar, pitch, and turpentine. For much of the
1600s, England found the quality and price of imported naval stores to be satisfactory. But by
the beginning o f the eighteenth century, wars and mercantilistic trade policies scuttled this
arrangement. Therefore, in 1704 England created an incentive program to encourage its North
American colonies to increase their then small output o f naval stores. After a slow start, the
program succeeded and, for most of the remainder of the colonial era, England enjoyed a steady,
abundant supply o f naval stores, most of it produced in North Carolina. For a variety of
economic, environmental, and geographical reasons, North Carolina was particularly well-suited
for making naval stores. Although other colonies with similar capabilities produced tar, pitch,
and turpentine, in them other commodities proved more profitable and crowded out naval stores
products. North Carolina, with few alternative staple crops, therefore, never lost its hold on the
naval stores trade once it achieved dominance after the 1720s. In fact, North Carolina produced
so many of these products that it became known as the “Tar Heel State.”1
In the Middle Ages England had provided its own ship materials. As the country’s
merchant fleet and navy grew larger, its population increased, and its iron industry expanded,

1Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, North Carolina: The History o f a
Southern State (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954), 90.
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however, England’s forest resources rapidly dwindled, causing wood product prices to climb.
Ships required wood for lumber, planking, and masts; homes needed wood for heating; and iron
forges burned charcoal, carbonized wood. Coal proved to be an adequate substitute for heating,
and iron manufactures found alternative wood sources in Ireland. Ship-building supplies were
more difficult to obtain. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, English shipyard managers
sought materials from Prussia, the most important producer and exporter of naval stores at the
time. Soon, Sweden established itself as the primary European supplier and retained that status
throughout the remainder o f the seventeenth and all o f the eighteenth centuries. Sweden—whose
territory by the late seventeenth century included not only what is today Sweden, but also
Finland, Estonia, Livonia, and parts of northern Germany—made the highest quality tar. Using
Scotch pine, Swedish tar-makers employed a labor-intensive process that involved removing the
bark o f the tree from the base to a height of eight feet and leaving only four inches on the north
side to sustain the tree’s life. After standing this way for a year, the pines were cut and their
pitchy bottom sections burned in a ground kiln. Because tar-manufacturing paid little, farmers
made it primarily as an income supplement. Few producers were willing to sacrifice their own
forest lands to such a wasteful method, so they used community-owned land instead. For forest
owners with tracks close to markets or transportation centers, significantly greater profits could
be had from sawing timber into lumber. In the more remote areas where shipping charges proved
prohibitably expensive, tar was the only profitable choice. Although it was relatively
inaccessible to markets, the tar region had sandy soil, which not only grew the most resinous
trees, but also eased the task o f digging a kiln.2
2 Kustaa Hautala, “European and American Tar in the English Market During the
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries.” Annales Academia; Scientiarum Fennicae 130
(1964): 7-9; Sinclair Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” The Virginia Magazine of
History and Biography 72 (1964): 78; Mikko Airaksinen, “Tar Production in Colonial North
America,” Environment and History 2 (1996): 116; Stephen Innes, Creatine the Commonwealth:
The Economic Culture of Puritan New England (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995),
243.
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Although inefficient, the Swedish tar makers offered England a reliable supply o f a highquality product at reasonable prices. The exclusion o f forest products from the enumerative
clause of the 1660 Navigation Act suggests that England did not consider its dependence on
Swedish naval stores a problem. In the mid-seventeenth century, however, a single firm, the
Stockholm Tar Company, tightened its grip on the entire Swedish tar trade; by the 1690s it
possessed enough power to fix tar prices at home and abroad. Between 1689 and 1699 tar prices
more than doubled (from 5 pounds, 15 shillings to eleven pounds for twelve barrels). England
scrambled to find a cheaper source. Improved trade relations with Russia following Peter the
Great's visit to England in the 1690s, combined with Russia's rising naval stores production,
offered hope for an alternative tar supplier. However, the Tsar raised Russia’s price to capitalize
fully on this highly-demanded product.3
In the early 1700s, England’s problems in securing reasonably priced naval stores
increased. During the Great Northern War, the Russian Army overran Finland, which resulted in
a drop in the latter’s naval stores production. England had imported 30,117 barrels of Swedish
tar and pitch in 1701, but only 6,654 barrels arrived the following year. The War o f the Spanish
Succession, in which the English, Dutch, Austrians, and Prussians fought France from 1700 to
1713, led to a massive naval buildup that increased demand and pushed naval stores prices to
record levels. By 1703, the cost o f twelve barrels o f tar had risen to twenty-two pounds, double
its price before the war. At the same time the Stockholm monopoly further tightened its control
o f the market. It no longer sold naval stores directly from Stockholm, but only through its factors
abroad and only at the price and quantities set by the company. All supplies sold to England

3 Thomas R. Cox, Robert S. Maxwell, Phillip Drennon Thomas, and Joseph J. Malone,
This Well-Wooded Land: Americans and Their Forests from Colonial Times to the Present
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1985), 28; Justin Williams, “English Mercantilism and
Carolina Naval Stores, 1705-1776.” The Journal o f Southern History 1 (May 1935): 172;
Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 9-11,22-23.
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were delivered only aboard company ships. Not only did Stockholm force Britain to pay
exorbitant prices for naval stores, but British shipping interests lost a valuable cargo. England’s
cheap and stable naval stores supply had ended.4
England’s dependent position in the early eighteenth century had developed through
years of failed endeavors to develop naval stores production in its colonies. From the beginning
of their efforts in North America, English financiers hoped the new colonies would produce,
among other commodities that England had to import, naval stores—products essential to the
construction and maintenance of Britain’s growing fleet of naval and commercial ships. In
1585, Ralph Lane, the governor of the fledgling colony on Roanoke Island, reported “that what
commodities soever Spaine, France, Italy, or the East parts do yeeld unto us in wines of all
sortes, in oils, in flaxe, in rosens, pitch, frankenscence, currans, sugars & such like, these parts do
abound with ye growth o f them all

”5 Prospects for naval stores also appeared promising

with Thomas Harriot’s exploration of the Carolina coast. He claimed that “Pitch, Tarre, Rosen
and Turpentine. There are those kinds of trees which yeeld them abundantly and great store.”6
But any attempts by the Roanoke colonists to produce naval stores ended with the colonists’
mysterious disappearance. However, the Jamestown colony, founded in 1607, met with early
success in tar manufacturing. In 1608 the colony was resupplied with a second group of
colonists, among them Poles who knew the methods of tar and pitch making. With the English

4 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 19-20; J. Williams, “English Mercantilism,”
173; Walter Allen Knittle. The Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration: A British
Government Redemptioner Project to Manufacture Naval Stores (Philadelphia: Dorrance &
Company, 1936), 114; Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from
1670 Through the Stono Rebellion (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974), 111.
s David B. Quinn and Alison M. Quinn, The First Colonists: Documents on the Planting
of The First English Settlements in North America. 1584-1590 (Raleigh: North Carolina
Department o f Cultural Resources, Division o f Archives and History, 1982), 22.
6 Ibid., 51.
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apprenticed to the Poles, Jamestown managed to include several barrels o f naval stores among its
first exports. Despite hopes that Virginia would become an important source for these products,
however, the new colony soon lost interest in tar and pitch and cast its lot with another staple,
tobacco, a crop that could deliver more substantial returns. When British officials pushed
Virginians to produce naval stores—particularly tar—the colonists complained that there were no
horses or other means to transport the wood necessary for production. Moreover, they argued,
the threat o f Indian attack made work in the forest too dangerous. Parliament tried to encourage
tar production by allowing naval stores from Virginia and Maryland to be imported free of the
four shilling, two pence duty for five years. The effort apparently failed because, in 1682, the
colonial government made its own attempt to increase production. The Virginia General
Assembly made tar legal tender in the colony with each thirty-two-gallon barrel carrying a value
of fifteen shillings. Like Parliament’s, Virginia’s attempt to encourage production met with little
success. By 1698, the only place in Virginia where naval stores were produced in any significant
quantity was Elizabeth City County, and its products never exceeded 1200 barrels annually.7
More than the Indian threat or a lack of horses, three significant disadvantages in
profitably selling naval stores to overseas markets discouraged colonial production. First,
shipping distances between North America and Britain vastly exceeded those between the Baltic
and Britain and therefore resulted in significantly higher shipping costs for colonial suppliers,
despite colonial measures to lower them. In an effort to lower transport costs, the Virginia
General Assembly in 1640 set a standard shipping rate charge of six pounds per ton on products
traveling from Virginia to England. Although the act was primarily designed to reduce the
excessively high rates for shipping tobacco, it applied to naval stores as well. Despite the act,
7 Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 78-81, 91; Thomas Gamble, “Early History
of the Naval Stores Industry in North America,” in Naval Stores: History. Production.
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing
Company, 1921), correction o f page 17.
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however, by 1704, the cost o f shipping naval stores from Virginia had climbed to eight pounds
per ton. Exporters from the Baltic states paid only two pounds. Second, colonial labor costs also
exceeded those in the Baltic states because of a shortage o f workers in the colonies. Third, the
colonies lacked experience in tar-making, which resulted in lower productivity and a lowerquality product than that made in Europe. For all three reasons, naval stores never became the
predominate export o f any colony during the seventeenth century. Virginians produced some
naval stores, but concentrated on tobacco. The Carolinas exported a combination of beef, pork,
rice, and naval stores, but not significant quantities o f the latter before 1700. In the seventeenth
century, New England became the first center of American naval stores production, but its
exports failed to supply more than a small fraction o f England’s needs. New Englanders tended
to favor lumbering and shipbuilding as more profitable enterprises for wood products and limited
tar and pitch production to quantities required for their own needs.8
The Whig government, which controlled Britain in the early eighteenth century, felt new
pressure to force colonial naval stores manufacturing. Coming to power in the Glorious
Revolution o f 1688, the Whigs strongly supported mercantilist policies that emphasized
exporting the largest possible amount of products while importing as little as possible. Under
their control in 1696 Parliament created the Board of Trade, which determined that the empire’s
mercantilist structure was not operating up to its potential. Not only were the colonies failing to
supply adequately the raw materials for British manufacturing, but the northern colonies actually
posed a threat to the English wool industry. A shift to a more mercantilist-oriented trade policy,

8 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 42; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,”
91; Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the American Gum Naval
Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942), 43-45; A. Stuart Campbell,
Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blanchard, The Naval Stores Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau
of Economic and Business Research, College of Business Administration, The University of
Florida, 1934), 8; Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 120; Innes, Creating the Commonwealth. 272;
Wood, Black Majority. 110.
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the Whigs believed, would help strengthen English manufacturing, increase the volume o f
English shipping, and develop the outer regions of the empire. Colonial naval stores production
could help achieve these ends.9
A combination o f these three factors—the Scandinavian tar monopoly, Whiggish
mercantilist support, and the threat of developing colonial manufacturing—influenced Parliament
when in 1704 it passed “An Act for Encouraging the Importation o f Naval Stores from America,”
a piece of legislation that one historian has described as “one o f the most interesting and
significant mercantilist experiments made by England during the whole colonial period.”10
Encouragement took the form of bounties, or subsidized prices, which compensated for the high
shipping charges associated with transatlantic export. Effective January I, 170S, and lasting nine
years, the Navy Department would pay a bounty of four pounds per ton on tar and pitch, three
pounds per ton of rosin and turpentine, six pounds per ton o f hemp, and one pound for each ton
o f masts, yard-arms, and bowsprits. The Admiralty, however, had the right of refusal for up to
twenty days of any colonial naval stores sent as part o f the program. The act also made naval
stores enumerated commodities; colonists could export tar, pitch, and turpentine only to British
ports and aboard British or British colonial ships. Few colonists complained about the
restriction; in essence the bounty act created a receptive market for colonial naval stores by
forcing the British Navy to purchase them at inflated prices. The British, not the colonists,
complained most about the new policy."

9 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 170-171; Hautala, “European and American Tar,”
20; Knittle. Palatine Immigration. 122.
10 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 169.
"Charles Christopher Crittenden, The Commerce o f North Carolina. 1763-1789 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), 37-39.
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The War o f the Spanish Secession delayed the bounty act’s effectiveness because the
high wartime freight rates, as much as four times those from Sweden, rendered the compensation
inadequate. While Swedish exporters paid only £.25 to ship a barrel of tar to England, Carolina
colonists paid £.1, New England £.9, and New York £.8. Although colonial exports rose slightly
immediately following the bounty act’s passage, between 1708 and 1710 tar exports actually
dropped. However, with the end of hostilities in 1713 and a subsequent drop in shipping costs,
American tar achieved prominence in the British naval stores market and soon came to dominate
it. Britain had imported only 177 barrels, or one half o f a percent, of its naval stores, from the
colonies in 1701. By 1714 the colonies supplied 11,639 barrels, or twenty-five percent. A year
later it imported nearly one half of its naval stores from America, two years later a majority and
six years later ninety percent o f its supply. Between 1716 and 1724 England received an annual
average of 61,488 barrels of tar and pitch from the colonies and an annual average o f only 12,849
from the Baltic. By 1725 the colonies provided England with more than it required for annual
use. England then began to export naval stores to Holland, Flanders, Germany, Spain, Portugal,
and Ireland. Britain’s import volume released it from its dependence on Sweden and, in fact,
drove down the costs o f the Swedish products.12
Although highly successful in stimulating naval stores production, the 1704 act did not
foster the industry where Whig administrators had wanted. They intended the act to boost naval
stores manufacturing in the northern colonies whose export products actually competed with
England’s. New England and New York, with a climate similar to England’s, produced
agricultural commodities that could just as easily be grown by farmers in the mother country.
Much o f the northern colonies’ produce, consequently, had to be exported to other colonies. The

12 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 45-47; Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores
Industry,” 49; G. Melvin Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial Georgia,” The Georgia Historical
Quarterly 52 (December 1968): 427; Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 175, 177-178.
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mercantilists hoped that if New England could shift from wool to naval stores production, not
only would competition with English woolen works diminish and an alternate source o f tar and
pitch open, but the colonists could use the profits from naval stores to purchase England’s
woolens. The act called for bounties to be paid only on naval stores produced in the New
England and middle colonies. But by the end o f seventeenth century, New Englanders had
relentlessly cut timber, especially pine, until its depletion curtailed even limited naval stores
activities. The southeastern colonies, however, possessed an abundance o f longleaf pines, a
species that yielded much more oleoresin than New England pines. Therefore, most o f the tar,
pitch, and limited amounts o f turpentine that left northern ports originated from the southern
colonies, especially Carolina. Southern producers exported naval stores through such northern
ports as Philadelphia, New York, and Boston so they could receive the bounty. The British
overlooked the origin o f most o f the naval stores because they were pleased with the volume they
received. England remained determined, however, to build a northern naval stores industry, so
determined that in 1709 it sent, three thousand Palatine immigrants to New York and instructed
them to produce naval stores. The effort failed when it lost its financing and the Germans, who
were not accustomed to burning tar kilns, found they could prosper as farmers instead. Britain
also persisted in its efforts to obtain masts—for which it continued to rely on the Baltic states—
from the northern colonies. To preserve the mast supply in the northern colonies, the bounty act
prohibited the cutting o f pines smaller than twelve inches thick, three feet from the ground.
However, when the colonies failed to produce an adequate number of masts, Parliament, in 1711,
imposed a one-hundred-pound penalty for cutting such pines. Continued depletion o f forests in
the Northeast led to additional measures. A 1715 Massachusetts law forbade the boxing of pine
trees for turpentine on Cape Cod. In 1720, Parliament outlawed the cutting o f any pine in Nova
Scotia, New England, New York, or New Jersey.13
13 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 168; Cox et al., Well-Wooded Land. 28; Hautala,
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While few pines grew in the northern colonies by the early eighteenth century, an
expansive pine forest covered the coastal plain of the southern colonies. In much of this area,
longleaf pine, the best pine species for making naval stores, made up eighty percent of the tree
species. Only river bottom lands, where hardwoods and other pines grew, broke up this almost
pure longleaf growth. A nineteenth-century traveler through the southern forest observed that
“its features are monotonous in the extreme, varied only by alternate swamp and piney woods;
the former bordering the water-courses, the latter covering the sandy ridges between.”14
Stretching for nearly twelve hundred miles from near Norfolk, Virginia, through the Carolinas,
eastern Georgia, the Florida panhandle and northern peninsula, southern Alabama and
Mississippi, and portions o f Louisiana and Texas, the longleaf pine forest o f the southeastern
coastal plain and Gulf South regions covered an estimated sixty million to ninety million acres.
Andre Michaux, the French botanist who explored the United States’ forests in the late
eighteenth century, found only three significant areas in the southern pine belt where longleaf did
not dominate, one in the Neuse River vicinity in North Carolina, another north of Columbia,
South Carolina, and the third just north of Augusta, Georgia.ls

“European and American Tar,” 15, 21, 42-43, 70-71; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,”
82; Knittle, Palatine Immigration. 120, 122, 128, 226, 133; Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 119;
Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 59-60; Carl E. Ostrom, “History of Gum Naval
Stores Industry,” The Chemurgic Digest 4 (July 15, 1945): 219.
14 Porte Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods.” Harper’s New Monthly
Magazine 84 (May 1857): 745.
15 R. D. Forbes, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices in the
Southern Pine Region (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1930), 7;
Edward Buckner, “Prehistory o f the Southern Forest,” Forest Farmer 54 (July/August 1995): 21;
Thomas C Croker, Jr. “The Longleaf Pine Story,” Southern Lumberman (December 1979): 69; S.
W. Greene, “The Forest that Fire Made,” reprint from American Forests. Austin Cary Memorial
Forestry Collection, Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries,
University o f Florida, 2; F. Andre Michaux, The North American Svlva (Philadelphia: D. Rice &
A. N. Hart, 1857), 107.
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The longleaf pine is particularly well adapted to the southern environment. As a pioneer
tree species, pines are first to appear on land where vegetation has been disturbed by wind, water,
fire, or human or animal activity. In the absence of further disturbance, they give way to a mixed
forest o f gum, oak, and other hardwood species. The mixture o f hardwoods represents the
natural climax forest for the southeastern United States’ coastal plain. But in areas of frequent
fires, caused either by lightning or humans, the longleaf remains dominant. For while hardwoods
and other pine species are easily damaged and killed by fire, the longleaf s reproductive and
growth characteristics render it well-suited to not only survive but to thrive in frequently burned
over areas. Although it produces seed only at long intervals, usually no more than once every
seven years, it does so in abundance. These seeds take two years to mature in large cones. When
the seeds reach maturity, the cone dries out and its scales spread apart, freeing the winged seeds
which then float to the ground. Although the relatively large size of the seeds permits foraging
animals and birds to find them with ease, their weight enables them to penetrate undergrowth and
reach the forest floor where they can germinate. The tops o f new longleaf pines emerge in early
winter but achieve little height growth. They remain at a low grass stage for three to ten years,
depending on growing conditions, which puts the longleaf at a disadvantage to other tree species,
especially other pines. Slash and loblolly pines, for example, grow considerably faster at an
early stage and can crowd out the squat longleaf seedlings. But the longleaf s slow growth gives
it superb fire resistance. Until the first autumn alter germination, very young longleafs are as
susceptible to fire as other species. However, after that, when the stem reaches six inches tall,
the longleaf is well protected from fire by a covering o f heavy eight- to fifteen-inch needles that
grow in bundles o f three. At this stage, the seedling grows a deep root system in which it stores a
reserve food supply. In the event it looses its crown of needles in a fire, the seedling can draw on
the energy stored in the root to grow a new se t Once the grass stage ends, the longleaf begins
rapid height growth for two or three years, and is once again susceptible to fire. If it survives,
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though, it develops a layer of heavy bark, from one-quarter- to one-half-inch thick, that can
protect it from most fires for the rest of its life. The longleaf requires fire to eliminate the
competing tree species. In fact, it is seldom successful in wet areas where fires occur
infrequently. In such places other tree species shade the longleaf out during its short, grass stage
years.16
The southeastern forests endured frequent fires. Some had natural causes. The heat and
humidity the region experienced during the warmer months encouraged thunderstorms and
lightning that sparked fires. But because most lightning strikes were accompanied by
precipitation which moistened the forest floor, the fires it started often bum slowly, low to the
ground, and, consequently, rarely spread. On occasion they could smolder until extinguished by
the next rain. Lightning, however, was only a secondary cause o f the fires that created the
longleaf pine forest.17 Native Americans were responsible for most of the fires in the
southeastern forest. “It was in large measure owing to the Indian and his Grandfather Fire,”
explains Stephen J. Pyne, historian o f fire in America, “that the forest primeval had already been
widely cleared, converted, and otherwise managed.” 18 Environmental historian Albert E.
Cowdrey maintains that in the hands of native Americans, “fire became central to the
maintenance of a human-centered ecology.”19 Burning served as a means of sustaining a balance
16 Timothy Silver, A New Face on the Countryside: Indians. Colonists, and Slaves in
South Atlantic Forests. 1500-1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18; Buckner,
“Prehistory o f Southern Forests,” 21, Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land. This South: An
Environmental History, revised edition (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 15;
Forbes, Timber Growing. 7-11,25; Howard E. Weaver and David A. Anderson, Manual of
Southern Forestry (Danville. Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1954): 38-39;
Lenthall Wvman. Florida Naval Stores (Tallahassee: State o f Florida, Department o f Agriculture,
1929), 5; Greene, “Forests that Fire Made,” 2-3; Michaux, North American Svlva. 107.
17 Silver. New Face on the Countryside. 18.
18 Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 83.
19 Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 14.
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in the forest that supported the Indian economy. It was the only way for Indians to maintain their
population in the temperate forest that developed in eastern North America at the end o f the last
ice age. As glaciers retreated northward, the boreal forest, which consisted mostly o f conifers
adopted to cold weather and once extended as far as central Georgia, followed. But when
undisturbed, the temporal or mild climate forests that replaced it sustain relatively low plant and
animal populations, making human habitation difficult for all but the smallest communities. By
the time vegetation in such a forest reaches its most mature stage, it has developed a two- or
three-layer canopy that shades the ground enough to prevent grass and undergrowth
development. Since the beginning of the Holocene period, which began ten thousand years ago
and marks the disappearance of the megafauna, Indians relied on bison, deer, elk, and other
grazing animals as their source o f protein. To encourage the growth o f grasses and shrubs on
which this game could feed, native Americans periodically burned the undergrowth to keep the
forest open, a common approach among both pastoral and farming cultures. Indians also used
fire to herd their prey together for easier hunting and to improve their own quality o f life in the
forest. Fire drove off mosquitoes, flies, snakes, and other pests. It improved the production of
edible berries, eased nut gathering by clearing away debris, opened the forest for better travel,
boosted security by giving better visibility, unlocked nutrients for trees and grasses, and
discouraged larger forest fires by clearing away their fuel, forest debris.20
The accumulation rate of ground litter—leaves, needles, branches, and twigs—varies with
forest type. In pine forests it tends to collect more rapidly than in hardwood or mixed forests.

20 Thomas Hansbrough, “Human Behavior and Forest Fires,” in Southern Forests and
Southern People, ed. Thomas Hansbrough (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1963), 22-23; Buckner, “Prehistory of Southern Forests,” 20; Pyne, Fire in America. 74; Michael
Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 43; Silver, New Face on the Countryside. 60-63; Cowdrey, This Land.
This South. 14; Greene, “Forests that Fire Made,” 3; Forbes, Timber Growing. 25.
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But the volume at any given time depends on the burning frequency. Pyne explains that “under
natural conditions the intensity and frequency o f fire varies according to the work required o f it:
The greater the litter, the more intense the fire; the more frequently litter is built up, the more
frequent the fire.”21 By keeping accumulation to a minimum, Indians, who may have fired the
southern coastal plain woods as often as twice a year, ensured that fire had only enough fuel to
bum slowly and at ground level. Besides fuel accumulation, other factors that contributed to fire
intensity include precipitation patterns, relative humidity, wind speed and direction, ground
slope, and temperature. During periods o f average precipitation, only the upper layer of debris
burned because the lower layer remained damp and fire resistant. Indians allowed such fires,
which offered no threat to their life or property, to bum until they reached water courses or were
put out by rain. These fires rarely harmed hardwoods and other pine species which occupied the
swampy terrain that seldom played host to fires. But when areas that had escaped fire for a
number o f years finally did bum, considerable damage occurred, especially if the flames began
spreading through the tree tops. Because Indian burning was primarily localized and not all areas
o f the forest received even burning, such occasions were not uncommon. Lush undergrowth and
a thick layer o f debris could fuel a conflagration, which, if started during a dry summer period
when the entire forest floor was dry, could consume everything in its path. Such hot fires were
especially damaging during the growing spring and summer seasons and in dense stands of young
trees. The vast differences in forest fire frequency and characteristics created different
vegetation environments. Intense fires during dry periods could eliminate trees altogether,
creating open fields with dense shrub growth on their periphery, while areas that experienced

21 Pyne, Fire in America. 35.
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frequent low-burning became savannas with widely spaced trees, little undergrowth and lush
grasses.22
Indians, therefore, “made an indelible impact on the forest” through burning as ecology,
historical geographer Michael Williams has explained.23 “Far from being incapable of modifying
his environment, the Indian created it, gradually replacing dense forest with thinner forest,
thinner forest with grassland, and changing the composition o f the standing forest.”24 The initial
arrival of the Europeans may have caused some forest areas to grow uninterrupted and close. As
native population declined, primarily from disease epidemics, cultural pressure on the
environment relaxed and reduced the need for frequent burning. But European settlers quickly
adopted and continued the Indian patterns, a practice that lasted for centuries and for a time
enabled the longleaf to retain its dominance over the coastal plain.23
In addition to its ability to endure fire, other features o f longleaf favored its growth in the
southeastern coastal plain. The tree thrives in poor, dry soil. With the exception o f river flood
plains, where longleafs rarely prospered, the soil of the southeastern coastal plain is relatively
poor. Southern topsoils are old, having experienced the leaching effects of rain much longer than
northern topsoils. They have also experienced more the process that reduces soil to a mixture of
clay and aluminum hydroxides and iron hydroxides. In such soils the soluble nutrients from
organic decomposition are carried deep into the ground, beyond the reach of many plants’ root
structures. But the longleafs taproot, which penetrates well into the ground, enables it to
22 Buckner, “Prehistory of Southern Forests,” 21; Silver, New Face on the Countryside.
18, 60; Greene, “Forests that Fire Made,” 3; Forbes, Timber Growing. 25; Williams, Americans
and Their Forests. 43; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 14.
23 M. Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 44.
24 Ibid., 43.
23 Ibid., 49; Buckner, “Prehistory o f Southern Forests,” 22, Hansbrough, “Human
Behavior,” 23; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 15.
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survive in such soils where the growth o f other trees would be slow. Its long taproot also helps it
withstand severe weather conditions. During dry periods it can access water deep within the
ground and in high winds the tap root acts as an anchor to prevent it from blowing over.26
Despite its ability to withstand harsh conditions—fire, poor soil, low precipitation, and
high winds—the longleaf is not invincible. When the seedling first emerges, ants may attack it,
biting out the tenderest parts. Only after the formation o f needles does their threat end. More
than any other pine species the longleaf is susceptible to brown-spot needle blight, a disease that
strikes seedlings that have been covered by dead grass and rough. Since young longleafs can
spend up to ten years as seedlings, they are easy targets for needle blight. As its name suggests,
the disease causes brown spots to form on the needles. During the spring of the second year of
infection, new needles are attacked by spores produced on the old needles. In severe cases, the
young pine is defoliated and dies. Once the young trees are two feet high, however, they are less
susceptible to such a damaging attack. Another enemy o f the longleaf pine, feral hogs, were
especially destructive. These hogs, which savored the energy-packed longleaf taproots, could dig
up scores of seedlings a day. Introduced by the Spanish, hogs had little effect on existing forests
because hogs posed no threat to mature trees, but in later years, wild hogs became a significant
cause of the longleafs inability to reproduce itself.27
On the margins o f the longleaf belt and in the coastal plain’s wetter areas, loblolly,
shortleaf, and slash pine grew along side hardwoods. Loblolly grows individually or in small
groups and is adapted to a variety of soil conditions, from wet bottom lands to dryer, rolling

26 Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 2; Silver, New Face on the Countryside. 18; Forbes,
Timber Growing. 8-9.
27 F. C. Craighead, “Insects that Attack Southern Pines,” Austin Cary Memorial Forestry
Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of
Florida, 9; Greene, “Forests that Fire Made,” 3; Weaver and Anderson, Manual of Southern
Forestry. 286.
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uplands. It produces a smaller seed than the longleaf and can prosper in a variety o f soil
conditions. Although it grows rapidly as soon as it germinates, it is somewhat resistant to fire,
although not as much as the longleaf. Shortleaf pines can be found scattered among longleafs,
but grow in purer stands near rivers and in swamps throughout the southeastern coastal plain.
Like the loblolly pine, the shortleaf produces a smaller seed and is capable o f growing in a
variety o f soils. They grow rapidly but remain susceptible to fire until they are ten to twelve
years old. The slash pine’s characteristics resemble the shortieafs. It is abatable to different,
soils but is found more in bottom lands and their rapid growth makes them susceptible to fire,
especially in their first years. But throughout the southeastern coastal plain the number of slash
pines, along with loblollies and shortieafs, were vastly outnumbered by the longleaf.28
Because o f the abundance o f longleaf pine, southern colonists, especially those in the
Carolinas, were well situated to manufacture naval stores. From the 1700s to the 1720s, most
Carolina naval stores came from the region between the Cape Fear River and Charleston, South
Carolina. In fact, production of these commodities dated back to before 1700 when settlers first
arrived in the region.29 In his 1709 account o f travels through Carolina, John Lawson observed
that “as for Pitch and Tar, none o f the Plantations are comparable for offering the vast Quantities
of Naval Stores, as this Place does.”30 Between 1705 and 1718, the Carolinas exported 134,212
barrels o f tar and pitch while New England exported only 86,411 barrels, many o f them
originating from the Carolinas. Planters in the colony took advantage o f their ability to make tar
and pitch on a large scale. They not only possessed significant holdings o f longleaf pine forest,

28 Silver, New Face on the Countryside. 21; Forbes, Timber Growing. 7, 10-11.
29 Norman Hawley, “Naval Stores: America’s First Widespread Forest Industry,”
Southern Lumberman (December 15, 1966): 163.
30 John Lawson. A New Voyage to Carolina ( 1709: reprint, Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1967), 11.
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but numerous slaves whom they set to building and burning tar kilns. After the bounty made
naval stores an attractive export product, some planters bought even more slaves on credit to cash
in on the trade’s increased profitability. They operated on a grand scale, employing their large
slave labor forces in thousands o f acres o f pine forest. Until the 1720s, South Carolina’s naval
stores export tonnage exceeded that o f any other product, including rice.31
The sparsely settled area o f southeastern North Carolina produced only small quantities
of tar, pitch, and turpentine until the 1720s, when settlers began spreading up the Cape Fear
River. In the Cape Fear Valley, the river and its tributaries provided North Carolina makers of
tar and other naval stores products with an extensive water transportation system. The first part
of the journey was usually overland. Laborers drove a stick through each barrel o f naval stores
and left both ends protruding so it could serve as an axle. A draft animal drew the barrel, which
rolled on its own hoops, to a landing where workers sawed both ends of the stick off leaving it in
the barrel. Rafts took barrels of naval stores to points where they could be collected for export
aboard larger vessels. The port at Brunswick, laid out in 1727 on the west bank o f the Cape Fear
River, handled most o f the region’s early naval stores exports. A rival port community, Newton,
planned in 1733 and incorporated as Wilmington in 1739, gradually drew commerce from
Brunswick until, by the Revolution, Wilmington enjoyed the most active trade. Like their South
Carolina counterparts, naval stores producers along the Cape Fear Valley owned abundant land
in the longleaf belt and controlled slave labor forces o f considerable size. But it appears that not
all Cape Fear area settlers brought their slaves with them; those who did not found it difficult to
acquire needed workers. Cumberland County, set in the heart o f the longleaf pine forest and

31 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 176; Lawrence Lee, The Lower Cape Fear in
Colonial Davs (Chapel Hill; The University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 59-60, 97, 151;
Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 76; Wood, Black Majority. 55, 110.
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beside the Cape Fear River, would seem to assure it as a base for substantial naval stores
production, actually made very little because it had few slaves.32
Slaves labored at tar-making during the winter and at crop cultivation and limited
turpentine production during the warmer months. In 1699 Edmund Randolph witnessed slaves
preparing tar kilns. Alexander Spotswood, Virginia’s governor from 1710 to 1723, reported that
in the 1720s he purchased from the Royal Africa Company four hundred slaves to make naval
stores in his colony.33 John Brickell’s The Natural History o f North-Carolina. published in 1737.
describes slaves laboring to produce both tar and turpentine. “The Planters,” he writes, “make
their Servants or Negroes cut large Cavities on each side of the Pitch-Pine Tree (which they term
Boxing o f the Tree) wherein the Turpentine runs, and the Negroes with Ladles take it out and put
it into Barrels.” Producers distilled little of the raw turpentine their slaves collected, “few giving
themselves to the trouble.” Not only did the refining process require considerable skill, but the
large iron stills necessitated considerable capital outlay.34 In 1765 a Frenchman traveling
through North Carolina also noted that slaves worked in tar and pitch production and “that one
Negroe will tend 3000 [boxes], which will rendr about 100 Baris, terpentin”35
During the winter slaves built tar kilns, first gathering pine Iightwood, then splitting it to
the thickness of a man’s leg, and finally building and firing kilns to extract the tar. Tar producers
32 Lee, Lower Cape Fear. 97, 151-152; Harry Roy Merrens, Colonial North Carolina in
the Eighteenth Century (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina, 1964), 89-90, 106;
William S. Powell, North Carolina Through Four Centuries (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1989), 83; Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 42, 57; Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Islands. Capes, and Sounds: The North Carolina Coast (Winston-Salem, NC: John
F. Blair, Publisher, 1982), 225, 227.
33 J. Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 180.
34 John Brickell, The Natural History of North Carolina (New York: Johnson Reprint
Corporation, 1969), 265, 267.
35 “Journal o f a French Traveler in the Colonies,” The American Historical Review 26
(July 1921): 733.
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made earthen kilns by digging shallow pits as large as twenty-four feet in diameter. The floors o f
these pits sloped toward the center from which a gutter led to the perimeter and extended
outward anywhere from two to ten feet. Some kiln builders used a wooden pipe to channel tar
from the kiln. Laborers placed two-to three-foot long pieces o f split pine wood into these pits.
The wood pile extended up and out over the sides o f the pit until it formed what J. F. D. Smyth
described as a “circular pyramid,” that often reached from twenty-five to thirty feet in diameter
and was ten to twelve feet high. Slaves covered the structure with earth and clay, sometimes
mixed with pine straw, so that only an opening at the top was left. The kiln was fired through
this top vent, often around sundown. Once the top wood was ignited and the combustion had
begun to penetrate downward, usually after twenty-four hours, workers covered the top hole and
made vents in the walls. Laborers manning the burning kiln, it was reported in American
Husbandry, “temper the heat as they think proper, by thrusting a stick through the earth, and
letting the air in at as many places as they find necessary.” If the kiln burned too fast, black
smoke arose, indicating that the tar was burning before it reached the bottom. A hard wind from
one direction could build up the fire on one side, requiring a worker to climb to the top of the
kiln and stomp hard to seal the vents and smother the blaze. After a day o f burning, the tar began
to flow, falling first to the bottom o f the kiln, then sliding to the center, and running out through
the gutter, and finally collecting in a trough from which workers dipped it into barrels. Unlike
turpentining, building a tar kiln was not strenuous work but did require limited technical skill.
Monitoring a kiln only meant keeping a constant eye on the flow o f tar and the amount o f smoke.
But the job did require patience. Tar burners probably lived in brush lean-tos and did their own
cooking as did those laborers who continued this occupation in the nineteenth century. A typical
kiln that produced from 100 to 130 barrels of tar could take eight to nine days to bum
completely. The work could also be hazardous. Workers who fell into the kilns while sealing
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vents could be burned to death. Those who were injured were often miles from help. Brickell
observed that in accidents with the kilns, “Negroes have been very much burnt or scalded.”36
Although delighted by the increased export volume o f colonial naval stores produced
largely by these slave laborers, Britain was greatly disappointed with the product’s quality.
British buyers complained about the condition o f many colonial goods; they claimed that colonial
flour was too old and course, tobacco dark and sour, timber poorly dried, linseed light in weight,
and beeswax dirty in color. But naval stores, particularly tar, appear to have been of especially
poor quality. Consumers grumbled that manufacturers added foreign matter—dirt, sticks, water,
grass-to barreled tar to increase its weight. Trash also accidentally mixed with tar as it drained
from earthen, woodland kilns.37 Ship builders and captains complained that the poor-quality or
“hot” tar “burned” the rigging, but modem scholars disagree on the nature of the harm. Some
maintain that the inferior tar’s acidity damaged the ropes. Timothy Silver explains that “the high
temperatures of the kilns led to the accumulation of wood acids in the tar. When applied to the
ship’s rigging, those acids sometimes weakened or ‘burned’ the very ropes the tar was supposed
to protect.”38 Others believe the complaints referred to how the hot temperature of the tar
actually caught the ropes on fire. Before workers applied tar, it had to be heated until its
consistency was thin enough for it to penetrate into the rope fiber. Colonial tar, the argument

36 Brickell, Natural History of North Carolina. 265-266; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial
Virginia,” 78; John Macleod, “The Tar and Turpentine Business in North Carolina,” Monthly
Journal o f Agriculture 2 (July 1846): 17-18; Michaux, North American Svlva. 114; “Journal o f a
French Traveler in the Colonies,” 734; John Ferdinand Dalziel Smyth, A Tour in the United
States of America (1784; reprint, New York: Amo Press, Inc., 1968), 95-97; Harry J. Carman,
ed., American Husbandry (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1939), 244-245; John K.
Cross, “Tar Burning, A Forgotten Art?,” Forests and People 23, no. 2 (1973): 22-23; Robert M.
Weir, Colonial South Carolina: A History (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1983), 144; John K.
Cross, “C-HAR-C-O-A-L
Charcoal” NSCP Safetv-Valve 3 (June 1965): 2.
37 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 58; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial
Virginia,” 88; Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 58.
38 Silver, New Face on the Countryside. 127.
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goes, was so thick and the temperature at which it reached viscosity so high, that it literally
burned the rope. “So by calling tar hot,” Mikko Airoksinen writes, “the dockyard workers
actually meant it was too thick.”39 Finally, tar often sat for long periods on wharves where,
unprotected from the hot sun, its temperature could rise to degrees that permitted it to melt and
ooze from cracks in poorly-constructed barrels. Many barrels shipped from the colonies were
reportedly made o f green timber. Although the cooper may have fashioned a tight barrel at his
shop, as the staves dried they contracted, opening cracks between them.40
As with tar, British consumers also complained about the quality of colonial pitch and
turpentine. Buyers claimed that colonists processed their pitch only half way, thus increasing its
volume but rendering it useless. Colonial pitch was also reputed to contain dirt, rocks, and
debris, a result o f having been processed in ground pits.41 Naturalist William Bartram, who
toured the southeast in the 1770s, described this primitive method used in the Carolinas. He
explained that “when they design to make pitch, they dig large holes in the ground, near the tar
kiln, which they line with a thick coat of good clay, into which they conduct a sufficient quantity
of tar, and set it on fire, suffering it to flame and evaporate a length of time sufficient to convert
it into pitch, and when cool, lade it into barrels, and so on until they have consumed all the tar, or
made a sufficient quantity o f pitch for their purpose.”42 Producers were also accused o f packing
pitch, like tar, into weak barrels that leaked. Turpentine quality received similar complaints.
British buyers claimed that colonial turpentine, most shipped as raw gum, contained wood chips,

39 Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 121.
40 Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 58.
41 Ibid., 58.
42 William Bartram, Travels Through North and South Carolina. Georgia. East and West
Florida, the Cherokee Country, the Extensive Territories o f the Muscogulees or Creek
Confederacy, and the Country of the Choctaws in William Bartram: Travels and Other Writings.
The Library o f America (New York: Literary Classics o f the United States, Inc., 1996), 339.
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water, and other foreign matter. The barrels in which the colonists shipped it were so inferior
and prone to leakage, the British said, that some packed with three hundred pounds of turpentine
when shipped could arrive in Britain weighing only a few pounds.43
Three factors contributed to the low quality of American naval stores. First the
producers’ economic situation demanded that they extract the quickest return from their land
with the least possible labor and capital expenditures. Producers, therefore, avoided the laborintensive Baltic practice o f barking and felling the trees from which to secure wood to build kilns
and instead instructed their slaves to gather dead pine wood in the forest. A second and related
reason for poor quality tar, especially among less wealthy producers, was the practice of
collecting dead wood from ungranted lands. No law forbade the scavenging o f fallen limbs from
unowned property, but to bark a tree and then later cut it down, as the east country method
required, constituted trespassing. Third, American tar makers did not choose shortcuts but
simply did not know proper techniques. Since Britain had produced almost no naval stores for
many decades before North American colonization, English settlers possessed little practical
knowledge of tar making. Neither did their slaves. Whereas Africans arrived in America with
knowledge of rice production, knowledge South Carolina planters quickly put to use, Africans
had no prior experience with naval stores. Producers did not know the best wood to use and, as
North Carolina Governor Gabriel Johnston suspected, fired their kilns to such high temperatures
that all of the wood’s juices came out with the tar.44
The colonial assemblies addressed the problem o f colonial tar quality through legislation.
The first attempts actually predated the bounty. A 1698 Virginia General Assembly measure
%

43 Crittenden, Commerce o f North Carolina. 58.
44 Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 62; Cox et al., This Well-Wooded
Land. 17; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 83; Lee, Lower Cape Fear. 53; Hautala,
“European and American Tar,” 58.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34
created a penalty for marketing unclean or inferior-quality tar and pitch. Producers were subject
to a twenty-shilling fine for each barrel of unacceptable pitch and ten shillings for each barrel o f
low-quality tar. The same act also established a standard-size naval stores barrel and created an
inspection system. In 1705 the Assembly passed a similar measure. Continued complaints,
however, suggest the legislation had little effect. A North Carolina act, much like Virginia's,
stipulated that naval stores barrels were to be made o f seasoned staves, bound by at least twelve
strong hoops, and contain thirty-two gallons. As in Virginia, North Carolina’s law produced very
little regulatory activity. Virginia again tried in 1720, this time offering its own bounty on top o f
that already paid by Britain for tar made according to the east country method. Two shillings per
thirty-two gallon barrel were to be paid provided the tar was made on land belonging to the
producer. Yet, nothing changed.45
Enterprising colonists attempted to evade criticism of their tar by making pitch from it
and marketing that product instead. Good pitch could be produced from even the poorest-quality
tar, but pitch did not bring the profits that tar returned. One barrel o f pitch required two barrels
of tar, thus reducing the quantity of marketable goods by half. Since the bounty for tar and pitch
were the same, four pounds per ton, half of the potential profits were lost by making pitch. From
the colonists’ perspective, however, receiving one half payment for their pitch was better than
receiving nothing for the tar that the Navy rejected as substandard. The threat o f rejection was
real. In 1707, alone, the Navy refused to pay the bounty on six thousand barrels of Iow-quaiity
tar. Another advantage o f pitch was that its shipping costs were half that o f tar. Shipping firms
favored hauling pitch over tar because tar had a tendency to leak from its barrels and ruin other
merchandise during the voyage. Some colonies, including North Carolina, did not export pitch.
Yet Virginia and South Carolina did and in such quantities that for some years England received

45 Crittenden, Commerce o f North Carolina. 51, 57; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial
Virginia,” 88.
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more pitch than tar from the North American colonies. (Shipments to the West Indies contained
more tar than pitch.) This export pattern did not serve the purpose England had intended for the
bounty because Britain’s shipyards needed more tar than they did pitch. Furthermore, colonial
pitch production contradicted the mercantilist economic policy. England, not the colonies was
supposed to refine goods.46
The British Navy expressed disgust at the excessive expense o f the bounty program, the
poor-quality tar they received at this high cost, and the colonists’ shift to pitch production.
Between 1705 and 1724, the Navy paid a yearly average of £18,703 for colonial naval stores. In
years of active production the cost ran considerably higher—£27,410 in 1716 and £52,011 in
1718. Many British administrators advocated an end to the bounty system, favoring acquisition
of naval stores supplies from the troublesome Baltic suppliers. Despite opposition, Parliament
finally succeeded in renewing the bounty act in 1713 for eleven more years. By the early 1720s,
tar quality had still not improved and prospects for the act’s renewal at the end of 1724 appeared
bleak. With the approaching bounty renewal threatened by mounting criticism, Parliament
passed an act in 1722, to take effect on September 29, 1724, that would exclude from the bounty
program any tar not made by the Swedish method. Some colonial producers fought
unsuccessfully for the act’s repeal. Others attempted the required method, but, unfamiliar with
the technique, barked all the way around the trunk, essentially girdling it, causing the tree’s
death. Parliament’s attempt to change procedure succeeded no better than earlier colonial
efforts, little more green tar found its way to England, and the Navy continued to complain. The
act’s greatest effect was to reduce naval stores production in areas with high labor costs—the
northern colonies, South Carolina, and the Cape Fear region-and to push it into areas settled by

46 Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 123; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 64-68;
Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 92.
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poorer colonists where labor was cheaper, including the region surrounding North Carolina’s
Albemarle Sound.47
Throughout 1724, representatives o f the tar issue’s two sides refused to compromise and
on January 1, 1725, the bounty expired. Over the next few years colonial naval stores exports to
England dropped nearly sixty percent, from 81,003 barrels in 1725 to 66,667 barrels in 1726 to
34.277 barrels in 1727. The colonies simply could not compete with the Baltic states’ lower
production and shipping costs. The colonists carried a seven-shillings-per-barrel labor expense,
but in Finland the cost was only four shillings. Colonists paid eight shillings per barrel in freight
charges; shipping from Finland was but half as much. Other costs were roughly the same. But
the higher labor and shipping costs made a barrel o f colonial tar seven and one half shillings
more expensive to produce and transport than a barrel of Finnish tar. The bounty had provided a
payment of ten shillings per barrel, a payment that more than compensated for the colonists’
disadvantage. With its disappearance, Russia and Sweden, who offered a better product at a
cheaper price, resumed their exports to Britain. In the absence o f competition from the English
colonies, Sweden raised its prices. In addition, the English shipping business suffered with the
colonial naval stores industry’s decline since British vessels lost the extra business that the naval
stores bounty had generated. In part to end the shipping depression, Parliament restored the
bounty in 1729.48
The new bounty act paid a subsidy payment for colonial naval stores, but on terms more
acceptable to the Navy. Tar made using the Swedish method received four pounds per ton, but

47 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 181, 183; Hautala, “European and American Tar,”
48, 61; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 83; Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores
Industry,” 53.
48 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 175, 179, 184; Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial
Georgia,” 427; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 86; Hautala, “European and
American Tar,” 46,48.
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the act reduced payment for common tar to two pounds, four shillings per ton, and the payment
for pitch to one pound per ton. Furthermore, only the lowest-quality tar, the last half to emerge
from the kiln, could be made into pitch. One pound, ten shillings was paid for every ton of
turpentine. In sum, the new act attempted to tailor production to England’s needs. It encouraged
higher-quality tar, reduced the reward for making common tar, and made pitch production a
practice of last resort with only the worst tar. The act made specific requirements about how tar
was collected from the kiln. It insisted that producers catch the tar in a cask as it ran from the
kiln, not collect it in a hole in the ground as was the common practice. These casks were to be
covered to prevent rain from mixing with the tar. The act also called for products to be shipped
in lots of eight barrels, each barrel holding thirty-two gallons and constructed o f seasoned staves,
well-hooped, bunged at the sight of production, and to be kept in the shade or a cool place until
shipped. Finally, the act used stiff penalties to discourage violation o f its provisions. A tar
maker could lose half his product for breaching the act’s requirements. For the remainder of the
colonial period Parliament unfailingly renewed the bounty act, once in 1742, again in 1750, and
for the last time in 1758.49
Within a decade o f the 1729 act’s passage, a large percentage o f American naval stores
were accepted on par with those from the Baltic states, not because the new bounty act’s
combination of punishments and incentives achieved the desired result, but rather, because the
quality of Swedish tar went down. Turmoil generated by the Great Northern War so greatly
disrupted the Swedish tar industry that by the conflict’s end few former producers successfully
reestablished their trade and within a short time the traditional tar-making practices were largely
forgotten. Also, the Tar Company went out o f business in 1714 and with it went its strict

49 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 184; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,”
86-87; A. K. Thurmond, Jr., “The Early American Naval Stores Industry,” Olustee Experiment
Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton Georgia, 6; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 44.
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standards and efficient quality inspections. Finally in 1734, in an effort to save the country’s
remaining forest resources, the Swedish government declared that tar was to be manufactured
only from stumps, roots, and trees that had blown down. In other words, Swedish tar was now to
be made by the same method used in the American colonies. Kustaa Hautala, a Finnish scholar
o f international commerce, explains that “since the quality o f Finnish tar was not much better
than that of American tar at the beginning of the 18th century, it is no wonder that the latter
captured the English market.”50
With the bounty’s return and the Swedish industry’s decline, the colonial naval stores
industry quickly rebounded. England received 33,062 barrels from the colonies in 1730,47,541
in 1731, and 70,428 in 1732. But these exports did not come from South Carolina and the Cape
Fear area as they had before the bounty act’s lapse at the end of 1724. In the southern portion of
South Carolina, the Yamasee War of 1715 had already disrupted naval stores production. Many
producers in other regions o f the Carolinas had purchased slaves on credit to take advantage of
the high naval stores prices resulting from the bounty. When the subsidies stopped, these
indebted slave masters faced ruin unless they could find another way to put their slaves to
profitable employment. At least one South Carolinian attempted to provoke the British
mercantilists by warning that if the bounties were not continued, the slaves who had labored to
make tar could be diverted to industries that competed with England. Although this threat was
never carried out, South Carolina did reduce naval stores manufacturing and turned its slaves’
energy toward increased rice production. The cultivation o f rice continued after 1729 because at
the same time Parliament revived the naval stores subsidy, it also repealed restrictions on the rice
trade. Where before South Carolina had to export rice to other countries through England, it
could now ship it directly to other markets, especially Southern Europe, where demand for rice

50 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 63-64.
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was high. In the 1740s indigo offered another alternative to naval stores, especially after 1748
when Parliament placed a subsidy o f six pence per pound on indigo shipped directly to England.
The naval stores bounty act’s premium o f four pounds per ton for green tar could not compete
with these more profitable uses for slave labor. In 1748 Charleston exported only 5,521 barrels
of pitch, 3,075 barrels o f tar, and 2,387 barrels of turpentine, a decline o f forty-one percent from
1741 and a drop o f almost seventy-five percent from 1738. While tar and pitch production in
South Carolina never ended entirely, that colony’s tar exports dropped in both relative and
absolute figures and remained low for the remainder o f the colonial period.51 "South
Carolinians,” one historian explains, “believed that they had better things to do.”52 For the same
reasons that it declined in South Carolina, naval stores production also declined in the Cape Fear
region, which also switched to rice and indigo as well as tobacco.53
Yet North Carolina’s naval stores exports, as a whole, increased during the late colonial
era. The industry’s center shifted northward into the counties surrounding the Albemarle Sound.
The Albemarle area, settled for roughly sixty years by 1725, had a relatively sparse population.
The area’s small farmers and backwoodsmen owned few slaves and contributed little to the
colony’s staple export trade except limited amounts o f tobacco. Living among the longleaf
pines, however, they could use their own labor to make and bum tar kilns and tap trees for raw
turpentine. Reduced competition from the wealthy slave owners to the south and the renewed
bounty on tar made production o f these commodities profitable for Albemarle settlers, who

51 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 176, 181; Weir. Colonial South Carolina. 108, 149150; Lee, Lower Cape Fear. 97; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 79-81, 163; “The
Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” The Commercial Review o f the South and West 8
(May 1850): 451.
52 Weir, Colonial South Carolina. 145.
53Powell. North Carolina. 131-134.
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heretofore had made only limited quantities.54 Because northeastern North Carolinians lacked
the capital resources to invest in large slave labor forces and huge timber tracts, they
manufactured naval stores on a small, almost casual level, performing most o f the work
themselves, and often using timber they did not own.
Not only did naval stores producers in the Albemarle region lack the financial means to
develop large operations, they faced the challenge of transporting their goods to the open sea.
The Albemarle region possessed no significant water courses, such as the Cape Fear River,
which could connect it to a port facility accessible to ocean-going ships. Exasperated ship
captains had to ply its smallish rivers, picking up barrels o f naval stores from the many small
landings that dotted the banks. Even the largest Albemarle port, Edenton, could be reached from
the Atlantic only with considerable time and difficulty.55 In the 1780s Johann David Schoepf, a
German traveling through the confederation, described this challenge:

The road which ships must take coming in from the sea by the navigable and best
channels is as much as 180 miles long, although the town itself is not more than 35-40
miles from the sea in a direct line. There would be a shorter passage if the
Roanoke and other inlets were navigable for vessels even of a moderate tonnage.
Coming in, vessels must first pass the Occacock Bar, where at high tide there is no
more than 13 ft. water, and then there lies in the way another bank, 2-3 miles wide,
called the Swash, consisting of firm sand, and a t the highest tide giving a depth o f only 9
ft. Ships, therefore, often take 8-12 days entering and clearing the Sound, at times must
wait months for a favorable opportunity, and then are subject to the very inconvenience
of lading and unlading at a distance from the town by means of lighters. And when at
last a ship is freighted and past all obstacles, shortly after getting into the ocean the Gulf
Stream must be contended with, which in this latitude approaches very near the main
land.”56
54 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 82; W . W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands,
and Forest Products o f Eastern North Carolina (Raleigh: North Carolina Geological Survey,
1894), 18; Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina. 90,113; W. Neil Franklin, “Agriculture in
Colonial North Carolina.” The North Carolina HistoricaJ Review 3 (October 1926): 553-554.
55 Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 91, 106.
56 Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968),
111- 112.
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Shipping challenges encouraged a concentration on naval store production by preventing
commercial lumber operations from developing in the Albemarle region as they had along the
Cape Fear River.57 “It is found much more profitable,” the author of American Husbandry
explained, “to apply the timber they cut down to this use [turpentine] than to saw it or export it in
any kind of lumber; and the tar &c. being far more valuable in proportion to bulk, is a
circumstance o f great importance in a country that does not abound with good ports.”58
Moreover, the expensive mill equipment was well beyond the means o f the relatively poor
Albemarle settlers.
Some producers near the Virginia boarder preferred to transport their naval stores to
Norfolk for shipping. The volume of this traffic reached such a high level that Virginia, which
remained a relatively unimportant tar-producing colony itself, generated revenue from North
Carolina naval stores by charging a duty o f eighteen pence on each barrel of pitch and twelve
pence on each barrel o f tar that left the colony.59
From the mid eighteenth century to the Revolution, the naval stores industry spread
southward from the Albemarle region, into the Washington and New Bern areas, and slowly
migrated up the Tar and Neuse Rivers. In 1811, Jeremy Battle explained that settlers from
around the Albemarle region introduced naval stores production in Edgecombe County, through
which the Tar River flowed. “The natives of this county . . . would have starved,” he argued,
“had they been possessed of no other means o f subsistence. Emigrants from Virginia and the
northeastern Counties o f this State, settled on these barren lands, and converted the pines into

57 Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 99.
58 Carman, American Husbandry. 245.
59 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 18; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial
Virginia,” 91-92.
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meat, bread and money.”60 This area east o f the Pamlico Sound remained the heart of North
American naval stores production until the mid-nineteenth century. In the Albennarle region
production declined so that by the end o f the eighteenth century it produced little naval stores.
Virginia naval stores production, only a small part o f that colony’s economy, also declined. In
1743, England received approximately eight thousand barrels of tar and pitch out of the ten
thousand made in Virginia. But from October 1764 to October 1765 only four hundred, seventy
left the upper James River area.61
Like the upper Albermarle area and Virginia, other regions of North America produced
limited quantities o f naval stores but failed to sustain an important and lasting industry. Georgia,
not settled until the 1730s, included these commodities among its exports, but never approached
North Carolina’s volume. During Georgia’s trustee period, which lasted until 1753, its officials
considered sending representatives to North Carolina to learn the trade of tar and pitch
production. Nothing came o f the plan, however, and it was not until later in the decade that the
colony began shipping naval stores. By then the colony’s ban on slavery was lifted, and
Georgians, like South Carolinians, found rice and indigo cultivation to be the most profitable
employment for their slaves.62 Georgia consequently exported only small quantities of naval
stores, their manufacture confined to coastal areas and lands adjacent to the major rivers. The
second half of the 1760s saw the beginning o f a trend toward proportionately greater tar
production. In fact, by the last two years before the Revolution, tar exports exceeded pitch by

60 Quoted in Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 17891861” ( Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 232.
61 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 18; Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial
Virginia,” 92-93.
62 Many o f the largest slaveholders in colonial Georgia were South Carolinians who had
moved southward with their slaves seeking new lands. Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial
Georgia,” 428, 430; Betty Wood, Slavery in Colonial Georgia (Athens, GA: University of
Georgia Press, 1984), 65; Cox et al., This Well-Wooded Land. 18.
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nearly a third. In 1766 the Georgia legislature, concerned that the colony’s tar, pitch, and
turpentine could not compete in the English market, passed an act requiring that the colony’s
naval stores meet the standards set by the 1729 bounty act. To ensure compliance, the law called
for inspection o f all naval stores before they were loaded aboard ships and levied a five-shilling
fine for each barrel that was not up to standard. Despite these efforts, Georgia’s naval stores
business remained small. From 1755 to 1775, Georgia only exported a yearly average o f only
220 barrels o f tar, 149 barrels of pitch, and 44 barrels o f turpentine.6'’
Florida and Louisiana, both colonial possessions of various European countries until the
nineteenth century, experienced considerable difficulty with their respective naval stores trades.
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the time when Britain experienced its most urgent need for
a colonial naval stores supplier, Spain was also seeking a source. In a memorial to the King of
Spain, probably written in 1700, the curate rector o f St. Augustine reported that not only did
Florida possess “a diversity of woods” suitable for masts, posts, and yards, but already “a very
good pitch and tar necessary for the careening o f the frigates and vessels o f your majesty and the
rest of the vessels o f the presidio is made in the lan d .. . . ” He admitted that the products were
not as good as those available in Europe, “because the master is not very expert in the science
and thus it is a little thick.. . . ” Transporting the Florida naval stores to Cuba for the readying of
ships, the rector believed, could save the crown the cost o f shipping them from Europe.64 Spain
did not take swift action in this matter, by the 1730s administers were still attempting to
implement the policy. In 1757, however, another governor developed an independent naval
stores operation and with the King’s endorsement shipped his goods to Havana. The Spanish
63 Herndon, “Naval Stores in Colonial Georgia,” 428-431; I. Jams Pikl, A History o f
Georgia Forestry (Athens, GA: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of
Georgia, 1966), 4.
64 John H. Hann, “Translation of Alonso De Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of
Spain.” Florida Archaeology. n.s. 2 (1996): 195-196.
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crown sought to encourage their export by allowing naval stores into Vera-Cruz duty free.65
Further evidence of Spanish Florida tar and pitch production comes from William Bartram’s
report on his travels through America in the 1770s. While walking near Mobile Bay, then part of
West Florida, he observed “three vast iron pots or kettles, each of many hundred gallons
contents.. . . ” He was informed that “they were for the purpose of boiling tar to pitch, there
being vast forests o f Pine trees in the vicinity o f this place.”66 Although the Spanish were most
interested in tar and pitch, chipped faces discovered deep in the hearts of Florida pines indicate
that before 1750 turpentine production had also begun.67
French administrators in colonial Louisiana also struggled to stimulate naval stores
production. In the early eighteenth century, Governor Bienville recommended that France would
offer subsidies, transportation, and a guarantee to purchase tar, pitch, and turpentine as well as
import slaves to make them. Some production started. Bienville reported in 1734 that three or
four tar works operated across Lake Pontchartrain from New Orleans. When the French crown
cut the price it paid for naval stores by half, however, production slowed. As in the English
colonies, higher returns from alternative staples drew efforts away from naval stores. Tobacco
and indigo cultivation increasingly consumed the energy o f slave laborers, as these products
replaced naval stores in the crowded hulls o f merchant ships. In fact, the merchants’ preference
for products other than naval stores was so great that, despite offering advances and preferences
to shippers for carrying naval stores, the colonial government found cargo space inadequate.
Naval stores stock began overcrowding warehouses. Through the 1740s the importance o f naval

65 Robert S. Blount, Spirits of Turpentine: A History of Florida Naval Stores. 1528 to
1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 8.
66 Bartram, Travels. 339.
67 Florida Writers’ Project, “The Story o f Naval Stores . . . , ” Florida Highways 11 (May
1943): 12.
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stores declined as shipments of indigo, rice, cotton, timber, and pelts rose.68 Under Spanish rule,
which lasted in Louisiana from the 1760s to the beginning o f the nineteenth century, demand for
the colony’s tar and pitch rose. Local consumers purchased some o f these products. One
enterprising New Orleans builder fashioned roofs using resin, oyster shell, and two types o f
tile.69 However, it appears that no turpentine production developed.70 With only moderately
successful efforts to develop naval stores production in Georgia, Florida, and Louisiana, North
Carolina remained the manufacturing center o f tar, pitch, and turpentine in America.
By the 1760s the center o f colonial naval stores production in North America was
located between North Carolina’s Pamlico Sound and the Cape Fear River. The area’s poor soil
could not support extensive agriculture, but its expansive pine forests offered its residents a
means of support. A traveler in the 1780s described the region as “a wide extended dead flat,
covered in a thousand places with stagnated water.” But, he continued, “this land that appears,

68 Jack D. L. Holmes, “Naval Stores in Colonial Louisiana and the Floridas,” Louisiana
Studies 7 (Winter 1968): 295-300.
69 Ibid., 301.
70 In February 1773, Bernard Romans sailed into New Orleans “there being a necessity
for some turpentine on board of the vessel.. . the Captain was obliged to pay sixteen dollars for a
half cask o f it, and i have been informed, that even then it was sold in that town for medical uses
at a great price by the pint and quart.” Bernard Romans, A Concise Natural History o f East and
West Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1962), 150. In 1797, Governor
Carondelet granted permission for a resourceful producer to use his slaves to make tar and pitch
from pines that had fallen down on an island considered royal land. Carondelet to Don Pedro
Olivier, Feb. 2, 1797, Archivo Central de Indias, Cuba 24, fol. 183. Louisiana continued to make
tar and pitch into its American territorial period, but still no turpentine. During his travels
through Louisiana from 1803 to 1805, C.C. Robin observed that in the areas around Lake
Pontchartrain “the most lucrative industry of the region.. . is the manufacture of pitch which
requires fewer men than would agriculture.” Robin does not indicate which method o f tar
production was used, but he does describe a unique method o f making pitch. According to him,
“iron balls are heated red hot and thrown into the collected pitch, which bursts into flames with a
loud explosion and throws off a thick smoke. When the pitch is judged to be concentrated
enough, the pits are covered with a screen which is then covered with turf. The fire is smothered,
the tar then cools and hardens. It is cut out with an ax.” C. C. Robin, Voyage to Louisiana (New
Orleans: Pelican Publishing Company, 1966), 29.
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and actually is, totally barren and altogether useless and unfit for any kind o f culture, yields more
profit to the occupiers, from the smallest capital imaginable, than can well be conceived----This prodigious profit is derived from making tar, which is one o f the most estimable staples of
North Carolina.”71 Another observer, surprised to find so few “plantations scattered about in
these woods at various distances, 3-6 miles, and often as much as 10-15-20 miles apart,” reported
that rather than staple agriculture “it is the forest which supplies the present inhabitants o f North
Carolina not merely an occupation and a support, but the means as well o f an easier life and often
considerable estates.”72 The author of American Husbandry was not so well impressed with the
promises of naval stores. For him, that “pitch, tar, and turpentine are made throughout this
province in vast quantities[, w as].. . a proof, among others, that the country is very far from
being well settled even yet.”73
Not only did counties between the Pamlico Sound and the Cape Fear River have a higher
concentration o f longleaf pines than the Albemarle area, its forests were closer to more
accessible port facilities. The ports o f Beaufort and Brunswick, both offered easier access to the
open sea than Edenton, together handled approximately seventy-five percent of the total naval
stores exports from North Carolina, and the greatest portion o f these exports from North
America.74 Yet despite the importance of these two ports in the naval stores trade, their overall
size and total export volume paled in comparison to others such as Charleston and the northern
ports. A Frenchman traveling through Beaufort in 1765 could not have been less enthusiastic
about the town. He reported it was “a Small village not above 12 houses, the inhabitants seem

71 Smyth, Tour in the United States. 94-95.
72 Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation. 103.
73 Carman, American Husbandry. 244.
74 Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 88-89.
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miserable, they are very lasy and Indolent, they live mostly on fish and oisters, which they have
here in great plenty.” As for the harbor, “Non but small vessels Can come here there being but
13 feet water on the bar at low water, the tide does not rise above 4 feet, the little trade that is
Caryed on here Consists in terpentine, tar and pich.”75
North Carolina made naval stores, especially tar, its specialty. In 1768 England imported
one hundred, thirty-five thousand barrels of tar, pitch, and turpentine from her colonies, around
sixty percent from North Carolina. In 1769 North Carolina exported 63,301 barrels of tar and
pitch. The same year Virginia exported only 23,365 barrels, much of which was actually made in
North Carolina and shipped through Norfolk. South Carolina exported 10,531 barrels, Georgia
653 barrels, and Maryland only 24 barrels. By 1775, North Carolina alone exported 130,000
barrels of naval stores. This volume made the bounty program increasingly expensive for the
navy. Between 1730 and 1750 the annual subsidy averaged £17,000 and by the 1750s rose to
£24,000. Between 1763 and 1776 the annual average rose again to just under £34,000. Colonists
no longer tried to compensate for poor quality tar by making it into pitch. By the late colonial
period the percentage of pitch as part of naval stores export had dropped dramatically, down to
only seven percent by 1771. Although tar dominated naval stores shipments, turpentine,
nevertheless, represented a significant commodity o f North Carolina. Most often it was shipped
in its raw form. In 1785 Port Brunswick exported nineteen thousand barrels of crude turpentine
and only twelve barrels of distilled spirits.76
Despite the 1729 bounty act’s measures aimed at improving naval stores quality, the
export o f substandard and adulterated products continued to worry colonial officials. In a 1735
letter to North Carolina’s Governor Johnston, a group o f concerned gentlemen requested that he
75 “Journal o f a French Traveler in the Colonies,” 773.
76 Williams, “English Mercantilism,” 176, 185; Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 86;
Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 69,79,85; Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 54.
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suggest to “the Assembly that some proper regulations might be enacted as rules for making Tar
throughout the Province and a proper person or persons appointed to inspect the several kilns that
penalties might be inflicted on such o f them who transgress the said rules

” They feared that

“if the Tar of your Province should be brought into disrepute by the burning quality o f it none of
it will be exported from thence and that Manufacture will be quite lost to those o f your Province
who now maintain themselves thereby.”77 In 1751 the colonial assembly passed a law regulating
exports from the Cape Fear River, later applied to all ports, that provided for inspection o f goods
before shipment to ensure that they conformed to quality, weight, and packaging standards. Only
marketable casks, each bearing the producer’s initials, were to be exported. Each county court
was responsible for appointing inspectors for its own jurisdiction, but because county judges
were sometimes naval stores producers themselves, the inspectors integrity rarely rose above
suspicion.78 In a March 1770 memorial to the Earl of Hillsborough, British tar, pitch, and
turpentine importers expressed their concern over the poor monitoring o f North Carolina naval
stores quality. The colonies’ refusal to enforce standards, they argued, resulted from “the
Officers and Inspectors being appointed by the Magistrates of the different Counties.. . such
Magistrates being Planters and Tar Burners

”79 The British recommended the usual

remedies: only the second half o f tar should be made into pitch, official inspection of kilns,
better-made tar barrels, cleaner turpentine, and finally, pitch fully-made in kettles. Despite these
continued efforts, green tar represented only a minor portion of the colony’s naval stores exports
77 Fitz. Walker, et. al. to Governor Johnson, 12 September 1735, The Colonial Records
o f North Carolina, vol. 4, ed. William L. Saunders (Raleigh: P. M. Hale, Printer to the State,
1886), 16.
78 Lee, Lower Cane Fear. 153; Crittenden, Commerce o f North Carolina. 57.
79 The Memorial o f Messrs. Bridgen & Waller and Hindley & Needham Merchants
Trading to North Carolina and Importers o f Naval Stores to the Earl o f Hillsborough, 31 March
1770, The Colonial Records o f North Carolina, vol. 8, ed. William Saunders (Raleigh: Josephus
Daniels, Printer to the State, 1890), 189.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49
on the eve o f the Revolution. O f the 82,075 barrels of tar exported from the colonies in 1770.
only 653 barrels, less that one percent, contained green tar.80
Colonial administrators also attempted to deal with the problem o f unscrupulous
producers who made naval stores from trees on land they did not own. As early as 1717,
Virginia passed a law that anyone manufacturing naval stores from material taken from crown
lands for which they had no intention to patent and pay quitrents would be guilty of trespass.
The problem arose in North Carolina as well, especially after 1730 when small producers, who
owned little land, began production in the Albemarle area.81 In 1738 Henry McCulloh
complained to the Board o f Trade in London that “it has been a practice o f long standing in the
Colony [North Carolina] for people to Box pine trees for Turpentine and bum light wood for
Pitch and Tarr without taking out Patterns for the Lands the Govemour has been much censured
for the preventing this— .” McCulloh requested that the board support the governor in his effort
to collect quitrent on this property.82 As late as 1772 North Carolina Governor Josiah Martin
issued a proclamation addressing a similar problem. According to the governor, unprincipled
colonists “have made frequent practice of entering Tracts of Land in the Secretarys Office and
immediately set down on the same—carried off the timber and burnt the Iightwood without
further prosecuting their claim to a patent for the said Land

”83

By the end o f the colonial period naval stores had become North Carolina’s most
important export. In 1769 North Carolina’s total export tonnage amounted to 23,113, o f which

80 Ibid., 187-190; Crittenden, Commerce of North Carolina. 57; Martin, “American Gum
Naval Stores Industry,” 56-57; Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 62-63.
81 Snow, “Naval Stores in Colonial Virginia,” 82; Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 89.
82 Proclamation from Governor Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores Industry,” to King
George III, 26 May, 1772, The Colonial Records o f North Carolina, vol. 9, ed. William L.
Saunders (Raleigh: Josephus Daniels, Printer to the State, 1890), 294-295.
83 Ibid.
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more than half went to Great Britain and Ireland. Naval stores, the colony’s number one export,
was valued at £42,000. Although the export o f all goods from six other colonies—Massachusetts,
Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, and South Carolina—exceeded North Carolina’s,
North Carolina exported seventy percent of tar from the North American colonies, more than
Fifty percent of the turpentine, and twenty percent of the pitch. Ports servicing the Cape Fear
Basin—Brunswick and Wilmington—saw the most overall trade activity o f any of North
Carolina’s ports, handling a total tonnage of 8,500, and shipping the largest volume of naval
stores. Port Roanoke, which handled the entire Albemarle region’s trade—6,000 total tons in
1769—was the colony’s next busiest port and ranked behind Brunswick and Wilmington in naval
stores exports. The other three important ports—Beaufort, Bath, and Currituck—shipped a
combined total o f 8541 tons in 1769 but considerably smaller quantities o f naval stores.84
Although tar, pitch, and turpentine represented significantly important commodities for a colony
that possessed so few export staples, North Carolinians relied too heavily on them. As historian
Lawrence Lee observes, “by unduly concentrating their energy on naval stores, they built their
economy on a flimsy foundation o f bounties that might be discontinued, and on a narrow and
distant market over which they had no control.”85
84 Crittenden, Commerce o f North Carolina. 41-41, 70-73.
85 Despite North Carolina’s specialization in naval stores, the colony did export a few
other goods. Timber products, although not enumerated like naval stores, retained their
importance. North Carolina ranked only behind Massachusetts in lumber exports, and held first
place among the southern colonies. The Cape Fear Valley, which by the end of the colonial
period possessed around fifty sawmills, produced most of the colony’s exported lumber. The
amount was considerable. Average annual exports before the revolution ranged between 2.5
million and 3 million feet. Seventy to seventy-five percent o f the colony’s lumber passed
through Port Brunswick. Staves, commonly cut from oak, came from areas with considerable
bottom lands in whose wet soil conditions these trees grew best. Similarly, shingles, most often
crafted from white cedar and cypress because these woods are light, soft, and resistant to
dampness, originated from swampy areas where the trees could be found in greatest abundance.
The Albemarle region’s slight dominance of this market may be attributed to the area’s many
swampy environments. Cox et al., This Well-Wooded Land. 19; Lee, Lower Cape Fear. 149-150,
169; Merrens, Colonial North Carolina. 93-94,99, 101-105; Crittenden, Commerce of North
Carolina. 39; Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina. 71.
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The American Revolution created volatility in colonial naval stores trade and production,
but Britain possibly suffered more than the United States. As early as August 1774 the first
North Carolina Provincial Congress, which was called to elect delegates to the Continental
Congress, drew up a set o f resolutions criticizing British colonial policies. One resolve
threatened “That unless American Grievances are redressed before the first day of October 1775,
We will not after that day directly or indirectly export Tobacco, Pitch, Tar, Turpentine, or any
other articles whatsoever, to Great Britain, nor will we sell any such articles as we think can be
exported to Great Britain

”*6 When bounty payment to the colonies ended in 1776, North

Carolinians, free from the navigation acts that had restricted colonial trade, found markets for
their products in other countries and colonies. It appears that tar remained profitable, each
laborer, according to one report, generating “from one hundred pounds, to two hundred pounds
sterling, and upwards, annually.”87 Britain, however, suffered a naval stores shortage. American
tar and pitch exports to Britain dropped from 87,152 barrels in 1774 to 78,358 in 1775, and then
to 4,823 in 1776, and to 216 in 1777. So desperate were the British for naval stores, the Second
Continental Congress feared that the Redcoats might attempt to capture the sizable stash o f these
supplies at the Wilmington port. On May 21, 1777, it advised that that these products be either
transported to a more secure area or destroyed before they could fall into British hands. Nothing
apparently came of the perceived threat and the British navy was forced to obtain its badly
needed supplies from the sources it had tried to free itself from decades earlier, Scandinavia and
Russia. The rise in naval stores imports from Sweden, Russia, and Denmark corresponded with
the falling of colonial trade. In 1774, British tar and pitch imports from these three countries

86 “Resolutions o f the First Provincial Congress, August 27,1774,” quoted in Hugh
Talmage Lefler, ed., North Carolina History Told bv Contemporaries (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1948), 97.
87 Smyth, Tour in the United States. 95.
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were only 6,900, 5,340, and 945 respectively. But by 1776 they had risen to 27,929, 17,397, and
1,704 and reached their high in 1781 with imports of 73,079, 43.123. and 8,606.“
Britain attempted to secure at least a portion of its badly needed naval stores from
Florida, which it had take possession o f in 1763 as part o f the agreement ending the Seven Years
War. Despite Britain’s early efforts to encourage naval stores production and population growth
in its new colony, by 1776 only approximately three thousand settlers lived in Florida, they made
tar and pitch in only small quantities. During the American Revolution, however, loyalists from
Georgia and South Carolina seeking political asylum and economic opportunity flooded into
Florida. Between the war’s outbreak and 1784, Florida’s population grew to 17,000, as it rose,
so did naval stores production. Florida made only 190 barrels of tar in 1776 but in one year
output jumped to 2,241 barrels of tar and 417 barrels of pitch, and in 1778 it increased to 8100
and 1980 barrels respectively. By 1783, the last year of British rule in Florida, the colony made
20,000 barrels of tar and turpentine, the production centered in the vicinity o f the St. Marys,
Nassau, and especially the St. Johns Rivers.89 Florida colonists made tar in the same fashion as
their counterparts in Carolina and Georgia did. In his natural history o f Florida, published in
1775, Bernard Romans observed that “green tar has not yet been made in F lorida... [because] it
was entirely unknown in the country.” Instead, tar was manufactured the common way, “by
splitting the heart o f the pitch pine, fallen dow n... -”90 An active turpentine trade also developed
over these years. In a pine forest four miles north o f St. Augustine, one producer used slaves to
harvest turpentine from 25,000 trees. Another producer, John Imrie, made turpentine on 450

88 Gamble, “Early History,” 22; Thurmond, “Early American Naval Stores,” 6; Hautala,
“European and American Tar,” 105-107.
89 Holmes, “Naval Stores,” 304; Historic Properties Survey o f St. Johns County (St.
Augustine, Florida: Historic St. Augustine Preservation Board, 1985), 23.
90 Romans, Concise Natural History. 149-150.
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acres along Moultre Creek in northeastern Florida.91 Because Britain no longer received naval
stores from the rebellious colonies, Florida became its only source in North America. With the
American patriots’ success sealed upon Cornwallis’ surrender at Yorktown in 1781, Francis
Philip Fatio reported to Britain in 1782 that “East Florida is now the only Province ofN .
America belonging to the crown where Naval Stores can be made.”92 But, in 1783 Florida
returned to Spain as part o f the Treaty o f Paris and Britain lost this last colonial supplier.93
Following the Revolution, North Carolina continued its dominant role in American naval
stores production and export, despite the absence of a bounty.94 Manufacturing recovered
gradually. In 1785 North Carolina exported 56,000 barrels of naval stores, less than half the
128,000 barrels exported in 1768. By 1788 naval stores exports rose to 95,000 barrels. Tar
91 Imrie owned five hundred acres, four hundred, fifty o f which he used in his operation.
Fourteen slaves labored to make his tar and turpentine, each slave tending an estimated 2,500
trees and producing sixty barrels o f turpentine. Along with turpentine, Imrie’s operation made
three hundred to four hundred barrels o f tar a year. With the help of his slaves Imrie built for
himself a wood-framed house, thirty feet by twenty feet and two stories high with two rooms on
each floor. He also constructed a log house for his overseer, six or seven slave cabins, and a
bam. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine. 12; Stanley C. Bond, Jr., “The Development of the Naval
Stores Industry in St. Johns County, Florida.” The Florida Anthropologist 40 (September 1987):
195.
92 That forest depletion was already a concern is evident in Fatio’s claim that “experience
has teached us how to remedy, to that vast destruction o f Timber by such Crops [turpentine].. . . ”
To solve this problem Fatio recommended outlawing the setting o f fires in pine forests,
regulating boxing trees for turpentine, requiring a few trees be left on every acre for reseeding,
and preventing hunters and cattlemen from burning over pine forests until the tree bases had been
raked clear o f weeds and debris. Francis Philip Fatio, “Considerations on the Importance o f the
Province of East Florida to the British Empire,” December 14, 1782, transcript at St. Augustine
Historical Society Research Library, St. Augustine, FL, 2.
93 As it did in the first Spanish period, Florida naval stores production suffered after
1783. Many of the British settlers who had entered Florida during the American Revolution left
for other parts o f the Empire or returned to the United States. East Florida’s population fell to
under 2000. Spanish administrators did little to encourage the new naval stores industry’s
continuation and by 1787 only three tar and pitch producers remained. Blount, Spirits o f
Turpentine. 14; Historic Properties Survey of St. Johns Countv. 25; Holmes, “Naval Stores,”
304-305.
94 Crittenden, Commerce o f North Carolina. 160.
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remained the principal naval stores export product, followed by turpentine, pitch, and rosin (fig.
1.1).9S As the quantity o f production resumed, so did poor quality. In his history o f North

Exports ofTar, Pitch, Turpentine, and Rosin
1789-1799
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Figure 1.1. Exports ofTar, Pitch, Turpentine, and Rosin, 1789-1799
^Numbers for 1794 not available.
Franklin B. Hough, Report Upon Forestry, vol. 2, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1878), 333.

Carolina, published in 1812, Hugh Williamson, like the British during the colonial era, blamed
inferior tar on the producer, who “performed every operation in the most hasty and slovenly
manner” and on “unprincipled inspectors, who, instead of being broke by giving their sanction to
imperfect produce, are apt to court popularity by passing the worst that comes.”96 The industry
center appears to have moved back towards the Albermarle area. An increase in naval stores
shipments through Port Roanoke and a decline through the state’s more southerly ports indicated

95 Ibid; Franklin B. Hough, Report Upon Forestry, vol. 2, (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1880), 333.
96 Hugh Williamson, The History of North Carolina (Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson,
1812), 213-214.
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a northward shift in production. Although the port at Brunswick saw its total export tonnage
increase, its naval stores exports actually declined while Port Roanoke’s naval stores shipments
almost doubled.97 At the same time, tobacco shipments from Brunswick and Beaufort increased
over sixteen times from the late 1760s while Port Roanoke, which had lead in tobacco export,
dropped to third place, Brunswick took its lead and Bath came in second. This pattern suggests
that, as during the late 1720s when the bounty lapsed for four years, naval stores production
declined in South Carolina and the Cape Fear region where slaveholders required profits
adequate enough to cover their large investments in labor and moved into the northern half o f the
state where slaves were fewer and labor was cheaper. The iate-eighteenth-century shift
represented the industry’s center’s third movement since the 1700s, the first being from
southeastern North Carolina to the Albermarle region, then from there to the area of the Neuse
and Tar Rivers. In another change, the northern states replaced Great Britain as the principal
buyer of North Carolina naval stores. The revival of American shipping, especially in New
England, lead to this increased domestic consumption 98 By 1800 North Carolina was firmly
established as the principal American naval stores producer and would continue to live up to its
designation as the “Tar Heel State” for most of the nineteenth century.
North Carolina achieved this distinction, not solely because it possessed abundant
longleaf pine trees, for expansive stands o f the species grew in other southern colonies, but
because North Carolinians lacked any other staple they could produce profitably. England’s
bounty, which compensated for the prohibitably high shipping costs from America, was required

97 Overall trade in the southeastern portion o f the state was hurt by a sand bar, which
blocked the Wilmington port during the 1780s and allowed no more than nine to ten feet o f
clearance and limited shipping volume through the town. Schoepf reported that “larger ships
must consequently first lighten cargo at Brunswick a litle place 16 miles from here.” Schoepf,
Travels in the Confederation. 145.
98 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 121,123.
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to stimulate colonial naval stores manufacturing. South Carolina and portions o f southeastern
North Carolina manufactured tar, pitch, and turpentine until the bounty ended and changes in
trade policies made rice and later indigo viable substitutes with even better returns. As Georgia’s
economy developed in the mid eighteenth century, settlers there also preferred rice and indigo to
naval stores. The same proved true in Florida and Louisiana, in North Carolina, however, tar,
pitch, turpentine, and other forest products did not face competition from other staples. Except
for tobacco, which grew well in the fertile eastern river bottom lands, and rice, which could be
cultivated in the coastal region near Wilmington, North Carolina lacked any other profitable
export commodity. Even though naval stores did not bring the returns that rice and indigo
provided other colonies, the bounty, which continued uninterrupted from 1729 until the
Revolution, made profits from them adequate enough to attract attention o f producers who lacked
the large slave labor forces to operate on the same grand scale as South Carolinas and settlers
along the Cape Fear River. Although North Carolinians were able to produce some lumber from
their pine forests, scarcity o f water power for sawmills and the difficulty and high cost of
transporting lumber made tar and pitch relatively more profitable. Also, naval stores
manufacturing, especially tar making, which could be performed at any time o f the year,
provided small farmers with a means to supplement their income, just as it did for Finnish
farmers.99 With no competing export commodity, limited transportation opportunities, and
seasonal flexibility in the production, “tar-making conditions,” as one scholar has explained,
“were at their best in the Carolinas, especially in North Carolina.”100

99 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 511; Martin, “American Gum Naval Stores Industry,”
58-59; Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 121; Schoenbaum, Islands. Capes, and Sounds. 225.
100 Airaksinen, “Tar Production,” 121.
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Chapter Two
North Carolina Trades Tar for Turpentine:
The Emergence of the Southern Turpentine Industry

During the antebellum period, turpentine developed into the most heavily demanded
naval stores product and its rapid production increase drove the industry, which remained
centered in North Carolina, to impressive heights. New uses and a growing need for turpentine
following the American Revolution brought prices high enough to make gum and spirit
production an appealing alternative to cotton cultivation for the southeastern North Carolina
counties, whose poor soils prevented extensive plantation agriculture. Such high returns
attracted the attention o f the state’s planter class by the 1830s. With access to capital resources
and the control of large, slave labor forces, these market-sensitive entrepreneurs invested in
thousands o f acres o f previously undesirable pine land, constructed their own distilleries, and
began production on a grand scale. At the same time a transportation revolution in North
Carolina facilitated turpentine’s expansion into areas previously too remote to permit profitable
manufacture. As high demand continued through the 1830s, 40s, and 50s the number o f
turpentine operations that spread across southeastern North Carolina taxed the state’s
undeveloped economic resources and structures. Not only did the many new businesses drive
land and labor costs higher, but the greatly increased production volume strained the poorly
organized marketing system. By the antebellum period’s end, efforts were under way to organize
better the system o f inspecting and selling these commodities.
During the first decades o f the 1800s the variety of applications for rosin, tar, and
turpentine grew. Rosin became widely used in making soap. It did nothing to enhance the
properties of soap, only increased its bulk. Tar had a multitude of uses. It was painted on coarse

57
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surfaces to make them smooth and applied to posts to prevent rotting. Cuts on domestic animals
that received a coat o f tar stood less chance of infection and the feet o f cattle painted with tar
were less likely to be injured by dampness or abrasion. Some farmers coated their grain seeds
with tar to discourage hungry birds. At the beginning o f the nineteenth century the greatest
demand for naval stores continued to come from shipyards. Tar remained the most important
naval stores commodity, but turpentine production increased faster than other naval stores
manufacturing and replaced pitch as the second most produced of these products.1 Spirits also
served as flea repellent and as a waterproofing agent for cloth. It could even be used to wash
clothes, especially to remove grease spots. Economist Kustaa Hautala speculates that this rise in
demand for turpentine occurred because of oil paints, in which turpentine served as a thinner.
Turpentine’s use in oil based paints increased until, by 1855, it was estimated that the industry

1Thomas Jefferson’s trade policies did little to stifle the industry’s progress. Attempting
to bring Great Britain and France to terms over abuses o f American shipping rights, in 1807
Jefferson drafted and Congress passed an embargo which forbade American ships to leave the
United States for any foreign port. Repealed in early 1809, the Embargo Act’s short lived impact
on naval stores exports was reflected in the sudden rise o f prices in foreign ports. Tar, which
sold in 1807 in Liverpool for $4.67 a barrel rose to $5.56 the next year. The rise in turpentine
prices was even greater, from $3.00 for one hundred pounds in 1807 to $8.00 or $9.00 in 1808, a
jump of around three hundred percent. Foreign turpentine prices probably reacted more to the
embargo than did tar because no alternative source for the former existed. The Baltic states
continued to produce tar in limited quantities. Yet, during the embargo turpentine exports from
North Carolina rose by more than three hundred percent. In 1804, 28,500 gallons or 650 barrels
of gum left North Carolina. By 1810 the amount was 94,900 gallons or 2160 barrels. However
the War of 1812 appears to have more seriously affected naval stores trade. The inability of
North Carolina producers to ship their products to northern ports caused crude gum prices in
New York to rise from $2.50 per barrel in 1812 to $12.00 per barrel the next year. A Dr.
William Lay Smith, who made turpentine by the Chowan River north o f Edenton and one o f the
few producers in the upper Albermarle region at the time, saw his business ruined by the war
time interruption in trade. W. W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products of
Eastern North Carolina (Raleigh: North Carolina Geological Survey, 1984), 74; Jack Temple
Kirby, Poquosin: A Study o f Rural Landscape and Society (Chapel Hill: The University o f North
Carolina Press, 1995), 30-31; F. Andre Michaux. The North American Svlva (Philadelphia: D.
Rice & A. N. Hart, 1857), 112, 114; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the AnteBellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 49; Thomas Gamble, “Early
History of the Naval Stores Industry in North America,” in Naval Stores: History. Production.
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing
Company, 1921), 23; G. Terry Sharrer, “Naval Stores, 1781-1881,” in Material Culture o f the
Wooden Age, ed. Brooke Hindle (Tarrytown, NY: Sleepy Hollow Press, 1981), 252.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59
consumed 112,000 gallons o f it a day. Popular belief held that turpentine possessed a multitude
of curative properties, especially as a treatment for respiratory disease and as a powerful
purgative. So powerful was the effect of turpentine perceived to be against cholera, diphtheria,
whooping cough, hay fever, and phthisis that merely living in a pine forest was thought to
provide some protection. As a preventative measure, turpentine could also be burned to purify
the air. Patients with worms, hemorrhages, and severe gas might receive turpentine rectally.
Turpentine was even applied to both male and female genitalia to treat gonorrhea and sores. But
taken in too large a dose, turpentine could have dangerous consequences.2 Alex MacRae of
Washington, North Carolina warned his brother Donald to “watch carefully the effects o f the
vermifuge [medicine to expel parasites] + Spts. Turpt you give Lizzy.. . When given too often or
for too long a time results badly.” MacRae recounted that he “was once rendered blind + stupid
as a goose for 24 hours for taking too much” turpentine.34
In the 1830s the discovery o f two new uses for turpentine further boosted its production.
The rubber industry, which was expanding during that decade, began using turpentine as a
solvent. More important, turpentine became a main ingredient in a popular lamp fuel. During
the 1830s Americans experimented with alternatives to tallow-dipped candles and sperm whale

2 “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” De Bow’s Review. 18 (February 1855): 190191; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 75; Kustaa Hautala, “European and
American Tar in the English Market During the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,”
Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae 130 (1964): 114-115; Francis Peyre Porcher, “Uses of
Rosin and Turpentine in Old Plantation Days,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution
and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company,
1921), 29-30; John S. Haller, Jr., “Sampson of the Terebinthinates: Medical History of
Turpentine,” Southern Medical Journal 77 (June 1984): 752-753; Franklin B. Hough, Report
Upon Forestry, vol. 1, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1878), 138;
3 Alex MacRae, Jr. to D. MacRae, August 27, 1863, Hugh MacRae Papers, Special
Collections Library, Duke University.
4 Charles Christopher Crittenden, The Commerce of North Carolina. 1763-1789 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), 160.
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oil. Early efforts to bum turpentine as a substitute failed because it gave off a strong odor and
had a tendency to smoke. Attempts at burning turpentine-based mixtures met with similar
failure. The first wideiy-used lighting alternative consequently was not turpentine but lard oil.
Introduced in 1841, this fast-burning fuel gave off satisfactory light, however in cold weather it
hardened and became useless. Soon afterwards, a mixture o f alcohol and turpentine, popularly
known as Camphene, Camphine, Teveline, and Palmetto oil, appeared for general use and
gradually replaced lard oil. Not only did Camphene give off more light without ever flaring up,
but it was cheaper and burned longer.5 In February 1847, B. Murphy & Co., manufacturer of
Camphene lamps in Philadelphia, claimed of the lamps that for “half the money they will give
double the light of any Oil or Lard Lamp yet invented.”6 It sold for about 40 cents per gallon.
Camphene soon became the most popular illuminant in America and burned in homes,
businesses, hotels, public buildings, and aboard some trains. In at least one instance it was even
burned as a heat source for hatching eggs in an incubator. It could be purchased at distilleries,
from merchants or druggists, or, in large cities, delivered to the home or business.7 So popular
was the oil that when the New York market experienced unusually low turpentine shipments
from the South, it was reported that “the quantity of Camphene used for burning has become so

5 By the mid 1850s, the rubber industry annually consumed 4,650 casks containing a
total of 187,000 gallons o f spirits. Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum
South, 1789-186l” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 203-208, 213.
6 “Latest Improvement in the Camphene Lamp,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 26
February 1847.
7 “Camphine! Camphene!!,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 2 March 1849;
Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss.,
Duke University, 1947), 212, 214; Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical
Geography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 158; “Camphine Lamps,”
Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle 21 December 1842; “The Southern Pine Forest—
Turpentine,” 191.
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great, that for this purpose alone, a large supply is needed, and any considerable disruption in the
receipts is immediately felt.”*
However, Camphene had to be handled with great care. When used correctly this oil
provided safe effective lighting, but serious accidents sometime occurred from carelessness with
this volatile and flammable fluid. When in 1847 a Philadelphia man attempted to fill a lighted
lamp, the Camphene exploded, “blowing the lamp to pieces and the bottom of the can out, and
setting fire to the room and to his clothes, from which he was so dreadfully burned.” After a day
he died.9 In 1851 a Mrs. Ewing o f Chesterfield County, Virginia, near Petersburg, met
unfortunate circumstances when the lit camphene lamp she held in her hand burst into flames
which immediately engulfed her. She too lingered for several days before succumbing to her
burns. Each of these cases represents the two different circumstances under which camphene
lamps could explode. As in the Philadelphia case, refilling the lamp while the wick still burned,
could ignite vapors rising from the pouring liquid and transfer the flame from the wick to the oil
can. In many such instances, the panicked lamp lighter would drop the can spreading the flames.
As in the Chesterfield County case, the sloshing o f the oil in the glass lamp, even from the
motion o f walking with it, could cause the oil to overflow its reservoir, catch fire from the wick,
and run down the outside o f the lamp. The heat from the burning oil on the lamp’s exterior
would crack the glass causing the rest of the oil to escape, spreading the fire. By the 1850s the
annual deaths from accidents involving Camphene lamps exceeded those from steamboat
explosions and railroad accidents combined. In response to consumer concerns, a safer lamp
soon appeared. Newell’s Patent Safety Lamps kept the burning wick away from the vapor, thus

*Quoted in Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 17891861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 207.
9 “Death from Camphine Gas,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 12 October 1849.
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reducing the risk of explosion. Also introduced was the safety can and filler which allowed for
refilling o f the lamp while it continued to bum.10
With Camphene rendered safe, producers who rushed to meet the increased demand for
turpentine faced a perplexing problem. Because distilled gum yielded four gallons o f rosin for
every one gallon of spirits o f turpentine, increased turpentine production resulted in over
production of rosin. Experiments to discover marketable uses for rosin yielded two new oil
products. Pinoline, the lightest of these oils, could be burned as an illuminant, while the heavier
oil, known as rosin oil, was used as a lubricant and in the manufacturing o f printing inks. Rosin
oil production increased in the 1850s, with most of its manufacturing facilities located in the
northern states. However, similar plants opened in Wilmington and New Bern before the end of
the 1850s. Yet rosin consumption never approached that o f turpentine and throughout the
nineteenth century was treated largely as a byproduct of spirits production."
As increased demand for turpentine raised its price, more North Carolinians began
harvesting gum. The first burst of production began in the area between the Tar and Cape Fear
Rivers, especially the Washington and New Bern areas, where the inhabitants were already
familiar with the methods o f turpentining (fig. 2.1). By the late 1830s, the quest for more
suitable pine land lead to the opening of turpentine operations on the west and south sides of the
Cape Fear River, where, until then, general opinion held that local pines would not yield

10 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 206, 209-212.
" Ibid., 216-221; “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” 191.
Figure 2.1: Tench Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures o f the United States
of America for the Year 1810 (Philadelphia: A. Comman. Jr. 1814), 133-134.
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sufficient gum (fig. 2.2). By 1840, when Edmund Ruffin traveled through the Cape Fear Basin,
turpentining was “the almost sole business of the thinly settled population o f the pine lands.”
Throughout the 1840s the industry moved up the Cape Fear toward the northwest into
Cumberland and Harnett Counties and to the south, spreading into South Carolina. In 1844 one
Henry Harrison cut the first boxes near the town of Manchester in Harnett County and shipped
the gum to Fayetteville for distilling. Harrison’s turpentine was probably handled by Thomas
Lutterlaw, who that same year opened the first distillery in Fayetteville.12
Repeal of British duties on turpentine over-heated the market and eventually led to a
temporary downturn. Becoming effective in May 184S, the repeal made exports to England
increase and American prices climb. Speculation followed. A New York firm attempted to
comer the market, causing prices to rise from $2.30 per barrel to $3.00 to more than $5.00.13
Attracted by these outrageously high prices, the Wilmington Journal reported, “many of our
citizens have withdrawn their labor and capital from their wonted channels, and have embarked
them in making Turpentine.. . . ” However, the bubble soon burst. In the mean time, “Lands and
negroes have been both purchased and hired at high prices, in the anticipation that the product of
the pine would continue to command such a price as would amply repay any outlay.” Producers

12 Edmund Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” The Farmer’s Register 8 (30 April
1840): 250; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 75; Percival Perry, “The Naval
Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” North Carolina Forestry History Series 1 (April
1967): 8; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 516; Hough, Report Upon Forestry. 138.
13 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 517.
Figure 2.2: United States Department of State, Compendium o f the Enumeration o f the
Inhabitants and Statistics o f the United States as Obtained at the Department o f State. From the
Returns of the Sixth Census. 1840 (Washington. DC: 1841), 158, 170, 182, 194, 206, 218, 230,
242, 254, 266, 338.
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were urged to hold their current crop off the market until the large supplies at New York,
Liverpool, and London had diminished and the price recovered.14 The strategy worked. By the
fall of 1845 prices rose to $3.50 per barrel of raw turpentine and 600 for spirits and production
resumed its expansion.15 By 1847 North Carolinians made an estimated 800,000 barrels o f were
urged to hold their current crop off the market until the large supplies at New York, Liverpool,
and London had diminished and the price recovered.16 The strategy worked. By the turpentine,
valued at between $1,700,000 and $2,000,000. And around ‘Tour or five thousand laborers are
engaged in making it, and perhaps three times as many more human beings are supported mainly
from the proceeds o f its first sale.”17 De Bow’s Review guessed that “there is no one article
produced in this country by the same number o f laborers, which contributes so much to the
commerce and prosperity o f the country as the article o f turpentine.”18 By 1850, turpentine
production had reached the upper reaches o f the Cape Fear and Deep Rivers and Fayetteville and
Cumberland County especially its seat, Fayetteville, became the inland center of the trade.19
A shift to planter control of production accompanied the turpentine industry’s migration
into the Cape Fear region. Since the late 1720s, small farmers had manufactured most naval
stores; as the industry expanded along the Cape Fear in the 1840s and continued its dramatic

14 “Naval Stores,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 15 May 1846.
15 “New York Market,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 20 November 1846.
16 “Naval Stores,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 15 May 1846.
17 “North Carolina, Its Resources, Manufactures, Ect.,” The Commercial Review o f the
South and West 4 (October 1847): 257.
18 “North Carolina, Its Resources, Manufactures, Ect.,” 258.
19 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 75-77; Percival Perry, “The Naval
Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” North Carolina Forestry History Series 1 (April
1967): 8; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860.” The Journal
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 519.
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growth into the 1850s, men with capital and large numbers o f slaves entered the production on a
grand scale. Although these businessmen may not have participated in a classic market
relationship with their bound labor, they certainly engaged in a market exchange o f their product
and shifted to turpentine in order to benefit from its increasingly profitable trade. The large
producers included James R. Grist, who worked timber in Brunswick and Columbus Counties
with over 100 slaves; James Metts, whose 65 slaves harvested turpentine in both North and South
Carolina; John A. Averitt, whose 125 slaves were primarily employed in turpentine on his huge
estate in Onslow County; and Daniel L. Russell, who with 25,000 acres in Brunswick County
and 150 slaves, was one o f the largest producers in the state. In many cases these large operators
were the sons o f Washington, North Carolina, area planters who moved to the previously
untapped region where they could work their slave labor forces more profitably in the virgin
timber than in the region’s poor soils, which were unable to sustain intensive agriculture.20 As
large turpentiners took control o f more and more production in the 1840s and 1850s, evidence
suggests, the size o f the operation tripled. A sample of newspapers advertisements for the sale of
operations reveals that while the average business in the 1840s consisted of around 25,000 boxes,
by the 1850s the typical operation made use of 85,000 boxes.21

20 James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation o f the Old South (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 54; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 17901860,” The Journal o f Southern History 34 (November 1968): 516; Percival Perry, “The Naval
Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), ISO151.
21 “Land for Sale on Cape Fear River,” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 10
November 1841; “Lands for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 27 June 1845; “Real
Estate for sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 July 1845; “Plantation for Sale,”
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 24 April 1846; “Valuable Turpentine Land For Sale,”
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 20 November 1846; “Valuable Real Estate.” Wilmington.
North Carolina Journal. 26 February 1847; “Valuable Lands For Sale.” Wilmington. North
Carolina Journal. 22 December 1848; “Lands For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29
December 1848; “Valuable Farming and Turpentine lands For Sale.” Wilmington. North
Carolina Journal, 2 March 1849; “Valuable Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.
11 May 1849; “For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.” 10 August 1849; “Notice.—A
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For those few North Carolinians capable of profitably cultivating cotton, naval stores
actually offered a better alternative in many years. At the same time turpentine prices rose
during the 1830s and 1840s, cotton prices fell. The Panic o f 1837 badly hurt the cotton market;
the 1836 price o f 13.30 by 1839 had dropped to 7.90 and reached a low o f 5.50 in 1844.22 With
cotton prices generally depressed during the 1840s, one observer commented that “compared to
other labor,” turpentine “has, for the last ten years, been deemed the most profitable of all.”23 In
1846 the Fayetteville Observer reported that the turpentine region of North Carolina “has never,
to our knowledge, been in so prosperous a condition as at present. Lands have risen, one, two, or
three hundred per cent, and labor is so profitable that the country is full o f money to make
investments.”24 In 1846 the Tarboro Press described “a gentlemen [sic] who had gone to
Wilmington to sell his turpentine, in pocketing $1900, remarked that sum was the produce of the
labor of four hands.” In 1850 a Barnwell County, South Carolina man concluded that turpentine

Valuable Plantation For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 23 November, 1849;
“Valuable Plantation For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 23 November 18491;
“Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.” 19 July 1850; “A Great Bargain,”
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 October 1850; “Land and Negroes For Sale,”
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 July 1851; “ 10,000 Acres o f Land For Sale,” Wilmington.
North Carolina Journal. 21 November 1851; “For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29
October 18521; “Valuable Cape Fear Plantation For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.
24 June 1853; “Valuable Real Estate For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4
November 1853; “Valuable Real Estate For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 10
March 1854; “Land For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal 13 October 1854; “A
Valuable Tract o f Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 January 1856;
“Turpentine Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856; “For Sale,
Valuable Turpentine and Farming Lands in Bladen County,” Wilmington. North Carolina
Journal. 21 March 1856; “Turpentine Lands in Florida For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina
Journal. 21 March 1856; “A Turpentine Farm For Sale or Rent,” Wilmington. North Carolina
Journal. 29 August 1856.
22 William J. Cooper, Jr. and Thomas E. Terrill, The American South: A History (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 192.
23 “Product o f Turpentine at the South,” De Bow’s Southern and Western Review 11
(September 1851): 305.
24 “The Turpentine Region,” Tarboro. North Carolina Press. 11 February 1846.
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production offered a profitable alternative for timber owners who “are tired of making cotton at
the low prices, to which planters have been hitherto compelled to submit.”25
Cotton prices recovered by the early 1850 and remained stable, even during the Panic o f
1857.26 But turpentine prices also remained relatively stable and continued to rival cotton
profits. Dugall McMillan o f Wilmington maintained that one slave could collect 200 barrels of
turpentine in a season and that the profit margin was very good. It was “better by far than cotton
raising,” he reported, and “many cotton planters are going into it.” Prices remained steady, he
believed, because the demand expanded with the growing number of producers.27 The average
hand, it was estimated in 1850, could make one hundred, fifty barrels o f dip and fifty of scrape.
With the former selling at $2.50 per barrel and the latter at $1.25 a barrel, a producer could
realize a gross profit o f $437.50. Subtracting $137.50 in expenses ($60 for two hundred barrels
costing 30 cents each, $50 for shipping to market at twenty-five cents per barrel, and $27.50 in
commission to the factorage house), the turpentiner could make $300 per hand. With cotton
selling at nine cents per pound, a cotton planter could make only $200 per hand. With prices
running around $2.31 for dip and $1.50 for scrape in 1852, the naval stores industry continued to
attract producers.28 That year William Underhill of Wake County reported that “turpentine is all
that is talk a bout nearby, it has been very high this year.”29 In the fall, a Wake County area

25 “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” The Commercial Review of the South
and West 8 (May 1850): 455.
26 Cooper and Terrill, American South. 192.
27 Dugall McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 14 April 1846, Southern Cultivator 4
(November 1846): 172-173.
28 “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 455; “Review of the Newbem
Market,” The New Bern. North Carolina Newbemian. 6 January 1852.
29 W. M. Underhill to Brother and Sister, 20 December 1852, Ransom Lee Papers,
Special Collections Library, Duke University.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70
shoemaker quit his shop and began cutting boxes in his father-in-law’s pines.30 Naval stores
prices soared in 1853. On the Wilmington market, dip sold for $3.90 to $4.00 per barrel, scrape
for $2.10 to $2.30 and spirits at 63 cents to 65 cents per gallon. At these prices, the Fayetteville
Observer reported, “the Naval Stores men o f the state, (and their name is legion,) are coining
money out o f the pine trees.”31
The increased prosperity and rise in land values that the turpentine boom brought seemed
a blessing for North Carolinians living in southeastern portion o f the state where soil was
incapable o f sustaining commercial cotton agriculture. Edmund Ruffin, the South’s leading
agricultural reformer, like other observers, was struck by the poor, sandy soil of the southeastern
pine region. He found the level land broken only by slight depressions of swampy areas where
loblolly pine grew. “But whether dry or wet,” he proclaimed, “ all these pine lands, and the
shallow ‘bays’ intersecting them are very poor. . . and will continue worthless for tillage.”32 J.
MacLeod o f Wilmington agreed that the “long leaf was found on soil that will produce little
else.”33 Dugall McMillan, who traveled through the area in the mid 1840s, remarked that “the
stranger who enters North Carolina will be struck with the wilderness appearance.” The area’s
“sandy, stark soil offers little to tempt the adventurer or emigrant to settle down.”34 Olmsted
understood that North Carolina dominated the South’s naval stores production “because, in it,
cotton is rather less productive than in the others, in an average o f years.” He observed that “in
the region in which the true turpentine-trees grow, indeed, there is no soil suitable for growing

30 Ibid.; W. M. Underhill to Brother and Sister, 1 September 1852, Lee Papers.
31 “High Prices,” Fayetteville Observer. 1 February 1853.
32 Ruffin, “Notes on a Steam Journey,” 246.
33 John MacLeod, “The Tar and Turpentine Business o f North Carolina,” Monthly
Journal o f Agriculture 2 (July 1846): 13.
34 McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 172.
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cotton; and it is only in the swampy parts, or on the borders o f streams flowing through it, that
there is any attempt at agriculture.35 A Bladen County resident commented that “in the pine
region tracts owned by individuals unfit for cultivation, high prices o f turpentine has added much
to their value.”36
In the mid 1850s turpentine continued to distract producers away from cotton.
Turpentiner Benjamin Williams, his wife explained in 1854, did “not like to remove any of his
hands from his turpentine land, the income from that being much larger than from the
plantation.”37 In 1855 De Bow’s Review reported that “no business makes better returns for
common labor, take one year with another, not even the culture of cotton and tobacco, especially
when the amount o f capital employed is taken into consideration.” The same article claimed that
a prime turpentine laborer could gather $600 or $700 worth o f turpentine in a year. After
deducting the costs o f barrels, hauling, provisions, the overseer’s wage, and other expenses, $200
per hand was a moderate return.38
With the increase in turpentine harvesting, the number o f distilleries in port towns grew.
In 1818 the first turpentine still in Wilmington began operating. In 1845 the Tarboro Press

35 Frederick Law Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States (New York: Dix &
Edwards, 1856), 338.
36 J. Wright to Thomas D. McDowell, 9 December 1858, Thomas David Smith
McDowell Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
37 Sarah F. Williams to Parents, 17 March 1854, Sarah Hicks Williams Papers, Southern
Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
38 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” De Bow’s Review
2 (October 1855): 488. D.W. Kyle, an enterprising man searching for business opportunities with
the greatest return, informed his friend John Buford in 1856 that he was interested in the Pacific
Railroad because “it is the place to make money.” He also anticipated going into “the turpentine,
tar, and pitch trade.” D. W. Kyle to John Buford, 29 March 1856, John Buford Papers, Special
Collections Library, Duke University. In 1859 one producer proclaimed, “good turpentine land is
a fortune.” G. W. Perry, A Treatise on Turpentine Farming (New Bern, North Carolina: Muse &
Davis, 1859), 87.
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reported that Wilmington had nine turpentine distilling operations with a total o f thirty stills.
The paper estimated the daily capacity o f these facilities combined at five hundred barrels of
resin and four thousand casks o f spirits a day. The largest distillery operated seven stills, while
the smallest ran but two. Between September 1845 and March 1846 Wilmington added three
new distilleries, bringing the city’s number of stills to thirty-seven with three more under
construction. When all were completed, the city’s thirty-seven stills were thought to consume
1,500 barrels of crude turpentine a day and produce two hundred barrels of spirits.39 A traveler
visiting Wilmington in 1846 reported that “there are to be seen here twenty turpentine
distilleries, most o f them lately set up and all doing a very profitable business.” So impressed
was he with such activity in the port town that he proclaimed it North Carolina’s commercial
capital.40 Washington experienced a similar increase in distilleries. In 1842, three distilleries
that consumed up to two hundred barrels a day were operating in Washington. By January 1846,
Washington, where naval stores represented nearly seventy-five percent o f the value of all
products leaving its port, had seven turpentine distilleries in operation and another was under
construction. Between these seven operations there were fifteen stills which, when all running at
their peak capacity, required six hundred barrels of crude gum a day 41 The increase in local
distilling brought an end to the earlier practice of shipping crude turpentine to the North and

39 Steam Mills and Turpentine Distilleries, Tarboro. North Carolina Press. January 25,
1845; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D.
diss., Duke University, 1947), 243, 249; Sharrer, “Naval Stores,” 254.
40 McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 172.
41 “Trade o f Washington.” Tarboro. North Carolina Press. 21 January 1846.
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England for distillation.42 By 1844 fifty percent o f the crude gum distilled in the United States
was distilled in North Carolina, the result o f the growing number o f stills operating in that state.43
With the rapid increase in distilleries, raw turpentine processing grew into an important
segment o f the North Carolina economy. In 1847, the industry supported 150 stills with an
average cost o f SUSOO.44 One observer explained that “the cost o f distilling is very great, and
when we reckon the cost o f transportation, the profits of distillers, o f ship owners, commission
merchants, and the venders o f the article abroad, it will be seen that the capital and labor
employed is not only immense, but the numbers who are supported by the manufacture and sale
of the article is astonishing.”45 Distilleries consisted of more than one or more stills and their
shelters. In 1849 one typical operation, located one-half mile north o f Wilmington, had four
stills, capable of running one hundred barrels o f gum a day; a large spirit house, where distilled
turpentine was stored to protect the casks from the heat of the sun; a large glue house, where
empty spirit casks were prepared by coating their interior with hot glue; “a large Negro house”
where the slave workers slept; and a wharf.46
Communities did not always welcome these combustible facilities. Between 1842 and
1852, twenty Wilmington area stills were destroyed by fire. In 1844 the Wilmington Chronicle
objected to the construction o f a distillery in a densely populated section of the town. At around
the same time, a still at the Brown and DeRossets Distillery caught fire, destroying all the

42 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 516.
43 Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current
Problems o f the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., The University o f North
Carolina, 1942). 77.
44 “North Carolina, Its Resources, Manufactures, Ect.,” 258.
45 Ibid.
46 “Distillery for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 24 January 1849, 3.
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buildings, most o f them sheds, and between six hundred and seven hundred barrels o f rosin. The
total loss amounted to between $1200 and S1500.47 In 1837 John Meyers became alarmed when
he learned that Joseph Redding planned to set up a turpentine still on a lot adjacent to his
property by the Tar River in Washington, North Carolina. Meyers feared for the safety o f the
wooden structures on his lots, which not only included shelters for protecting naval stores and
produce from the weather, but his family’s residence. Distilleries, Meyer complained, belted
ashes and soot throughout the community. Moreover these facilities commonly caught fire,
erupting into flames as many as six to eight hours after the still had stopped operating. When
such operations caught fire, they were difficult to extinguish. Flammable barrels of turpentine
and rosin surrounded stills and often guaranteed that accidental fires would grow large and last
long. Meyer worried that with the right winds, the flames from such a conflagration could travel
the distance to his property. “It is because of the great annoyance for smoke + ashes that
distilleries are commonly placed out o f the reach o f other buildings,” Meyer stated.48
With naval stores promising such high returns, not only did businessmen erect annoying
stills in North Carolina’s port communities but sections of the state experienced a population
increase as hopeful producers rushed into the area. Fayetteville and Cumberland County
experienced solid economic and population growth, each related to the turpentine industry’s
prosperity. The county’s population, especially its slave population, was on the rise. Between
1840 and 1850 Cumberland’s white population increased from 15,284 to 20,160, a rise o f 34
percent. However the slave population rose 75 percent, from 4285 to 7217 49 The Fayetteville

47 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861,”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 62-63.
48 Edward Pauly to the Honorable the Judge o f the Court of Equity for the County of
Beaufort, 16 January 1837, Thomas Sparrow Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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Observer explained in 18S3 that “the population o f this county has increased about 1000 since
the first o f the present month—about 300 whites and 700 slaves having come here from other
parts of the State to engage in the turpentine business.” Area boosters looked forward to the
increased business this production would bring since “grain, provisions, and other necessities of
life, would be in demand.”50
One result o f this newfound prosperity was an increased cost o f labor. The Fayetteville
North Carolinian reported that “Negroes hired on New Year’s day for prices higher by 25 to 33
per cent than last year—first rate men bringing from 100 to 135 dollars. This is attributed to the
high price o f timber in the Wilmington market, the great demand for labor on the various plank
roads now in process of construction from this place, and also on the Cape Fear and Deep River
improvements, and the increasing production of turpentine in the surrounding country.”51
Olmsted found that in the early 1850s “wages of ordinary practiced turpentine hands (slaves) are
about $120 a year, with board, clothing, ect., as usual.”52 In 1852 one producer reported that
hiring prices were high for turpentine hands, between $125 and $150. However for $100 he had
been able to hire a white man. Although the slave population rose it was not enough to keep up
with demand. With one slave estimated to earn for his employer $500 to $800 a year laboring in
the naval stores industry, owners could hire them out for between $150 and $175 annually. The
rising cost o f hiring turpentine slaves in the 1840s and 1850s is illustrated by the prices charged
by the Francis Harper heirs o f New Bern who hired out slaves to turpentine producers. In 1849
they received $56.50 for “Amas” and $49.50 for “Haywood.” In 1852 Amas and Haywood were
49 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 258-259.
50 “The Tide Turned,” Fayetteville Observer. 25 January 1853.
51 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 258.
52 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 346.
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each rented for $125, and by 1853 Aamas’s hiring price had risen to $175 and in 1854 to $215.
This increase corresponds with a 1853 Fayetteville Observer report indicating that the annual
cost of hiring a good naval stores laborer was $ 150 to $ 175. By 1860 turpentine workers were
hired for as much as $250. However especially skilled slaves could cost even more to rent. In
1853 a blacksmith for the Grist operation cost $300 to hire.53 Producers found difficulty in
securing such talented slaves. They occasionally became available for hire when the operation
they worked for closed.54
Producers could not only rent slaves, but turpentine boxes as well. The rental price
depended on the boxes’ age and their distance from transportation. In 1854 C. W. Smith
received $ 181.32 for the rent of 17,435 boxes for 4 years. The price amounted to $26.00 per year
for 10,000 boxes. However, some rental agreements were made for only one year. For the
turpentine season o f 1846/1847 William D. Rodman rented his turpentine boxes to Mabum
Minifield and Allison Whitly but found new renters for the next season. In cases of a turnover in
renters, it was common for the gun in the boxes to be reserved for the previous year’s renter until
time for the new renter to commence chipping. Rental agreements usually contained other
stipulations. When a producer rented turpentine boxes belonging to the estate of A. B. Mattick
for 1860, he was required to post notes of security before working the boxes and had to agree to

53 W. M. Underhill to Brother and Sister, 20 December 1852, Lee Papers; “High Prices;”
Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss.,
Duke University, 1947), 42-42; Slave Hiring Agreements, 1849, 1852, 1854, 1854, Francis
Harper Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; Alfred Smith to James R. Grist, 11
January 1853, “List o f Negroes belonging to Mr. John W. Grist and Worked bv Grist + Striknev
during the year o f 1861,” 1860, James Redding Grist Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke
University.
54 In 1854 a sawmill and distillery business in Lumberton was auctioned at the Robeson
County courthouse. At the sale there was “hired out until the I st day o f January next, about
twenty-five slaves who have been engaged in the Turpentine and Saw-Mill business.” “Steam
Saw-Mill, Turpentine Still, &c. Trust Sale" Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 17 March
1854.
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maintain a split rail fence on the premises. For this lease, the renter had use o f a house on the
land, its out buildings, and the orchard.55
As naval stores prices rose and created greater demand for both rented and purchased
pine land, more marginal areas went into production. Convenient access to a still or market
could determine whether or not a timber stand was worked for turpentine. Olmsted noted that “it
is yet thought a harder venture to start the business where more than thirty miles wagoning is
required to bring the spirits o f turpentine to a railroad or navigable water.”56 Turpentine
producers were advised to locate their operations as nearby a still as possible. “You may do a
very profitable business,” De Bow’s Review explained, “six or seven miles off if the country is
favorable for hauling. If the distillery is on a river, turpentine may be hauled two or three miles,
and rafted down forty or fifty miles, cheaper than to haul to the still over six or seven miles.”57
Pine forests on the periphery of transportation systems were often so isolated they could not be
profitably worked at all or, at most, worked for only the most valuable gum.58 Some producers
could only profitably harvest gum, not scrape, or work the tree for only a few years. While
traveling through North Carolina Olmsted observed trees at a prohibitively far distance from the
market that had never been scraped. In such cases scrape, which contained about half the spirits
of gum and was therefore less valuable, was not worth the expense of the labor to collect it and

55 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 44; John F. Minifield to William R. Rodman, 30 October
1847, William Blount Rodman Papers, North Carolina State Archives; “The Condition of
renting farm land + Turpentine Boxes belonging to the estate A. B. Matttick dec.,” 28 December
1859, William Basden Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
56 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 339.
57 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486.
58 One producer found that “the tract o f land belonging to Mary Eliza laying on Turnbull
is so inconvenient that I have concluded not to cut Turp. boxes this spring.” Thomas D. S.
McDowell to Sir, 16 January 1843, Thomas David Smith McDowell Papers, Southern Historical
Collection, The University o f North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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the transportation to get it to market. But at the time of his journey, he added, “the price o f
turpentine being now much higher than usual, many of the small proprietors are this year
scraping their trees, that have not scraped before.”59 Edmund Ruffin observed that in the case of
scrape, which “is sold at half the price o f the fluid turpentine[,]

the expense o f Iand-carriage

is a sufficient bar to the production o f so heavy and low-priced products, where the distance is
considerable.”60 Other times when prices were not as high, turpentine operations located some
distance from transportation were worked only three or four years and then abandoned for new
areas. The greatest profits came during the first year’s harvest which yielded virgin turpentine
and number one rosin, the finest quality o f these respective products and which could be
obtained from trees only during their first year harvested for turpentine. Second and third year
harvests were also profitable. But as the distance that the gum had to flow down the face to the
box increased with each season, the more the gum deteriorated from greater exposure to the sun
and the less valuable it became.61
Olmsted also explained that with the rising demand for spirits “the business has been
extended into the depths of the forest.”62 The copper still, introduced in 1834, helped these
producers push farther inland and affected the turpentine industry much like the gin had cotton
production. Distilling in the forest permitted turpentining to be done further from transportation
routes near to which the industry had previously been confined. Copper stills, much like those
used in the scotch whisky industry, were much lighter than the large iron ones used in port cities
and could be transported, making it possible to refine gum in the forest, near to where it was

59 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 343
60 Ruffin, “Notes on a Steam Journey,” 250.
61 Percival Peny, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 45; Peny, Treatise on Turpentine Farming, 78.
62 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 339.
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harvested. Naval stores products were bulky relative to their value. With on-site stills, producers
were no longer burdened by the trouble and expense o f hauling the heavy barrels o f raw
turpentine to port. They could save by shipping ju st the lighter and more valuable spirits and
transport rosin only when its price was high enough to bring a profit Rosin prices reached these
high levels only occasionally. At distilleries located near rivers, producers saved just the first
and second quality rosin while the poorer qualities were run off and wasted. One distillery, by
the mid 1850s, had accumulated an estimated $15,000 worth of rosin which was simply drained
out of the still and left at the site because the freight prices were too high to justify shipping it to
market.63
Because stills cost between $1,500 and $2,000, only the largest producers could afford
their own. Wealthy businessmen also constructed inland distilleries to take advantage of the
spreading production. In 1854 Jonathan Worth, who would become the state’s governor during
Presidential Reconstruction, and his son operated a still in the extreme western part o f Harnett
County. Some Wilmington distillers brought their services closer to their clients. In 1848 W. O.
Jeffreys o f Wilmington advertised that he was constructing two new stills at Sarecta in Duplin
County. When constructing a still, they looked for three qualities in its location—close proximity
to adequate timber supply, access to transportation facilities, and a nearby water supply from
which to fill the condenser’s cooling tank.64

63 “Turpentine Business in North Carolina and Georgia,” The Commercial Review o f the
South and West 5 (April 1848): 364; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old
South, 1790-1860.” The Journal of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 514; Kenneth B.
Pomeroy and James G. Yoho, North Carolina Lands: Ownership. Use, and Management o f Forest
and Related Lands (Washington, DC: The American Forestry' Association, 1964), 14; Ashe,
Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 76; “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” 190;
Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 345.
64 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77; “To Turpentine Makers in
Duplin,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 12 May 1848; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 59; Martha
Green Hayes, “General History of the Turpentine Industry,” Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, Georgia,
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A temporary price collapse in late 1846 and 1847 necessitated a reduction in shipping
costs to maximize profits and thus spurred a movement away from central distillation in the port
cities and toward more inland locations, nearer the source o f production. Where in 1844
Cumberland County had only one distillery, by 1852 thirty-two distilleries operated. They
represented a combined capital investment o f $75,000, required $300,000 of operating capital,
and yielded an annual income of $348,000. And new distilleries were always being
constructed.65 In May 1847 prices dropped to two dollars per barrel for crude gum and to thirtyfive cents for a gallon o f spirits, down from sixty-five cents during the 1846 speculative bubble.
Wilmington exported 145 times as many barrels o f crude turpentine as casks o f spirits in 1837;
by 1848 only seven times as many gum barrels as spirit casks came through the port, and by the
mid 1850s their numbers were about even. Washington experienced a similar trend. By 1855
about half o f the spirits shipped from Washington had been distilled inland. The amount of
spirits shipped was also up over crude gum. That year 147,211 casks of turpentine left the port
and 68,897 barrels of gum. By 1860 the difference had grown even wider, with 147,962 casks of
spirits shipped, but only 49,176 barrels o f crude turpentine. Consequently, less raw turpentine
reached the market, reducing the loading volume and need for distilleries.66 In 1848, Scientific
American reported that “twenty years ago, there was more spirits o f turpentine distilled in
Europe than in the United States, but the tide has now turned and Europe gets turpentine from

53; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Loneleaf Pine Belt. 1840-1915
(University: The University o f Mississippi, 1962), 126.
65 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 258-259.
66 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 518; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products.
76-77; Richard C. Cook, “Naval Stores: The Forgotten Industry in Tar Heel State,” Naval Stores
Review 77 (July 1967): 8; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South,
1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 59.
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America.”67 By this time, North Carolina was unquestionably the most important turpentine
producer not only in the United States but in the world, far exceeding Finland and Russia which
continued to specialize in tar. In I860, North Carolina produced 96.7 percent of the naval stores
made in the United States. The total value of crude and distilled turpentine produced that year,
$5,311,420, represented a more than two hundred percent rise from ten years earlier.68
As with stills, transportation improvements—plank roads, opened rivers, steamboats, and
railroads—also facilitated the naval stores industry’s expansion by regularizing shipping and
reducing transportation costs. Commercial traffic on the Cape Fear River faced a considerable
challenge. Although steam boats came into general use nationally in the 1830s, through the next
decade most naval stores traffic continued to move by raft and pole boats, with each raft carrying
anywhere from twenty to three hundred barrels. The Cape Fear was commonly too low for
steamboat navigation during the summer. Often, naval stores had to wait at landings until winter
rains brought the river to a passable level. Wilmington’s port’s activity therefore depended on the
Cape Fear’s water level. Its market was busiest after heavy rains when the valley’s creek and
river levels rose high enough for inland producers to launch their rafts, weighted with naval
stores, lumber, and other commodities.69 But when water was too low, no products could come
through. The example o f Wilmington’s 1845 commercial cycle illustrates this situation. On

67 “Turpentine Business in North Carolina and Georgia,” 364.
68 Hautala, “European and American Tar,” 115; Abstract o f the Statistics of
Manufactures. According to the Returns o f the Seventh Census (Washington, DC: Department of
the Interior, 1858), 116; Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1865), 438.
69 Thomas Gamble, “Pages From Wilmington’s Story as America’s First Great Naval
Stores Port,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas
Gamble Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 31-32; Percival Perry, “The
Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861,” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University,
1947), 85-87, 89-90, 99-100.
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April 18 the Wilmington Journal reported that “owing to the very low state of the river, but very
little produce, o f any description, have reached this market within the past week.” After a month
of low water the paper reported with hope that they had “noticed a rise in the north-east prong of
the Cape Fear river, and also a slight rise o f the north-west.” But it was not enough o f a rise for
many commodities to get through. The Wilmington commission merchants waited with
anticipation for they understood “that from 8000 to 10,000 barrels of Naval Stores are on the way
to market—down the north-east prong. Some say 20,000 barrels are expected to reach the market
in a few days.” But not until August 7 was commercial traffic flowing freely. After a week of
heavy rains “the Cape Fear river has swollen several feet; it is now as full as it has been any time
during the last six months, and the atmosphere clearly indicates more rain yet.” According to the
paper, the rise in the river level brought large quantities o f timber into Wilmington, “likewise
Naval Stores.” In mid-December of the same year the river was up once again and nearly 40,000
barrels of naval stores entered to port. The wide fluctuation in turpentine availability was
reflected in a situation that occurred in Wilmington in 1846. By mid April, with the previous
year’s harvest nearly all into market, the raw turpentine supply ran out. Distilleries did not have
enough to continue operating and five sat idle. They could only wait for the new crop to find its
way to market when the river cooperated.70
In the 18S0s, the Cape Fear and Deep River Navigation Company, supported by
innovative Wilmington interests concerned with increasing the port’s activity, set about making
the Cape Fear River navigable as far north as Chatham County. Initiated to provide access to
coal beds in Chatham County, the resulting improvements consisted of a series o f dams and
locks. Because this newly navigable stretch of river passed through the longleaf belt, it provided
cheap transportation for an area that had previously been effectively cut off from the coastal

70 “Wilmington Market.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 18 April 1845; 16 May
1845; 8 August 1845; 19 December 184S; 17 April 1846.
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market. Enterprising men constructed stills at the landings that dotted the newly open stretch o f
the Cape Fear, permitting the naval stores industry to extend into the far western reaches o f the
longleaf pine belt.71
By the 1850s, new light-draft steamers were able to navigate the Cape Fear’s low water
level during the summer months and helped make naval stores marketing a year-round activity.
Most of the steamers that operated on the Cape Fear measured one hundred to one hundred,
thirty feet long and fifteen to twenty-five feet wide. Steamboats could carry from three hundred
to five hundred barrels o f naval stores, but most often the products were transported aboard large
flats, called lighters. Pulled behind steam boats, the lighters could carry from 300 to 1,100
barrels, depending on their size and the depth o f the river. When Frederick Law Olmsted
boarded a steamboat in Fayetteville headed for Wilmington, he discovered that “the bulk o f our
freight was turpentine.” Introduction o f river boats and navigation improvements gave
Wilmington another advantage over New Bern and Washington. The Tar and Neuse Rivers that
serviced the latter port communities were too shallow and sluggish to allow steam navigation,
forcing producers to continue using carts, wagons, and flatboats to transport their commodities to
market.72
Just as navigation improvements and steamboats improved water transportation, plank
roads, which radiated from Fayetteville into the pine forests, facilitated better overland
transportation. These roadways were constructed o f heart pine planks, cut nine to sixteen inches
wide, at least eight inches long, and three to four inches thick, laid at a ninety degree angle over

71 Percival Peny, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861,”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 97.
72 Gamble, “Pages From Wilmington’s Story,” 32; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 85-87, 8990, 99-100; Frederick Law Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom (1861: reprint, New York: The
Modem Library, 1984), 150.
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heavy sills which rested on a graded road bed. Ditches and culverts provided adequate drainage
to keep them dry. With these roads producers could haul their naval stores during any type o f
weather, even the most rainy periods when work in the forest slowed and time was best spent
transporting their goods to market. The first road built was the Fayetteville and Western, also
known as the “Appian Way o f North Carolina.” Incorporated in 1849, completed in 1854, and
reputed to be the longest plank road ever constructed, it extended for 129 miles from
Fayetteville, toward the northwest, and ended at the Moravian settlement o f Bethania in Forsyth
County. Its success as a toll road, especially from naval stores traffic, lead to the construction o f
other such roads radiating from Fayetteville. One ran from Fayetteville through the western
section of Cumberland County. Another which was supposed to connect Fayetteville with
Raleigh by passing through Harnett and into Wake County never was completed. However, the
finished portion provided access to areas of the pine forest that before had been too remote for
profitable turpentine production.73
Plank roads facilitated the naval stores industry’s spread into inland forests and funneled
a considerable portion o f the new production toward Fayettville. In 1852 the Fayetteville
Observer reported “that within the last three years the lands along the line of the Fayetteville and
Western Plank Road in this country,. . . have risen in value far more than the cost of that road
through the country.” Land prices rose because “the country, for sixty miles, has been thrown
open to the production o f various articles which previously could not be brought to market. We
may instance [sic] Turpentine which is too heavy for transportation long distances over bad

73 Hugh Talmadge Lefler, ed., North Carolina History Told by Contemporaries (Chapel
Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1948), 229; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores
Industiy in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal o f Southern History 34 (November 1968):
514, 519-520; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77; William S. Powell, North
Carolina Through Four Centuries (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1989),
305; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D.
diss., Duke University, 1947), 116, 118; “The Tide Turned,” Favettville Observer. 23 January
1853.
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roads. But upon the Plank Road a number o f Distilleries have been put up, and one is now going
up sixty miles from this place.”74 The Fayetteville Observer reported in 1853 that “the discovery
of the value o f our pines, aided by plank roads, has worked a wonderful change within the last
years.”7S Plank roads made Fayetteville the center o f wagon trade for the state and the inland
seat for the handling of naval stores and distillation o f crude gum. Most o f the products collected
at Fayetteville were shipped down the Cape Fear to Wilmington for export.76 However, wooden
roads, also referred to as “farmers’ railroads,” deteriorated rapidly, making their maintenance
difficult and expensive.77 Not only did they fall into disrepair but the cost o f moving goods on
them was relatively expensive, like all over-land transportation, although not as costly as over
dirt roads.
In the end, roads of iron worked the most lasting impact on the naval stores industry’s
growth. In 1833 farsighted citizens o f Wilmington, who believed correctly that their future
prosperity depended on rail transportation, subscribed $400,000 for the Wilmington and Raleigh
Railroad, which they chartered the following year. When Raleigh, which lacked Wilmington’s
enthusiasm for the project, failed to raise its share o f the capital, the projected route shifted
northward to the Roanoke River. In 1836 the charter was revised and in 1837 construction began
on the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad. By 1838 the line was already operating out of
Wilmington along the right bank of the Cape Fear River for a distance of sixty-four miles. Upon

74 Percival Peny, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 116, 118.
75 “The Tide Turned.”
76 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 116; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old
South, 1790-1860.” The Journal o f Southern History 34 (November 1968): 514, 519-520; Ashe,
Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77; Powell, North Carolina 305.
77 Powell, North Carolina 305.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86

completion in April, 1840, the Wilmington and Weldon was 161.5 miles long, the longest
railroad in the world. Edmund Ruffin, who traveled on the new line just after its completion,
believed it to be “the most level and straight route o f any of considerable length in the world; and
being well planned and constructed, as well as on so remarkable and admirable a location, it
necessarily is an excellent road.” It cut northward through the heart of the longleaf pine forest,
crossing the regions that had historically relied on the Tar and Neuse Rivers for transportation.
As a result, much of the naval stores trade that had once flowed toward Washington and New
Bern now rolled toward Wilmington, especially since railroads reportedly gave turpentine
shipping priority. Cotton bales sometimes sat beside the tracks for two or three weeks before
they were loaded, naval stores rarely had to wait as long.78
Wilmington sought to continue its hold on the naval stores trade in the 1850s by
constructing other rail lines that would terminate at its port. The Wilmington to Manchester
Railroad, completed in 1853, extended 158 miles through the pine forest o f Columbus County to
Manchester, South Carolina. By opening the forest in the southeastern tip o f North Carolina and
northeastern South Carolina, it helped develop the naval stores industry in these regions.79 In
1850 De Bow’s Review reported that “the route contemplated for the Wilmington and
Manchester railroad runs through the center of it [the pine forest]; and in anticipation of the
success o f this enterprise, lands which once brought no more than ten to twenty cents per acre,
have risen to $1 and Sl.50.”80

78 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
o f Southern History 34 (November 1968): 519-521; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest
Products. 77; Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 243; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 110.
79 Powell, North Carolina. 285-289; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the
Old South, 1790-1860.” The Journal o f Southern History 34 fNovember 1968): 519-521; “The
Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 451; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products.
77.
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The next major North Carolina railroad project, although it did not run to Wilmington,
was nevertheless designed to protect that town’s shipping volume. Fearful that a proposed line
from Danville, Virginia, through Charlotte, North Carolina, and on to Columbia, South Carolina,
would take trade away from North Carolina’s ports, particularly Wilmington, W. S. Ashe, a
Democratic congressman from New Hanover County, introduced a bill in the North Carolina
General Assembly in 1849 chartering the North Carolina Railroad Company. The state
subscribed two million o f the three million dollars needed for the project. Completed in 18S6,
the new rail line ran for 223 miles from Goldsboro, North Carolina, through Hillsborough,
Greensboro, Salisbury, and ended in Charlotte. Its eastern leg provided more access to the
western reaches of the pine barrens.
Wilmington sponsored yet another railroad in 1855. The Wilmington, Charlotte,
Rutherfordton Railroad was projected to run westward from Wilmington, through Bladen,
Robeson, and Richmond Counties. By the eve o f the Civil War, however, the line was completed
only a few miles beyond Lumberton, a distance o f only eighty miles. It nevertheless opened up
the pine forests of the region south o f the Cape Fear River and permitted turpentine production in
that area until the Civil War interrupted it (fig. 2.3).81 As Percival Perry, the recognized expert
on antebellum naval stores, has observed “improved transportation and the expansion o f the

80 “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 451.
81 Powell, North Carolina. 285-289; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the
Old South, 1790-1860.” The Journal o f Southern History 34 (November 1968): 519-521; Ashe,
Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77.
Figure 2.3: United States Department o f the Interior, Manufactures o f the United States
in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82, 168-204, 285-294, 420-438, 552-579.
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Figure 2.3. Naval Stores Production, I860, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, Value of Crude and Distilled Turpentine

89
naval stores industry in North Carolina went hand in hand, and each greatly influenced the
other.”82
These transportation improvements—clearing the Cape Fear River, steamboats, plank
roads, and railroads—raised Wilmington’s prominence in the naval stores trade. Producers
preferred to send turpentine to Wilmington by railroad than by boat to Washington. The railroad
offered a more reliable and regular means o f transportation to a more established market where
prices were higher because of lower shipping costs to northern ports. But while the railroad
linked Wilmington to previously inaccessible (ongieaf pine stands, it also made outside markets,
particularly those o f the north, accessible to the individual producers. Consequently a portion of
the new turpentine production in the Cape Fear bypassed Wilmington and traveled directly to
inland distributors. However, the railroad channeled a larger portion o f this new production to
Wilmington, which became the trading center of North Carolina naval stores, eclipsing both New
Bern and Washington. In 1837 Wilmington had exported but 81,872 barrels o f naval stores. In
1855 it handled 698,780 barrels and in 1860 777,691 barrels (fig. 2.4).83 In the mid 1850s, a
British traveler explained that “nearly the whole trade of the town is derived from the produce of
the pine forests. The Wharves display immense quantities of pitch and resin barrels, and stills

82 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 514. In 1855 the manager o f one Grist operation
requested that James Grist “Hire me fore negroes . . . for I cant get but fore or five over hear for
thair is more men over hear after negroes than ever was before and hire running high from 200 to
225 for the railroads[.] I shant hire but about 14 with the fore I ask of you to hir
” W. J. Grist
to Brother, 31 December 1855, Grist Papers.
83 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 257; Powell. North Carolina 285-289: Percival Perry, “The
Naval Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1869,” The Journal o f Southern History 34
(November 1968): 519-521; “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 451; Ashe, Forests.
Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 77; Cook, “Naval Stores,” 8; For figures related to antebellum
naval stores exports from the United States see Appendix A.
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Richard C. Cook, “Naval Stores: The Forgotten Industry in the Tar Heel State,” Naval Stores
Review 77 (July 1967): 8-9.

for the manufacture o f turpentine are numerous. Pitch and turpentine afford an export trade of
nearly one million sterling.”84 This trade made Wilmington’s population the fastest growing of
any town in North Carolina. In 1840 it was the largest town in the state with a population of
4,744. Fayetteville was second with 4,285 and New Bern third with 3,690. By 1860
Wilmington’s population had grown to 9,552, doubling in size since 1840, New Bern had 5,432
residents, and Fayetteville, which remained an important inland naval stores market but was
bypassed by all the main railroad arteries, had 4,790.8S Yet by most standards, Wilmington
remained a small town. In 1860, over one million people lived in New York, 565,000 in
Philadelphia, and 169,000 in New Orleans. One visitor to Wilmington found that ‘’the houses are
chiefly built of wood, and a little plot o f garden ground surrounds the best o f them. There is only

84 Robert Russell, North America: Its Agriculture and Climate (Edinburgh: Adam and
Charles Black, 1857), 158.
85 Guion Griffis Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina: A Social History (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 117.
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one street paved, and the other are no better than the loose sand can make them. The numbers o f
mean negro huts, in some parts, are by no means a pleasing feature o f the place.”86
Except for Wilmington’s domination of naval stores exports, there was little consistency
by which these products were marketed. Turpentine producers had a choice of ways to sell their
product. One means, used especially by small farmers, was to sell their raw turpentine to a
distillery owner. “Those collecting but a small quantity [of turpentine],” Olmsted observed, sell
to large producers who own stills “or to custom distilleries, owned by those who make distilling
alone their business.”87 Small producers in areas where turpentine was o f little importance and
located a considerable distance from a distillery could sell their few barrels of gum to a large
planter who marked it themselves. For example, in the 18S0s, William R. Smith, a planter from
Halifax County, North Carolina, handled small quantities of locally produced gum. Smith
maintained accounts for producers whose turpentine he purchased and offered them either cash
or such supplies as coffee, pork, com, bacon, and turpentining tools. Other small producers, who
could get their gum or spirits to market, sold them to speculators who bought naval stores on
commission for northern firms. Speculators commonly worked on a small scale because they
lacked wharf accommodations and worked only during the busiest time o f the marketing season.
Tar shipments into Wilmington peaked from January to May and turpentine from June to April,
but the latter was present in its greatest quantity from November 20 to February 1. If a producer
rafted his own turpentine to the market, he might serve as his own agent, finding a buyer and
making the sale while the barrels remained on the raft. By custom, the buyer purchased the
whole raft as landed, which could contain from twenty to as many as three hundred barrels of
naval stores. The buyer subtracted the cost o f handling, inspection, and cooperage, a charge of

86 Russell, North America, 158.
87 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 343.
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from ten cents to fourteen cents per barrel. If the producer could not accompany his product, it
was not uncommon before the mid-1840s for an inspector to serve as his agent for the sale.88
However, this arrangement proved unsatisfactory to many producers. In 1843 forty turpentiners
explained “that great dissatisfaction exists among turpentine makers with regard to the mode o f
inspecting that article in the town of Wilmington, the way in which it is disposed of, and the
manner generally o f conducting the business connected with its sale, leading to the belief that
they are not fairly dealt with

” They requested a change in either the inspection laws or the

manner of selling.89 When the practice o f inspectors serving as agents ended in 1844, some
inspectors quit their posts and became agents.90
Most producers, however, especially the large ones, employed the services o f a
commission and forwarding merchant, or factor, who, upon the naval stores’ arrival in port, saw
that they were unloaded, inspected, and sold. In the 1840s distillers and factors competed for
gum. The stiff competition gave producers such an advantage that they often had the option of
contracting their product in advance, which guaranteed them the highest market price at time o f
delivery and saved them the commission fee. As the amount of individual inland distilling
increased and the volume o f distillation in Wilmington waned in the latter 1840s and 18S0s,
competition loosened and the business for factors grew. Most producers chose to sell their naval
stores through factors, because factors proved so adept at marketing their commodity to the
producers’ best advantage and offered a variety o f other helpful services. Despite producers’

88 William R. Smith Memorandum Book, 1852-1853, Special Collections Library, Duke
University; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 148-149, 152; Gamble, “Pages from Wilmington’s Story,”
31-32.
89 “To Turpentine Makers,” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 27 December 1843.
90 “To Turpentine Makers,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 September 1844;
“Notice,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 30 May 1845.
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reliance on unfree labor, profitable market trade remained their principal concern Wilmington
factors were reputed to have had the best knowledge o f the naval stores trade. And they provided
prompt sale o f naval stores and avoided speculation unless directed to do so by their client. They
also advanced capital to producers whose wealth was tied up in slaves and pine land. Unlike
banks, which were few in the region did not lend on the security of pine timber tracts or still
facilities because o f their temporary and transient nature, factors supplied the necessary
operating capital. If an account went unsettled, they would simply extended the balance to the
next year; they rarely called in debts. Finally, the factor defended the producer against any
complaint from the buyer.91
To attract clients, factors advertised that they offered the most accommodating service
and the finest facilities for marketing naval stores. In 1844, James 1. Bryan, a Wilmington factor,
promised to give his clients needed attention for a modest charge. “When the price is depressed
and owners wish to hold for an improvement, he will furnish a WHARF, and make suitable
ADVANCES either in CASH or GOODS, to enable them to do so. Those wishing to SHIP will
have every necessary facility.”92 In 1852, Miles Costin, another Wilmington factor, notified
producers that he had “leased for a term of years, o f R.W. Brown, Esq., his fire-proof store, with
his wharves, and is now in a condition to take especial care o f Spirits Turpentine and other Naval
Stores committed to his care.” Not only that but “the lower wharves have on them four large
new sheds, where Spirits can be safely kept from the rain and sun.”93
Factors were not unique to naval stores marketing. Historian Harold Woodman explains
that factorage houses served as the most common means by which antebellum southern planters

91 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 148-149, 152, 157-158; Hayes, “General History,” 98.
92 “Notice to Turpentine Makers,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 October 1844.
93 “To the Public,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 March 1853.
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marketed their cotton crop. The factor bought, sold, received, and forwarded goods, for which he
received a commission. The 2.5 percent commission that both cotton and turpentine factors
received for their services was a carryover from the standard used by London factors who
handled American tobacco sales in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As the producers
representative in the market, factors possessed the skill, experience, and information sources to
make the proper judgments in their clients’ best interest. Because the factor had to be an expert
on market fluctuations, crop size and quality, and the producer’s needs, he most often specialized
in only one commodity. However, it was not uncommon for factors dealing in turpentine also to
trade timber and lumber. Factors also ensured that producers received their needed supplies. If
they did not actually stock what was needed, they acquired it from elsewhere, paid the bill, and
charged the producer’s account. Factors usually extended a line o f credit. Producers who
required funds turned to their factor rather than to banks, although ultimately it was the bank that
supplied the credit. Planters could only draw a note on the bank with the factor’s endorsement.94
Woodman explains that “this, o f course, changed the whole nature of the loan: banks were
lending not on the security o f a plantation, slaves, or cotton but on the liquid assets o f a city
merchant. In a word, by adding his endorsement to the planter’s note, the factor was
guaranteeing the payment of the note at maturity.”95 Woodman emphasizes that the factor, far
from holding producers in debt peonage, provided an essential service in the South’s plantation
economy. Not only did they bring capital into the region, but with their knowledge o f price and
market conditions, they were the most effective brokers to sell commodities and, with their
connections in port towns to keep the inland producers supplied with goods. But, as with cotton,

94 Harold Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the
Cotton Crop o f the South. 1800-1925 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1968; reprint,
Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 6, 14,22,26, 32, 39,41,
49, 114; “Agency for the Sale o f Timber, Lumber, and Naval Stores,” Wilmington. North
Carolina Journal. 5 January 1849; “Notice.” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 1 June 1849.
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the real locus o f power in financing, marketing, and pricing o f naval stores was not found in the
Southern port cities where factors and shipping firms handled these commodities, but in New
York and Liverpool, where trading firms monitored the world supply and set prices.96
As with cotton, the cost of marketing turpentine, which included, on top o f the 2.5percent factor’s commission, cost for freight drayage, inspection, storage, cooperating, and
insurance, consumed more than a small portion o f the products gross value. Into the 1850s
schooners remained the most common means o f transporting naval stores from North Carolina to
New York. Bulky naval stores were not valuable enough to justify the more expensive shipping
rate charged by steamers or railroads. New York was the most popular and the least expensive
shipping destination, the freight rate from Wilmington to Philadelphia and Boston ran twenty to
thirty percent above that to New York. However, trading at Wilmington could entail one added
expense. Ships entering the port could not draw more than ten to twelve feet if they expected to
clear the sand bar. Often lighters had to move the cargo down river, below the bar, before it was
loaded aboard the ship, a costly and time consuming procedure. Shipping cost varied for spirits,
gum, and rosin. Between September 1859 and September 1860 the cost o f shipping spirits from
Wilmington to New York ranged between 450 and 700 per barrel. In the same period shipping
cost for gum ran between 350 and 550 and rosin between 350 and 500. Spirit shipment costs ran
more, about 22 percent more, because the barrels had to be carried below deck to prevent
evaporation from exposure to the sun. Rosin and gum, both less valuable, were transported on
deck which carried a cheaper rate. However, the insurance for goods shipped on the deck ran
higher because during storms, these items commonly fell overboard first. When marketing their

95 Woodman, King Cotton. 115-116.
96 Ibid., 130, 174-175.
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naval stores producers paid around 120 per barrel for inspection, wharfage, cooperage, and
loading.97
Turpentine shipped through R. W. Brown & Son, a Wilmington factor, serves as an
example o f the expenses involved in marketing naval stores. In October 1835 the firm shipped
seventy-seven barrels of raw turpentine aboard the Regulus from Wilmington to New York. In
addition to the freight cost, handling charges included $2.34 to transport the barrels around the
Wilmington dock, S1.54 to land the shipment when it first arrived at the port, 600 to deliver the
barrels to the schooner for the trip to New York, and twenty cents to load them aboard the ship.
To inspect the shipment cost $2.20 and to repair either deficient or damaged barrels cost $3.04.
The fee for storage at the wharf was 760. The commission paid to the factor for handling the
shipment was 5 percent, $ 13.79, double the usual fee. Total cost of marketing the turpentine
shipment amounted to $24.47, a little more than nine percent of the shipments gross value of
267.51. This is similar to the minimum cost o f marketing cotton, six to ten percent o f the gross
proceeds.98
For the few producers who remained in North Carolina’s northern counties, transporting
naval stores to New York cost considerably more. William B. Wise o f Murfreesboro in Hertford
County, a dry goods merchant and naval stores trader, had to spend over forty percent of a sixtyeight barrel shipment’s gross value to get it to New York. Valued at $171.51, the shipment first
went to Norfolk by ship at a cost o f $19. The cost of hauling, cooperage, inspection, wharfage,
and the 2.5 percent selling commission totaled $42.07. Thus, when the shipment was ready to
leave Norfolk for New York, its net value had been reduced to $129.44. The cost o f shipping the

97 Ibid., 176; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 17891861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 131, 135, 136, 146; Gamble, “Pages From
Wilmington’s Story,” 32.
98 Shipping Receipt, 17 October 1835, Oliver H. Jones Papers, Special Collections
Library, Duke University; Woodman, King Cotton. 177.
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sixty-eight barrels by railroad to New York was $ 19.44 and the handling, cooperage, wharfage,
and a 1 1/4 percent commission ran an extra $9.20 for a total cost o f $28.64. Wise received
$ 100.80 for a naval stores shipment that was valued at $ 171.51." Woodman explains that ‘"those
planters and fanners who sold locally to stockeepers or itinerant merchants could escape the
direct assessment o f these charges, but since local buyers had no option but to resell through a
factor, the price they offered had to include the added expenses.”100
Marketing naval stores could not only be costly, but confusing as well. Until the naval
stores developed into a big business within its borders, North Carolina neglected to create a
uniform marketing code for these products. For most of the antebellum period there existed only
chance consistency in weight and product standards among the several ports that handled naval
stores. Once North Carolina attempted at last to bring some order to this chaotic situation, the
dealers in Washington, New Bern, and Wilmington proved less than eager to relinquish their
virtual autonomy and cooperate with measures imposed by the state. A 1784 state inspection act
served as the basis for North Carolina’s naval stores inspection legislation. Because there was no
systematic revision o f the 1784 inspection act, the additions and amendments over the years
created an amorphous inspection code in which some acts applied to some ports, but not others.
Under the law the county courts had almost complete control over the inspection system. They
appointed the inspectors and designated the places o f inspection. Originally, inspectors, upon
their appointment, were required to post a five-hundred-pound bond, but the legislature raised it
to one thousand dollars. If a complaint was brought against an inspector, he was to be tried by
the court and if found guilty the court would replace him. And they could be sued for damages
for a period of three years after leaving their post. While serving, inspectors were prohibited

99 Receipt for sale of turpentine, July 31, 18SS, William B. Wise Papers, Special
Collections Library, Duke University.
100 Woodman, King Cotton. 176.
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from holding an office and could not be elected to the General Assembly. Legislation limiting
the number o f inspectors per town was revised as the industry grew. An 180S law restricted the
number of inspectors in any town to six. However, the increased naval stores traffic through
Wilmington soon strained the ability o f these six as well as the five to six additional inspectors
who worked in districts around New Hanover County. An 1852 law permitted the New Hanover
County Court to appoint eight or more inspectors for Wilmington. In 1831 an earlier law
limiting the appointment o f Wilmington inspectors to one year was revised to allow them to
serve two-year posts. In most cases, however, inspectors were reappointed; between 1842 and
1860, the term for Wilmington inspectors averaged slightly less than six years.101
The appointments could prove to be very lucrative. Inspectors did not receive a salary,
but were paid a commission for each barrel they inspected. The usual fee was 20 for a barrel of
tar, 2.50 for each barrel o f pitch or turpentine, and ten cents for each certificate o f the number
and quality of the barrels they inspected. In 1858 the eleven Wilmington inspectors received an
average o f $1,176 in fees, one making as much as $2,265 and another only $410, still a living
wage for this time.102 With the promise o f such profits at stake, many inspectors competed for
business through newspaper advertisements. In 1844 C. B. Morris posted a notice advertising
that he had “lately been appointed Inspector o f Naval Stores, and respectfully solicits a share of
patronage from his Country friends and the public generally.”103
Inspectors employed relatively arbitrary standards in their duties because the legislature
provided only vague guidelines. They examined barrels to determine how free the product was
of dirt, wood chips, bark, straw, leaves, and water. They also decided if the raw turpentine was

101 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 161-165, 171-173,198-199.
102 Ibid., 161-165, 171-173.
103 “Notice,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 30 May 1845.
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“hard” or “soft,” hard being the scrape removed from the face and soft the gooey resin dipped out
of the box. The standards for soft and hard gum were well established. However, barrels
containing a mixture o f hard and soft turpentine were more difficult to grade. Typically, hard
turpentine sold for half the price o f soft, so unscrupulous producers mixed soft and hard gum in
hopes that the mixture could be sold as soft. Others mixed hot water, scrape, and dip to achieve
the same result. In such cases inspectors had few guidelines by which to judge the quality, a
situation that often led to disputes between buyers and sellers. Inspectors also checked to see
that barrels were branded with the producer’s initials. Inspections were valid only for twenty
days before export. If the barrels sat for longer, they had to be reinspected to determine if
exposure to the sun’s heat had damaged the material or made it more viscous causing it to leak
from the barrels.104
Contributing to the confusion over grades was the inconsistency in the size of the state’s
turpentine barrels. The barrels used in the northern counties and at Washington and New Bern
weighed 280 pounds gross, but those shipped through Wilmington weighed 320 pounds gross.
Although the resulting complication created in the export market by this situation was recognized
early, neither region would conform to the other’s standard. One writer to the New Bern
Carolina Centennial, who believed Wilmington’s standards should become universal, wished “to
impress on the minds o f the Turpentine makers, who look to this place for a market, the necessity
of paying more attention than they usually do to the quality and thickness of the Staves and
strength of the Hoops, as well as to the size and proper proportion of the barrels, so as to raise the
reputation of our Inspection to an equality with that of Wilmington.” 105 Against this writer’s
wishes, the state legislature, in 1846, passed a law calling for all turpentine barrels to weigh 280

104 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 165, 167, 179.
105 Ibid., 177.
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pounds gross, the northern county standard. The same law also required that the barrels o f soft
gum to be sealed with twelve hoops and branded with an “S” and those with hard fastened with
ten hoops and branded with an “H.”106 There was to be no mixing. Despite the new law,
producers felt little obligation abandon familiar standards. Not only did the act impose no
penalty against producers who did not conform to the legal standard, but Wilmington marketers
agreed to continue accepting 320 pound barrels. At worst the inspector could condemn
fraudulent turpentine and keep it off the market. Inspectors, however, faced a steeper penalty.
They could be fined fifty dollars for each offense o f deceitful work. Turpentine dealers in the
city objected to the new smaller barrel size. Because freight was paid per barrel, regardless of its
size or weight, a smaller size would require more barrels and would bring a rise in freight costs.
In response to this situation producers, inspectors, and dealers decided to ignore the law and set
out to develop their own code or rules and standards. In May 1847, a month before the state
regulations were to take effect, the Wilmington dealers drafted their own regulations. They
called for a 320-pound barrel, turpentine to be brought to market at the producer’s expense, the
seller and producer to split the cost of inspection, and penalties for substandard packaging.107
The three parties also refused “to compromise for fraudulent mixture as heretofore, that we deem
chips, straw, billets o f wood, limbs, dirt, &c., as a fraudulent mixture, and that we shall abide by
the strict letter of the law in all such cases.”108 But despite Wilmington’s domination o f the
turpentine trade, the 280-pound barrel was more reasonable for the export market. Because the
northern counties had first supplied the bulk of the turpentine trade, the New York market had
established their 280-pound barrel as the standard trade weight and continued to do so. After ten

106 Ibid., 185.
107 Ibid., 185-188, 190-193; “Notice to Dealers in Turpentine & Tar.” Wilmington. North
Carolina Journal. 25 June 1847; “Turpentine—The New Law,” Wilmington. North Carolina
Journal. 21 May 1847.
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chaotic months o f dual barrel sizes and price scales, the Wilmington dealers, in 1849, finally
submitted and accepted the smaller barrel.109
During the antebellum era, naval stores production, especially turpentine manufacturing,
grew into a large-scale business dominated by a wealthy class of entrepreneurial producers who
required the services o f factorage houses to financially sustain their businesses as well as
consistent quality standards to ensure their products’ marketability. In the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries naval stores production languished as a marginally profitable business
which no state, save North Carolina, wanted. Prevented by its poor soils from participating in
the cotton boom that other southern states enjoyed, North Carolina’s economic development
stagnated through the 1830s, earning it the unfortunate distinction as the “Rip Van Winkle
State.” But as demand for turpentine outstripped that of tar and its price persisted at relatively
high levels, spirits developed, in a sense, into a substitute for cotton which attracted the attention
of some of the state’s wealthier men. Their ability to construct their own stills, coupled with
transportation improvements, permitted the industry to expand into previously inaccessible areas
of southeastern North Carolina. The growth and prosperity that turpentine production brought
many North Carolinians rested, however, on the backs o f black slaves who performed the
particularly strenuous work the industry required. The conditions under which they and the
white piney woods inhabitants lived represented a distinctive way o f life for slaves and poor
southern whites.

108 “Turp—The New Law.”
109 In 18SS it was agreed that the purchaser would pay the inspection fee, which was
lowered to one cent per barrel. Although producers were pleased to be freed o f this expense, in
some cases it could bring the inspector’s interest too close to the merchants, a situation that
raised suspicion among many producers. Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the AnteBellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 190-193; “Notice to Dealers in
Turpentine & Tar.”
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Chapter Three
A South Apart:
Life and Labor in the Piney Woods

Southerners—poor whites, small piney woods fanners, and slaves—who occupied the
antebellum pine forest and labored in some capacity in the turpentine industry, all lived an
existence different from that o f most southerners engaged in agriculture. Poor whites, who lived
a relatively isolated and subsistence-based existence in the pine barrens, either harvested small
quantities of gum, which they sold for finished goods or food, or worked on an irregular basis for
larger producers. Other, more middle class whites worked on a somewhat larger and more
regular schedule to produce turpentine for the market, sometimes with the help o f several slaves.
Unlike the piney woods whites, however, large naval stores operators often did not reside in
areas quite so isolated, but rather close by small population centers or at least near major
transportation routes. They lived lives more similar to large plantation owners than other
southern whites who produced on a smaller scale with their own labor. Because big producers
came to dominate the industry, slaves performed the vast majority o f labor. For them, the
expansion o f naval stores manufacturing after 1830, the various procedures involved in
harvesting turpentine, the size and location of the turpentine forests, and the ways that these three
factors effected slave management practices created a distinct “work and . . . manner o f life.”1 In
fact, turpentine slaves endured harsher working and living conditions than bondsmen on a typical
agricultural plantation.

1William J. Parham to James R. Grist, May I, 1854, James Redding Grist Papers,
Special Collections Library, Duke University.
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Poor whites who lived in the pine forest often engaged in turpentining in some way,
whether producing small quantities on their own or laboring for a large producer. Unfortunately,
as Percival Perry explains, little is known o f the smaller-scale producers. Illiterate for the most
part, they left scant written record. It is known, however, that the few white dwellers of the
piney woods lived in near isolation. The longleaf pine prefers light, sandy soil and a clay
subsoil. These soil conditions could not sustain agriculture and, consequently, made settlers
bypass the pine barrens. Any farmers who attempted to grow cotton on land that formerly grew
only longleaf pines experienced a decline in yield by over fifty percent from the first year to the
third.2
Mid-nineteenth-century travelers commented on the dearth of inhabitants in the region.
When reporter David Hunter Strother (pen name Porte Crayon) turned from the main road to
explore the countryside, he could not “resist the feeling o f loneliness that creeps over one on
entering these silent forests, or to repress a sentiment o f superstitious dread as you glance
through the somber many-columned aisles, stretching away on every side in interminable
perspective.”3 Olmsted described the road which he traveled upon in the same region as “a
narrow opening through a forest of long-leafed pine.” The pine branches, fully tipped with
needles, formed a dense canopy that shaded the forest. “In ten miles,” he claimed, “I passed half
a dozen cabins, one or two small clearings, in which com had been planted, and one turpentine
distillery, with a dozen sheds and cabins clustered about it.”4 Still another traveler reported that

2 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), vi; Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography of the South: A
Study in Regional Resources and Human Adequacy (Chapel Hill: The University o f North
Carolina Press, 1935), 112; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of the South: The Recovery of Land
and Forest (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 15.
3 Porte Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods,” Harper’s New Monthly
Magazine 14 (May 1857): 746.
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one could journey fora day anywhere in the region between Wilmington and Raleigh and not
pass more that one or two houses. Signs o f life and development reportedly increased as one
approached the Wilmington to Weldon Railroad.s Yet even there William C. Corsan, an
Englishman touring the Confederacy in 1862, found the countryside along the railroad
“depressing.” “Low swampy levels, intersected with turbid streams,” he explained,” were
followed by long stretches o f poor, sandy, monotonous country, covered with pitch pines, and
destitute apparently o f inhabitants.”6
Poor whites occupied the unwanted clay bottom lands and sand-hills. Known by other
whites as vagabonds, clay eaters, dirt eaters, tallow-faced gentry, crackers, and sandhillers, they
had the reputation for being lazy, ignorant, and hard-drinking. Across the South, from the
Carolinas through the Gulf South, they either occupied an empty log cabin with the owner’s
consent or constructed a log hut on land on which they squatted. The infertile land was of such
low value that poor white families could, with little harassment, find small tracts on which to
live. Here they worked small garden plots and did occasional odd jobs on neighboring
plantations. Their houses often consisted o f rude log cabins furnished with just a few chairs, a
bench, one or two beds, a comer cupboard, an oven, and a skillet and hying pan. In their garden
they grew com, sweet potatoes, peas, col lards; their hogs foraged for themselves in the forest.
They supplemented their diet with such game as they could shoot in the forest—wild hogs, deer,
wild turkey, squirrel, raccoon, and opossum. They probably suffered from hookworm disease,
which might explain their reputed laziness and habit of eating dirt.7
4 Frederick Law Olmsted, A Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States (New York: Dix &
Edwards, 1856), 326.
s Dugall McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 14 April 1846. Southern Cultivator 4
(November 1846): 122.
6 W. C. Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1996), 68.
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Historian Bill Cecil-Fronsman argues that “Common whites did n o t. . . live in a purely
subsistence economy in which they never bought or sold anything.”8 Bradley Bond agrees that
piney-woods people did not live in complete isolation or by self-sufficiency, but participated in
the market economy. Most used the market to acquire finished goods and probably to
supplement the grain they grew. To acquire the money for what they needed to buy, small
farmers produced crops for the market economy or engaged in home manufacturing. In the piney
woods turpentine production often provided a family o f small means the only staple they could
produce from the sandy pine land. Despite little capital, the father and older boys could still cut
boxes and chip while the wife, girls, and younger boys dipped. Such a family operation could
turn a profit—even if it had to rent the boxes, buy the barrels, and pay to have the product hauled
to the market or to a larger operator who would buy the gum. Edmund Ruffin observed that
white families living in the piney woods relied almost solely on tar and turpentine for a
marketable product. They cleared only small patches for cultivating sweet potatoes, the only
crop that grew well in the sandy soil.9
Piney woods folk not only produced naval stores themselves but worked for large
operators as well. At Richiands Plantation, for example, poor white families aided with fire
7 Guion Griffis Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina: A Social History (Chapel Hill:
The University o f North Carolina Press, 1937), 69, 72; Grady McWhiney, “Crackers and
Cavaliers: Shared Courage,” in Plain Folk of the South Revisited, ed. Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 190; Grady McWhiney, “Antebellum Piney
Woods Culture: Continuity Over Time and Place,” in Mississippi’s Pinev Woods: A Human
Perspective, ed. Noel Park (Jackson: University Press o f Mississippi), 47; Paul H. Buck, “The
Poor Whites of the Ante-Bellum South,” American Historical Review 31 (October 1925): 43, 45.
8 Bill Cecil-Fronsman, Common Whites: Class and Culture in Antebellum North
Carolina (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 100, 102.
9 Bradley G. Bond, “Herders, Farmers, and Markets on the Inner Frontier: The
Mississippi Piney Woods, 1850-1860,” in Plain Folk of the South Revisited, ed. Samuel C. Hyde,
Jr. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 81, 86; Cecil-Fronsman, Common
Whites. 10; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” De Bow’s
Review 19 (October 1855): 488; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 486; Edmund Ruffin,
“Notes of a Steam Journey,” The Farmer’s Register 8 (30 April 1840): 246, 250.
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prevention. With insurance impossible to obtain for such a combustible business, the only
protection from fire was for piney woods whites to police the forest and extinguish any flame as
soon as possible. Log cabins in which the families lived dotted the expansive forest o f twenty
thousand acres. They lived rent-free and could cultivate as much land as they chose, which was
rarely more than a garden. Typically the women worked their plot and raised children while the
men hunted and fished and the children gathered wild berries. In return, these families rendered
several services to the plantation, most importantly guarding against fire. Whenever fire broke
out, it was the families’ responsibility to extinguish it. If flames got out of control, they were to
blow horns to summon the other families in the forest to assist. Their secondary task was to tend
the plantation’s livestock which grazed loose in the forest. Once a week they provided salt and
care to the cattle herd, and each night they drove the sheep into a pen for protecting from
predators. The white families also cared for the plantation’s bees and gathered the honey for the
big house. When the plantation’s roads required repairs, they performed the work. To earn cash
they sold their game, poultry, and berries to the plantation. Avirett reported that these poor
whites kept to themselves. “They never mingle with the more thrifty white people,” he
explained, “while the negroes on the estate look down upon them, calling them, most
disdainfully, ‘poor white trash.’”10
Travelers through the piney woods also spoke despairingly of its white residents.
Edmund Ruffin described them as “generally poor and indolent” despite ample opportunity for
profit from naval stores.11 Strother described their homes as “little better in appearance than the
huts of our Western borders.”12 The yards of all piney woods houses, he added, included a well

10James Battle Avirett, The Old Plantation: How We Lived in Great House and Cabin
Before the War (New York: F. Tennyson Nedy Co., 1901), 70-71.
11 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250.
12 Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods,” 746.
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with a cypress bucket, fodder stacks, consisting of com leaves held above the ground by tall
poles, three well-protected sweet potato hills, and empty gourds used for martin houses. Most
yards had fhiit trees or a scuppemong grapevine. Strother characterized the people who lived
these homes as lazy and thieving. As an example o f a typical piney woods family, he reported a
domestic fight which he had witnessed in which a woman chased her husband around the yard
yelling and beating him with a broom stick. “It seems,” Strother recounted,” that the man having
got through the proceeds o f the last sale of turpentine, instead o f gathering more, as he was
ordered, had robbed two o f madam’s sitting hens and sold the eggs, the proceeds whereof he had
invested in whisky.” 13
Where Strother described the piney woods people’s backwardness with lighthearted
amusement, Olmsted delivered a scathing criticism o f them, painting them as “entirely
uneducated, poverty-stricken vagabonds.”14 “They are poor,” he wrote, “having almost no
property but their own bodies; and the use o f these, that is, their labor, they are not accustomed to
hire out statedly and regularly, so as to obtain capital by wages, but only occasionally by the day
or job, when driven to it by necessity.”15 He observed that piney woods whites commonly
squatted on a plot where they built a log cabin which they never bothered to seal on the sides.
They cultivated a little com, potatoes, and soybeans and owned a few hogs which lived in the
forest. The men spent most o f their time hunting.16 “If they have need o f money to purchase
clothing ect., they obtain it by selling their game or meal. If they have none of this to spare, or an
insufficiency, they will work for a neighboring farmer for a few days, and they will usually get

13 Ibid., 747.
14 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 348.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 348-349.
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for their labor fifty cents a day, funding themselves.”11 However, Olmsted added, farmers did
not like to hire them because they could not be relied upon to finish a job or perform it as
directed. They also could not be driven to work as fast and as hard as slaves.18 In fact, Olmsted
concluded that slaves “are superior in every moral and intellectual respect to the great mass o f
the white people inhabiting the turpentine forest.”19
Small, independent farmers and turpentiners occupied a slightly higher status in piney
woods white society, but as Cecil-Fronsman explains, ‘The line between poor whites and their
more prosperous yeoman neighbors was never rigid.”20 Many small producers lived in cabins,
although better constructed than those belonging to the poorer whites, and some inhabited framed
houses. Their houses still had no glass windows, but did contain more abundant furniture than
those of the poorest classes; their yards included a vegetable garden with collards. These small
piney woods farmers also owned a few dogs, more hogs, raised more com than the poor whites,
but cultivated very little in way o f staple crops. Their property holdings, which in some cases
could be surprisingly considerable, consisted mainly o f slaves. One small producer worked three
slaves, at least one he hired. Because of his farm’s poor soil he grew only a little cotton, just

17 Ibid., 349.
18 Ibid., 349-350.
19 Ibid., 348. In Alabama the poorer class o f piney woods whites was “distinguished
alone for their ignorance and poverty, living almost entirely by the rifle
” The introduction of
the turpentine industry, producers in that state hoped, would provide “a means of employment for
this class and thus allowing them not only the necessities, but the comforts o f life, including
schools.” Turpentine, they argued, could create “an industrious, well-fed and well-clad people,
adding not only to their own comforts by their labor, but elevating themselves into a sober,
moral, and intelligent class of citizens, contributing in no small degree to the strength and wealth
of the State.” “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” De Bow’s Review 18 (February 1855):
189.
20 Cecil-Fronsman, Common Whites. 17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109
enough for his family to make cloth for their own clothes, and instead concentrated on
turpentine.21
Large, specialized operators, whose numbers grew sharply during the three decades after
1830, produced far more turpentine than did yeoman farmers. James Avirett o f Richlands
Plantation in Onslow County, for example, produced more turpentine than nearly any one else in
the business. Although Avirett raised tobacco, rice, sorghum, cotton, wheat, oats, rye, and com,
as well as several hundred head o f hogs and sheep, his thirty-thousand-barrel-a-year turpentine
operation consumed the largest portion o f Richlands’ labor. The plantation’s twenty-two
thousand-acres o f pine forest provided enough boxes to keep busy 125 slaves, 2 turpentine
distilleries, and several cooperage shops. Bom in 1797, John Avirett was descended from
German Huguenots who settled in the area in the 1740s and who had become prominent enough
by 1791 to host George Washington during his southern tour. As a powerful member of the
planter class, Avirett served a term in the state senate and nearly twenty years as Onslow
County’s sheriff. In his forties when turpentine demand swelled, he used the industry to make
his short-lived fortune. His expansive operation lay on the stage road fifty-eight miles north of
Wilmington and forty-two miles south o f New Bern and occupied level terrain except for a creek
that cut through the fields. An avenue o f elms, 1,200 feet long and 40 feet wide lead to the big
house, which rested on a five-foot high brick pillars. A piazza extended around his three-story
residence whose large windows opened to the floor. The out buildings included a kitchen, which
was connected to the house by the piazza, three smoke houses, a flour house, a cotton house, and
a large storage house. Located to the rear o f these buildings were the chicken coops that John
Avirett’s son James explained, were “well fenced in, secure from the egg-sucking cur of the
negro quarter, as well as from mink or weasel at night.” Near the poultry yard was a one-acre

21 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 350; Robert Russell, North America:
Its Agriculture and Climate (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1857), 160-161.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110

vegetable garden and a weaving room where slaves wove the cotton and woolen cloth used on
the plantation. Beyond the quarters was the Richlands’ ginhouse, with shed rooms built around it
where carpenters worked. Down the hill from it stood a storage building for groceries and
wagons and a corral for the one hundred, fifty horses and mules used on the estate.22
James R. Grist was another representative large producer, who, like Avirett, lived in
relative grand style for the area. While traveling through North Carolina in 1857 the only object
that caught Strother’s eye in Washington was the Grist residence, located “at the end o f the main
street, with beautifully-improved grounds.”23 In the early 1850s Grist o f Washington, North
Carolina, entered the turpentine business with his father in Beaufort County but later moved to
areas near the Cape Fear River and South Carolina. Grist became a wealthy and influential
businessmen in eastern North Carolina. He assisted the Banks brothers’ steamboat company by
endorsing their loans and using his influence to convince a Wilmington factorage house to use
the Banks to carry their freight. Out of gratitude, the Banks in 1854 named their new steamer the
James R. Grist.24
The experiences o f Sarah Hicks Williams offers insight into the life of women married to
large turpentine producers, like Grist and Avirett. Sarah Hicks o f New Hartford, New York had
known Benjamin Williams for five years when he first proposed marriage in 1850. Although she
was certain of his affection for her, she disliked two characteristics about him—“his owning of
slaves” and his “not being a professed Christian.”25 However when Williams renewed his offer

22 Avirett, Old Plantation. 22-25, 36-41, 51-54, 64-66 (quotation on page 40); David
Cecelski, “The Rise and Fall of the Rich Lands,” Coastwatch (January/February 1997): 22;
David S. Cecelski, “Oldest Living Confederate Chaplain Tells All?: Or, James B. Avirett and the
Rise and Fall o f the Rich Lands,” Southern Cultures 3 (Winter 1997): 10.
23 Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods,” 750.
24 Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 95, 523.
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three years later, Sarah, for unknown reasons, agreed to overlook these qualities and accepted .
An ambitious North Carolina doctor, Williams had served in the state legislature, invested in
both forest and cleared land, and operated a turpentine operation about seven miles from his
Greene County home. After moving to her new home in the North Carolina pine barrens during
the fall, she was struck by the region’s isolation and lack o f development. During a twenty mile
journey from her home to the town o f Wilson, she did not “think we passed over a half dozen
houses. The road on both sides was bounded by woods, mostly pine, and the trees are much
taller and larger than ours [in New York].”26 She was also surprised to find that North
Carolinians “live more heartily” than northerners, always serving two or three different kinds of
meats for breakfast and dinner. Although the portions were more plentiful than those issued to
the slaves, Sarah’s diet, which included com bread, biscuits, and sweet potatoes, resembled that
of the bondsmen who labored at her husband’s turpentine operation. But while the slaves
probably received salt hog meat, the Williams enjoyed fresh pork prepared in traditional Carolina
fashion. “Red pepper,” she observed, “is much used to flavor meat with the famous ‘barbarcue’
of the South and which I believe they esteem above all dishes is roasted pig dressed with red
pepper and vinegar.27 The Williamses also ate peaches and apples when they were in season.
Sarah occupied her time attending church, receiving visitors or visiting in other’s homes, and
helping with housework and even management of the plantation. She shared the doctor’s twostory, wood frame house with her mother-in-law, who acted as mistress o f the home. Sarah had
her own room, furnished with her belongings, in which she could read and write in privacy.28
25 Sarah F. Hicks to Parents, 7 March 18S3, Sarah Hicks Williams Papers, Southern
Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
26 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 7 November 1853, Ibid.
27 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents 10 December 1853, Ibid.
28 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 10 October 18S3, 17 November 1853; 10 December
1853, Ibid.
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When not engaged with church or visits, she assisted the doctor’s mother in sewing cloths for the
slaves who worked about the plantation. Sarah explained that although many plantations “keep a
seamstress to do th is,. . . Mother Williams has always done it herself with the assistance o f her
daughters when they were home.” They did not, however, sew for slaves who labored at the
distant turpentine operation.29 Sarah persisted in her opposition to slavery, but admitted that she
found “no unkind treatment o f the servants, indeed I think that they are treated with more
familiarity than many northern servants.” The slaves’ consistent presence “in the parlor + in
your room, + all over” unnerved her.30
After a couple o f years in North Carolina, Sarah gained more responsibility for her home
and the plantation, especially when her husband was absent on his frequent trips to tend to his
turpentine operation. During his absences, “I see to his business,” she explained in 18S5. “I am
up before sunrise to give out the keys, he told me how to order, + sometimes I steal Mother’s
thunder I watch, and see what her hands are doing + then I order ours as if I knew it all.”31 She
played an increased role in the plantation’s management when she moved with her husband to
south Georgia in the late 1850s. By 1859 her responsibilities had become so great that she
complained “my mind is so filled” with the care of the slaves. She was in charge o f “sixteen here
[Carleton County], + five up in Ware Co + over thirty getting Turpentine though these latter do
not come to me for clothes, or food, still they call this their home + several of them always are
here Sundays.”32 She also tended sick slaves who labored at the house as well as those who
worked for the turpentine operation several miles away. In October 1860 she was not only

29 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 10 December 1853, Ibid.
30 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 10 October 1853, Ibid.
31 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 22 May 1855, Ibid.
32 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 25 March 1859, Ibid.
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tending to her sick cook, but “Jim was sent home from the still half sick, so now I have two to
take care of.”33
A foundation o f slave laborers like Jim supported the turpentine boom o f the 1830s, ’40s,
and ’50s.34 As larger producers entered the business, adequate labor became a constant concern.
Correspondence between members o f the Grist family and their overseers is filled with frequent
complaints that “we bearly have enough to work the business.” When in February 1861 three
hired hands failed to work out, the overseer explained that he would “manage to work the
business with the hands I have, but would be more than glad if you could hire me 4 or 5 hands at
once for balance o f this year + the next.”35 Producers could either hire slaves or use their own,
and many chose to do both. Mining, lumber, transportation, and turpentine concerns all made
considerable use o f each kind. Such combined work forces were more common in southern
industry than in agricultural enterprises.36 In 1859 Ben Williams employed “about thirty or
thirty-five hands besides his own.”37 Hired slaves were vital to the Grist Alabama operation,
which n 1851 worked thirty-five slaves belonging to six different owners.38 Hiring slaves
enabled men o f moderate means to enter the expanding turpentine business by freeing them from
making heavy initial investments in slave laborers. It was common for producers who were

33 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 21 October 1860, Ibid.
34 Donnie D. Bellamy, “Slavery in Microcosm: Onslow County, North Carolina,” The
Journal of Negro History 62 (October 1977): 343.
35 James R. Grist to Father, 4 February 1851, Grist Papers.
36 Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (New
York: Vintage Books, 1989), 71; Robert S. Starobin, Industrial Slavery in the Old South (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 12, 129-130, 138; Rosser Howard Taylor, Slaveholding in
North Carolina: An Economic View (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1926), 3840.
37 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 7 November 1859, Williams Papers.
j8 Benjamin Grist to Allen Grist, 21 January 1851, Grist Papers.
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starting in the business to purchase or rent several hundred to a thousand acres and hire slave
laborers. After a few years they could make enough money to buy slaves and possibly a still.
The ability to hire slaves strengthened the institution by increasing small slaveholders’ and
nonslaveholders’ dependence on the labor of bondsmen.39 One producer, however, discouraged
using hired slaves, “for they will invariably put more mean tricks into the heads of your own
negroes than they ever knew before.”40
Both purchased and hired slaves in the naval stores industry lived distinctive lives from
bondsmen laboring in agriculture. Historians have offered two interpretations of the lives of
industrial slaves. Ronald L. Lewis and Charles B. Dew question whether industrial slavery was
“the most brutal phase o f the regime.”41 Dew, who studied slaves in the iron foundries in
Virginia, and Lewis, who examined slave labor in the coal and iron industry in Virginia and
Maryland, argue that Starobin’s generalizations do not apply to life and labor at the forge. Lewis
shows how industrial slaves challenged their masters’ authority and consequently improved their
quality of life by negotiating extra rations, gaining more autonomy, and receiving payment for
work performed beyond their normal tasks. Similarly, Dew’s work, especially his Bond of Iron.
demonstrates that in iron manufacturing the slaves’ skill and determination, combined with
southern iron producers’ desire to maintain an appeased, and thus more reliable, labor force,
created a middle ground in which those in bondage could exercise some control over their
working conditions, family affairs, and livelihoods. Lewis and Dew convincingly substantiate
their conclusions about iron manufacturing and coal mining; these findings may be valid for

39 Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 42; Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 135.
40 G.W. Perry, A Treatise on Turpentine Farming. (New Bern, NC: Muse & Davies,
1859), 120.
41 Ronald L. Lewis, Coal Iron and Slaves: Industrial Slavery in Maryland and Virginia.
1715-1865 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 8.
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cotton mills, salt works, and the chemical industry as well. But they do not hold entirely true for
the naval stores industry, an enterprise that operated in isolated forests and was less “industrial”
than iron manufacturing.42
Their experiences conform more to Robert S. Starobin’s generalized description of
industrial slavery.43 Industrial slaves, he argues, were men, although a few women and children
also labored in such enterprises. The majority of industrial slaves lived not in large cities but in
rural areas, small towns, or on plantations. Generally their employer owned them; only one-fifth
were hired. But in extractive industries, such as turpentine making, an integrated workforce of
owned and hired slaves and a few white laborers became common. As with agricultural slaves,
overseers or drivers commonly managed industrial slaves, not their owners or employers.
However, Starobin writes that “working conditions were usually worse than those for laborers

42 Ibid., 8; Charles B. Dew, Bond o f Iron: Master and Slave at Buffalo Forge (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1994); also see Charles B. Dew, “David Ross and the Oxford Iron Works: A
Study o f Industrial Slavery in the Early Nineteenth-Century South,” William and Mary
Quarterly. 3d Ser., 31 (April 1974), 189-224; Charles B. Dew, “Disciplining Slave Ironworkers
in the Antebellum South: Coercion, Conciliation, and Accommodation,” American Historical
Review 79 (April 1974): 393-418;” Charles B. Dew, “Sam Williams, Forgeman: The Life of an
Industrial Slave in the Old South,” in Region. Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C.
Vann Woodward, ed. J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982), 199-239.
43 Such a study supports Ira Berlin and Philip D. Morgan’s argument that “the legacy of
slavery cannot be understood without a full appreciation o f the ways in which slaves worked.”
These historians maintain that, because slavery was above all an institution o f forced labor and
slaves spent most o f their time at work, studies that focus on slave families, religion, and culture,
while important, describe only a portion o f the bondsman’s life. If work was the central
component o f the slaves’ existence, it should become the center o f scholarship on slavery. New
studies, Berlin and Morgan argue, should examine the various labor requirements and the
numerous and complex factors that shaped slave work and should consider “the requirements of
particular crops and crafts, which shaped the nature o f the workforce, the organization o f
production, and the division of labor.” These factors should be studied in relation to the
geography o f the production site, the size o f the slave labor force, the proportion o f slaves, free
blacks, and whites in the labor group, and the system of slave management used. Ira Berlin and
Philip D. Morgan, “Labor and the Shaping o f Slave Life in the Americas,” in Cultivation and
Culture: Labor and the Shaping of Slave Life in the Americas, ed. Ira Berlin and Philip D.
Morgan, (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 1993), 1-45 (quotation on page 3).
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engaged in southern farming, since industrial development often demanded longer and harder
working days than did plantation agriculture.” Starobin argues that “the tendency to drive
industrial slaves to the utmost, and to feed, clothe, and shelter them at subsistence levels, as well
as the inadequate medical knowledge of the time, contributed to a tragic incidence o f disease and
fatality in virtually all industrial occupations.” “The rigors o f bondage and the hazardous nature
o f southern industries,” Starobin concludes, revealed that the conditions experienced by
industrial slaves were very different from those o f plantation laborers.44
More than anything else, the longleaf pine’s seasonal growth cycle shaped the
turpentiner’s work schedule. In large trees the center, dark-colored wood, the heartwood, is
physiologically dead. Its cells no longer function and it does not grow. Sapwood, a younger and
lighter colored wood, surrounds the heartwood and facilitates the movement o f nutrients and
water between the roots and the needles. A thin layer o f cells called cambium surrounds the
sapwood which is in turn encased in a layer o f inner bark called phloem. Trees grow each year
by the division o f cambium cells which create a layer o f new wood called xylem. All pine trees
contain resin ducts, tiny tubes that run horizontally and vertically, creating a network in the
sapwood that extend from the inner layer o f bark to a depth o f one inch or more into the tree.
When the tree reaches maturity, these passages become lined with a tissue, epithelium, from
which resin is secreted. The resin serves as a protective outer coating in case the bark is
damaged and falls away from the tree. In such instances resin oozes from the ducts over the
wound to create a protective layer that diseases and insects are unable to penetrate and thereby
provides time for the bark and cambium layer to heal. Resin is not sap. The epithelium cells
manufacture resin only when required to protect the tree; it does not circulate through the tree as
sap, a water-based solution that does. Resin ducts are particularly large and abundant in longleaf

44 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 11-12,36, 37, 63, 138.
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pines. The intersection o f vertical and horizontal ducts may number more than fifty million per
cubic meter. Moreover the gum of this species does not harden as rapidly when exposed to air
and water and flows more freely over the wood than in other southern pines.45
The longleaf s resinous quality was widely recognized in early America. Naturalist F.
Andre Michaux reported that its “resinous matter, which is abundant, is more uniformly
distributed than in the other species

1,46 He argued that, whereas the loblolly pine afforded

"turpentine in abundance,” it did so “in a less fluid state than that of the Long-leaved Pine.”47
When beginning a turpentine operation, producers attempted to identify pine acreage that they
believed would yield the most abundant resin. G. W. Perry, a producer from Craven County,
North Carolina, recommended that turpentiners concentrate their efforts on healthy, straight trees
with large tops. In 18SS turpentine producers in Alabama were informed that thick stands would
not produce as much turpentine as those more sparsely placed and therefore free to grow with
less competition.48 Another producer agreed that “the best trees are young, thriving, on pretty

45 Howard E. Weaver and David A. Anderson, Manual o f Southern Forest (Danville,
Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc, 1954), 33,35; A. J. Panshin, E. S. Harrar, J. S.
Bethel, and W. J. Baker, Forest Products: Their Sources. Production, and Utilization (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), 439-440; Karl Peteraschak, “The Further Development of
the Technique o f Turpentining Pines,” 1920, Austin Cary Memorial Forstry Collection,
Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, 4;
Nelson Courtlandt Brown, Forest Products: The Harvesting. Processing, and Marketing of
Materials Other Than Lumber. Including the Principal Derivatives. Extractives, and Incidental
Products in the United States and Canada (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950), 183-184;
M. D. Mobley and Robert N. Haskins, Forestry in the South (Atlanta: Turner E. Smith & Co.,
1956), 230; Eloise Gerry, “The Production o f Crude ‘Gum’ by the Pine Tree,” in Naval Stores:
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review
Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 152; Peter Koch. Utilization of the Southern Pines
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture Forest Service, 1972), 1476.
46 F. Andre Michaux, The North American Svlva (Philadelphia: D. Rice & A. N. Hart,
1857), 108.
47 Ibid., 125.
48 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Fanning. 94; “Turpentine Product of the South,” De
Bow’s Review 18 (January 1855): 61.
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good soil, o f quick growth, having the most sap-wood. If found on low, level, or moist lands,
they will yield all the better. Dry seasons are unfavorable for a large crop o f turpentine, and, of
course, trees on lands that suffer easily from drouth are least profitable for market.”49 Other
observers also commented on the importance o f soil quality. Perry explained that the sandy and
gravely land was the best for making turpentine because land with a good clay foundation
produced straighter trees. He argued that poor, moist soil grew less resinous trees that would fill
the boxes only slowly. And he was sure that mountainous or hilly land would never make much
turpentine.30 One report observed that “the soil best adapted to the production of the turpentine
pine should be o f light and porous nature, with a subsoil o f clay, capable of retaining moisture.”51
Along with soil type, producers realized precipitation influenced resin production. Perry
reported that during dry periods trees produced less resin but that excessively wet periods could
have a similar effect. Turpentine ran best with moderate ground moisture. In areas where water
drained slowly, Perry recommended ditching and furrowing before beginning a turpentine
operation. Properly prepared land, he argued, would yield twice as much turpentine.52
Once producers had selected a likely forest, beginning in November and ending around
the first o f March, workers performed the first and most important procedure, boxing. During
these cooler months the sap was stored in the roots and would not rise to the needles until spring,
so the procedure did not immediately interfere with the pine’s vitality. Ideally hands cut boxes
during November, December, and January so the tree could have more time to adjust to its
wound before the resin began to flow in the spring. Using a special ax with an elongated head,

49 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486.
50 Perrv. Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 18,84, 134, 154.
51 “Turpentine Product of the South,” 61.
52 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 9-10,20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

119

workers cut a hole or box, as it was called, eight to fifteen inches wide and three to four inches
deep, at the base o f a pine tree trunk. The boxes were cut down at an angle and could hold one to
two quarts o f raw turpentine. Laborers had to use care when cutting boxes. First they decided
the number o f boxes to cut into the pine, which depended on the tree’s size. Pines less than one
foot in diameter could not support a box as readily as larger trees could. If smaller ones were to
be tapped, they could have only one small box; a full quart-size box would cause the tree to fall
or to decay prematurely. In no case were workers to allow the box to extend deep into the tree’s
heart. Larger trees could support larger boxes, and trees o f great size could support multiple
boxes, usually around three. One Harnett County man believed that very large trees could hold
as many as twenty boxes. In such cases the ideal placement o f the boxes was side by side with
four inches o f bark between them, with a third or more of the tree’s face left uncut for circulation
of sap between the needles and the roots. Some producers, instead o f cutting all the possible
boxes at one time, worked only one side of the tree for five or six years, then back boxed the
opposite side when the yield o f the old boxes diminished.53
Second, workers had to adapt boxing methods to their employer’s particular
specifications. Some producers preferred the boxes cut at the swell of the root so they would
remain safely away from the heart. For smaller trees the box began six to eight inches from the
ground. Other producers found boxes cut as high as eighteen inches from the ground more
beneficial. Although increasing the risk that the heart of the tree might be cut, putting the box

53 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” De Bow’s Review: After the War Series 3 (February
1867): 196; Edmund Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250; “The Manufacture of Turpentine
in the South,” De Bow’s Review 8 (May 1850): 454; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to
Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 487; “Production of
Turpentine in Alabama,” De Bow’s Review 7 (December 1849): 560-561; “Product of
Turpentine at the South,” De Bow’s Review 11 (September 1851): 303; “Turpentine Product of
the South,” 61; John MacLeod, “The Tar and Turpentine Business o f North Carolina,” Monthly
Journal o f Agriculture 2 (July 1846): 14; Description of turpentining, John McLean Harrington
Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

120

farther off the ground insured against rain washing into it. Boxes that sat damp during the winter
months could cause disease and decay at the tree’s base.
Finally, the position o f the box also depended on the configuration of the tree. If a tree
leaned, the best location for the box was on the side opposite the direction of the lean. Not only
did this side generally have the most prominent root, but it was also the only position that
guaranteed a sufficient amount o f raw turpentine would reach the box. If a box was located
anywhere else on such a tree, the gum would fall outside the box in increasing amounts as the
scarred face moved up the trunk with every harvest season. When the shape of the tree
permitted, producers found that placing boxes on the north side was beneficial. This protected
gum in the box from evaporation caused by the sun’s heat and ensured a higher grade of gum,
which would produce more spirits.54
Boxing required not only care but strength, skill, and experience. Strong men could be
trained to become adequate boxers in several days, and the amount o f work performed by box
cutters varied with the skill o f the worker and the demands o f the producer and overseer. All
agreed that new hands could not cut as many boxes as experienced ones and that driving them to
do so would result in Iow-quality boxes and inadequate yield from the orchard.55 People
planning to enter the business were advised that “beginners will not cut at first more than SO
boxes a day, and there is nothing gained by tasking them too high, until they have got well used
to the proper shape and size o f boxes.”56 Producers valued slaves skilled at boxing. In 1851

54 “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 452-53; “Turpentine: Hints for Those
About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486; A. W. Schorger and H. S. Betts, The Naval Stores
Industry (Washington. DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1915), 16.
55 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 196; Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250; “The
Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 454; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in
Its Manufacture,” 486; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina, 487; “Production of Turpentine in
Alabama,” 560-561; “Product o f Turpentine at the South,” 303.
56 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486.
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Grist’s manager reported that he was “cutting boxes with all of the best hands + giting timber +
distiling with the batlans I have a good many green hands + they ar hard to learn to cut boxes.”37
In 18S3 James R. Grist purchased a slave named Dick who was skilled at box-cutting. Dick’s
former master informed Grist that he was a potentially “very valuable boy, he is certainly one of
the best axe-men I ever saw, but his disposition is too irascible to work any kind of horse or
mule.”58 White managers accepted the idea that “Negroes are generally expert with the axe.”59
An experienced laborer was expected to cut 75 to 80 boxes a day or 450 to 500 a week.
However, exceptional workers could cut 90 to 100 a day. On one operation the best boxers
reportedly cut 125 a day. The number o f boxes cut in a day also depended on the number of
daylight hours. As days grew longer, workers were usually expected to cut more boxes. The size
of the pines and their distance from each other also determined the hand’s task. Because larger
trees could support more than one box, laborers could spend more time cutting and less time
walking from tree to tree. The distance of the trees from one another also influenced walking
time. If trees grew far apart, workers spent a larger portion of their time walking to them. On
average an acre contained about 100 boxes.60
After the boxes were cut they had to be cornered. Usually performed around the first of
March with an ordinary ax, cornering involved removing a one-inch triangular chip from the top
two comers of the box. Each comer could usually be cut with two strokes. One gash rose

57 Benjamin Grist to Allen Grist, 21 January 1851, Grist Papers.
581. C. Sutherlan to James R. Grist, 27 August 1853, Ibid.
59 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 196.
60 Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 487; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to
Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14; “Product of
Turpentine at the South,” 303; “Production of Turpentine in Alabama,” 561; “The Manufacture
o f Turpentine in the South,” 452; “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 196; Avirett, Old Plantation.
67; Professor Percival Perry, interview by author, notes in author’s possession, Wake Forest
University, Winston-Salem, NC, 9 April 1991.
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diagonally from the apex of the box and the other rose perpendicularly from the comer of the
box. The ax cuts had to be precise, because the angle o f the comers guided the gum into the box.
While some producers calculated that workers should comer 500 to 600 boxes a day, others
reckoned the task at 600 to 800 boxes.61
Once they had been cornered, the boxes began to fill with gum and had to be dipped.
The number o f dippings per season varied from four to seven, with more dipping performed
during the tree’s first two years o f harvesting. This operation required a dipper, an instrument
with a spade-shaped blade and a handle. The harvester collected gum by thrusting the dipper into
one end of the box, pushing it to the bottom, and bringing it up to the opposite side—all in one
quick motion. The sticky contents o f the box adhered to the flat surface of the dipper. As
laborers dipped each box, they carried the gum to one o f two buckets. The buckets usually held
eight gallons and had bases wider than their tops, making them less likely to spill. A strip of
hoop-iron attached to the edge of the bucket served as a scrapper that cleaned the gum off the
dipper. When the first bucket was full, the slave carried it to a forty-gallon barrel, turned it
upside down, and left it to drain while they went back to fill a second. When the second bucket
was full, it took the place of the first. Although dipping was a light task requiring little physical
strength, it was a dirty operation that smeared the workers’ hands and clothing with gum.62
Many factors influenced the number of boxes that could be dipped and the consequent
amount of gum that could be harvested. Weather conditions, for one, affected the dipping

61 MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14; Schorger and Betts. Naval Stores
Industry. 16; “Product o f Turpentine at the South,” 303; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to
Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486.
62 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486-487;
“Production o f Turpentine in Alabama,” 561; Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250; “Product
of Turpentine at the South,” 303-304; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14; “The Pine
Forests of the South,” 197; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 17; Avirett, Old
Plantation. 68.
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frequency. Temperature influenced the raw turpentine’s consistency and thus the ease and speed
with which it could be dipped. In hot weather it had a viscous quality but when the thermometer
dropped it stiffened. G. W. Perry explained that “by the continuance o f cool weather, the dipper
will be hard to get down in the box, and if the turpentine be left therein, it will remain stiff until
the return of warm weather in the following spring.”63 Dry weather also affected gum yield.64
The manager o f the Grist operation observed that “all o f work is going on well but it is too dry
for the pines to run well.”65 Wet weather also slowed dipping. One producer explained that “an
early or backward spring or fall, long drouths, during which the tree almost stops running, or
heavy driving rains which fill the boxes with water and float out the turpentine, all have their
effect on the number o f drippings [sic], which depends otherwise on the frequency and care with
which chipping is done.”66 Perry recommended that in bad weather, the forest workers be put to
assisting the coopers hoop barrels. When it rained continuously one March day in 1856, the
coopers at G. I. Germond’s turpentine operation in the region o f south Georgia and north Florida
continued to work in their shop, but the other hands were put to shelling seed com. Finally, the
dippers’ task depended on the age of the boxes. Because newer boxes produced more gum than
older ones, more time was required for emptying the buckets and fewer boxes could be dipped.
Workers could manage dipping 10,000 to 12,000 older boxes and perhaps as few as 8,000 new
ones a week.67

63 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 32, 123.
64 Ibid., 116-117.
65 Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 17 July 1860, Grist Papers.
66 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487.
6718 March 1856 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal, Department o f Special
Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida; Perry, Treatise on Turpentine
Farming. 88; ”The Pine Forests of the South,” 197; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 488;
William Kauffman Scarborough, ed., The Diarv of Edmund Ruffin, vol. 1, (Baton Rouge:
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Because some stands produced more gum than others, which meant the hardest worker
could actually bring in less gum, P e n y advocated not tasking dippers by the barrel but by the
number o f boxes. The amount o f barrels dipped in a day was not necessarily an indication of a
slave’s effort.68 In March 1856 G. I. Germond observed that his “boxes are not filling well,”
consequently, the seven hands who had been dipping “could not get their task.”69 In fact the
amount of gum collected by individual dippers could vary significantly. In 1855 fifteen slaves
labored for one week dipping boxes and collected an average of 44.5 barrels of gum. Two
collected as much as 48 barrels and one collected only 32 barrels. Like boxing, the size of the
task varied with the individual producer. Some expected workers to fill from four to seven
barrels with raw turpentine a day. Truly exceptional dippers could fill ten. Of turpentiners who
tasked by the box, some found 1,800 boxes a day sufficient, others apparently tasked their
laborers as high as 3,000.7°
Once gathered, producers strove to get their resin, especially the highest quality and most
valuable gum, to distilleries quickly before it deteriorated. Virgin dip possessed a thin, oily,
transparent quality and produced the highest quality rosin. Every year a tree was worked, the dip
became thicker and darker, moving from a light cream color toward an orange. Contemporary
observers explained the phenomenon as a result o f light wood forming around the box and

Louisiana State University, 1972), 52; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14-15;
“Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487; McMillan to Southern
Cultivator. 172; Michaux, North American Svlva. 141.
68 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 116-117.
69 24 March 1856 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal.
70 Michaux estimated that three thousand trees could yield seventy-five barrels o f raw
turpentine and twenty-five of scrape a season if they were dipped five or six times. Michaux,
North American Svlva. 141; M. Jones to James R. Grist, 30 October 1855, Grist Papers; “The
Pine Forests o f the South,” 197; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 488; Scarborough, Diary
of Edmund Ruffin. 52; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 14-15; “Turpentine: Hints for
Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487; McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 172.
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staining the gum which flowed into it Because lightwood did not form until the first winter after
the box was cut, the virgin turpentine was not discolored. Since virgin dip was much more
valuable than gum harvested from older boxes, it was important for hands to keep it separate and
best to get it to market quickly.71 Spirits evaporated rapidly from the gum, especially in hot, dry
weather. Sofi gum was the most susceptible to the effects of heat. It was recommended that “as
fast as they are filled the dip barrels should be hauled to the still and emptied into it. If left in the
woods they lose by leakage, and the quality o f the gum for yielding spirits o f turpentine is
impaired.”72 Strother explained that “the produce is carried to market on a sort o f dray or cart
which holds but two barrels, consequently the barrels are always seen setting about in the woods
in couples.”73 One strong hand with a wagon and two mules could haul the turpentine dipped by
ten hands for an average o f three miles and also be able to supply the workers with provisions
and empty barrels. Hauling in wet weather could be difficult especially down the muddy cart
paths that wound through the pine forest.74 An overseer managing an Alabama operation
reported that “the ground is so wet we cannot run the wagon to any advantage hence I stop.”75
A pine would bleed only as long as its wound was fresh. Within seven or eight days the
gum crystallized at the opening of the wounded resin ducts, and so fresh wounds were required
about once a week in warm weather, less often during cooler periods.76 Chipping, as this

71 “Product o f Turpentine at the South,” 304; Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming.
124; Description o f turpentining, Harrington Papers; “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the
South” 453.
72 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 197.
73 Crayon, “North Carolina Illustrated: The Piney Woods,” 745.
74 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487; Perry,
Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 110.
75 Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Grist Papers.
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operation was called, was done with a hacker or shave, a circular piece of iron with a sharp lower
edge and a two-foot handle. It involved cutting the bark away just above the box and extending
the cut to the comers or outer edges o f the box. Each new chip, located just above the last one,
extended the face o f the box upwards after each task. With each stroke, the chipper cut a onefourth inch furrow-like gash through the bark and into the sapwood. A narrow scar, one-half
inch up the surface, would suffice, however, the chip length was commonly one inch broad,
causing the face in some cases to rise two feet each year. Because each chip was cut at the upper
edge of the last one, the oldest orchards contained trees with faces extending up twelve to fifteen
feet. When the face reached shoulder height, workers switched to using a puller, a long-handled
tool with a metal scrapper on the end, which allowed them to reach the high faces. Perry warned
that some hands tried to pull early because it was easier than using the hack. This practice
should be discouraged, he argued, because the puller caused the face to rise faster than did the
hack. “Hacking,” he explained, “is to strike with the tool, and it requires a slight stoop to cut the
right quantity, and do it well. I have found it necessary to threaten some hands before I could get
them to hack my low faces.” Producers sought well-trained workers for the task since the skill of
the chippers determined how many years an orchard could be harvested. If the gashes were too
deep, the tree's life was shortened; if the cut was too broad, the face would soon rise out o f reach
and the tree could no longer be harvested. Moreover, producers required that this difficult task
be executed with considerable speed. Although some producers calculated that chipping 800 to
1,000 faces a day for average laborers and 1,200 to 1,500 for better workers was standard, others
found that 12,000 to 17,000 faces a week were possible for the average chipper. A few

76 In fact, sixty-seven percent of the total resin flow occurs within twenty-four hours of
the cut and tapers off sharply afterwards. Cold weather, 45° F. or below, could either slow or
stop gum flow. Brown, Forest Products. 184; Description of turpentining, Harrington Papers; V.
L. Harper and Lenthall Wyman, Variations in Naval-Stores Yields Associated With Weather and
Specific Days Between Chippings (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture,
1936), 10, 15.
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extraordinary laborers were reported to have chipped 20,000 faces a week.77 In the most
sophisticated operations hands specialized in either dipping or chipping. It was recommended
that “the dipping should be done by hands employed for the purpose, and the hackers should
continue their work without changing the proper interval between the hackings of each tree.”7* It
was also suggested that chipping be “done by the strongest and most expert hands, these should
be kept at it regularly through the season, while women or inferior hands can dip very well.”79
Four to six chippings were required to fill a box with turpentine.80
The season’s last chipping occurred in mid-October and the last dipping around the first
of November. After this, scraping began. Scrape was gum that had hardened to the face, lost
much o f its spirits in evaporation, and was therefore only half as valuable as liquid gum. It was
important to remove the scrape promptly before high winds could cause the pine to sway so
violently that the hardened turpentine fell off. Workers used a small blade attached to a long
handle to dislodge scrape from the face. They then gathered it in a specially designed box that
measured about two and one-half feet square and was open at the top and one end. The bottom
of the opened end was supported by the tree and the closed end sat on two constructed legs or
sometimes wheels. When collecting scrape, laborers would drag or roll these boxes through the
forest, lean the open end against the tree, just below the face, and pull the scrape down into them.

77 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250-251; “Product of Turpentine at the South,”
304; “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” 453-454; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi
Harvest: Lumbering in the Longleaf Pine Belt 1840-1915 (University: The University of
Mississippi, 1962), 123-124; “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,”
487; MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 15; Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave
States. 342; Avirett, Old Plantation. 67-68; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 17;
Description of turpentining, Harrington Papers; Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 78.
78 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 197.
79 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487.
80 “Product o f Turpentine at the South,” 304.
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Each box held 100 to 150 pounds o f scrape. After the boxes were full o f scrape, it was
transferred into rosin barrels, pounded in, and hauled to the still. Scrape collecting was usually
completed around December or January.'1
When the boxes stopped filling and the scrape had been collected, the turpentine
laborers’ work was still not finished. If new pine forests were to be opened for the next season,
the strongest and most skilled laborers began cutting boxes immediately. The laborers who were
not boxing cleared grass, pine straw, and tree limbs from the bases of trees and burned the debris.
Still others collected the timber needed to make the barrels for the next season. At one operation
a tar kiln was fired in mid December when the turpentine work was almost completed.82 In 1851,
De Bow’s Review reported that, “like the engagements of a farm-hand, in always finding
something needful to be done in every day of the year, and something that should not be
neglected; so with the turpentine hand, the whole year has its various demands upon him in their
proper season, so that there is no time to spare from his turpentine crop.”83 Similarly, in 1846, a
producer writing from Washington had noted that “the hands who tend turpentine have no time
for any other business.”84 But if the turpentine production was part o f the operation of a
traditional agricultural plantation, some laborers were used for work unrelated to turpentine. A
sample of operations listed for sale in the 1840s and 1850s indicates that less than half included

81 MacLeod, “Tar and Turpentine Business,” 15; “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the
South,” 453; “Product of Turpentine at the South,” 304-305; Ruffin, “Notes of a Steam Journey,”
250- 251; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 18; Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming.
109.
82 Benjamin Grist to Allen Grist, 21 January 1851, Grist Papers; “Turpentine: Hints for
Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 488; John Carr to Sir, 15 December 1858, Thomas
David Smith McDowell Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
83 “Product of Turpentine at the South,” p. 305
84 McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 172.
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any crop land. O f those that did, there was an average o f just over 240 acres which could
potentially be cultivated. The most common crops grown included com, peas, potatoes, oats, and
wheat. Few operations produced any cotton.85 Joining the field hands, turpentine laborers
sometimes opened ditches, cleared new ground, trimmed hedgerows, mended fences, and
repaired roads. On February 27, 1856 G. I. Germond had three slaves—Dick, Moses, and Adam—
getting timber for a pig pin. The next day his slaves cleared a field for planting and burned of
another tract. The day after that they burned over another area.86 James Battle Avirett, whose
father owned Richlands Plantation, wrote that only “by joining these two industries, the
[turpentine] orchards and the plantation,” could the plantation be maintained.87

85 “Land for Sale on Cape Fear River,” Wilmington. North Carolina Chronicle. 10
November 1841; “Lands for Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 27 June 1845; “Real
Estate for sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 July 1845; “Plantation for Sale,”
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 24 April 1846; “Valuable Turpentine Land For Sale,”
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 20 November 1846; “Valuable Real Estate.” Wilmington.
North Carolina Journal. 26 February 1847; “Valuable Lands For Sale.” Wilmington. North
Carolina Journal. 22 December 1848; “Lands For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29
December 1848; “Valuable Farming and Turpentine lands For Sale,” Wilmington. North
Carolina Journal. 2 March 1849; “Valuable Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.
11 May 1849; “For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.” 10 August 1849; “Notice.—A
Valuable Plantation For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 23 November, 1849;
“Valuable Plantation For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 23 November 1849; “Land
For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.” 19 July 1850; “A Great Bargain,” Wilmington.
North Carolina Journal. 4 October 1850; “Land and Negroes For Sale,” Wilmington. North
Carolina Journal. 4 July 1851; “ 10,000 Acres o f Land For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina
Journal. 21 November 1851; “For Sale.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29 October 1852;
“Valuable Cape Fear Plantation For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 24 June 1853;
“Valuable Real Estate For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 November 1853;
“Valuable Real Estate For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 10 March 1854; “Land
For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal 13 October 1854; “A Valuable Tract o f Land For
Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 4 January 1856; “Turpentine Land For Sale,”
Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856; “For Sale, Valuable Turpentine and
Farming Lands in Bladen County.” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856;
“Turpentine Lands in Florida For Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856;
“A Turpentine Farm For Sale or Rent,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29 August 1856.
86 27,28, and 29 February 1856 entries, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal.
87 Avirett, Old Plantation. 68-69 (quotation on page 69).
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Certainly, distillers, who were the most skilled turpentine workers, were too busy for
such tasks. To insure a high-quality product, they distilled the gum and scrape as quickly as
possible. Distilleries were often two-story structures. A wood or occasionally an oil furnace was
at ground-level, and a copper still sat above it on the second floor. They were located near
streams, which provided water to cool the condensing tube, or worm—the long, coiled tube in
which the spirits o f turpentine were transformed into a liquid. Although these stills ranged in
capacity from five to thirty barrels, most had a capacity o f between ten- and twenty-barrel
capacity. To charge or fill them, workers brought barrels o f gum to the second floor, often by
rolling them up a ramp, and the distiller removed the head o f the still and dumped in the gum.
He then replaced the head, connected it to the condensing tube, and put the tube in its tank to
cool while the turpentine distilled. When everything was ready, he fired the furnace. Generally
the distilling process lasted two or two and one-half hours. The first turpentine to flow from the
worm had a green tint from the oxidation o f the copper, even when the still was fired regularly.88
The frequency with which a still was fired depended on the volume of gum coming from the
woods. At the peak o f the season the operator of the Grist Alabama operation had “to run my
still three times a day keep up.”89
Because of the primitive nature o f mid-nineteenth-century distilling technology, still
operators faced significant challenges in successfully processing a charge o f gum. Distillers first
needed to bring the still temperature to a steady, gradual rise to ensure that the gum heated

88 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 344; “The Pine Forests o f the South,”
197; “Production o f Turpentine in Alabama,” S61; Although Tatum is describing experiences at a
pine woods distillery in the early twentieth century, the still was the same as those used in the
antebellum era. Fitzhugh Lee Tatum, interview by Ruth L. Stokes, 19 October 1974, transcript,
Southern Oral History Program, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1; Panshin et al., Forest Products. 4S3; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores
Industry. 29; A. David King, ID, interview by author, notes in author’s possession, Georgia
Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 14 June 1996.
89 Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 7 July 1860, Grist Papers.
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evenly and distilled thoroughly. Heating the kettle too quickly would result in the bottom
becoming excessively hot and burning the gum. When adding wood, distillers needed to know
the direction of the temperature in the kettle. Oak wood burned slower and held the heat longer,
but pine wood, which was consumed much more quickly, was easier to control. When heating
the still distillers also needed to consider the quality o f the gum that they were about to distill
since different grades o f gum distilled at slightly different temperatures. Higher grades required
less heat than lower ones; scrape required the hottest temperatures. Because antebellum
producers had not learned to add water, which would have aided the distilling process, distillers
had to cope with serious difficulties. In the absence o f water, raw turpentine, which is seventyfive percent rosin and twenty-five percent spirits, does not boil until it reaches around 363° F.
However, rosin begins to decompose when it reaches 392° F., coloring the spirits yellow and thus
lowering the quality. Therefore, the distiller had a margin of error of only 29° F. Making his
task even more challenging, the property o f resin that causes its temperature to rise rapidly as it
distills. Only rarely, then, was more than a portion of the turpentine distilled before the rosin
began to decompose. If the temperature fluctuated too far the disastrous consequences could
threaten life and property. In cases when the fire grew too low, the distilling mass began to cool
trapping the spirit vapor within the rosin causing the volume in the still to increase, boil over, and
create a danger o f five. If the still temperature rose too quickly, causing the vapor to grow in the
still to grow too abundant, a similar situation could occur. Because the temperature of the rosin
was critical in the process, distillers needed to know exactly when to extinguish the furnace.
Since stills had no gauges, however, workers had to rely on other methods to monitor the
progress of the gum. They could collect the distilled emissions from the worm in a clear
drinking glass and then examine the proportion o f water and turpentine. Gum releases water as it
distills and the longer the still ran, the more water it emitted. Or the distiller could place his ear
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against the lower end o f the worm to listen to the gum boiling. An experienced worker could
determine from the sound what stage the gum had reached.
The distillation o f gum resulted in two products: rosin and spirits of turpentine. Crude
turpentine yielded from six to eight gallons of spirits per barrel of gum, depending on how soon
it was stilled and its purity. Generally five gallons o f gun yielded one gallon of spirits. During
distillation a mixture o f ninety to ninety-five percent spirits of turpentine and five to ten percent
water flowed from the worm into a fifty-gallon barrel. Because turpentine is lighter that water, it
floated to the top where it could run off into another barrel or be dipped off. Rosin remained in
the still. When the distilling o f a charge was completed, the rosin was drained from the still
through a gate at the bottom. It flowed through a series of screens, which filtered out wood
chips, dirt, and other foreign matter, and into a cooling vat. If the hot liquid rosin did not cool
and become more viscous before it was put into barrels, considerable loss could occur through
leakage. After the liquid had cooled sufficiently it was dipped into barrels for shipment.
Workers who could perform the complicated distilling process were scarce and
expensive. A white distiller earned between $500 and S600 a year, and a hired slave distiller cost
generally more than a less-skilled turpentine worker. Evidence suggests that whites usually
served as head distillers, although their assistants were likely to be skilled slaves. At a fifteen
barrel still, Olmsted found “one white man and one negro employed under the oversight of the
owner.” As the naval stores industry grew during the 1840s and 1850s, distillers became harder
to find, and producers advertised for their services. Some producers even attempted to train their
own slaves to operate a still.90

90 King, interview; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 12-14,30-31; Panshin et
al., Forest Products. 453; Robson Dunwody, “Proper Methods o f Distilling and Handling in the
Production of Turpentine and Rosin,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and
Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921),
128; Tatum interview, 1,4; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 126; Olmsted, Journey in the
Seaboard Slave States. 345-346 (quote on page 346); “Production o f Turpentine in Alabama,”
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The great volume o f naval stores refined at stills required a large number o f barrels for
use as shipping containers. Without them, turpentine operators had no way to package their
product. In 1850 J. I. McRea complained from Elizabethtown in Bladen County that he had
“been trying to make some turpentine this year and find that 1 will not have hoop poles enough to
make my barrels.” He hoped to buy one thousand poles so he could finish his job.91 In 1853 J.
W. Wheeler ran into similar trouble when he explained that “I am don my crop and I cant get
barels to do any thing with turpentine.”92 When the cooper at one operation ran away, the
remaining coopers could not keep up with the demand, and the still had to stop for lack of spirit
barrels. To alleviate the barrel shortage problem, during the 1840s and 1850s, producers began
importing spirit barrels from the North. Commonly these casks were second-hand barrels that
had been used to transport naval stores to New York or Boston and were returned for resale in
lots of five to six hundred.93
Because barrels were essential and required in such large numbers, as a general rule,
every fifth man in a naval stores operation worked as a cooper. Unlike distillers, most coopers in
the turpentine industry were slaves. Constant demand for them made them among the more
expensive turpentine laborers. As early as the 1780s, Johann Schoepf found that “A cooper,
indispensable in pitch and tar making, cost his purchaser 250 Pd., and his 15-year old boy, bred

561; Pervical Peny, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D.
diss., Duke University, 1947), 45; “Notice,” The New Bern. North Carolina Newbemian. 6
January 1852.
91 J. I. McRea to Thomas S. D. McDowell, 16 September 1850, McDowell Papers.
92 J. W. Wheeler to Thomas S. D. McDowell, 12 July 1853, Ibid.
93 James to Grist, 23 August 1853, Grist Papers; Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 79;
Shipping receipt, 30 June 1859, William H. Turlington Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke
University; Thomas S. D. McDowell Account with H. H. Robinson, October 1855 entries,
McDowell Papers.
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to the same work, fetched 150 Pd.”94 In the mid 1850s the cost of hiring slave coopers ran from
$1.50 to $2.00 a day. They labored ail year. They constructed barrels during harvest season,
some reportedly singing as they worked: during the off season they collected timber for the next
year’s staves. Since rosin hardened once it cooled, making it highly unlikely to leak, cheaply
made barrels with loose pine staves could suffice. And because craftsmanship was not
important, a cooper could make eight to ten rosin barrels in a day. Raw turpentine barrels,
though, were more carefully constructed. With a forty-gallon capacity, these barrels were made
from good pine staves and fastened with six light iron hoops. Coopers commonly constructed
dip barrels from higher grade staves than those used in hauling scrape. Spirits o f turpentine
barrels usually held forty to forty-five gallons and were also built with great precision. They
were made o f well-seasoned white oak staves and were tightly looped with strong iron hoops. To
protect against leakage, these barrels were given a coat o f glue, and the exteriors were thickly
varnished or painted. While ordinary coopers could be trusted to make rosin and gum barrels,
only expert coopers could make spirit barrels, which normally required half a day to assemble.93
As during the colonial era, however, naval stores barrels were not always properly
constructed. In 1860 J. H. Richardson’s factor in Wilmington informed him that the barrels
containing his spirits o f turpentine had leaked badly in transit and required new casks when they
arrived in Wilmington. The original ones, he wrote, were “good for nothing but for Rosin,” the
least viscous naval stores product.96 That same month Richardson learned that “This lot o f spirits

f Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the Confederation (1788: reprint, New York: Burt
Franklin, 1968), 148.
95 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 340; “Turpentine: Hints for Those
About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 488; Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the
Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 45; “The Pine Forests of
the South,” 197-198; “Production o f Turpentine in Alabama,” 561; MacLeod, “Tar and
Turpentine Business,” 16; Avirett, Old Plantation. 65.
96 William H. Turlington to J. H. Richardson, 17 July 1860, Turlington Papers.
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had leaked a good deal owing to its long duration on the river[.] You will see it took nearly two
brls to fill up the lot - Every brl of this was in same bad condition.” His factor sent back “ 10
casks that you can use for [raw] turpt but dont put any more spts in them.”97 However, even the
best turpentine casks occasionally leaked. Olmsted reported that evaporation was inevitable
given the volatile nature o f spirits. Stave making machines, first introduced during the 1830s,
made smoother, more uniform staves which resulted in tighter barrels and reduced problems with
leaking. By at least the early 1840s mechanically-dressed staves were available in North
Carolina.98 However, not many producers used these machine-made staves. While traveling
through the South, a northern agent for barrel-making machinery passed the Grist turpentine
works. Upon inspection of the cooperage house, he reported that he could “improve your
coopers by working with them one week that they can make three or four more barrels per day to
the man[.] They are far behind the times.”99 He also claimed that he could "furnish a machine to
cut heads ready for putting in the barrel and one hand will cut from six hundred to 1000 per day,
Price $150.00.”'°° No more is said regarding the barrel technology, but it is safe to assume that
Grist, like other turpentiners o f his day, continued to rely on the labor-intensive, traditional
method.
From barrel-making to boxing, the turpentine production schedule hinged on the longleaf
pine’s seasonal growth cycle. Workers cut boxes during cool weather, when the trees entered

97 William H. Turlington to John H. Richardson, 25 July 1860, William A. B. and John
H. Richardson Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
98 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 345-346; Pervical Perry, “The Naval
Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 80;
Carroll B. Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines: Naval Stores (Shalimar FL: Tarkel
Publishing, 1998), 106.
99 C. L. Benson to Mr. Grist, 1 October 1855, Grist Papers.
100 Ibid.
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their dormant period, and began chipping faces and dipping gum once wood growth and resin
ducts activity resumed in the spring. As the pines’ resin production peaked during the hottest
summer days, the pace o f chipping and dipping increased. Rainy periods, during which water
soaking the ground and standing in the boxes rendered efficient work impossible, and drought
conditions, which reduced the pines’ resin-production ability, could lower labor intensity even
during this peak period. In autumn, once temperatures cooled and the daylight hours grew
shorter, the pace o f work in the forest slowed. But as the intensity o f gum harvesting declined
during the colder months, the energy of naval stores laborers shifted to such other necessary tasks
as raking around the base o f trees, gathering wood for staves, and coopering. Thus the seasonal
labor pattern, shaped by the iongleafs twelve-month cycle, provided for the most efficient labor
use.
Naval stores producers turned to slave management techniques to organize and control
their labor force around this annual schedule. Under slavery, two distinct methods o f labor
management developed: the task system and the gang system. Under the latter, plantation
owners gave a gang of slaves an allotment of work that they were expected to complete as a
group. This system worked best in the open fields where the overseer had a clear view o f their
performance. Where slaves could not be closely supervised, producers preferred the task system.
Under it, individual slaves worked at an allotted task. Each slave could set the pace, taking as
little or as much time as necessary to complete the assignment, as long as it was performed to the
producer’s satisfaction.101
Because dipping, chipping, and boxing required workers to fan out in ail directions
through the expansive pine forests, producers found that the task system worked best for
harvesting turpentine. Many o f these forests were large and isolated, such as the one at

101 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 54-55.
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Richlands Plantation which covered twenty-two thousand acres. De Bow’s Review described '‘a
suitable place for operations” as one “where one or two thousand acres of proper pines lie in an
unbroken body, convenient to water transportation.”102 To organize the tasks, producers marked
off turpentine orchards in grids o f continuous blocks. They created these blocks or crops by
blazing a line o f trees and further dividing each crop with rows of stakes placed at fifty-yard
intervals, cutting the forest into half-acre squares. Tasks consisted o f ten thousand boxes or
roughly one hundred acres. In most instances laborers had approximately one week to complete
work in the task area103 Without such a division, reportedly, “the overseer o f several hands
cannot possibly inspect their work with any accuracy, nor can the hands, however faithful, avoid
skipping a great many boxes in cornering, dipping, cmd chipping.”10*
Even though their workers were organized under the task system, producers expressed
concern that isolation in the forest would allow laborers to work slowly and carelessly. Some
worried that, unless they were carefully watched, their chippers would cut only the obvious trees
around the perimeter o f their allotment and would neglect those in the center that were more
difficult to detect.105 A producer who explained that “Watchful care will be necessary in
attending to the hands, or the cunning old negroes will frequently neglect to chip the pines
regularly,” believed that the work was best monitored by “looking on the surface for the chip
which has lately fallen, as that will retain its new color long enough to enable you to discover

102 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” 196.
103 Avirett, Old Plantation. 64; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 122; “Turpentine: Hints
for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 486-487; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina.
487; Cecelski, “The Shores o f Freedom,” 187; Bellamy, “Slavery in Microcosm,” 344; “Product
of Turpentine at the South,” 303; Adam Hodgson, Remarks During a Journey Through North
America in the Years 1819. 1820. and 1821 in a Series of Letters (New York: Samuel Whiting,
1823), 112; Scarborough, Diary o f Edmund Ruffin. 52; Russell, North America. 159.
104 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 487.
105 Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 487; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 124-125.
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whether the tree has been recently chipped or not.”106 Turpentiners were also concerned that
“streaks on the face would be made too short, the chip too shallow, or trees chipped only on one
side, the side the producer or overseer would see when they passed.” 107 De Bow’s Review
warned producers that “it is important. . . to see that the hands perform their task properly, and
not allow them to mislead you, as they will frequently do, by saying they perform their task,
without half doing so.”108 Producers were also advised that “in task work like this [turpentine],
constant watchfulness will be necessary to insure faithful execution o f the work.”109 In 1851
James R. Grist believed that he had a “good lot o f boys + they will do well with proper
attention.”110 In late summer 1852 he “rode over a portion of the boxes. . . + will go over the
Ballance with Mr James to day —I find them well faced + well chipped.”111After similar
inspections, G. W. Perry advised that good hands should not be confronted about trees that they
may have missed for it would shame them. He believed that producers should instead mark the
missed trees so slaves would not “lose confidence in their owners, and fail frequently to do their
duty, when they would not have done so otherwise.” 112 It was also suggested that producers
mark the trees where the next chip should come so the slaves would know they were being
closely watched.113 Perry also recommended that producers not show excessive anger over poor
work or too much gratification for improvement. “This treatment,” he explained, “keeps them in

106 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 75.
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their proper places; and as they perceive, by your daily conduct, that things pass over and are
settled at the same time, a confidence is engrafted in the negro toward his owner. Masters may
rely upon it that hands will work better from firm conviction than any other way.”114
The task system also aided owners and overseers in organizing their labor force into
multi-unit work groups. Because harvest season for turpentine was limited to the warmer months
when the tree produced resin, none o f the directly related operations—chipping, dipping,
scraping, and distilling—could wait until the slower season. Therefore, in the more active periods
different hands performed a variety of tasks. Olmsted witnessed an operation employing two
men at a still, twenty-five chippers and dippers, two coopers, and several wagoners.115 In
October 1855 a Grist overseer had “ten hands dipping turpentine + four hands getting timber,
five hands at the still, six hands coopering, one hand cutting wood, one heading rosin + four
hands helping.”116 But by November the overseer had altered the tasks. He had “five hands
scrapping. . . + ten hands dipping, six hands getting timber, seven hands at the cooper shop, five
hands at the still, one hand cutting wood, [and] three wagoning.”117 By assigning tasks to the
forest hands, such potentially chaotic arrangements were better organized.
In most situations slaves preferred the task system to gang labor, for it afforded a relative
degree of autonomy. This system worked best in areas such as rice fields and turpentine forests
where the tasks were clearly marked. Laborers could work at their own pace and enjoy free time
if their job was completed early. Although their work was inspected, they escaped the persistent
driving that gang laborers endured. Under this arrangement, each hand’s work was more easily
113 Ibid., 114.
114 Ibid., 118.
115Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 346.
116 M. Jones to James R. Grist, 24 October 1855, Grist Papers.
117M. Jones to James R. Grist, 5 November 1855, Ibid.
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monitored. Despite their preferences, agricultural slaves most commonly worked in gangs. They
remained under the constant surveillance o f a driver or overseer who kept them working at a
brisk pace. All laborers, no matter how well or fast they worked, continued their labor until all
workers in the gang were discharged in the evening. They had no way o f earning incentive
payment for hard work or free time for work completed early. Nor did the gang laborers have
any opportunity to develop self-reliance or to exercise control over their work schedules; every
workday was the same as the one before.118
Many producers believed that their slaves preferred task work in the turpentine forest
over gang labor in agriculture. One remarked, “no set o f hands have ever been known to
willingly leave it and go back to cotton.” " 9 Olmsted found “the negroes employed in this branch
of industry . . . to be unusually intelligent and cheerful.” 120 Accepting these claims, the leading
historian o f the naval stores industry, Percival Perry, writes that “once trained in turpentine
operations, blacks preferred turpentining to other forms o f farm labor because it was based on the
task system and they were somewhat more independent in their work.”121 He also finds that
‘"turpentine plantation slaves worked as part of a production team, yet at an individual task, rather
than in gang labor. This may have contributed to a sense o f independence, responsibility, and
greater contentment.”122 While Perry accurately describes labor under the task system, his

118 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 54-56.
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122 Randall M. Miller and John David Smith, eds. Dictionary of Afro-American Slavery
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), s.v. “naval stores industry.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141
general conclusion that this made work in the turpentine forest more pleasant than agricultural
labor is questionable. Both the task and gang systems had advantages and disadvantages, but “in
the long run,” as Kenneth M. Stampp maintains, “the rigors o f either system were determined by
the demands o f masters and overseers.”123 The type of work and amount of labor expected of
turpentine slaves greatly affected the relative difficulty o f their tasks. Moreover, Perry fails to
consider important factors related to the isolation of the camps—the realities of work that
significantly shaped the lives o f slaves.
Although turpentine workers did not endure the same drudgery that gang laborers did,
the task system, as used by naval stores producers, denied the slaves the “community in labor as
well as in life generally” that they so desired.124 On many agricultural plantations the task system
facilitated close contact among bondsmen. Slaves who received allotted rows to hoe in cotton
fields worked closely with other slaves, as did those laboring in adjoining rice patches.
However, in the turpentine forests, workers encountered a different situation. Because producers
marked their tasks in half-acre squares, and boxers, dippers, and chippers were assigned several
tasks, laborers were placed at considerable distances from one another and lacked social
interaction to break the monotony of their work.
For many turpentine laborers, loneliness did not end with their work day. Producers,
taking advantage o f mid-nineteenth-century transportation improvements, purchased virgin
forests and moved their stills, overseers, slaves, and equipment into isolated camps. The camps
were commonly so far away from agricultural plantations that men in the labor force had no
regular contact with their families and, for the most part, no female companionship. Only a few
women and children worked in the antebellum naval stores industry because, except for dipping,

123 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 56.
124 Eugene D. Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York:
Vintage Books, 1976), 324.
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the tasks required strong arms and backs. Most o f the jobs—boxing, chipping, and cornering—
demanded considerable strength; therefore, men dominated the labor force.125 As the Southern
Cultivator reported in 1846, “the same boxes will stand tending or chipping from eight to ten
years, which labor is performed by males, both white and slave, women and children not being
very serviceable.”126 At Benjamin Williams’ operation in southeast Georgia, the slave women
and children stayed at his home where his wife was in charge.127 Men were deprived of the
emotional support o f their relatives and friends. In discussing the lamentations o f lonely slaves,
Genovese writes, “Their hollers provided a counterpart to plantation work songs, but ranged
beyond a direct concern with labor to a concern with the most personal expressions o f life’s
travail. As such, they created a piercing history o f the impact o f hardship and sorrow on solitary
black men.”128 Some turpentine slaves, however, took measures to alleviate their loneliness. At
Williams Georgia operation, it was reported that without permission or passes to leave, “some of
our turpentine hands will work all day + then walk eight or ten miles to dance all night.”129
Labor incentives were commonly used in the naval stores industry to stimulate lonely
and unhappy workers to greater productivity and to encourage them to work during their own
time. Incentives came as cash rewards for completing more than their assigned tasks and as time
off for finishing tasks early. Because such tasks as boxing and chipping were vitally important
and overseers had difficulty monitoring each hand’s work, incentives helped to assure that slaves

125 “The Pine Forests of the South,” 197; Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina. 488;
Account Book, 1846-1849, Daniel W. Jordan Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke
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performed work properly. In 1854 Williams was so pleased with his workers that he paid some
o f them as much as fifty dollars during the season. In the winter o f 1856, eleven slaves at one
operation in the vicinity of south Georgia and north Florida earned an average o f $8.23 for extra
work cutting boxes. The most made was $ 19.20 and the least was $ 1.69. At Richlands
Plantation, laborers could earn from 400 to 600 by continuing their work on Saturdays. To
encourage speed, tasks were designed to allow a free day (usually Saturday) in the work week.'30
James B. Avirett explained that laborers “must be stimulated to their best work . . . by so
regulating their work that a portion of each week is their own to do as they please with.”131
Turpentine producers, like virtually all slave masters, also employed punishments,
especially the whip.132 Slaves received beatings for not working fast enough, for failure to
complete tasks, for complaining, and simply because their master arbitrarily decided to punish
them. G. W. Perry found that his turpentine slaves “required whipping every time after dipping
when chipping was commenced.”133 As a solution to poor work, he considered whether the slave
“knows how to course pines well or not, and whether his tool is in good order or not, and
thrash[ed] him accordingly.” 134 In May 1856 G. I. Germond punished one slave for allowing his
horse to get away and then lying about it. That same month he found three slaves had been
negligent with their hacking and each received forty lashes. Germond did not always resort to
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the whip to punish his slaves. When he suggested that one hand had not cleared around his task
of trees, he “told him that I had no confidence in his Honesty + that I should watch him very
close + if I detected any such thing in him again that I would Punish him (or any other one for a
similar offense) by not allowing to Work at task work any more for the year.” 135 In March 1856
he “Brought Lymons home with hands tied behind him + locked him up in the Smokehouse till
night to punish him for going to Mr. Simpsons without a pass on Saturday.”136
Observations by scholars on slavery and supervision help explain why the turpentine
industry’s form o f labor organization and combination of incentives and punishments took the
shape that they did. Economist Stefano Fenoaltea explains that in managing slave labor, pain and
reward incentives were best used in various combinations for different types o f work. Pain
incentives were the most effective at generating greater worker effort but did not promote
carefulness. For labor-intensive activities where brute effort, not precision, was important, as in
breaking rocks, slaves most often worked in gangs and were punished with physical pain if they
fail to work fast or hard enough. Because the threat o f pain produces high anxiety levels, it does
not facilitate carefulness. Not only did anxiety impair the slaves’ ability to work carefully, but
threats could generate ill-feeling among the slaves and lead to intentional carelessness. Rewards,
which tended to cause a reduction in work effort and productivity, however, did lead to labor
with greater care. Slaves who worked by reward incentives, Fenoaltea continues, were more
typically self-supervised and less likely to work as part of a gang. In this case, by allowing the
slaves to retain a portion o f their production they could be made to work with less supervision.
Fenoaltea maintains that masters typically used a combination o f pain and reward incentives.
They adjusted the levels o f each until the maximum benefit for the specific job was reached.

135 15 March 1856 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal.
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Fenoaltea also argues that slavery was most likely used in occupations where the working
conditions were unpleasant and free workers would require a high percentage of the product
produced in order to voluntarily perform the labor. Economic historian Ralph Shlomowitz makes
similar points in his study o f southern sharecropping. Slaves, he explains, could be made to work
long hours and intensely under hard conditions and at a higher level o f participation than fiee
labor. Like Fenoaltea, Shlomowitz finds that the character o f slave supervision was largely
determined by the nature o f the work they were to perform.137
The difficult work involved in turpentining, carried out in the isolation o f the southern
piney woods, required slaves to provide reliable and adequate work force. Physical punishments,
such as the whip, were needed to force the slaves to perform the long hours of such backbreaking
work as boxing and chipping. However the workers, spread out across the forests could not be
closely monitored. Yet the slave workers absolutely had to carry out tasks with precision. If the
boxes were improperly cut, they could permanently ruin the turpentine harvest for those trees.
Poor chipping could diminish the turpentine yield and at worst kill the trees. Incentives such as
time off and small cash payments were therefore required to ensure that the work these slaves
were forced to perform was done well.
As with expansive agricultural plantations, large turpentine operations relied on
overseers or foremen to be watchful. Usually referred to as “woodsriders,” these men rode
through the forest on horseback inspecting each worker’s task. Given the distance o f each
laborer from other workers, a single overseer could supervise no more than twelve slaves.138
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Producers sought overseers familiar with turpentine production. One North Carolina turpentiner
desired “’some competent person who thoroughly understands the business, to over see hands in
getting Turpentine.”139 In 1850 a producer near Wilmington sought “A Man of sober, industrious
habits, an experienced farmer, with some knowledge o f the Turpentine business.”140 James
Avirett complained about the overseers at his plantation, Richlands. He described them as low
class whites who could not be relied upon to run the turpentine operation well and who by their
third year acted as if they owned the enterprise themselves. Consequently, Avirett relied also on
black drivers.141 Because the overseers’ success was often measured by the amount produced
under their supervision and not by the health o f the slaves under their care, they usually drove the
hands hard. In August 1854 an overseer employed by James R. Grist reported: “I shall dow all in
my power to make all I can for I am Working for my self as well as for Grist + Daves for my
work has to be my recommendation in the State sow it is to my interest to make all I can.”142
Another letter reports that “I am driving a head + doing all I can to get as much done [of] the
turpentine as feasible.”143 This fast-paced driving was especially true in the case o f hired slaves.
While their labor was highly valued, their welfare was only of temporary interest to their
employers and overseers.144
“The hired slave,” so commonly used by producers, according to Kenneth Stampp,
therefore “stood the greatest chance of subjection to cruel punishments as well as to
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140 “Overseer Wanted,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 30 August 1850, 1.
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overwork.” 145 Their employers had little incentive to treat them kindly. Peter Kolchin explains
that being hired out placed slaves “under the authority o f someone who lacked the owner’s
incentive to treat them decently; the hirer-slave relationship was far more fundamentally
utilitarian than that between master and slave.”146 Because the slaves’ time was the commodity
purchased and the value and overall well-being o f the slaves was o f financial concern only to
their owners, employers generally sought to extract as much work as possible from hired slaves
and gave little attention to their welfare. This meant that their work hours were long and their
shelter, clothing, and provisions lean. Robert S. Starobin writes that under these circumstances
“conflicts between masters and employers of industrial hirelings occasionally arose.” 147 Too, the
use of hired slaves in an isolated setting, combined with the environment o f the turpentine forest
and the migratory nature of the industry, created living conditions for the naval stores slaves that
were comparably worse than those o f bondsmen in agriculture. Because o f their isolation,
turpentine operations were often hidden from travelers and were seldom visited by anyone but
the owner of the operation. With no witnesses to their treatment o f laborers, naval stores
producers experienced little outside pressure to provide properly for them.
The owners o f slaves hired to turpentine producers expressed concern for their hands’
safety and health. One irate owner from Wake Forest wrote that his slaves, John and Albert, had
run away because they were overworked and underfed. It was his “expectation that those who
hire them will see that they are taken proper care o f in every respect. The plan of giving up the
management o f hands entirely to overseers who have no feeling, is to my mind most
shocking.”148 The owner requested that Grist “deal leniently with the runaways, as they are first
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of my negroes which have left you, and I feel confident—there was some improper oppression
which drove them to it.” He requested a report on the condition o f his other slaves in Grist’s
hire.149 When one slave owner hired his laborers out to a turpentine operation only to learn that
they got so sick they were unable to work, he became “very much displeased with the business +
is anxious to take them home.”150
One facet o f the turpentine slaves’ poor living conditions was housing. In the decades
before the Civil War the quality o f plantation slave quarters ranged from relatively roomy
cottages with brick or stone fireplaces and glazed windows to one-room log cabins with dirt
floors and chimneys crudely fashioned o f clay and sticks.131 The latter were, in the words of
Stampp, “cramped, crudely built, scantily furnished, unpainted, and dirty”;152 housing for
turpentine laborers was probably even worse. Plantation quarters were built for extended use (as
long as the plantation operated), but turpentine operations, which were in a forest and usually
distant from the plantation, lasted for no more than ten years. Therefore housing was intended to
be temporary, and was often little more than sheds. In similarly transitory operations such as
fishing, shingle, and lumber camps, the quarters were only crude lean-tos.153 Ruffin described
the living quarters o f shingle-getters in the Dismal Swamp as “houses, or shanties . . . barely
wide enough for five or six men to lie in, closely packed side by side—their heads to the back
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wall, and their feet stretched to the open front, close by a fire kept up through the night. The roof
is sloping, to shed the rain, and where highest, not above four feet from the floor.”154 Cabins
built to house turpentine workers in the early 1900s, reported to be much like those inhabited by
enslaved turpentine laborers, “were one room huts, made of pine poles and possessing neither
floors, doors, nor windows.”155
The housing arrangement at Avirett’s Richlands Plantation was atypical of turpentine
cabins, being of relatively high quality and situated in close proximity to the master’s house. The
cabins were to be found on the right side o f the elm-lined drive leading to the big house. The
forty or more cabins were built back from the drive and arranged along a seventy-foot long street,
in the middle of which was a communal well. The cabins’ sizes varied, Avirett assigning the
larger ones to the larger families. The average cabin size was approximately thirty feet long and
twenty-two feet wide with two rooms downstairs, one for cooking and living and the other for
sleeping. These houses had an upstairs and most had fire places. The two most comfortable
houses Avirett reserved for the two foremen. Housekeeping standards varied. Some cabins were
kept neat and well-maintained with Spanish moss mattresses made by the slaves and covered
with blankets furnished by the plantation store and quilts and comforters the slaves made
themselves. Avirett made efforts to keep the quarters sanitary. Every week the plantation
foreman inspected the cabins and demanded cleanliness. He also expected the yards to be clean
and the trash collected on a compost heap. Twice a year he ordered the cabins whitewashed.
During the malarial season, Avirett had old salt vats dating to the War of 1812 filled with rosin

154 Edmund Ruffin, “Observations Made During an Excursion to the Dismal Swamp,”
Farmer’s Register 4 (January 1837): 518.
155 While the cabins described were built for laborers in the Mississippi turpentine
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and burned in the quarters and around the big house. It was believed that the burning rosin
would not only kill the mosquitoes, but the fumes would purify the air.156
Some producers provided for religious services in these crude quarters. In 1855
Germond “attended services at the Negro quarters at 11 0 ’clock[.] I read from the 12 chapter of
Matthew + tried to explain its contents as best I could.”157 At Williams’ Greene County, North
Carolina operation the slaves “can go to Church (Preaching, as they say) on the Sabbath. Indeed,
a majority of the congregation is colored. On Sundays they dress up and many of them look very
nice.”158 A distance of six miles from the producers home, the church was “a rough framed
building in the midst of woods. With a large congregation consisting of about equal numbers of
white + black

” Meetings were held twice a month and lead by uneducated preachers.159

Turpentine slaves appear to have been more poorly clothed than those working in
agriculture. Each plantation hand commonly received four shirts, four pairs of pants, and one or
two pairs of shoes each year. Every several years they were issued a hat or blanket. Some
turpentiners followed a similar pattern. Each year Avirett provided his slaves with three suits of
clothing, three pairs o f shoes, two blankets, one wool hat, one straw hat, and wool and cotton
from which the slave women made socks and stockings. Those who had to work in bad weather,
such as coachmen, also were given overcoats and those who labored at ditching received a pair of
brogans. Slaves spun thread, wove cloth, and sewed clothing on the plantation. They used barks
to dye the material.160 But in the naval stores industry, producers did not always use this
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distribution pattern, especially not for the slaves they hired.161 Owners tried to ensure that their
slaves received proper clothing by including instructions in their contracts. The Francis Harper
heirs required that whoever hired their slaves had “to furnish the males Three Suits Cloths one to
be o f woolen, one pr. shoes, and two if worked in Turpentine one pr. o f stockings + one Hat +
blanket.. . . All to be new and well made.” 162 But these instructions were not always followed.
An angry slave owner wrote to the turpentine producer who had hired his slaves, “My Negroes
told me they had not got all their clothing, their hats Blankets & c.”163 One turpentine producer
in Fayetteville presented his slaves with cloths as needed, which caused clothing to be unevenly
distributed. One slave, Bill, received two pairs o f pants, two shirts, a pair o f shoes, and a
blanket. Another, Obey, received two pairs o f pants, two shirts, a pair of shoes, and a coat. But
Lewis was given only one pair o f pants.164 G. W. Perry complained that his turpentine slaves
would make it known when it was time for their clothing allowance or when their clothes and
shoes had given out. He reported that he “had them to walk by me, and let the old shoes drop off
their feet, so that I should notice it, and at other times to complain that their feet were badly cut
up, for want o f shoes.” When one slave persisted in demonstrating how his worn out shoes
would easily drop off his feet, Perry “let him repeat it until I felt satisfied that he knew I noticed
it: I then had him whipped, without telling him the cause, and whether he understood it or not, he
never tried a repetition o f the maneuver.”165 Slave cloths were usually made o f “Negro Cloth.”

161 Kolchin, American Slavery. 114; Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross. 116-117;
Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 54-57.
162 Contract to Hire Slaves, 2 January 1849, Francis Harper Papers, Special Collections
Libraiy, Duke University; Miller and Smith, Dictionary o f Afro-American Slavery. 521.
163 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 57.
164 “Clothing for Negroes, Delivered,” 1849, in Task Book, 1849-1851, Tillinghast
Family Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
165 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 120.
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Manufactured primarily in northern mills, this cloth was durable and sturdy but uncomfortably
rough. Plantation mistresses often sewed their slaves’ clothes, but larger and more organized
operations employed slave women for this task. In some cases the slaves made their own clothes.
Evidence suggests that clothes for turpentine workers were made at the forest camps. On Ben
William’s Georgia plantation the white women made clothes for the agricultural laborers but not
for the turpentine workers. James Grist shipped cloth directly to one o f his turpentine operations
in Columbus County. He also shipped in shoes.166
Holidays, especially Christmas were important to slaves. Masters customarily gave them
at least one or two days off and sometimes a week or more. Many masters allowed their slaves to
have a feast and some gave them presents. But hired slaves, who worked some distance from
their homes, and workers such as turpentine slaves, who labored in camps many miles from their
master’s house, were often not allowed to return home on special occasions.167 One slave owner
wrote to the turpentine producer who had hired his slaves, “I am quite w illing. . . that they
should remain with you during the Christmas holidays. It can do them no good to come home...
and . . . their stay will be so short, that they cannot expect to enjoy themselves much.”168
However, evidence suggests that producers permitted limited holiday celebrations in the camps.
For Christmas 1860 the slaves in one turpentine camp received “2 hogs + a barrel o f Flower +

166 “Production of Turpentine in Alabama,” 561; M. Jones to James R. Grist, 5
November 1860, Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 21 October 1855, and List of Negroes
belonging to Mr John W. Grist Worked by Grist + Striknev during the year o f 1860. Grist Papers;
Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 290-291; Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. 551; Sarah Hicks Williams
to Parents, 10 December 1853 and 25 March 1859, Williams Papers.
167 Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 365; Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. 573; According to
Sarah Williams in Georgia, the slaves who worked in the distant turpentine orchards still
considered their master’s plantation their home. Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 25 March
1859, Williams Papers.
168 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 95.
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potatoes so they can have a dinner.. . .”169 The overseer promised to “due my best to keep the
negros all strat [straight] + satisfied[.] I hope that they will behave well.”170
This Christmas dinner menu differed little from the provisions issued to turpentine slaves
for every other day o f the year—commeal flour, salt pork, and often potatoes. On some small
operations, producers worked in the forest with their slaves and also engaged in agriculture.
Some larger operators attempted both farming and turpentining but most often they gave more
attention to turpentine and agriculture was only to supply the turpentine operations. It appears
that the Grist operation produced their com and some o f their pork. A portion o f their pork was
supplied by hogs which ranged freely in the pine forest and which were frequently hit by the
train. In one day eight were killed. Another operator also raised hogs as well as potatoes.
Although some turpentine producers tried to provide com and bacon for their own needs, most
operators typically purchased provisions for their work force.171 Olmsted observed, “few
turpentine-farmers raise as much maize as they need for their own family; and those who carry
on the business most largely and systematically, frequently purchase all the food of their hands.
maize and bacon are, therefore, very largely imported into North Carolina

”172 He found

that, “the farmer in the forest, makes nothing for sale but turpentine, and, when he cultivates the
land, his only crop is maize.”173 When these supplies arrived, usually by boat or railroad, they

169 Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 25 December 1860, Grist Papers.
170 Ibid.
171 Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina. 39; James R. Grist to Father, 4 February
1851, M. Jones to James R. Grist, 5 November 1855 and 5 November 1860, Grist Papers ; 24
January and 18 February 1856 entry, Gilbert Isaac Germond Work Journal; Stampp. Peculiar
Institution. 282; Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States. 338; Avirett, Old Plantation. 87;
Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss.,
Duke University, 1947), 42.
172Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 338.
173 Ibid.
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were locked in storehouses. Because purchasing food was the largest cost of supporting a slave,
producers kept rations at a subsistence level, especially when they hired slaves and therefore had
less self-interest in their workers’ welfare. Avirett issued his slaves their food rations on
alternate Saturday afternoons. For two weeks each slave received one-half bushel o f commeal,
seven pounds of pork, potatoes, rice, sorghum, and tobacco. Another source o f provisions for
Rich lands slaves was from a small store that a slave named Philip ran from his cabin. He traded
in such basic goods as coffee, tea, sugar, cheese, cakes, peanuts, calico, and home brewed beer.
The slaves paid with the money they earned for extra work and often with raccoon, rabbit, and
squirrel pelts. The slaves did their own cooking. In warmer weather it was done outside under
brush shelters. Plantations, where food was more often produced, afforded slaves greater
opportunity to raid smokehouses, chicken coops, orchards, dairies, gardens, and com fields.
Turpentine workers found stealing food more difficult. But naval stores laborers did have one
advantage over plantation slaves, who during their free time, commonly hunted and fished to
supplement their diet. Because they worked in the forest, turpentine slaves had more opportunity
to catch wild animals and collect edible herbs. Squirrels, possums, raccoons, rabbits, and turtles
were plentiful in the turpentine orchards and occasionally supplemented the workers’ diet.174 In
exceptional cases slaves raised some o f their own food. Behind their cabins at Richlands
plantation the slaves maintained chicken yards and garden plots in which they grew cabbage.
Some slaves raised pigs in pins behind their cabins and some raised com, peas, and cotton.
James Avirett explained that slaves worked these plots “On Saturday afternoon or by moonlight.

174 Avirett, Old Plantation. 63-65; Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 338;
M. Jones to James R. Grist, 5 November 1860 and 12 November 1860, Grist Papers; Starobin,
Industrial Slavery. 51; Stampp, Peculiar Institution. 282; Genovese, Roll. Jordan. Roll. 486-488,
599-606; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 150; Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross. 110-111.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155
. . instead o f going coon hunting.” They could either sell their produce in New Bern or to the
plantation.175
Drinking water, unlike wild game, was often scarce in the forests. Where clear, flowing
streams ran through the pines, workers had little difficulty obtaining water; but, often there were
no such streams. Many workers justifiably feared drinking from the murky, slow-moving
streams that they commonly found in the woods. Instead, they carried a hollow reed straw that
they used to suck the water collected in turpentine boxes after rains. But during particularly dry
seasons, rain water was not available. In the summer of 1860 Alabama experienced a dry spell.
At the Grist operation near Mobile it was necessary “to keep Dave hauling water with the carte
all the time in the woods to the hands.”176 Although it was difficult for workers to obtain
adequate water in this manner, the water they drew from the boxes, when able, was probably
unhealthy to drink. Evidence suggests that laborers suffered from digestive problems probably
caused by ingestion o f turpentine.177 James Battle Avirett reasoned that the water from the resin
boxes was safe, “impregnated as it is with the turpentine,” because it “reaches . . . his liver and
keeps him healthy.” 178 Although Avirett’s assertion is doubtful, scholars have either accepted or
refused to question the claims o f observers and producers that “the turpentine business is
considered a very healthy employment for hands.”179 Historian Donnie D. Bellamy writes: “It
appears that the naval stores industry was not hazardous to the slaves’ health. The authorities

175 Avirett, Old Plantation. 48.
176 Benjamin Grist to James R. Grist, 17 July 1860, Grist Papers.
177 Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 150; Avirett, Old Plantation. 69; Benjamin Grist to
James R. Grist, 17 July 1860, Grist Papers
178 Avirett, Old Plantation. 69.
179 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” 488; Olmsted
reported that “turpentine business is considered extremely favorable to health and long life.”
Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 346.
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agree with John B. Avirett that the slaves o f the turpentine orchards were generally healthy.”180
In his 1947 dissertation Percival Perry states that “the turpentine business was considered
extremely favorable to health and long life

”IS1 But the nineteenth-century accounts that

provided the evidence for assumptions were either based on inaccurate observations or were
simply biased promotional literature. Turpentine is a local irritant and a central neural
depressant that is easily absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract. Its ingestion probably induced
flux, a form o f dysentery common among turpentine workers, which was characterized by
abdominal pain, inflammation o f the intestine, and frequent stools. However, because the lethal
dose of turpentine for adults is four to six ounces, ingestion through the drinking water was
rarely fatal.182
Laborers came into contact with turpentine in other ways. When laboring in the forests,
workers’ “hands and clothing become smeared with the gum . . . .”183 Raw gum is extremely
sticky and difficult to clean off clothes and skin. While traveling through North Carolina in
1856, D. W. Kyle reported that he “got turpentine all over me.” Unable to clean it off, he had to
throw away his suit and buy a new one.184 While its adhesion to workers’ clothing was only a
nuisance, its contact with their skin could cause dermatitis. Treatment of this skin irritation is

180 Bellamy, “Slavery in Microcosm,” 344.
181 Pervical Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 39.
182 Robert E. Gosselin, Harold C. Hodge, Roger P. Smith, and Marion N. Gleason,
Clinical Toxicology o f Commercial Products. 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co.,
1976), s.v. “turpentine;” Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 151; Dorland’s Illustrated Medical
Dictionary. 25th ed. (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1974), s.v. “dermatitis” and “flux;” Sarah
Hicks Williams to Parents, 11 March 1860, Williams Papers.
183 “n jg pjne porests of the South,” 197.
184 D. W. Kyle to John Buford, 29 March 1856, John Buford Papers, Special Collections
Library, Duke University.
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ineffective until the offending agent is removed. Laborers who found themselves afflicted during
the harvest season had to wait until November for a cure.1*5
Fumes were another problem, especially around the still, which emitted a pungent
turpentine smell.1*6 Even workers handling barrels in the pine forest were exposed to spirit
vapors. A twentieth-century reporter explained that “it’s like nothing you’ve ever smelled
before. Sweet, spicy, raw. Something like sassafras tea but magnified to a degree that almost
clears your sinuses.”187 Fitzhugh Lee Tatum recounted that a still in Bladen County “smelled
awful turpentiney!” “After you’d inhale it a while you could feel it all down in your throat...
.”188 While no direct evidence indicates physical harm from such exposure, current medical
research indicates otherwise. Twentieth-century workers have developed occupational asthma
when exposed to such high concentrations of these fumes, which are readily absorbed through
the respiratory tract Some have shown neurological damage and intellectual impairment.
Moreover, laboratory test reveal a higher mortality rate among the progeny o f rats exposed to
turpentine fumes. With these discoveries, strict regulations o f such solvents are recommended to
prevent tissue lesions in workers and to protect pregnant women.1*9

185 Michael G. Carraway, telephone interview by author, April 6, 1991, Museum o f the
Cape Fear, Fayettville, North Carolina; Percival Perry interview; Industrial Toxicology. 3d ed.
(Acton Massachusetts: Publishing Sciences Group, Inc., 1974), s.v. “wood dust;” David N.
Holvey, ed. The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy. 12th ed. (Rathway, New Jersey:
Merck, Sharp, and Dohne Research Laboratories, 1972), s.v. “contact dermatitis;” Gosselin et al.,
Clinical Toxicology. 315.
186 Carraway, interview; Tatum, interview, 5; One of the Grist slaves suffered from sores
in his throat, but the cause was not reported. Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26
February 1861, Grist Papers.
187 Kathy Hawk, “Turpentine: An Ancient Technology Almost Tapped Out in St. Johns
County,” Ancient City Beacon (St. Augustine, FL), 25 June 1982,1.
188Tatum, interview, 5.
189 M. S. Hendy, B. E. Beattie, and P. S. Burge, “Occupational Asthma Due to an
Emulsified Oil Mist,” British Journal o f Industrial Medicine 42 (January 1985): 54; Per
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Turpentine slaves reportedly complained o f “headache, pain in the eyes, arms and legs,
their knees hurting them, pain in the back, stiff neck, feet and hands feeling dead, pain across the
breast, and a severe griping in the bowels.” All these ailments are easily explained as the result
of either fume exposure, over work, or turpentine ingestion through the water. G. W. Perry
recommended that producers not listen to complains, initially, “just tell them it is a busy time,
and you will not allow any such sickness, and that will be sufficient.” He believed that if a slave
was actually ill the producer could tell easily enough and should give the slave the proper
medicine and see that he takes it.190 Turpentine laborers often sought to cure themselves o f
maladies by relying on medicines made from forest products. A tea made from the leaves o f the
yellowtop plant treated flux. The leaves o f the dollarleaf plant were also supposed to remedy
dysentery and those from the boneset plant relieved vomiting. Butterfly weed was thought to
cure diarrhea, while sufferers o f rashes, bums, and other skin ailments drank smartwood tea.
Black snakeroot tea remedied fever.191
In some cases overseers reluctantly permitted sick or injured slaves to return to their
owner’s home plantation for care and rest or visit a doctor. In I860 one sick slave at Williams’
Georgia operation was sent to Williams’ residence where his wife looked after him.192 After
“boy Moses,” who worked at another operation, had suffered from sores in his throat for several
weeks, his overseer wrote, “though I regret very much to have him off the place[,] — I would

Gregersen et al., “Neurotoxic Effects o f Organic Solvents in Exposed Workers: An
Occupational, Neuropsychological, and Neurological Investigation,” American Journal of
Industrial Medicine 5 (1984): 214; Joaquin Garcia-Estrada, Antonio Rodriguez-Segura, and
Pedro Garzon, “Cerebral Cortex and Body Growth Development o f Progeny o f Rats Exposed to
Thinner and Turpentine Inhalation,” General Pharmacology 19 (1988): 470; Gosselin et al.,
Clinical Toxicology. 315.
190 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 120.
191 Hickman. Mississippi Harvest. 150-151.
192 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 21 October 1860, Williams Papers.
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suggest to let him go back to the doctor at once

as he is not fit to work in turpentine.”193 He

stayed with the Doctor for several months during which time he drove the doctor’s buggy. In
return for Moses’ service to the doctor Grist received S25 a month and was not charged for his
medical care. In October 1855, five slaves laboring at one Grist operation got sick and were
allowed to miss work. In 1860 one slave working for Grist in Cumberland County missed work
because of a cold, and another, Ruffin, was allowed to rest from his work for a week. When a
hand was kicked in the face by a mule and badly cut, he also rested a week and received care
from the doctor. A doctor made regular visits to one o f Grist’s North Carolina operations.
Between October 13, 1853 and July 29, 1854, a Dr. P. D. Mott saw thirty-eight slave patients at a
total cost o f $59.50.194 When the owner of slaves hired by Grist learned that one had died and
another was down with fever, he requested that Grist spare no expense for the welfare and
comfort of his other slaves who remained at work for Grist. Also, the owner wrote, “allow me
kindly to request you to adhere strictly to the Doctors instructions relative to the administration
of stimulants and food. For any thing furnished extra you shale be paid.”I9S
Another hazard to slaves was the explosive nature o f stills and their flammable contents.
Given the difficulty o f regulating these crude devices, distillers could not always determine the
pressure generated by the evaporating spirits of turpentine. Therefore, explosions and fires were
common and could kill or seriously injure anyone close by.196

193 Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Grist Papers.
194 M. Jones to James R. Grist, 30 October 1855, 12 November 1860, and 16 December
1860, P. D. Mott to James R. Grist, Bill for doctor’s visits, 13 October 1853; Thomas F. Strikney
to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Ibid.; Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 21
October 1860, Williams Papers.
195 S. B. Carraway to John L. Wright, 10 October 1854, Grist Papers.
196 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 43; Avirett, Old Plantation. 70.
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The wilderness conditions o f the turpentine forests contributed further to harsh working
conditions. Wild animals, poisonous snakes, malarial mosquitoes, ticks, and chiggers found in
the pine woods could make turpentine production a miserable, and sometimes hazardous,
occupation. The heat and humidity of the southeastern North Carolina coastal plain added to the
difficulties. In 18S4 turpentine laborers fainted in the forest from these extreme conditions.
Moreover, workers could easily lose their direction in the expansive pine forests. In 18S9 a hand
in a Georgia operation became lost in the woods and wandered for nearly six days before finding
his way home. Despite a week of nursing care, he died o f fever brought on by hunger and
exposure. Because he worked in a turpentine forest, his master had not noticed his absence for
three days. In another instance, a hired slave, Willis, who worked for Grist, drowned and another
slave, Jack, almost drowned when they tried to remove turpentine casks from a remote platform
near a swollen river.197 A defensive James R. Grist explained that “we have not worked or
employed Willis by water on the Contrary he was ordered not to go by Mr. Shile our agent;
therefore Mr. Pammerly [Willis’ owner] Cannot expect us to pay for him.”198 In such cases, the
isolation and loneliness o f the turpentine forests, combined with heavy work demands, poor
housing, inadequate clothing and food, and unhealthy and dangerous labor conditions, made the
slaves’ already difficult work and manner o f life unbearable. It is no wonder that the turpentine
industry had the reputation for having “ruined more hands than anything else in this country.”199
Some slaves reportedly resisted these terrible conditions. According to Edmund Ruffin,
producers believed the fires that occasionally roared through the pine forests were “committed by

197 Starobin, Industrial Slavery. 42; Clark, Greening o f the South. 22; James R. Grist to
Father, 17 September 1852 and R. M. Wadsworth to James R. Grist, 11 August 1854, Grist
Papers; Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 25 March 1859, Williams Papers.
198 James R. Grist to Father, 17 September 1852, Grist Papers.
199 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 116.
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the negroes who would have to attend the trees, to collect turpentine, which labor they dislike
very much, because it is solitary.”200 Further evidence o f the discontent comes from the stories
o f runaway turpentine slaves. Although it is impossible to determine the frequency o f escapes,
evidence o f slaves fleeing the James R. Grist operations suggests such acts were not uncommon.
In all cases these slaves cited harsh living and working situations as their reason for flight. Two
hired slaves, John and Albert, ran away from a turpentine operation in 1853 because they were
“over worked and not well fed.” John reached Greenville, North Carolina, “in a most exhausted
condition,” but Albert lost his way. Their owner blamed their harsh treatment for their escape.201
That same year a turpentine cooper ran away when he and his partner were whipped for working
too slowly.202
The most dramatic story o f escaped turpentine slaves involved two brothers, Ned and
Colin, who were purchased from their owner in Sussex County, Virginia, by a slave trader in
Richmond. When James Grist bought them, “they were sent off into the pine woods to make
turpentine.” But they “could not stand the work and the life before them and ran away” in 18S4.
While they were fleeing across a bridge near Fayetteville, someone shot at them and probably
wounded Colin. The two slaves then ran in different directions and became separated. Colin
reached Greenville and worked on the Seaboard Railroad until eventually caught by a search
party later that year. Ned reached the home of a planter, William Parham, who was a neighbor of
his former master in Sussex County and lived not far from Ned’s wife and child. When Ned
reached Parham, he was very sick and Parham nursed him back to health. While Ned recovered,
Parham wrote to Grist, informing him o f Ned’s condition. According to Parham’s letter, Ned

200 Scarborough, Diarv o f Edmund Ruffin. 52.
201 L. F. N. to James R. Grist, 18 August 1853, Grist Papers.
202 James to Grist, 23 August 1853, Ibid.
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vehemently disliked the work in the turpentine forest. Parham reported that “the work and the
manner o f life in making turpentine he cannot stand, it is hard work and would kill him by
piecemeal, and he had rather be killed at once.” Parham advised Grist “not to put him to getting
turpentine again, he will cause you more trouble than profit, but sell him at once.” He concluded
that Ned would be best suited for the New Orleans slave market where a sugar producer would
likely buy him.203
“The work and the manner o f life in making turpentine” from which Ned and Colin fled
was much like that o f other industrial slavery occupations described by Robert S. Starobin. They
tended to labor for absentee producers, were worked excessively hard by overseers, and received
food, clothing, and shelter o f an inferior quality to agricultural laborers. It is also necessary to
consider the type and amount of work expected of turpentine slaves and the realities o f life in
isolated camps, both o f which Percival Perry fails to do. Contrary to assertions made by Perry
and others, work in naval stores tended to be more grueling than labor in agriculture.
Environmental factors played a major role in the harsh conditions o f turpentine making. As
geographically isolated and expansive enterprises, turpentine orchards possessed spatial
attributes considerably different from those of agricultural operations. Given the size of the pine
forests and the methods of harvesting resin, producers could not permit workers to labor in
groups. Instead, slaves were forced to spread out widely throughout the forest where their tasks
were individually assigned. Since tasks were clearly marked in half-acre blocks, overseers could
effectively monitor and evaluate each worker’s performance. Although slaves generally
preferred task work because o f the relative degree o f autonomy it offered, in the naval stores
industry this independence was accompanied by solitude. The industry denied social interaction
that would have broken the monotony o f the job. Such loneliness did not end with the workday.

203 William F. Parham to James R. Grist, 1 May 1854, 14 November 1854, 20 November
1854, Ibid.
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The camps were commonly so far away from agricultural plantations that the male-dominated
labor force was prevented from regular interaction with their families and largely denied female
companionship. Too, because few visitors journeyed to the isolated camps, production operators
and overseers received little social incentive to care properly for their slave laborers, especially
for the many hired bondsmen. This lack o f supervision contributed to relatively poor housing
and food provisions for laborers. The natural setting o f the turpentine orchards also accounted
for these conditions. Most owners found it infeasible to raise food at the camp sites. Instead,
food was hauled into the forests by producers who tended to keep rations at a subsistence level.
Unlike many plantation slaves, turpentine laborers lacked the opportunity to supplement their
diets with food raided from local smokehouses, chicken coops, and cornfields and gathered from
their own garden plots. However, because they labored in the forest, workers possessed more of
an opportunity to hunt wild animals and collect edible herbs. The migratory nature of the
industry discouraged producers from constructing substantial cabins to house their workers.
Instead, laborers could take refuge only in crude shed-like lean-tos that could be easily
dismantled, moved, and reconstructed. The unique attributes of the naval stores industry created
conditions greatly inferior to those on agricultural plantations, conditions that inevitably led to
misery and discontent among the slaves, who after the first decades of the nineteenth century,
made up most o f the industry’s work force.
The isolation o f the pine forest also influenced the lives of its white inhabitants. In the
remote forest, poor landless whites found plots where they could squat, construct a cabin, and
cultivate a small garden with a minimum of harassment. They also harvested small quantities of
gum for themselves to trade or worked on an irregular basis for larger producers. Small farmers
likewise lived in the piney woods and cultivated a few crops and barrels of turpentine for the
market, sometimes with the help o f several slaves laborers. The output of these smaller
producers, however, paled in comparison to that of the larger operators who made thousands o f

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

164

barrels of turpentine annually. For such naval stores men as Avirett, Williams, and Grist, the
experience o f managing a large-scale operation with scores of slaves and several overseers
differed little from that of plantation owners. Their intensive exploitation of the longleaf pine
matched their heavy reliance on unfree labor.
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Chapter Four
A Destructive Harvest:
Forest Degradation and the Turpentine Industry’s Move Southward

By the 1850s turpentine-harvesting practices had severely devastated the North Carolina
iongleaf pine forests, causing the industry to migrate southward in search o f fresh stands. After
ten years o f boxing, chipping, and burning, a large percentage o f turpentined trees succumbed to
reduced vitality, weakened truck structure, insect infestation, and disease. Once gone, the
Iongleaf failed to reproduce itself and a different vegetation replaced the once nearly solid pine
growth. As they witnessed their eastern pine forests’ disappearance, some North Carolinians
turned against the turpentine industry despite its continued profitability. Beginning with the
state’s older naval stores region, producers increasingly switched to staple cotton production
which the introduction of new fertilizers made possible. Not all turpentine producers, however,
so willfully abandoned their business. Those who refused to make the switch to agriculture
moved with their slave labor forces to other southern states and continued the destructive
harvesting practices that had driven them out o f North Carolina.
The changing nature of the turpentine production from a small-scale business dominated
by casual producers who also dabbled in agriculture to one controlled by large and highly
specialized operators contributed to more wasteful and destructive practices. When a turpentine
operation was a small part of a larger farming enterprise, producers probably used more care to
extend the life and efficiency o f the forest so that it would not wear out more quickly than the
agricultural land. Turpentiners who operated on a large scale and specialized in the business had
less incentive to prolong their use of the pines and ran more exploitative operations. The
increasing number o f such producers in the 1840s and 1850s meant more widespread forest
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degradation. The lease system further encouraged destructive harvesting practices. Because the
price o f the lease was determined by the number o f boxes worked, the system encouraged
producers to cut as many boxes as possible in each tree. And because the producers paid for the
number o f boxes, not the amount produced, they tried to maximize their yields by making
frequent and deep chippings. As the practice of leasing became more common, it too led to
greater inefficiency and waste.1
Harvesting practices themselves caused considerable harm to the pines. Boxes were
responsible for a variety o f problems. Producers instructed their laborers to cut boxes in the
swell o f the pine’s most prominent root. By placing the box here more gum could be collected
from trees that leaned. Otherwise gum began dripping outside the box as the face grew higher
and extended over the base. Laborers preferred to cut boxes here because they could be made
with the greatest o f ease and in the least time. But because boxes were usually cut seven inches
deep into the root, they could seriously interfere with the flow o f sap. In larger roots, which
represented a substantial portion of the pine’s root system, the box caused the greatest injury to
the tree. Although precise mortality statistics were unknown in the antebellum years, in 1909
forester A. L. Brower estimated that seven percent of boxed trees died from reduced vitality
before a stand was worked to its fullest potential. Boxes also weakened the stability of the pines,
making them more susceptible to wind. Larger trees were not as vulnerable, but in smaller pines
if more than one box was cut into the base they were sometimes nearly severed. Brower reported
that a hurricane or strong windstorm could down ninety percent o f boxed timber whereas only
thirty percent o f round timber would fall. Boxes also collected rain water. In stands where gum
harvesting continued this was not o f considerable consequence, for not only did the continuous

1 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 46; Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical
Approach to the Current Problems o f the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. Diss.,
University o f North Carolina, 1942), 98-99.
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gum flow provide the wood with some protection from the moisture, but in dipping the gum out
of the box most of the water was removed as well. Standing rainwater, however, could be
especially damaging in abandoned turpentine orchards where the wood's continuous contact with
moisture encouraged fungus growth and subsequent decay. Another problem was the occasional
practice of trying to deter fire by filling old boxes with dirt at the conclusion o f a forests’ use.
The dirt, which acted like a sponge, held water that might otherwise have evaporated in the box,
hastening decay.2
Fire, often intentionally set by the turpentiners themselves, posed a particularly
dangerous threat to boxed trees. Historian Stephen Pyne explains that “perhaps nowhere in the
country were Indian burning practices more thoroughly adopted and maintained than in the piney
woods, in the sand hills, and on the sandy soils where rice or cotton plantations failed to
penetrate.”3 Like the Indian, white settlers and turpentiners used burning to reduce fuel as a
means o f preventing conflagrations, to open the choked woods for easier passage, to encourage
more abundant grazing grasses, and to reduce pests.4 Despite efforts by turpentiners to guard
against the damaging effects o f fires on their forests, accidental tree burning was all too frequent.
Edmund Ruffin observed that although producers took care to control their burning, “they cannot
always command the progress of the fires; and from that, or other less carefully made fires, great
havoc is often made among the boxed trees.”3 Olmsted found that burning in round timber rarely

2 Asa L. Brower and John O. LaFontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval
Stores Industry and Statistics o f the Production o f Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons of 19078 and 1908-9,” Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 17-21; A. W.
Schorger and H. S. Betts, The Naval Stores Industry (Washington, DC: United States Department
of Agriculture, 1915), 26; Charles H. Herty, “A New Method of Turpentine Orcharding,”
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture Bureau o f Forestry, 1903), 12-13.
3 Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History o f Wildland and Rural Fire.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 144.
4 Ibid., 145-146, 149.
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harmed the trees. In such forests the fire “bums slowly, and with little flame, and the living
trees, the bark o f which is not very inflammable, are seldom injured.” Where the trees had been
boxed, however, great harm could result. “The chips lie about it, these take fire, and bum with
more flame; so that frequently the turpentine in the box, and on the scarified wood above it, also
takes fire.. . .”6
Such fires either greatly reduced the tree’s productivity or, as was often the case, killed
it. Perry explained that “in cases where pines are much burned by the fire, they will never make
as much turpentine afterward; it makes the wood dry and tough, kills many o f them, and finally
renders them useless for turpentine, or so much so that will never run enough to pay.”7 Perry
believed that even raking could hurt the pines, by exposing their roots to the elements.8 Ruffin
noted in 1840 that “without other cause or decay or destruction, the trees will live and yield well
until the sides can be shaved no higher. But the spreading o f accidental fires seldom fails to kill
the tree earlier. For the entire face o f the cutting being encrusted with turpentine, and the wood
below being converted to solid lightwood, no trees can be more inflammable; and the fire bums
so deeply in, as to kill the strips o f living bark by heat, or to weaken the trunk so much that it
yields to, and is prostrated by, the next storm.” The trees or parts of trees that escaped being
burned, he reported, were cut into pieces and burned in tar kilns.9 While on another trip through
North Carolina in the late 1850s, Ruffin attended a tea at which the talk was “o f much recent

5 Edmund Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” The Farmer’s Register 8 (30 April 1840):
250.
6 Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States (New York: Dix &
Edwards, 1856), 341.
7 G. W. Perry, A Treatise on Turpentine Farming. (New Bern, NC: Muse & Davies,
1859), 16-17.
8 Ibid., 28.
9 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 250.
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destruction o f the long-leaf pine trees, ‘boxed’ to collect turpentine, in this neighborhood, by
firing the woods.”10
Fires in abandoned turpentine forests caused the most damage. Such stands were highly
flammable after three to five years o f sitting unattended. With no one to rake around their bases
or bum off the yearly collection o f debris, trees here often sat surrounded by a thick mass o f pine
straw, limbs, resinous chips, and pools of resin. Moreover, the turpentined pines, their faces
covered with hardened gum and their boxes and bases coated with resin, were incredibly
flammable. A fire, started either by lightening, an arsonist, or human carelessness easily ignited
the box and climbed up the face. When it did, the dried gum of the face often melted and ran
down into the box, increasing the fires’ intensity. If such fires did not destroy the tree, they at
least burned away much o f the fresh growth of new wood around the box and face, thus slowing
the pine’ recovery from turpentining.11
As the problem persisted through the 1850s, turpentiners sought tighter controls on
burning. Perry proposed an elaborate remedy for controlling wildfire. His plan involved cutting
down all dead trees and hiring a man to stay in the forest as a lookout. He also believed,
neighbors needed to make agreements that no fire would be allowed without the consent and
presence o f each area landowner. Finally, he recommended “above all, never allow hands to
carry fire into the forest at night, under the pretext o f hunting, nor in the day-time, under penalty
of thirty-nine lashes, which will be found a good preventive.”12 Another producer, who also

10 William Kauffman Scarborough, ed., The Diary of Edmund Ruffin, vol. 1, (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1972), 52.
11 Guion Griffis Johnson, Ante-Bellum North Carolina: A Social History (Chapel Hill:
The University o f North Carolina Press, 1937), 486; Herty, “New Method of Turpentine
Orcharding,” 13; Brower and LaFontisee, “Report on the Investigation o f the Naval Stores
Industry,” 20-21.
12 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 131.
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identified fire as a great threat, believed that “the state ought to protect this important interest, by
enacting severe penalties against those who set out fire where it can extend among trees boxed
for turpentine.”13 Where some producers probably heeded Perry’s advice, the state took no
action to discourage fire.
Fires that did not kill longleafs could weaken them, making them susceptible to other
problems. One ailment that plagued turpentined Iongleaf pines was a condition known as dryface
in which pitch soaked the inner bark and wood. Pines with this affliction experienced a
permanent cessation o f gum flow from ail or part o f the face. In severe cases, lesions formed
above and beside the dry area and resin oozed through the bark. Fire contributed to dry face
when it burned the gum on the face, killing the living tissue above the face. Poor chipping
practices could also exacerbate the problem. Cutting a face wider than half of the tree’s
circumference, chipping too deeply into the wood, or working two or more faces on the same tree
could weaken the pine by taxing its capability to produce gum and thus lower its vitality.14 Also,
as Perry warned, “if they chipped immediately after burning, the turpentine which is brought
down by the fire will run out and leave the grain o f the wood open, which will fill them full of
dry faces, and occasion the death of many which would have lived had they not been chipped.”
He believed that chipping in the late fall as the sap was going down left “the grain o f the wood
open to receive the cool, dry air.”15
However, drought was probably the most significant factor in weakening pines and
making them susceptible to dry face. In the Iongleaf belt the soil posses relatively low water-

13 “Turpentine: Hints for Those About to Engage in Its Manufacture,” De Bow’s Review
19 (October 1855): 488.
14 C. S. Schopmeyer and Otis C. Maloy, “Dry Face of Naval Stores Pines,” Forest Pest
Leaflet 5 1 (Washington DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1960), 1-3; R. P. True,
“Dry Face o f Turpentine Pines,” The Forest Fanner 8 (August 1949): 6,14.
15 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 17, 28.
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retaining capability, making the region acutely susceptible to periodic precipitation declines.
During the average growing season, June through August, nearly all precipitation is lost through
evaporation or transpiration. The quantity of available water is not affected by long-term carry
over. Consequently, stream and lake water accumulations remain low except during periods of
unusually excessive precipitation. The sandy soils can hold sufficient moisture to sustain
vegetation growth for only a few weeks during this season. Thus the moisture level o f the soil
constantly fluctuates with precipitation. Although both surface and subsurface water supplies are
usually lower by the growing season’s end, from then, through the cooler months, to the next
season, precipitation replenishes depleted surface and subsurface levels.16
During the summer, dry spells stressed turpentined trees’ vitality, increasing their
susceptibility to dry face. Pines growing in wetter areas closer to ponds and streams were the
most at risk because these trees tended to have more shallow root structures than those growing
in areas with lower water tables and consequently suffered more from dry stress. Dryfacing also
plagued more trees in crowded stands where pines were less vigorous and consequently had
narrower growth rings and a narrower band of sapwood. Such trees were less able to withstand
the constant flow o f gum and interference with the flow of sap. Older pines could also
experience dryfacing. In them the sapwood was narrower and commonly cut through during
heavy turpentine work. Young Iongleaf with an abundance o f growing space rarely suffered
from dryface. These pines were more healthy with substantial seasonal wood growth and longer
healthier crowns. Yet deep chipping could weaken even these healthy specimens to the degree
they too deteriorated with dry face. If left standing, dryfaced pines commonly became the host to

16 Schopmeyer and Maloy, “Dry Face,” 3; John C. Hoyt, Droughts o f 1930-1934
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f the Interior, 1936), 15-16.
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various species o f sap rot fungi and with time frequently yielded to strong wind. Weakened
pines were also susceptible to another menace, insect infestation.17
Because wood-boring insects are attracted to the wounded areas o f trees, turpentine
faces, especially on weakened pines, were particularly vulnerable to attack. Ips beetles are the
most common pine bark beetle and probably killed more turpentine pines than the other bark
beetles combined. They are especially attracted to chipped and fire-scarred trees. Infested trees
are commonly scattered throughout the forest, but with favorable breeding conditions the ips
beetle can kill trees in groups. Because there actually are three different varieties o f ips beetles,
each with its own preference for part of the tree, they can attack a pine from its crown to the base
of its trunk. The smaller-sized, 1/8-inch Ips avals, attacks the crown and sometimes the trunk.
The medium-sized Ips grandicollis, approximately 3/16 inches long, prefers the middle and
upper trunk. At 1/4 inches long, Ips calligrophus most commonly attacks the lower trunk. But
all three can be found in any part o f the tree. They may work together in the same tree, their
tunnels overlapping, or they might work separately or even in secession. Hundreds o f beetles
attack at the same time. They become active when the weather turns warm in the spring, boring
through the bark until they reach the wood. Then they begin tunneling between the bark and
wood, their borrows running up and down the tree in a roughly Y or H pattern. As it bores the
beetle lays eggs spaced about 1/16 inch apart along each side o f the tunnel. The cream colored
worms which hatch from these eggs, bore their own tunnel out from the beetle’s tunnel. They
hatch in such numbers that in feeding on the cambium layer they essentially girdle the tree.
When these larvae stop feeding after a few weeks, they rest, and metomorphisize into adult
beetles. They then burrow out o f the tree in search o f other trees in which to start the cycle

17 Schopmeyer and Maloy, “Dry Face,” 3-5; True, “Dry Face o f Turpentine Pines,” 6;
Lenthall Wyman, Experiments in Naval Stores Practice (Washington, DC: United States
Department o f Agriculture, 1932), 10.
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again. The ips beetle carries with it a blue-stain fungus that spreads throughout the burrows and
into the wood. Once weak and unhealthy trees have been eliminated, the beetles move on to
infest more vigorous species. During the summer when breeding conditions are at their best, a
new brood is produced about every four to six weeks. Each tree that they attack and kill
produces enough beetles to attack at least five more. As the ips beetles breed though the spring
and summer their numbers, by fall, grows enormous. If the winter is mild and dry, the adults
remain alive and active, causing considerable tree deaths by late spring and by the next fall the
damage may be severe. Normal winter temperatures, however, considerably reduce the ips
population and in cases where drought is associated with the infestation, soaking rains usually
stop their activity. Trees weakened by ips beetle attacks sometimes attract southern pine beetle
and the black turpentine beetle.18
Turpentine borers take advantage o f fire-scared and dryfaced pines as well. They rarely
attack healthy trees. These grayish-brown and I-l/4-inch-long beetles lay their eggs only on
trees where wood has been exposed by a scar or wound. When the whitish gray grubs with broad
flat heads emerge from these eggs, they borrow into the inner wood, often riddling it. This
activity can continue within the tree for three years or more, filling it with hollow galleries, thus
weakening the tree’s stability and making it susceptible to wind. After about three and a half
years the life cycle is complete and the adult beetles emerge from the trees in the spring.

18 William H. Bennett, Charles W. Chellman, and William R. Holt, Insect Enemies of
Southern Pines (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, Southern Forest
Experiment Station, 1958), 7-9; R. J. Kowal, “Ips Beetles Are Killing Pines: What Shall We Do
About It?,” Research Notes (Asheville, NC: United States Department o f Agriculture, Forest
Service, Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, 1955), 1; R. J. Kowal and Harry Russel,
“Beetles in Your Pines?: How Good Cutting Practices and Management Stop Beetles from
Killing Your Timber” (Ashville, NC: United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service,
Southeastern Forest Experiment Station), 3-4; Ralph W. Clements Manual: Modem Gum Naval
Stores Methods (Ashville, NC: United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service,
Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, 1960), 29.
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Elliptical emergence holes in dry turpentine faces are the first signs o f attack. For trees already
undermined and broken off, the beetles’ tunnels indicate their work.19
The black turpentine beetle also takes advantage o f Iongleafs stressed by turpentining.
The dark brown or black 1/4- to l/3-inch-long beetles prefer freshly cut stumps, but also invade
weakened as well as apparently healthy trees. The most sever infestations occurred in slash and
loblolly pines but because it is attracted to fresh resin and scorched bark, Iongleafs that had been
overworked through excessive turpentining offered an acceptable home. The black turpentine
beetle’s habits are different from those o f any other bark beetle. They rarely attack above the
tree’s bottom six feet and usually only the bottom two feet. The adult beetles borrow through the
outer bark and stop when they reach the soft phloem. Then they begin to make a vertical gallery
1/2- to 3/4-inches wide, and around twenty inches long, usually in a downward direction. Along
the sides of the gallery they lay groups of seventy to two hundred or more eggs. The eggs are
laid on a soft cushion o f pulverized bark which may serve as an incubator as well as protection
from predators. When the eggs hatch in ten to fourteen days, the creamy white 1/3-inch-iong
grubs begin to feed in groups, side-by-side, on the cambium, working their way from the egg
gallery. They eventually eat out an irregular fan-shaped patch that may be twelve inches across.
Where several broods occur at approximately the same height on the trunk, the larvae can
actually girdle the tree. After ten to fourteen days the new adults bore out through the bark and
start a new generation. From two and a half to four months are required for the development o f
the turpentine beetle from egg to adult. Two generations usually develop each year. Attacks on
single trees last four to seven months.

19 F. C. Craighead, “Insects That Attack Southern Pines,” Austin Cary Memorial Forestry
Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of
Florida, 2; Bennett, Chellman, and Holt, Insect Enemies. 16.
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The black turpentine beetle kills more slowly than other bark beetles. Usually only a few
beetles attack each tree, making their buildup to outbreak proportions slow. They are most active
from early in the spring to late fall but during mild winters, especially in the gulf South, they may
remain active all year. When the beetles first attack a stand they most commonly concentrate in
a small number o f trees, usually no more than one half dozen. By the end o f the season they may
be in ten to fifteen percent o f the trees. After the beetle attacks the trunk it quickly moves
against the lateral root. If the root’s infestation becomes sever it an hasten the tree’s death. The
beetles work slowly and persistently through the year. Light attacks will not kill the tree.
Turpentine beetle can infest, attack, and kill trees, almost without being noticed until a large
number of the trees begin to die. First, the needles begin to fade from their normal green color,
to a yellowed green, and finally to a reddish brown. Fading will begin four to eight months after
the first attack, but in some cases it may take twelve months or longer. When the fading begins it
takes about one month for the tree to change fully to red and about two more months for the
foliage to fall off. Only rarely does the population grow quickly enough to cause sudden high
mortality in an area. When they attack forests disturbed by fire, logging, or wind, the beetle
seldom persists at high levels o f population for more than one or two years. But in stands boxed
for turpentine the activity could continue for three to five years. Intensely worked trees in dense
stretches were particularly susceptible to their attack.20
Although the southern pine beetle is also a dangerous enemy in the turpentine region, its
most vigorous activity is in the piedmont region. Only occasionally are huge tracts in the coastal

20 Bennett, Chellman, and Holt, Insect Enemies. 10-12; R. H. Smith and R. E. Lee III,
“Black Turpentine Beetle,” Forest Pest Leaflet 12 (Washington, DC: United States Department
of Agriculture, 1972), 1-6; Richard H. Smith, “Benzene Hexachloride Controls Black Turpentine
Beetle,” reprint from Southern Lumberman. 15 December 1954, Olustee Experiment Station
Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1-2; R. H. Smith, “A Control forthe Black Turpentine
Beetle in South Georgia and North Florida,” Research Notes (Asheville, NC: United States
Department o f Agriculture, Forest Service, Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, 1955), I;
Clements, Manual. 28; Kowal and Russell, “Beetles in Your Pines,” 7-8.
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plain attacked. The most severe outbreaks occurred after deficiencies in rain, the beetles first
infecting the higher and dryer tracts and spreading to other pine stands from there. The pine
beetle is the size o f a grain o f rice and it attacks and kills healthy trees o f all ages. They attack in
great numbers, boring through the bark, usually in the upper and middle portions of the trunk.
They then tunnel through the soft layer o f inner bark, making S-shaped galleries along which
they lay their eggs. The tiny larvae that hatch from these eggs feed on the inner bark until they
are fully grown, a period o f about two to three weeks. They then bore into the bark where they
developed into new beetles that borrow out and fly away. Three to five generations may be
produced in a year. By attacking in such large numbers, these beetles quickly destroy the
cambium layer causing the trees rapid death. Often the blue stain fungi follows the pine beetle
infestation, causing even more weakening o f the tree.21
A v a r i e t y o f other insects made the weakened turpentine trees their home for breeding as
well. The southern pine sawyer, a large, gray, molted beetle with very long feelers, lays eggs in
small oval pits which it gnaws in the bark. Their eggs hatch into larvae which bore into the bark
and through to the sapwood on which they feed. The larvae remain beneath the bark for about
twenty days during which time they cause complete destruction o f the wood. The pitch moth has
a similar breeding pattern. This small moth lays eggs along the edge of faces and when the eggs
hatch the larvae bore into the tissue. Although frequently abundant, they cause little serious
injury. However, in association with other insect infestations, they can contribute to the trees’
death. Damage from all these insects could be considerable, even if they did not directly kill the
trees. The fungi that often accompanied them could cause considerable decay o f the wood above
the face.22

21 Craighead, “Insects That Attack,” 4-5.
22 Ibid., 3,10; Schopmeyer and Maloy, “Dry Face,” 1.
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It is difficult to know precisely which insects plagued the mid-nineteenth-century North
Carolina turpentine forest. Twentieth-century entomology and forestry research, however,
provide clues as to what probably happened. Yet historians can only speculate because the
contemporary observers’ limited knowledge of insects resulted in vague descriptions. In his
Treatise on Turpentine, for example, G. W. Perry identifies a “black bug” as one such invading
beetle. That he is describing some form of bark beetle is clear, but the insect that he discusses
has attributes of turpentine borers, black turpentine beetles, and ips beetles. He explains that this
black bug laid eggs which hatched into a “cutting worm,” that fed on the sapwood. He goes on
to create such descriptive terminology for the worm as “Ramming worm, Laboring worm, or
Forward-moving worm.” Clearly this “worm” is the larvae stage o f the black bug, but Perry
seems to consider it to be another species of insect. He also identified a “black worm,”
apparently the larvae o f another beetle that he believed “is caused by a black fly laying its eggs
on the edge o f a scar,” and a “straw worm,” which lives in the boughs o f the tree on the green
straw attacks pine trees. Perry admits that he is “not able to give the origin of this insect, but
have no doubt, from the time o f its appearance, that it is produced by some large fly.”23
An example o f the devastation that insects could cause in turpentined forests occurred in
the late 1840s. In 1848 both boxed and round pines in the eastern half o f North Carolina began
mysteriously and rapidly dying in great numbers. The greatest damage appears to have occurred
below the Cape Fear, especially in Brunswick County. One timber owner there reportedly lost
130,000 tress, the task for about twelve hands. Another owner’s loss was estimated at an
astonishing 750,000 pines. Symptoms of the blight also appeared in several counties to the
north. That summer a traveler on the road from New Bern to Kinston and Waynesboro (probably
Goldsboro) reported seeing tracts o f pine either dead or dying. The death of so many trees

23 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 103-107.
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threatened the entire region’s economy. One writer in the Wilmington Journal wondered what
the area would do if the problem continued. Many people “are in debt for turpentine land, and
that, too, at a high price,” he explained. “Turpentine is the controlling commodity in this section,
and regulates the price o f everything else. Turpentine itself is very low—Turpentine land has
already depreciated more than one-half, and everything else in proportion.” The Journal and
other newspapers speculated about the cause o f the trees’ death. The Mobile Herald attributed
the blight to atmospheric conditions. The Tarboro Press thought it was caused by a bug which
laid its eggs in the tops o f pines. These bugs, the paper theorized, were attracted to the smoke o f
burning rosin which turpentine stills emitted, a theory that seemed logical to some because the
decline o f the pine forests came on the heels of the increased number of small back-woods stills.
When in July the pines around Wake Forest College, then located just north o f Raleigh, began to
succumb, Professor John D. White’s investigations found that two kinds of small bugs were the
culprit. White observed that these beetles entered the bark by boring a small hole and tunneling
between the inner bark and sapwood. The beetles small size, their ability to kill the trees quickly,
and White’s claim to have identified two different varieties, seem to point more toward ips
beetles as the cause. The problem apparently began in early 1848 when eastern North Carolina
enjoyed a mild winter, which allowed the beetle to continue breeding. By the spring and summer
of that year their numbers were huge and they began killing pines en masse These insects
continued to thrive into the spring o f 1849 until the area suffered a freak snow storm. On April
14 the temperature dipped and the next day sleet began falling. Within five or six hours the
precipitation turned to snow which continued to fall into the night. Before daybreak the weather
cleared and the next day the sun melted the snow, but the brief storm stopped the attack by
reducing the number of adults and larvae. Still, for the year that the insect’s numbers had
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increased unchecked, tremendous tree loss resulted and as turpentining continued into the
twentieth century infestations would reoccur with similarly disastrous consequences.24
By the beginning o f the 1840s the damage to the turpentine forests, brought on by
reduced tree vitality, structural weakening, dryface, and insects, was becoming clear. In
northeastern North Carolina where naval stores production had continued the longest, the number
of Iongleaf pines was declining.25 Fourteen miles outside o f Plymouth, North Carolina, on his
way to New Bem, Ruffin observed that the pine trees were “deformed by being skinned for
extracting turpentine

”26 In 1843, William Cullen Bryant, a New York City editor and poet

traveling from Richmond, was astonished at the number o f boxes in North Carolina pines. “This
is the work o f destruction,” he reported, “it strips acre after acre of the noble trees, and, if it goes
on, the time is not far distant when the long-leaved pine will become nearly extinct in this
region.”27 William D. Valentine o f Oaklawn Plantation in Hertford County, apparently
recognized the consequences o f excessive boxing. He not only warned against cutting too many
boxes in a pine, but he also suggested chipping only every other year so the tree could “recover
from the drain o f its fluid which is its blood.”28 No one, it appears, heeded his advice.
As the Iongleaf stands died from the effects o f turpentining, they failed to replace
themselves. In 1840 Ruffin found that the pines around Wilmington had vanished. Although in
this particular case the clearing was probably the result o f a demand for timber for fences,

24 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 261-270.
25 W. W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products o f Eastern North Carolina
(Raleigh: North Carolina Geological Survey, 1894), 18.
26 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 253.
27 Quoted from Jack Temple Kirby, Poquosin: A Study of Rural Landscape and Society
(Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1995), 32-33.
28 Ibid., 31,33.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

180

houses, and firewood, rather than from turpentining, the result gave an early indication of how
removal o f the Iongleaf pines could transform the region’s vegetation.29 The Iongleaf was not
replaced by a second growth o f more Iongleaf, but rather by what Ruffin described as an “almost
unmixed growth o f thickly set dwarfish ‘scrub’ oaks which rarely rose higher than six feet.”30 In
other areas further inland, Ruffin found a second growth of shortleaf pine, but no Iongleaf. He
recognized that turpentine production was the principal destroyer of the Iongleaf and explained
that “where vicinity to market, or cheapness o f carriage, permits this business to be in full
operation, it cannot last long, as the long leaf pines will be destroyed and will not be renewed.
The other kinds o f pines are not worth working for the purpose.”31 In the more western reaches
of the pine belt, John MacLeod of Johnson County observed, “where pines are destroyed by
blasts, hurricanes, or turpentining, a growth o f oak, hickory, ect. arises in their stead, not a
solitary instance of the Iongleaf.”32 Olmsted questioned whether there ever would be a revived
growth o f iongleaf given its slow growth and its apparent inability to reproduce itself. He
reported that “when the original long-leafed pine has been destroyed, and the ground cultivated a
few years, and then ‘turned out,’ a bastard variety springs up, which grows with rapidity, but is
of no value for turpentine, and of but little for timber.”33 In 1855 yet another observer reported

29 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 245; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of the
South: The Recovery o f Land and Forest (Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky, 1984),
143.

30 Ruffin, “Notes o f a Steam Journey,” 245.
31 Ibid., 250.
32 John MacLeod, “The Tar and Turpentine Business o f North Carolina,” Monthly
Journal o f Agriculture 2 (July 1846): 13.
33 Olmsted, Joumev in the Seaboard Slave States. 346-347.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

181
that “from Rocky Mount to Wilmington (with now and then an exception to the rule) the country
presents the appearance of a dreary desolate pine barren waste.”34
Longleaf pines failed to come back for two reasons, one o f which contemporary
observers understood. Hogs, Ruffin believed, were the primary reason for the slow-growing
iongleaTs inability to reproduce itself. Hogs eagerly devoured the pine’s large cones, allowing
few seeds to sprout into seedlings. For those that did escape and germinate, hogs posed a
continued threat. Ruffin reported that “of the few that do sprout, scarcely any of the young trees
survive the after attacks o f the hogs, which root up the young trees, to eat the roots, even when
the trees are several years old. Hogs ranging in the woods are quite fond of the tender roots, and
the bark of the roots o f older trees, and live on this food principally in the winter and spring, after
the pine seeds are consumed.”35 G. W. Perry likewise blamed hogs for eating the bark off the
roots of saplings. Second, the absence of regular low-burning fires contributed to the longleaFs
failed reemergence. As unwanted and neglected property, old and dying turpentine forests
received little if any management such as yearly undergrowth firing, a practice that had originally
created and sustained the southern Iongleaf forest by killing off competing species. Without fire,
loblolly and shortleaf pines quickly shaded out any Iongleaf seedlings fortunate enough to escape
the ravenous hogs. When abandoned turpentine forests burned by accident, the fires blazed so
intensely they killed off all vegetation, including the young Iongleafs.36
The rise and decline of the Richlands Plantation turpentine business typifies the
consequence of the Iongleafs destruction. Although turpentine was probably produced on the
tract in Onslow County as early as the eighteenth century, it did not become the plantation’s

34 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 10.
35 Ruffin, “Notes of a Steam Journey,” 250.
36 Perry, Treatise on Turpentine Farming. 27.
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focus until John Avirett undertook it on a large scale in the 1840s. As turpentine prices climbed,
so did Avirett’s output and profits until his annual income eventually reached $60,000. But
Avirett failed to diversify his business, focusing his slaves’ energy on the plantation’s pine land,
and did little to develop his agricultural operation. By the early 1850s the business’ exploitative
harvesting practices began to take their toll on the Richlands forests. In 1850 Avirett first
advertised the sale of the entire operation, even the 125 slaves who labored to make his naval
stores, in North Carolina newspapers. Avirett even tried to divest himself of the 125 slaves who
labored to make his naval stores. He found no buyers, however, and in 1857 Richlands failed, its
pine forest destroyed. Deeply in debt, Avirett at last sold off all his property, including his
distillery and even the family graveyard. By 1860 he was living in Goldsboro where he allegedly
died in 1863 in either a poor house or an insane asylum. His son James, who was bom at
Richlands in 1835 and was raised in the big house, received no inheritance with which to
continue the family legacy. He became an Episcopal priest and served as chaplain under
Stonewall Jackson’s chief cavalry officer.37 In his memoir of his youth at Richlands he
postulated that “It would have been far better for the landed estates o f the South if the timber,
especially the hardwood, had been more carefully guarded and economized.”38
As turpentining’s destruction o f the North Carolina longleaf pine stands proceeded and it
became more obvious that the industry could continue only for a limited time, many North
Carolinians began to condemn turpentine production and emphasized the need to raise cotton
instead. Whereas the area’s poor soils had earlier discouraged staple crop production, the

37 James Battle Avirett, The Old Plantation: How We Lived in Great House and Cabin
Before the War (New York: F. Tennyson Neely Co., 1901), 26,69; David Cecelski, “The Rise
and Fall of the Rich Lands,” Coastwatch (January/February 1997): 22-24; “Valuable Real Estate
for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 16 August 1850; David S. Cecelski, “Oldest
Living Confederate Chaplain Tells All?: Or, James B. Avirett and the Rise and Fall of the Rich
Lands,” Southern Cultures 3 (Winter 1997): 21.
38 Avirett, Old Plantation. 29.
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introduction o f lime, manure, super phosphate, and guano fertilizers now made this shift to
cotton cultivation feasible.39
The older turpentine region o f Edgecombe and Pitt Counties led the drift back to cotton.
In Edgecombe County in the early 1850s cotton began to replace turpentine, a trend that
continued into the late 1850s. The North Carolina Planter encouraged it with its report that
“throughout the entire region hitherto devoted to the production of turpentine, cotton may be
cultivated at great advantage. Even our sandy lands, aided by compost and other manures,
produce it finely, and will give to planters a better remunerating crop than turpentine has ever
done.”40 In 1853 one commentator, in a discussion on Edgecombe’s shift to cotton, called
turpentining “that great curse to our state” which had seduced farmers with the promise o f great
profits but proved “to be only a temporary resource.” “When this resource failed,” the writer
continued, “they then, through necessity, turned their attention to the cultivation o f their farms
and began to look around to discover the advantages which where in their midst, but hitherto
unobserved.”41 There was sound understanding that success would require patient labor and
judicious manuring, but the eastern part of the state had little choice but to shift to cotton and
com cultivation.42 In Pitt County, The North Carolina Planter reported in 1860, “cotton is manic
here; larger plantations devoting most o f their time and attention to it.” Planters believed that
their crop that year would be larger than ever before.43

39 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
o f Southern History 34 (November 1968): 509; Richard C. Sheridan, “Chemical Fertilizers in
Southern Agriculture,” Agricultural History 53 (January 1979): 308-309.
40 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 287.
41 Ibid., 286.
42 Ibid., 287.
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Southeastern North Carolinians also began to question their heavy reliance on turpentine
production, But because the vast iongleaf stands were slower to disappear than the more sparsely
growing stands in the old turpentine region, residents there were slow to make the shift to cotton
planting. As early as 1848 a Duplin County farmer complained that farmers o f that area placed
too much emphasis on turpentining and not enough on agriculture. Because the strongest hands
were used in turpentine production, he explained, farms had fallen into disrepair and producers
had to buy com and pork because they no longer supplied their own food staples.44 Three years
later the Fayetteville North Carolinian asked if “it were not better for our farmers in this
neighborhood to turn their attention to raising stock and making com, and not devote so much
time to getting turpentine.” Whereas in earlier years Fayetteville had supplied Wilmington with
com and pork, now these supplies moved in the opposite direction, through Wilmington and into
the of the Cape Fear Valley. Since the turpentine industry’s expansion the area’s importation of
com and bacon had quadrupled.45 This decline in food production is reflected in one traveler’s
report that “in passing over the railroad leading to your enterprising and flourishing town of
Wilmington, the eye o f the planter is particularly struck with the absence o f all Agricultural
improvements in its vicinity.”46 In 1853 a Beaufort County farmer advocated a shift to
agriculture where the turpentine industry was in decline. He explained that “our means of
transportation have greatly increased, but the resources that have been operated upon chiefly—
namely: Naval Stores—are becoming very limited and used up, while those o f agriculture and

43 “Cotton Growing in the Old North State,” The North-Carolina Planter 3 (August
1860): 263.
44 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 255.
45 Ibid., 256.
46 Ibid., 10.
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horticulture, the ones mostly to be relied on, have not been developed.”47 The Wilmington
Journal agreed, arguing that “it is a great mistake that when once the turpentine falls we must fall
too. It may be the best thing for us when staple agriculture is substituted for a dependence upon
the products of the forest.”48 In 1854 the Farmer’s Journal urged that North Carolinians explore
available land opportunities in their own state before giving up and moving to South Carolina
and Georgia in pursuit o f fresh turpentine orchards.49
Little advancement in southeastern North Carolina agriculture resulted from this
encouragement and by the late 1850s area agricultural organizations took up the cause. In
November 1858, William A. Allen addressed the Duplin Agricultural Society on that county’s
need to concentrate on agriculture. He spoke on the need for improved agricultural methods:
proper drainage and fertilizing. That Duplin lacked the agricultural development that
Edgecombe County enjoyed was because its citizens paid too much attention to turpentining and
not enough to their farms. He was “fully persuaded that if there never had been a barrel of
turpentine made in the county, the people would have been better off, and the county would to
day have been recognized . . . as perhaps the richest agricultural county in North Carolina

.”50

The editor of the Wilmington Journal, who was in audience, agreed with Allen that the Cape
Fear counties required “the devotion of a larger degree of attention to the cultivation o f the soil,
and a loss reliance upon mere products o f the forest—naval stores and lumber—since agriculture is
reliable, progressive, self-sustaining, while the other business which had at one time usurped its

47 Quoted from Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South,
1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 278.
48 Ibid., 291.
49 Quoted from Ibid., 278-279.
50 Ibid., 288.
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place is necessarily exhausting and inevitably tends to work itself out.”51 In Onslow County,
where agriculture was o f only moderate importance, a group of farmers in 18S9 organized an
agricultural society, hoping “to create a spirit o f improvement among the farmers . . . and that
better crops may be made thereby.” The organizers aspired for Onslow to become more o f a
farming county. That it was not, they believed was because “we make Naval Stores extensively,
thereby neglecting the more important o f all the farming interest by omitting to properly fertilize
and improve the soil.”52 That same year a Brunswick County farmer believed that the area had
reached a crossroads. “This county heretofore has been almost exclusively engaged in getting
timber, lumber, and Naval stores for market,” he explained, “but now, all the choice timbered
and lumber making growth within reach o f market, is gone, turpentine trees worked up, and our
citizens must either move off to a fresh country or turn their attention to agriculture.” He hoped
they would choose the latter. The soil was poor, he admitted, but the available abundance o f
lime from oyster shells and marl could enrich the earth enough to support agriculture.53 Yet
despite such encouragement, cotton cultivation increased only slightly in the southeastern
counties. Although it was clear by October 1860 that North Carolina's cotton crop that year
would be larger than ever before, most o f the production coming from the northeastern counties
while excitement over turpentine continued in those to the southeast. In 18S9 naval stores
exports from Wilmington reached their highest level ever.54

51 Ibid.
52 “Organizing an Agricultural Society in Onslow County,” The North-Carolina Planter 2
(October 1859): 311.
53 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 292.
54 “Cotton Crop in North Carolina,” The North-Carolina Planter 3 (October 1860): 320;
Sam Bowers Hilliard, Atlas o f Antebellum Southern Agriculture (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1984), 71; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum
South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 291.
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While some producers looked for new pine land, others turned to cotton. Evidence
suggests that producers who concentrated almost exclusively on turpentine production and only
in a small way on agriculture were more likely to remain in the business by moving South. Both
Benjamin Williams and James R. Grist engaged in little if any crop cultivation in North Carolina
and largely avoided it once they moved to Georgia and Alabama respectively. Slightly less than
half of turpentine operations appear to have included as much as two hundred acres o f farmable
land. Although most such cultivated plots grew mostly grain crops in the 1840s and 1850s,
fertilizer applications could have enabled cotton production on them by the 1850s, providing
turpentiners whose exhausted forests yielded small returns with an alternative staple commodity.
As in John Avirett’s case, producers who refused to move to the fresh pine tracts further south
but remained so dedicated to turpentine that they failed to shift to agriculture, faced almost
certain financial ruin. Few North Carolina operators appear to have possessed Avirett’s
dedication to both place and the turpentine business. Small producers with less capital invested
in specially trained slaves and stills commonly opted to remain in the state and switch their
efforts to cotton cultivation. Large producers, whose financial dedication to naval stores
prevented such flexibility typically chose to move south, demonstrating the same relative
disregard for community and the land as the plantation cotton farmers who between the 1830s
and 1850s moved from their exhausted fields in the East to the black belt and Mississippi Delta.
One observer o f the naval stores industry has argued that “turpentine represented the extensive
and exhausting practices that had long characterized use of southern land. Like tobacco in
Virginia in the seventeenth century and indigo in South Carolina during the eighteenth century,
turpentining stood for the maximum exploitation of land and labor in the short run.”5S

55 G. Terry Sharrer, “Naval Stores, 1781-1881,” in Material Culture of the Wooden Age.
ed. Brooke Hindle (Tarrytown, NY: Sleepy Hollow Press, 1981), 260.
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North Carolina producers who wished to remain in the business began buying virgin pine
forests in states to the south and moving their slaves, who were already familiar with turpentining
practices, there to begin production.56 In fact North Carolinians were responsible for much o f the
industry’s antebellum expansion into other southern states. Immigrant producers possessed the
experience in this unique industry that the natives o f other pine-rich states lacked. One
Wilmington man doubted that anyone without practical experience could make a success of
turpentining. He advised that if “you have any idea of going into the business, you had better
employ a young man from North Carolina to superintend for you the first year; at least one
accustomed to the business, who can put your hands in the way of making, coopering, &c.”S7
A state-by-state analysis reveals that South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama attracted the
most North Carolina turpentine producers, however Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi lured a
few. As early as 1840 production began to increase in the Palmetto State, largely as a result of
North Carolina producers drifting across the border in search of fresh pine land (fig. 4.1). That
year South Carolina manufactured only 73S barrels o f tar, pitch, turpentine, and rosin combined.
The early activity in South Carolina essentially represented an extension o f that in its northern
neighbor, the product being made by North Carolinians who marketed it mainly through

56 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 276
57 Dugall McMillan to Southern Cultivator. 14 April 1846, Southern Cultivator 4
(November 1846): 122, 172.
Figure 4.1: United States Department of State, Compendium o f the Enumeration of the
Inhabitants and Statistics o f the United States as Obtained at the Department o f State. From the
Returns of the Sixth Census. 1840 (Washington. DC: 1841), 158, 170, 182, 194,206,218,230,
242, 254, 266, 338.
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Figure 4 .1. Naval Stores Production, 1840, Southeastern United States, Barrels of Tar, Pitch, Turpentine, and Rosin
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Wilmington, especially after completion o f the Manchester Railroad.58 Agricultural journals o f
the day assured them o f the South Carolina pines’ productivity. An 1846 Monthly Journal o f
Agriculture article reported that “very recently several enterprising individuals have engaged in
this business in South Carolina.” The writer was confident that turpentine “will add considerably
to the other resources o f the State.”59 He assured consumers and potential producers that pines of
South Carolina differed in no way from those found in North Carolina and yielded resin in equal
abundance. De Bow’s Review agreed, reporting that “travelers through the middle and lower
districts o f the State, agree in pronouncing the pine forests o f these sections as well adapted as
those o f North Carolina for the manufacture o f turpentine.”60 Such claims apparently convinced
some North Carolinians. While traveling through South Carolina in the 1850s, Olmsted reported
that North Carolinians had been working turpentined trees there for several years.61 Shortly after
the Civil War, Whitelaw Reid, too, reported that “turpentine growers have for many years been
abandoning” North Carolina’s depleted forests “for the more productive forests of upper South
Carolina.”62

58 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 74; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores
Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal of Southern History 34 (November 1968):
522; Jeffrey R. Dobson and Roy Doyon, “Expansion o f the Pine Oleoresin Industry in Georgia:
1842 to CA. 1900,” West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences 18 (June 1979): 44;
Compendium o f the Enumeration of the Inhabitants and Statistics of the United States. Sixth
Census (Washington DC: Department of State, 1841), 194.
59 “Notes on the Long-Leafed Pine,” The Monthly Journal of Agriculture 2 (July 1846):
12-13.
60 “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” De Bow’s Review 8 (May 1850): 451.
61 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), p. 277.
62 Whitelaw Reid, After the Wan A Tour of the Southern States. 1865-1866 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1965), 28.
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From the late 1840s to 1860, South Carolina’s naval stores industry grew steadily (figs.
4.2,4.3,4.4, and 4.S). By 1848 Charleston had a turpentine distillery with a one-hundred-barrel
per day capacity and plans were underway to double the facility. In the late 1840s, Robert I.
Hyslop moved from North Carolina to South Carolina and began teaching people in the Barnwell
district how to make turpentine. In 1849 one producer whom he had instructed reportedly netted
$398.84 with the help of just one hand. Another man in Ridgeville, South Carolina, about thirtyfive miles northwest o f Charleston, made $3000 from the work o f forty hands who together
dipped 5000 barrels o f turpentine. At the time turpentine prices were relatively low at $2 per
barrel. By at least the early 1850s one S. T. Cooper operated a large thirteen-crop operation
along Black Mingo Creek in the Georgetown, South Carolina area.63 In some areas of South
Carolina the industry drove up land prices. “In the vicinity o f Orangeburg,” The Commercial
Review reported in 1850, “the range is from $1.50 to $5, Many o f the neighboring planters have
embarked in the business, and at present it is difficult to obtain suitable locations.”64 However,
affordable pine land was still available in other areas. Near Summerville, a village twenty-two
miles northwest o f Charleston, pine land had sold for as low as seventy-five cents to a dollar and
in a couple o f instances fifty cents per acre.6S In the lower part o f Barnwell, Colleton, and
Charleston districts good land sold for from fifty cents to two dollars per acre. The Edisto River

63 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 273-274; “Great Yield o f Turpentine,” Wilmington. North
Carolina Chronicle. 9 May 1849; “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 454; “A
Turpentine Farm for Sale or Rent,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 29 August 1856.
64 “The Manufacture o f Turpentine in the South,” 452.
65 Ibid.
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Figure 4.2. Barrels of Tar, Pitch, Turpentine, and Rosin Produced, Southeastern United States,
1840
United States Department o f State, Compendium o f the Enumeration o f the Inhabitants and
Statistics o f the United States as Obtained at the Department o f State. From the Returns of the
Sixth Census. 1840 (Washington. DC: 1841), 158, 170, 182, 194,206,218,230, 242, 254,266,
338
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Figure 4.3. Value of Naval Stores Produced, Southeastern United States, 1850 and 1860
United States Department o f the Interior Abstract o f the Statistics o f Manufactures. According to
the Returns o f the Seventh Census (Washington, DC, 1850), 116; United States Department of
the Interior Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14,57-82,
168-204,285-294,420-438, 552-579; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
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Number o f Naval Stores Establishments by State
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Figure 4.4. Number o f Naval Stores Establishments by State, Southeastern United States, 18S0
and 1860
United States Department o f the Interior Abstract of the Statistics o f Manufactures. Accordine to
the Returns o f the Seventh Census (Washington, DC, 1850), 116; United States Department of
the Interior Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82,
168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.

ran through the region providing water transportation to the coast. Also, the South Carolina
Railroad ran through the center of the region, crossing the Edisto at Branchville in Orangeburg
County.66 By 1855, a distillery operated at Reevesville, beside the South Carolina Railroad,
fifty-two miles northwest o f Charleston. At that time 150,000 to 180,000 boxes were worked in

66 Ibid.
Figure 4.5: United States Department o f the Interior, Manufactures o f the United States
in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82, 168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579.
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the area.67 A North Carolina producer found that the South Carolina lands, as well as those in
Georgia, offered the best opportunities for turpentine production o f any “region of the world.”
“The trees,” he believed, “in many sections, are so numerous as to be almost inexhaustible, and
the yield, both in respect to quantity and quality, equal to any he ever found in the best regions of
North Carolina. The location o f these lands, in the immediate vicinity o f railroads, navigable
streams and sea-port markets, offers the best facilities of transportation and ready sales.”68 With
these advantages South Carolina’s naval stores industry grew at a fierce pace during the 1850s.
The number of turpentine operations more than doubled, from forty in 1850 to ninety-five in
1860. Even more dramatic, the capital invested in these businesses jumped fourteen times; the
number of hands grew six times, from 220 to 1359; and the product value increased 450 percent
from $235,836 to $1,076,725 69
In the late 1840s and early 1850s turpentining also began along the Savannah and
Altamaha Rivers in Georgia. The first producers appear to have been mostly young, single,
native Georgians who began operation on a modest scale. In 1850, 14 producers manufactured
turpentine in Georgia with the aid of a total o f 202 laborers (figs. 4.4 and 4.6). O f the eight
producers that historians Jeffrey R. Dobson and Roy Doyon discovered in the 1850 census, five
were slaveholders with a combined holding o f fifty-six male slaves. Six worked in Camden
County, which then included most of present day Charlton County, in the extreme southeastern
comer of the state. McIntosh and Wayne Counties, each straddling opposite sides o f the
Altamaha River, had one producer each. That year Georgia produced an estimated 28,000

67 “Notice.^ Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856.
68 “The Manufacture of Turpentine in the South,” 454.
69 Abstract o f the Statistics of Manufactures. According to the Returns of the Seventh
Census (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 1858), 116; Manufactures o f the United
States in 1860 (Washington. DC: Department o f the Interior, 1865), 559.
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barrels of turpentine and distilling increased as well. Savannah had a large distillery, and
throughout the state there were ten distilleries either erected or ordered and seven to eight new
producers were thought to have entered the business.70 In 1850 De Bow’s Review reported that
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Figure 4.6. Number o f Hands Employed in Naval Stores Production, Southeastern United States,
1850 and 1860
United States Department of the Interior Abstract o f the Statistics o f Manufactures. According to
the Returns of the Seventh Census (Washington. DC, 1850), 116; United States Department of
the Interior Manufactures of the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82,
168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.

“if its production goes on increasing, for a few years longer, as rapidly as during the last year or
two past, it will not take long to transfer the general head quarters o f the turpentine trade from

70 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 522; Dobson and Doyon, “Expansion of the Pine
Oleoresin Industry,” 45,47; Abstract o f the Statistics o f Manufactures. According to the Returns
of the Seventh Census. 116; “Turpentine Business in Georgia,” De Bow’s Southern and Western
Review 9 (July 1850): 119.
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North Carolina to Georgia. So far as we are informed, most o f those who entered upon the
business o f producing turpentine in Georgia, have had as good success as could reasonably be
expected.”71 However, despite these increases and the claims made by boosters, in 18S0
Georgia’s turpentine industry was o f relatively little significance, contributing only $55,000 to
the state’s $7,000,000 gross manufacturing product.72
Yet conditions were right for the industry’s expansion, mainly due to the immigration of
North Carolinians to Georgia’s pine belt during the 1850s. Hundreds o f thousands o f the finest
longleaf pine acreage remained available. As one 1849 advertisement explained in Georgia
“companies engaged in the Lumber and Turpentine business will, upon examination, find the
above Lands much more favorably located than any in the [other] Southern States, being in such
large bodies and accessible to market by navigable streams.”73 The tracts were enormous.
10,000 acres were offered in Camden County, 87,000 acres in Ware County, and a contiguous
tract o f 72,000 acres in Wayne County. An 18,000-acre pine tract on the Satilla River in Ware
County promised to “be sold cheap” in 1850. By the late 1850s demand for Georgia pine and
improved access to it made the lands o f southeastern Georgia marketable. The Georgia Land
Agency of Macon began selling off parcels o f 150,000 acres which it owned in the Satilla River
basin. The land company had received the titles from the state in 1850, a period when except for
transportation up the river, there was no access to the region and very little was even known
about it.74 Promotional literature explained that it was said to be “the ONLY UNCULLED PINE

71 “Turpentine Business in Georgia,” 118.
72 Ibid., 119; Dobson and Doyon, “Expansion o f the Pine Oleoresin Industry,” 47.
73 “To Lumber and Turpentine Companies,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 7
September 1849.
74 Ibid.; “ 18,000 Acres Turpentine Land for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal.
28 June 1850; James R. Butts, 150.000 Acres Yellow Pine Timber. Turpentine and Cotton Lands
(Macon: Georgia Land Agency, 1858), 3.
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FOREST NOW EXISTING IN THE ATLANTIC WATERS, that is situated convenient for river
carriage.75 During the 1850s railroad lines extended into the region from Brunswick and
Savannah improved access. Making the land even more attractive was its low tax, 7.50 an $100
value.76
During the decade, North Carolina producers continued to move to the region. One
Richard Cogdall left North Carolina because the pines there were exhausted and established a
new turpentine operation on the Altamaha River, ten miles above the town of Davis. He was one
of five or six North Carolinians to have purchased land in the area and begun operations. The
combined harvest o f these producers was expected to yield 10,000 to 12,000 barrels. As
producers steadily expanded into Georgia between 1850 and 1860, the industry grew. The
combined capital o f naval stores producers rose from $110,000 to about $200,000 in 1860 and
although the number o f operations decreased from fourteen to thirteen, the number of wage
earners rose from 202 to 307, indicating the operations were growing larger in size (figs. 4.4 and
4.6). The product value, however, experienced a remarkable rise. It appears that high
productivity and a concentration on distilled spirits over raw gum caused the value of
manufactured turpentine to jump over four hundred percent from $55,068 to $236,111. Yet
despite the turpentine industry’s advancements, by 1860 Georgia’s wiregrass region remained
relatively undeveloped. The area lacked a deeply rooted planter class, most o f the sparse
population consisting o f yeoman farmers and livestock herders.77

"Butts, 150.000 Acres. 13.
76 Ibid., 13.
77 The move to Georgia was difficult and expensive and thus not feasible for all who
wished to make the move. In 1853 W. H. Turlington wrote from Wilmington to his brother
explaining that “I expect to try this place a while longer though if I had money I would go to
Georgia and make and distill turpentine.” W. H. Turlington to A. J. Turlington, 11 December
1853, A. J. Turlington Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; Percival Perry,
“The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University,
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Dr. Benjamin Williams, a producer from Greene County, North Carolina, illustrates the
process of moving from the older turpentine region and establishing themselves in Georgia where
they could take advantage o f the abundant pine forests. In January 1855 in preparation for the
move, Williams sold o ff253.5 acres of farm land and the remainder o f his pine land. As the
turpentine season for that year concluded in November, he hurried to complete the harvest and
begin the move with his wife to Charlton County, Georgia, located in the extreme southeastern
comer o f the state and covered largely by the Okefenokee Swamp. By November L858 his new
Georgia operation, which he apparently shared with a partner, was going well. With relief his
wife reported that “we are now out of debt, + in the Turpentine business[.] they are able to pay
for their land, their still, their wagons + mules + the hire of their hands, + have about ($3000)
three thousand to divide.” Not only that, but Williams had purchased some land in Ware County,
the adjacent county, and possibly part o f the tract offered by the Georgia Land Agency. This
490-acre parcel, which cost $1,000, slightly more than $2 per acre, reportedly contained beautiful
pine timbers and was conveniently located by the Albany and Gulf Railroad, which passed
through one comer of it. Moreover, because it appeared healthier and relatively convenient to
Savannah, which was about a four or five hour ride away, it promised to make a more appealing
home than theirs at Burnt Fort in Charlton County. By September 1859, Williams had purchased
property at St. Johns Bluff, Florida. Here there were “about six thousand young fruit trees of
different kinds, which have been carefully selected from the best nurseries, and a good dwelling
house, which cost $5000.00 when built twenty years since.” He desired to live there if it were
not so distant from his concerns in Georgia.

1947), 277; Dobson and Doyon, “Expansion o f the Pine Oleoresin Industry,” 47; Abstract o f the
Statistics o f Manufactures. According to the Returns o f the Seventh Census. 116; Manufactures
of the United States in 1860. 82; Mark V. Wetherington, The New South Comes to Wiregrass
Georgia. 1860-1910 (Knoxville: The University o f Tennessee Press, 1994), 28-30.
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Williams was by this time selling timber along with producing turpentine, and he
continued to plan a move to Ware County. Not only was transportation better there, but he
believed the fresh trees yielded gum capable o f make high-grade rosin. He felt that he could
make better rosin at the new location at transportation was better. He hoped to divest himself of
the Charlton County operation, which he anticipated he could sell for more than it cost him when
he began it two years earlier. Within a month and a half later, Williams found a prime tract of
3,000 acres in Ware County on the Satilla River. The Albany and G ulf Railroad ran through it,
just as it did the 490-acre parcel he purchased the year before, and the nearest depot and post
office were only two and a half miles away. He planned to erect a still beside the railroad and
already had a distiller, overseer, and between thirty and thirty-five slaves ready to be sent to the
location. By January Williams had forty-five hands, who came from Virginia, North Carolina,
and Georgia, at work in Ware County and he and his partner, a Mr. Becker, were working thirtyfive hands at the old operation in Charlton County, which he had not yet sold. Around this time,
Williams’ acquaintances from North Carolina also moved to the area; one purchased a cotton
plantation for $10,000 farther up the railroad line and another purchased a turpentine operation
thirty miles below Williams on the same line. Later that winter, Williams oversaw the
construction o f his still in Ware County and set out four or five hundred fruit trees that he
ordered from a nursery in Savannah. In late May the new Ware County operation produced
turpentine and the still was up and running. Williams also began shipping timber to New York.
As the turpentine harvesting season continued in the fall of 1860, Williams rushed to complete
the house in Ware County that he had been planning for some years. He had just recently sold
his Chariton County place, and his wife busily packed their belongings for the move. By early
December the Williams were finally living in Ware County. Ben’s patient wife reported that
they were “living in the kitchen and the house is going up slowly, but I had rather wait longer &
have it more convenient.” The acquisitive doctor had recently purchased yet more land, five

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

201

hundred acres, at the point where the Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad and the Brunswick
and Florida Railroad intersected. His wife explained that “he considers it a good investment.”
“You see,” she wrote her parents from Georgia, “the Dr believes in negroes + pine land.”
Benjamin Williams’ case shows how some producers, determined to remain in the turpentine
business, were willing to sell their entire North Carolina holdings and begin anew hundreds of
miles away in another state. As with Williams, it was not uncommon for turpentiners to
purchase different parcels o f land scattered across several counties, usually near a transportation
source, run separate operations on them, or to enter a related business such as timber cutting.78
Turpentining probably began in Alabama in the late 1840s, most likely in the Mobile
vicinity. One Col. R. D. Jones o f Clarke County, due north o f Mobile and serviced by the
Alabama River on its east side and the Tombigbee on its west, reportedly began experimenting
with turpentine in 1847. The area not only offered high quality pine land, but excellent river
access to the port at Mobile. A North Carolina producer interested in starting an operation there
received a very favorable report from Mobile that “there is plenty plenty o f Pine Land in the
whole South as well Adapted to the making of Turp as the finest sections are in the Old North
State and as far as I can judge it can be got to market equally as cheap as the charges are at
present on the Will Rroad.” The writer believed that “the freights on the River are very low +
from here to N York not ‘on an average’ over 20 pr ct higher from Wilmington.”79 In 1849 an
article in the Mobile Planter argued that operators could start with twelve hands and produce
$4,857 per year, within three years he could increase production and make $18,920 with thirty-

78 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 21 January 1855,26 November 1855, 16 January
1858,23 November 1858, 7 November 1859, 18 January 1860, 11 March 1860,21 October I860,
6 December 1860, Benjamin F. Williams to Samuel Hicks, 25 September 1859,31 May 1860,
Sarah Hicks Williams Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North Carolina
at Chapel Hill.
79 S. H. Gaines to Grist, 23 March 1854, James Redding Grist Papers, Special
Collections Library, Duke University.
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eight hands. For a planter to make the same profit, cotton would have to sell at 250; it then
brought somewhere between 110 and 120.*°
In December 1854 turpentine producers met in Mobile to discuss ways to encourage the
industry. A report offered at the meeting claimed that Alabama yielded 1,060,000 gallons of
turpentine and 130,000 barrels o f rosin worth $750,000. $2,000,000 o f capital was invested in its
production. At the same convention a Mr. Price estimated “that with the same rates o f increase
for the next five years, it will amount to the sum o f many millions o f dollars, provided the
inducements and encouragement can be afforded

”81 Price assured his fellow conventioneers

of the favorable profits “o f naval stores over that of cotton.” “The region’s forest resources,” he
explained, remained “uncultivated, and utterly worthless in a pecuniary point o f view, both to the
general government and the State.” His report centered on the increased volume of business the
turpentine industry could give to Mobile factorage houses and merchants over cotton. Whereas
the average slave could produce four bales o f cotton per year from which receivers in Mobile
realized $10, the average turpentine laborer would produce 170 barrels o f rosin and 30 casks of
spirits from which the city would make $87.50 in wharfage, drayage, storage, insurance,
cooperage, and commissions, $45 on the spirits and $42.50 on the rosin. Profits for railroads, it
was predicted, would be as great; $6 for transporting four bales of cotton, but $73.50 for
transporting 170 barrels o f rosin at 300 each and 30 casks of spirits at 750 each. Moreover, Price
predicted, “the laborer in turpentine will consume of the merchandise o f Mobile, to an amount
equivalent to five hands engaged in cotton, from the fact that his occupation precludes the

80 “The Southern Pine Forest—Turpentine,” De Bow’s Review 18 (February 1855): 188;
Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal of
Southern History 34 (November 1968): 523; “Production of Turpentine in Alabama,” De Bow’s
Review 7 (December 1849): 560-562.
81 “The Southern Pine Forests—Turpentine,” 189.
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possibility o f his producing any of the necessaries o f life.”*2 The convening producers were
justifiably excited about their industry’s prospects. Between 1850 and 1860 the number of
turpentine-making establishments grew from 4 to 37 (fig. 4.4). The rise in the number o f
laborers and production value indicate that and the average size of operations doubled. In 1850
33 workers labored in turpentine. By I860 that number had risen to 614, a more than eighteen
hundred percent increase (fig. 4.6). The value of turpentine produced jumped thirty-six times,
from $17,800 to over $642,000 (fig. 4 J ) .83
James R. Grist’s turpentine operation well represents the industry’s spread from North
Carolina into the deep South. Grist entered the turpentine business with his father in the older
turpentine region o f Beaufort County, North Carolina. When the demand for turpentine grew, he
purchased 6000 acres o f pine land in Brunswick County, south of the Cape Fear River. When he
had exploited that tract, he moved up the Cape Fear, but with the completion of the Wilmington
to Manchester Railroad in 1853, he once again moved south o f the Cape Fear, to a place in
Columbus County. However, by the mid 1850s the unexploited pine tracts which had brought
Grist his fortune had grown increasingly limited; he was forced to search elsewhere for pine
acreage to maintain his business. In 1854 he received a favorable report on the opportunities for
turpentine in Alabama, and four years later he sent his cousin Benjamin Grist, who had managed
one of his North Carolina plantations, to open a new operation on the Fish River in the Mobile
Bay area. With the labor o f around one hundred slaves, the Alabama operation in the 1859-60
season yielded 26,337 barrels of crude turpentine from which was distilled 3020 barrels o f spirits
and 15,118 barrels o f rosin, producing gross revenues o f more than $70,000.**

82 Ibid., 188-191.
83 Abstract o f the Statistics o f Manufactures. According to the Returns of the Seventh
Census. 116; Manufactures of the United States in 1860. 14.
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Although the Florida turpentine industry reemerged at about the same time that it picked
up in Georgia, the Sunshine State attracted few producers like Williams or Grist. In 1847
seventy barrels o f turpentine produced near Pilatka, Florida, reached Jacksonville for export. It
was believed to be the first to be collected in Florida since it had become part of the United
States in 1819. One year later, thirty pounds of Florida tar were shipped to the Savannah
market.85 By 1851 it was “no longer a matter o f doubt that Turpentine can be profitably made in
this section of country, as there are already a number o f persons largely and successfully engaged
in the business.”86 Yet production did not gain the momentum that industry boosters hoped. One
complained that Florida “is exporting considerable lumber and turpentine; but where one is
engaged in either o f these branches o f business, there should be at least twenty.”87 Not only did
Florida possess an abundance o f good pine timber, but easy access to the coast. In order to
increase turpentine and rosin production, De Bow’s Review argued that “we need only look to an
accession o f laborers in this productive field, for it to become a most valuable and important
resource o f the state.”88 More workers, however, were difficult to come by in the sparsely
populated and underdeveloped state. A plantation economy based on cotton and tobacco existed
in some areas o f Florida. However, significant areas o f the state, especially the piney woods
region, saw little plantation activity. For example, in 1860 St. Johns County, which possessed an
abundance o f longieaf pines, had only three plantations with more than thirty slaves; small
planters and subsistence farmers dominated the area. But despite this obstacle, timber and
84 Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861”
(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 95, 523.
85 Ibid., 273.
86 “ 12,000 Acres o f Turpentine Land for Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 10
January 1851.
87 “Florida,” De Bow’s Southern and Western Review 10 (April 1851): 411.
88 Ibid., 412.
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turpentine did grow in importance in the region, stimulated by cheap and abundant pine land.89
In 1851 an attractive 12,000-acre tract reportedly “peculiarly adapted to the Turpentine business,
being covered with a thick growth of pine, and having a River front of more than five miles”
came up for sale on the St. Johns River.90 Throughout the 1850s land in this region remained
relatively cheap, selling for between $1 and $1.25 per acre. By the mid 1850s, a 50,000-box
operation was located on 1,200 acres south o f Tallahassee on the St. Marks River. Such a
relatively large-size operation was typical o f the few Florida turpentine businesses of the time.
Although only five concerns operated in both 1850 and 1860, over the decade their size grew
from an average capitalization of $5600 to $28,200 (fig. 4.4). The total number o f laborers also
increased five hundred percent, from 82 to 127, and their production value jumped nearly three
and a half times, from $29,671 to $100,676 (figs. 4.6 and 4.3 ).91
In Mississippi and Louisiana the naval stores industry developed even more slowly.
Peter Hammond, for whom Hammond, Louisiana was named, began producing these
commodities soon after arriving in the state from his native Sweden around 1820. He purchased
land from the government in the piney woods region of present day Hammond for a few cents an
acre. The tar, pitch, and turpentine that he produced had to be hauled to Springfield, Louisiana, a
town about five miles southwest of Hammond with river access to Lake Maurepas, and from
there shipped to New Orleans. He reportedly prospered from his naval stores operation. Few
producers joined Hammond in naval stores manufacturing. Both the 1850 and 1860 Census list

89 Historic Properties Survey o f St. Johns Countv (St. Augustine, FL: Historic St.
Augustine Preservation Board, 1985), 31.
90 “ 12,000 Acres o f Turpentine Land for Sale.”
91 Felix Livingston to Alex MacRae, 21 January 1850 and 5 September 1859, Hugh
MacRae Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; “Turpentine Lands in Florida For
Sale,” Wilmington. North Carolina Journal. 21 March 1856; Abstract of the Statistics of
Manufactures. According to the Returns o f the Seventh Census. 116; Manufactures of the United
States in 1860. 60.
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only one Louisiana turpentiner. In 1842, Fairfax Washington, a North Carolina naval stores
operator, tapped trees in Mississippi. By the late 1840s several distilleries operated along the
gulf coast area, one relatively large facility built a few miles above the mouth of the Pearl River
by Nathaniel Mitchell in 1847. But in 1849 his business failed, in part because Mitchell and his
manager argued and eventually fought a duel. By 18S0 naval stores were produced in all three of
Mississippi’s coastal counties. One distillery in Jackson County sat on a bluff high above the
Pascagoula River. A rail track ran from the bluff to a landing on the river, and a hand wench was
used to lower the turpentine and rosin to it. However, between 1850 and 1860 the number of
operations actually dropped from five to just one. Correspondingly, the number o f laborers fell
from thirty-three to four and the product value tumbled from $19,680 to $1,700. Several
handicaps help explain the turpentine industry’s slow beginning in southern Mississippi and
Louisiana. Few North Carolina producers and their slaves moved to the area, and the native
slaves, accustomed to agricultural labor, where completely lacked turpentining skills. Would be
producers also found it difficult to acquire capital since they had to compete for resources with
the lumbering industry, which was growing important in the region during the years before the
Civil War.92
By the Civil War, destructive harvesting practices had pushed a portion of the turpentine
industry out o f North Carolina and into states further south. Boxing and chipping seriously
weakened the trees’ bases and left them vulnerable to decay and dryface. Fire badly scorched the
flammable faces and boxes, especially in abandoned stands where hardened gum coated the old
wounds and flammable debris carpeted the forest floor. Pines, weakened in these various ways,

92 Isabel Nelson Lovel, “Hammond, Louisiana, and Its Swedish Founder,” The Swedish
Pioneer Historical Quarterly n.s. 4 (1967): 221-222; Abstract o f the Statistics o f Manufactures.
According to the Returns of the Seventh Census. 116; Manufactures o f the United States in 1860.
203, 294; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Longleaf Pine Belt 1840-1915
(University: The University o f Mississippi, 1962), 127-129.
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were left susceptible to insects which invaded the tree’s bark and sapwood, nibbling at the live
wood until too little was left to support the tree. As North Carolina’s longleaf pines yielded to
windfall, rotting, fire, insects, and wild hogs, a cessation o f regular burning in used up tracts
prevented a regeneration o f this once expansive forest. As the pines disappeared, many North
Carolinians turned against the turpentine industry and switched to agricultural production which
new fertilizers made possible in the eastern counties’ sandy and infertile land. Other producers,
determined to continue in the business, purchased fresh pine tracts in South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, and Alabama. To these new locations such men as Benjamin Williams and James R.
Grist moved their slaves and continued the same destructive harvesting practices that had forced
them from North Carolina. After the Civil War this southward migration continued.
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Chapter Five
North Carolinians on the Move:
The Turpentine Industry’s Continued Migration Southward

The naval stores industry quickly recovered after the Civil War as producers rushed to
take advantage o f high prices. With the revival, North Carolina operators continued their
southward movement in search o f unexploited timber stands in Georgia and Florida. Railroad
expansion in these states made more and more fresh timber land accessible just as stands
previously available to turpentiners deteriorated from the destructive harvesting practices.
However, unlike their situation in the antebellum years when forest lands were plentiful,
producers now had to complete for timber with large, well-financed lumber companies. The
men, who came from the Carolinas to make turpentine in Georgia, Florida and the other Gulf
states, contributed to the rise o f the New South’s middle class. They migrated southward so
rapidly that by 1900 the industry was firmly centered in the deep South states, with North
Carolina and South Carolina responsible for only a small fraction o f the county’s naval stores
production.
The Civil War devastated the turpentine industry and interrupted its southward
movement out o f North Carolina. Even before the first shots were fired, pre-war political
conflict took its toll on the business by upsetting commodity markets. A week and a half after
Lincoln’s election, concern over the South’s ability to sell and export its goods sent prices in the
region’s coastal markets tumbling. A New Orleans factor reported to James R. Grist that “The
past week has been a remarkably bad one for trade of all kinds, the principal cause which is to be
found in the late Presidential election and its effects upon the South.”1 Naval store prices fell to

208
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such low levels that producers were encouraged to hold their barrels off the market as long as
possible. Moreover, the fear of bank failures, compounded by the lingering effects o f the Panic
of 1857, forced lenders to severely reign in their loans. “Money is almost impossible to get out
of our Banks and . . . on the street is bringing 2 or 3 per cent a month,” Grist’s factor reported.2
By January 1861 the southern market had grown even worse as supplies accumulated. Grist
learned that his New Orleans factor was “afraid we shall find difficulty in selling [your one
hundred barrels o f turpentine], as our market now goes, but hope for better times soon, if Politics
assure.”3 Money remained tight; when the Grist operation became indebted for $3000, it was
warned not to ask for more. Buyers also feared that they could not transport the product out of
the region, and since most naval stores were consumed outside o f the South, they were only of
value outside o f its boarders. To make matters worse, in late February the cost of marketing
naval stores rose when the Confederate Congress passed an export tax on such goods as cotton,
tobacco, tar, pitch, turpentine, and rosin to secure the principal on a fifteen million dollar loan for
the war effort.4
As war approached, turpentine producers threw their full support behind the
Confederacy. Grist’s partner in Alabama wondered “why don’t the good old north state take a
bold stand? put her shoulders to the (or rather) Our Wheel (Southern Confederated) + let the
miserable fanatics see we cannot be run over.”3 A producer in Georgetown County, South

1 Marxhall J. Smith and Company to Allen and James R. Grist, 17 November 1860,
James Redding Grist Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Ibid.; Douglas B.
Ball. Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 207208.
3 Thomas F. Strikney to Allen and James R. Grist, 26 February 1861, Grist Papers.
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Carolina, who also believed North Carolina should secede, wondered in March 1861 if the three
crops of boxes his slaves were then cutting would ever pay off. “The affares of the Country,” he
wrote, “are such, that every kind o f business depends so far as sucess is concerned, upon the
great + very important dicision waiting to be made by the U.S. + the Confederate States.”6
Although the nation’s division upset him, he was “ready as an officer o f the Sampit Rangers to
die on the battlefield in trying to guard + difend the rights of this Southern Confederacy.”7 Even
Sarah Williams, the wife o f Georgia turpentine producer Benjamin Williams and a transplanted
Yankee, felt “the Spirit o f 76” and prepared to aid the Confederate cause. Two weeks after the
firing on Fort Sumter, she was busy knitting and sewing clothes. “Before we shall buy o f Black
Republicans,” she proclaimed, “we shale go barefooted and wear homespun.” The Williamses
and their neighbors began planting more food crops than usual and “if necessary we shall take
hands out of turpentine in order to insure a good crop.” The Williamses also began building new
pens for their two hundred head o f cattle.8
During the war, prices in southern ports sunk to their lowest levels. In New Orleans a
factor replied that “The war has almost put a stop to business here the past week, + Naval Stores
have suffered along with the rest.” No rosin sold and the few barrels of spirits that moved sold at
low prices, which brought no profit to the producer. However, on the New York market prices
soared for the same reason that they fell in the South. Ever-growing fear that southern
commodities could not leave the region set prices for such goods as naval stores at a premium,
especially after Lincoln ordered a blockade o f southern ports on April 19. Gum rose to between

6 C. C. Mercer to Brother, 9 March 1861, Mercer Family Papers, Southern Historical
Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
7 Ibid.
8 Sarah Hicks Williams to Parents, 28 April 1861, Sarah Hicks Williams Papers,
Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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$4.50 and $5.00 per barrel and spirits climbing to 750 to 800 per gallon. As prices climbed,
northern buyers held their naval stores off the market, waiting for them to go even higher. If,
under these circumstances, southern producers could locate a ship heading north, it was to their
advantage to pay freight prices as high as five times the normal amount to get their naval stores
to northern ports.9 At the beginning of May, a New York factor advised James Grist to ship his
Alabama naval stores to New York at once. “You can afford to pay very high freight now as the
price of Spts + Rosin is so high—Ship Immediately—this is no doubt the best place in the World
to get the high prices now.” Barring that, if a foreign vessel was available he should ship to
Europe, preferably London or Liverpool.10 Grist, desperate to take advantage o f this market,
requested that the trade house of R. M. Blackwell & Co. of New York charter a ship to bring his
Alabama naval stores there. They informed him, however, that the Union government forbade
any vessel from leaving a northern port for the South. Because naval stores was low in value
relative to its bulk, it was not worth the risk o f running the Union blockade. The blockade and
restrictions on vessels in northern ports sailing south, which was firmly in place by the end o f
1861, also prevented turpentiners from receiving such needed supplies as pork and spirit barrels
which were commonly shipped through northern posts.11 “God grant that such a state of things
may soon be over,” Grist’s factor commented.12
During the war production ground to a halt. Neglected turpentine boxes lost much o f
their productive capacity and in some areas whole orchards burned. The railroad system’s

9 Marxhall J. Smith & Co. to Allen and James R. Grist, 27 April 1861, April 30, 1861,
and New York Commodity Price Listing, 4 May 1861, Grist Papers.
10 R. M. Blackwell & Co. to Allen and James R. Grist, 2 May 1861, Ibid.
11 R. M. Blackwell & Co. to Allen and James R. Grist, 30 April 1861 and 24 May 1861,
Ibid.; Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal o f
Southern History 34 (November 1968): 525.
12 R. M. Blackwell & Co. to Allen and James R. Grist, 2 May 1861, Grist Papers.
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destruction left producers with no means o f transporting their products. These problems were
aggravated when, in their search for supplies of desperately needed metal, the Confederate army
seized the copper stills.13 In many cases turpentine that had been harvested before the war
simply sat unattended in its barrels. While traveling by train through southeastern North
Carolina during the war, an Englishman observed that “at every stopping place, this valuable
staple [gum] was piled in thousands on thousands of barrels, apparently belonging to, or cared
for by nobody, hoops off, staves loose, and the resin melted by the hot sun into enormous masses,
and plainly left to take care of itself until the war is over.”14 A few producers, however, went to
great lengths to preserve their gum. When Simon Temple from the Starke, Florida, area heard
that northern troops were approaching, he ran his stored resin through a trough into a cypress
pond to hide it. When the threat had passed, he and his laborers chopped the hardened resin off
the top of the water and carried it back to be stored. Some stubborn southerners continued
efforts to market their naval stores throughout the war.

In 1864 M. J. Parker o f Washington

made efforts to get five gallons o f turpentine to Philadelphia, and Joseph V. Smedly searched for
a low cost means to ship his rosin. But despite such endeavors, by 1865 the disruption in trade,
loss o f stills, and especially the emancipation o f the slaves, whose labor had made the turpentine
possible, had effectively destroyed the southern naval stores industry.15 By the spring o f 1865

13 Percival Perry, “The Naval-Stores Industry in the Old South, 1790-1860,” The Journal
of Southern History 34 (November 1968): 525; William McKee Evans, Ballots and Fence Rails:
Reconstruction on the Lower Cane Fear (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press,
1966), 36; “The Pine Forests o f the South,” De Bow’s Review: After the War Series 3 (February
1867): 197.
14 W. C. Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1996), 69.
15Zonira Hunter Tolies, Shadows on the Sand: A History o f the Land and the People in
the Vicinity o f Melrose. Florida (Gainesville, FL: Storter Printing Company, Inc., 1976), 183; M.
L. Parker to C. Schrack & Co., 26 April 1864, C. Schrack and Company Papers, Special
Collections Library, Duke University; Joseph V. Smedley to Wife, 10 July 1864 and 25 August
1864, Joseph V. Smedley Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
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the southern forests formerly boxed for turpentine lay in unsalvageable ruin, and the region’s
naval stores exports had dwindled to nearly nothing.
During the next five years, however, the naval stores industry began an impressive
recovery. Market conditions made a return to naval stores production an attractive opportunity
for many southerners. The United States’ rapid industrialization during and after the war
expanded the demand for naval stores at the same time that the South was unable to provide the
supply. Consequently, the prices of naval stores products reached record highs. In mid-January
1866, spirits of turpentine sold on the New York market for an astonishing $ 1 to $ 1.03 per
gallon, crude turpentine for $7.50 to $8.50 per 280-pound barrel, high grade rosin for $15 to $16
per barrel, and even common rosin sold for around $6 a barrel. In the 1850s, producers rejoiced
when spirit prices temporarily soared to 63 or 65 cents per gallon and gum to $3.90 to $4 per
barrel. By 1870 the South’s production had returned to one half the value o f the naval stores
made in I860.16
Of course the price actually paid to southern producers, reduced by the cost of
transportation and marketing the products, was considerably lower than those in New York.
These expenses, plus a reduction in market prices by July when the first naval stores produced
since the beginning o f sectional hostilities entered the market, brought prices paid to producers
considerably lower, but they remained at attractive levels. In Wilmington, where prices were
always lower than in New York, fine rosin brought $4.25, virgin turpentine $4.05, dip $3.05,

16 A. Stuwart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blanchard, The Naval Stores
Industry (Gainesville: Bureau of Economic and Business Research, College o f Business
Administration, The University of Florida, 1934), 10; “The Quotation for Naval Stores Today,”
16 January 1866, Wooten and Taylor Company Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke
University; “High Prices,” Fayetteville Observer. I February 1853; W. W. Ashe, The Forests.
Forest Lands, and Forest Products of Eastern North Carolina (Raleigh: North Carolina
Geological Survey, 1894), 76.
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common rosin $1.90, and spirits 38£.17 On the London market, inroads made by European naval
stores producers kept prices at more normal levels. Only very pale American rosin brought high
prices there. Like Egypt and India, which both took advantage o f the South’s interrupted cotton
trade, many European countries found an opportunity to boost their naval stores production
during the Civil War. Corsica, Algeria, Spain, Portugal, and especially France developed their
turpentine and rosin manufacturing during the war years.18
By March 1866 signs o f renewed production appeared. That month a New York Tribune
correspondent traveling on the Charleston and Manchester Railroad “saw vast numbers o f barrels
of turpentine and rosin, both in its crude and prepared state.”19 Yankees, as well as southerners
reportedly took advantage of the high prices. While digging on a river bank in New Bern, some
northern soldiers struck the hardened rosin which the town distilleries had discarded over
decades and had been covered by sand and dirt over the years. The group reportedly made
thousands of dollars by quietly mining the rosin and shipping it to the North. Another northerner
built and burned a tar kiln on an occupied North Carolina plantation while the owner was locked
in the Craven County jail.20
Prices leveled off after 1866 as naval stores products began arriving in markets, but they
remained strong enough to continue to attract producers. On the New York market prices for soft

17 Alfred Mustru to Wooten and Taylor, 27 July 1866, Wooten and Taylor Papers.
18 Macleaumaris and Co. to John and Donald MacRae, 21 February 1866, Hugh MacRae
Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; John Drew, “The Early Days o f the Naval
Stores Industry.” Naval Stores Review 91 (November/December 1981): 17.
19 “Wilmington-Business—The Turpentine Trade—How Turpentine is Obtained-The
Pine Trees—Pitch and Tar—Speculations in Lumber,” New York Tribune. 17 March 1866.
20 Whitelaw Reid, After the War: A Tour o f the Southern States. 1865-1866 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1965), 30; M. H. Baker to D. W. Bell, 5 March 1866, J. H. Hunter to George
Henderson, 8 December 1911, and H. A. Marshall to George Henderson, 21 December 1911,
George Holland Collection, North Carolina State Archives.
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turpentine that reached as high as S5.49 per barrel in November 1866, by June 1868 had settled
at around $4.25 to $4.50 per barrel of crude turpentine, 450 to 45.50 per gallon o f spirits, $3.75
per barrel o f high quality rosin, and from $3.50 to $5.00 per barrel o f tar. Such prices were
remarkably high by antebellum standards. They remained high although prices did not remain as
astonishingly high in the 1870s as in the 1860s. In August 1877 spirits sold on the New York
market for 32.50 per gallon, the finest grade o f rosin—window glass—for $4.25 to $4.75 per
barrel, and tar for $2.50 per barrel. As always, the cost o f marketing naval stores consumed a
sizable portion o f the product’s gross value. A 100-per-gallon tax attached to the cost of
marketing spirits in the late 1860s added an extra expense. When John MacRae o f Shoe Heel,
North Carolina, shipped twenty-four barrels o f various grades o f rosin out of Wilmington in
August 1879, for example, the charges o f $16.63 consumed eighteen percent o f the product’s
gross value, leaving MacRae with $73.66 left o f the rosin’s original value o f $90.29.2I
Despite the high marketing costs, naval stores remained profitable commodities and the
large number o f producers who rushed into their manufacture competed so greatly for land and
labor that they drove production costs upward. During the winter boxing season o f 1866, the
first season in which turpentiners had to rely on wage labor, “the expense o f boxing has been
unusually great.” With virgin dip rosin selling at from $20 to $30 per barrel by the end o f the
war, producers rushed to open new orchards to cash in. The demand for box cutters drove up
wage prices until, by January and February, wages, which included rations, ranged from $20 to
$40 per month. This amounted to 10 to 20 per box, and in some areas the cost rose to as much as
30 a box. The pay scale for different jobs reflected the difficulty o f the labor and supply of

21 Ledgers for 1866 and 1867, Thomas David Smith McDowell Papers, Southern
Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Brown & Cuyler
commodity quotations, 20 June 1868 and Office o f the Internal Revenue receipt, 20 June 1867
and 25 June 1869, Wooten and Taylor Company Papers; New York Quotations, 1 August 1877,
Account receipt from Carolina Central Railroad, 28 August 1879, John McKay Papers, Special
Collections Library, Duke University.
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skilled hands to perform the tasks. For the whole 1866 turpentine season, boxers and chippers
received wages of around $40 per month, coopers around $60 per month, distillers got the same
as a coopers, teamsters received $40, and dippers little more than $27 per month. Most hands did
not work all year, however, only the boxers and chippers. The dippers worked for seven months
and the other workers for eight months, from April to November. Boxers and chippers received
around $480 each year. Even working for just over half a year, dippers, who were the lowest
paid workers, earned at least $189. In paying such high wages, producers spent in 1866 nearly
twice as much for free labor as they did before the war on hired slave labor (fig. S.l). With the
new paid labor force, wages were estimated to consume 52% of an operation’s annual operating
expenses. Census figures indicate that although postbellum labor costs remained substantially
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Figure 5.1. Annual Labor Cost Per Naval Stores Worker, Southeastern United States, 1850-1900
United States Department o f Commerce and Labor, Bureau o f the Census, Manufactures. 1905
(Washington, DC: 1908), 649.
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higher than those before the war, such high wages as seen in 1866 did not persist. The annual
wages that naval stores workers received ranged from around $150 to just over $200.“
The price o f leasing timber for turpentining appears to have also risen above that of the
antebellum period. In 1870 James H. Aycock o f Richmond County, North Carolina, leased
200,000 boxes for $1,400, a cost of $7 per thousand This represented an almost 63% increase
over what another North Carolina producer paid per one thousand boxes in 1854. However, the
same pre-war arrangements between lessee and lessor continued. In 1871, Aycock’s second year
leasing the tract, he paid $1200 for the lease of 171,300 boxes, the same rate o f $7 per thousand
that he paid before. As in typical antebellum leases, Aycock agreed to cause no unnecessary
damage to the trees and only cut as much timber as he needed for the barrels, fuel, and buildings
required to carry on his business. He had the right to remove any stills and fixtures he
constructed on the property. It also appears that as with antebellum lease agreements, producers
only paid for the productive boxes and according to how much gum the boxes yielded. This
meant that, for each year the boxes were worked, their leasing rate dropped. When the
Richmond Naval Stores Company took over the Aycock lease in 1873, the rent price reflected the
previously turpentined trees’ potential productivity. Richmond Naval Stores Company paid $4
per thousand boxes that had been worked for two years and $4.50 per thousand boxes worked for
only one. But the company paid $12 per one hundred new boxes, forty-two percent more than
when Aycock began leasing three years earlier.23

22 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” De Bow’s Review 3 (February 1867): 197-198; List
of Negroes belonging to Mr John W. Grist Worked by Grist + Striknev during the year of 1860.
Grist Papers.
23 Some turpentine producers reportedly preferred leasing to buying because they leased
by the box, meaning they only paid for what could be worked. John Avery Gere Carson to H. C.
Harwood, 8 May 1897, John Avery Gere Carson Papers, Manuscripts Collection, Georgia
Historical Society; W. W. Nettles to J. W. M. Nettles, 28 August 1869, Probate Record 1511,
Darlington County Historical Commission, Darlington, SC; Percival Perry, “The Naval Stores
Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1789-1861” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1947), 44; Leases
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The innovation o f working turpentine tracts on shares appeared in the 1870s as a means
to confront high production costs. Like undercapitalized southern fanners, small turpentine
producers could finance their business by offering a portion o f their product to the property
owner as rent. In 1873, for example, William Knight of North Carolina rented boxes owned by
Heck and Company. George S. Cole, a general merchandiser, oversaw the lease. As part of the
agreement, Knight delivered all the gum to a still, probably run by Cole. Here Cole collected
one-fourth of the barrels for rent payable to Heck and Company and paid Knight the current
market price for the other three-fourths barrels. However, problems could arise from these share
arrangements. Some producers were slow to hand over the landowners share. In 1870 one North
Carolina timber owner received barrels o f turpentine on a weekly basis from several different
turpentiners who worked his trees. Between May 1 and September 24, he received 222 barrels as
payment from the different producers. But in early fall two producers began to falter in their
payments, going for at least three weeks without paying any turpentine. Other share turpentiners
failed to surrender any portion o f the product. In the early 1880s, a South Carolina producer
rented turpentine boxes and made an agreement with another man to work the boxes for him on
shares. But after hauling gum that represented the work of four to five dippings to Darlington,
the share worker sold the product and failed to pay the renter his portion.24
The post-war migration in fact picked up considerable momentum as producers
continued their use of harvesting methods that killed the longleaf pine in their home state and

for turpentine boxes, 25 November 1869, 16 January 1871, and 14 January 1873, Dorothy
Fremont Grant Collection, North Carolina State Archives.
24 Lease between William Knight and George S. Cole, 22 January 1873, Aaron Ashley
Flowers Seawell Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North Carolina at
Chapel Hill; W. J. Wikeson to F. G. Smith, 24 September 1870, McDowell Papers; Testimony
regarding working boxes on shares, 30 May 1883, Sessions 805, Darlington County Historical
Commission.
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then sought out the fresh pines available to their south (figs. 4.5 and 5.2). These migratory North
Carolina producers either purchased or leased timber lands in the still heavily timbered states to
their south, typically forming partnerships with friends or relatives to start their businesses.25 As
early as February o f 1871, their movement out o f southeastern North Carolina made one man fear
that ‘th e Cape Fear [area] is doomed unless something be done to resurrect it. An apathy and
despondency seems to pervade the whole region from Fayetteville to Wilmington.”26 That year,
for example, a Mr. K. Hayeer o f Whiteville, North Carolina, in Columbus County, bought 1700
acres of round timber on the Waccamaw River just across the South Carolina state line. His
partner owned an adjoining 1600 acres of round timber. Although they had adequate land, these
men lacked the capital to begin production and, as the time to begin boxing approached, they
considered taking in a third partner who could supply the money. With his capital problems
apparently solved, Hayeer spent two weeks in late December 1871 and early January 1872 in
South Carolina recruiting labor and beginning work on the trees. As the gum harvesting season

25 Jane Twitty Shelton, Pines and Pioneers: A History o f Lowndes County. Georgia.
1825-1900 (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1976), 184, 198-199; Wallace Leigh Harris,
History of Pulaski and Blecklev Counties. Georgia. 1808-1956 (Macon, GA: The J. W. Burke
Company, 1957), 574-577, 582-587, 589-591; Biographical Souvenir o f the States o f Georgia
and Florida (Chicago: F. A. Battey & Company, 1889), 127-128; Karen Harvey, “Maguire Bom
Into Turpentine Family: Industry Once Had Major Impact on County,” The Compass. 26 April
1990, p. 8-9; Elliott Maguire, interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine
Historical Society, St. Augustine, FL; Elliott Maguire, interview by author, St. Augustine, FL, 5
June 1996; William T. Kennedy, History of Lake County Florida. Lake County Historical
Society, 1929, 101; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Longleaf Pine Belt.
1840-1915 (University: The University of Mississippi, 1962), 131-132; Martha Virginia McNair
Evans Patterson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North Carolina at
Chapel Hill; J. A. G. Carson to J. P. Williams, 11 September 1888, Carson Papers.
26 H. W. G. to Thomas David Smith McDowell, 24 February 1871, McDowell Papers.
Figure 5.2: United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office, The Statistics of the
Wealth and Industry o f the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 493-494,
505-508, 537-538, 554-556, 568-569, 627, 637-638, 645-648,669-670, 674-678,685, 709-710,
732-735.
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Figure 5.2. Naval Stores Production, 1870, Southeastern United States, Tar and Turpentine

began, he was away in South Carolina most of the time for he was doing his own distilling. He
proudly reported that he was making the best rosin in the area.27
The railroad’s expansion through the southeastern pine belt after the Civil War and the
accessibility o f large and inexpensive tracts o f mature longleaf pine permitted the naval stores
industry to resume the southward trek it began before the war. Following the war, state
governments under the control o f both Democrats and Republicans facilitated railroad
construction as a means to economic growth. In fact, from the end o f Reconstruction to the end
of the nineteenth century, southern railroad construction consistently outpaced that in the rest of
the nation.28 Railroad construction through the pine region began in the 1870s and made
impressive gains during the 1880s. Construction was especially impressive in Georgia. Mark
Wetherington observes that “the railroad’s arrival marked the ‘take-off stage for the piney
woods, a period o f increasing rates of investment, industrialization, and commercialization.”29
By the 1870s that state’s Wiregrass region, with dense stands o f longleaf pines, could be crossed
by rail in less than a day. The journey previously required a week. The new rail lines opened the
Georgia pine forest to market access. Encouraged by the accessibility the new railroad provided,
naval stores operators moved into areas previously too landlocked to be profitably worked. By
1880 virtually every county along the principal lines was producing naval stores (fig. 5.3).30

27 K. Hayrus to Thomas David Smith McDowell, 20 November 1871, January 8, 1872,
and 6 May 1872, Ibid.
28 Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 9; E.W. Carswell, Holmesteadine: The History of Holmes
Countv Florida. (Tallahassee, FL: Rose Printing Company, 1986), p. 141-142.
29 Mark V. Wetherington, The New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 1860-1910
(Knoxville: The University o f Tennessee Press, 1994), 73.
30 Ibid., 73; Jeffrey Dobson and Roy Doyon, “Expansion o f the Pine Oleoresin Industry
in Georgia: 1842 to CA. 1900.” West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences 18 (June
1979): 49.
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During the 1880s the naval stores industry continued to expand across the Georgia pine
belt, aided by the ever-growing rail system, which by 1880, gave Georgia 2,616 miles o f line.
One line, the Savannah, Florida, & Western Railroad, began in Savannah and ran for 237 miles
across South Georgia to Bainbridge in the extreme southwestern comer o f the state. One branch
ran from Thomasville in Thomas County for 58 miles north to Albany, another ran from DuPont,
Georgia in Clinch County southward for 48 miles to Live Oak, and a third branch stretched for
74 miles from Waycross to Jacksonville, Florida. A second major line, the Macon and
Brunswick Railroad, ran from Brunswick, on Georgia’s southern coast, for 189 miles to Macon,
with a 10 mile branch from Cochran in Bleckley C o u n ty across the Ocmuigee River to
Hawkinsville in Pulaski County. (A booklet published in 1881 to promote settlement in Georgia
claimed that between then and 1876 the lumber and naval stores businesses had more than
doubled along this line.) Another spur to Rome was completed in the early 1880s. A third major
line also began in Brunswick and ran 171 miles virtually parallel to the Savannah, Florida, &
Western Railroad and terminated in Albany. During the decade the line was extended westward
to Selma, Alabama. In 1889 a fourth line covering the 153 miles from Macon to Valdosta
opened.31
By 1890 Georgia’s railroad network reached every county in the piney woods. That
same year the state had 228 naval stores operators which employed nearly 10,000 workers whose
labor produced tar and turpentine valued at $4,000,000 (figs. 5.4,5.5, and 5.6). Ten years later,
the number of producers had more than doubled to 524, the work force had nearly doubled to

31 Jack N. Averitt, Georgia’s Coastal Plain, vol. 2 (New York: Lewis Historical
Publishing Company, 1964), 540; Joseph Tillman and C. P. Goodyear, Southern Georgia: A
Pamphlet (Savannah. G. A.: Savannah Times Steam Printing House, 1881), 5-6,38; Shelton,
Pine and Pioneers. 182.
Figure 53: United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office, Report on the
Manufactures o f the United States at the Tenth Census (June 1. 18801 (Washington. DC: 1883),
88-89, 103-106, 140-145, 159-161, 173-174, 193-194,206-210, 277-278,317-319,353-355
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over 19,000, and capital investment had risen by more than five hundred percent to $3,800,000,
reflecting the growing cost of production, and the products value had doubled to more than
$8,000,000. O f the 39 counties engaged in this business by 1900, all had railroad service.32
Florida developed its rail network more slowly than did Georgia. By the early 1870s
Florida’s rail ways, the state’s Commissioner of Land and Immigration explained, was “grand in
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Figure 5.4. Value o f Naval Stores Production, 1870-1900
United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry
of the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 627; United States
Department o f the Interior, Census Office Report on the Manufactures o f the United States at the
Tenth Census fJune 1. 1880HWashington. DC: 1883), 89-103, 106, 141, 161, 174; United States
Department o f the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part III (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States
Department o f Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part III
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.

32 Dobson and Doyon, p. 53; Report on Manufacturing Industries in the United States at
the Eleventh Census, part 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 1905), 308-309;
Manufactures. 1905. part 3 (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce and Labor, 1907), 650.
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Figure 5.5. Number of Hands Employed in Naval Stores Production, 1870-1900
United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office The Statistics of the Wealth and Industry
o f the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 627; United States
Department of the Interior, Census Office Report on the Manufactures of the United States at the
Tenth Census (June 1. 18801 fWashington. DC: 1883), 89-103, 106, 141, 161, 174; United States
Department of the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part III (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States
Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau o f the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part III
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.

design, but yet very partially complete

”33 Florida’s extensive coastline made railroads

less important for transportation. Roughly half o f the state’s counties possessed a shoreline and
rivers that ran through a considerable portion of its pine forest. In many areas served by rivers
and large streams, water ways offered a cheaper if slower and less reliable means o f moving
naval stores to port cities. In 1873 only two rail lines served the state, one from Femandina,
located just north o f Jacksonville, to Cedar Keys in the Gulf o f Mexico, about fifty miles south
west o f Gainesville. Another railroad ran from Jacksonville, through the panhandle’s northem-

33 D. Eagan, The Florida Settler (Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian, 1873), 11, 14.
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Figure 5.6. Navai Stores Establishments by State, 1870-1900
United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry
of the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 627; United States
Department o f the Interior, Census Office Report on the Manufactures o f the United States at the
Tenth Census (June 1. 1880) (Washington. DC: 1883), 89-103,106, 141, 161, 174; United States
Department o f the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part III (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States
Department o f Commerce and Labor, Bureau o f the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part III
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.

tier counties to the Choctawhatchee River. At Live Oak in Suwannee County the line connected
with the Georgia Railroad. Both Florida lines provided better access to the pine forests and by
1873 only lumber exceeded turpentine as Florida’s most valuable product. Cotton ranked third.34
Promotional literature for attracting settlers to the state referred to its pine stands as “mines of
Wealth” and the town o f Live Oak’s newspaper felt “satisfied that there is no industry which can
be started in our country, right here in Live Oak, which will pay as well as the production of
turpentine.”35

34 Ibid., 11, 14, 22-28; Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 63-64.
35 Ibid., 27.
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The major growth in Florida’s railroad network came in the 1880s and gave a boost to
both the naval stores and timber industries. The state possessed only 518 miles o f railways at the
beginning of the decade; five years later it had 1,654 miles and, by 1890,2,489 miles. The
introduction o f a rail line could have a profound effect on an area’s industrial development. For
example, before the first railroad was completed through Washington County, Florida in 1883,
nearly all of the panhandle county was forested with virgin pine. With the improved access to
port facilities and markets provided by the railways, the turpentine industry quickly established
itself in the region. By 1890, turpentining was the county’s second most important industry,
behind timber. Railroad expansion even permitted profitable turpentine manufacturing in Florida
as far south as Lake County near present day Orlando. Produced on a commercial basis there in
the early 1880s, its manufacture increased after the “Big Freeze” of 1894/1895 that destroyed the
area’s orange groves. Until they could reestablish their groves, citrus producers supported
themselves through turpentining. This far-flung rail system facilitated the naval stores industry’s
explosive growth in the state during the 1890s. In that decade the number of establishments
jumped more than twenty-four fold from 15 to 366, the number of workers leaped by thirty-one
times from 484 to 15,073, and the value of tar and turpentine increased more than 3400 percent
from $191,859 to $6,469,605 (figs. 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6).36
Although post-war war naval stores production in Alabama revived more quickly than in
Mississippi, railroad expansion through the latter’s pine forest encouraged production there.
When first reported in 1850, Alabama produced turpentine valued at $17,800. By 1870
production was up to $280,203. Only three years later the Mobile market received about 20,000
36 C. R. Clark, Florida Trade Tokens (St. Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors Publishing Co.,
1980), 1; Carswell, Holmestcading. 141-142, 249; E. A. Ziegler, A. R. Spiders, and C. H.
Coulter, Financial Aspects of Growing Southern Pine. Washington County. Florida (Tallahassee:
Florida Forest Service, 1931), 13; Kennedy, History o f Lake County Florida. 25; Report on
Manufacturing Industries in the United States at the Eleventh census: 1890. part I, 308-309;
Manufactures. 1905. part 3,650.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228
casks of spirits, between 75,000 and 100,000 barrels o f rosin, and 100 barrels o f tar and pitch,
together valued at around $750,000. Two years later, the state’s value rose to $1,200,000, but by
1883 production showed a slight decline to $1,109,760 because o f dwindling timber supplies
accessible by the transportation routes. In Mississippi, where the naval stores industry was in its
infancy in the 1850s, production recovered very slowly following the war. In fact the state
produced less naval stores in 1870 than it had in 1850 when production was very small. During
the 1870s, however, railroad construction and increased demand for naval stores led to the
industry’s growth. By the late 1870s operations had begun along the major transportation routes
in Mississippi’s southern counties near the Mobile & Ohio and the Louisville & Nashville
Railroads and on the Pearl, Pascagoula, and Biloxi Rivers. In 1880 the state possessed 11 naval
stores producing establishments which together employed 53 laborers who manufactured goods
valued at $97,000 (figs. 5.4, 5.5, 5.6). Some o f these operations were established by turpentiners
in Alabama who were attracted by the fresh timber as their own became exhausted. In the late
1890s producers from the older naval stores regions to the East were settling into Mississippi,
which possessed, on average, one small distillery for every five miles o f rail line. Over that
decade the number o f producers rose six hundred percent from 24 to 145 and the number laborers
increased three and one half times, from 645 to 2288. The value of the naval stores production
rose nearly twice as fast, from $282,066 to $1,772,435, probably the result of an increase in
distilled spirits over raw gum.37

37 J. M. Stauffer, “The Timber Resource o f ‘The Southwest Alabama Forest Empire,’”
The Journal of the Alabama Academy o f Science 30 (January 1959): 57-58; Hickman,
Mississippi Harvest 129. 131: The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry of the United States.
Ninth Census (Washington, DC: Department o f the Interior, 1872): 494,538; Report on the
Manufactures o f the United States at the Tenth Census. (Washington, DC: Department of the
Interior, 1883), 89, 141; Report on Manufacturing Industries in the United States at the Eleventh
Census, part 1,308-309; Manufactures. 1905. part 3,650.
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Railroads actively encouraged naval stores producers to locate near their lines in order to
add to their shipping volume. Railroad companies gladly built platforms by any still that located
along its tracks, knowing that the facility’s success would bring thousands o f barrels o f spirits
and rosin for shipping.3* In 1881 the Savannah, Florida & Western Railroad, the Brunswick &
Albany Railroad, and the Macon & Brunswick Railroad published a pamphlet aimed at boosting
the region by attracting travelers, farmers and especially naval stores and lumber producers. For
example, the pamphlet reported that Pelham, a town in southwest Georgia, would “offer superior
inducements to manufacturers o f naval stores. Timber plentiful and convenient to line o f
railroad. Only one man engaged in the business here. Plenty of room for more. Hands are easily
had that understand working the trees, such such [sic] as cutting boxes and hacking, ect.”39 That
Pelham was a distant 224 miles from Savannah meant the railroad would be paid substantially to
haul the product to market.
The expanding southern rail system which provided turpentine operators access to even
such inland timber tracts as those around Pelham, Georgia also opened the forests to a competing
interest, the northern-owned national lumber industry, which moved into the region in the late
nineteenth century and hastened naval stores manufacturing’s southward movement. The
lumbermen’s migration southward represented an continuation o f their persistent movement
around the country in search o f fresh timber supplies. By 1860 the nation’s lumber production
center had clearly passed from New England to New York and production was already growing
in the Great Lakes region. After the Civil War the nation’s lumber production center shifted
even more toward the Great Lakes region. Here, white pine forests were accessible by rail and a
strong demand existed for its lumber, which carpenters found softer and easier to work.
38 “Turpentine Orchards,” The Northern Lumberman. 2 August 1896, in Turpentine
Newsclipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
39 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 27.
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Historical Geographer Michael Williams explains that, like other industries, after 18S0 the
northern pine forest product industries, began a period o f industrial capital development that led
to expansion. The growing railroad network made transportation faster, cheaper, more reliable,
and more flexible. Business concentration permitted the construction o f large lumber mills with
steam power and steel tools. Fundamental changes in lumbering developed, including the
concentration o f ownership o f huge timber tracts and the systematic clear-cutting o f these areas
instead o f harvesting individual trees. During the late antebellum period, the northern lumber
industry’s technology, output, and business activity expanded while the vast southern pine forests
lay relatively unexploited, except for those tapped for gum in southeastern North Carolina and
small mills processing the limited number of trees felled for local consumption. Lackluster
markets for southern pine, limited transportation routes through the longleaf pine belt, and a
shortage o f capital among southerners with which to buy large timber tracts and construct
modem, high volume lumber mills prevented the widespread pre-war exploitation o f southern
woodland.40
Interest in relatively untouched southern forests began immediately after the Civil War’s
end. Writing from Gainesville, Florida in June 1865, one man, who believed that the South
could adjust to its new labor situation, reported that “the resources o f Florida will soon be
opened up anew. Dozens o f men o f my acquaintance are now turning their attention to Saw
Mills, Turpentine farms, Tar making, Timber getting + c

”4‘ He believed that the war’s

disruption o f the region’s business establishment offered an opportunity for him to secure a place
in the marketing o f South’s staple production. It was his hope that with his friend in Wilmington
40 Jeffrey A. Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers: Life. Labor and Culture in the
North Florida Timber Industry. 1830-1930 (Macon: GA: Mercer University Press, 1997), 24;
Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 193-194.
41 S. Swamm to Donald MacRae, 23 June 1865, MacRae Papers.
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as his partner, he could create an unusually versatile and powerful factorage house which would
handle lumber, naval stores, and cotton marketing in both North Carolina and Florida. All that
Swamm’s grand scheme lacked was operating capital. He suspected that he “might be able to
raise $6000 or $8000 to secure us until we can open up a respectable business.”42 In late winter
1866 there was already a revived interest in timber tracts growing in Florida’s St. John River
area. Some lumber and naval stores men wished to purchase the tracts, others were only
interested in purchasing the timber, while a few simply stole from the property what they
wanted. Speculators believed “that lands will go up in Florida as soon as quiet is restored in our
Country.”43
After the Civil War, the Southern Homestead Act of 1866 slowed the expansion of largescale lumber production in five states—Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas—
for ten years. In an effort to make the act’s benefits as widely available as possible, Congress
limited public homestead grants to eighty acres. Although a large number o f the 67,427
homestead claims made from 1866 to 1876 were filed fraudulently by agents acting for large
lumber companies, the legislation did successfully curb the large-scale taking o f public land. By
the mid-1870s, southern congressmen argued that the homestead restrictions unfairly limited
their states’ abilities to use their timber resources for economic development and in 1876
succeeded in getting Congress to revise the restrictive provision thus allowing open land
purchases of the 47.7 million acres o f public land in the five affected southern states.44

42 Ibid.
43 F. Livingston to MacRae, 6 March 1866, Ibid.
44 Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 36-37; Jeffrey A. Drobney, “The
Transformation o f Work in the North Florida Timber Industry, 1890-1910,” Gulf Coast
Historical Review 10 (Fall 1994): 97; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening o f the South: The
Recovery of Land and Forest (Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky. 1984), 15-16;
Albert E. Cowdrey, This land. This South: An Environmental History, revised ed. (Lexington:
The University Press o f Kentucky, 1996), 111.
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Northern investors quickly rushed in. These “timber carpetbaggers,” as forest historian
Thomas D. Clark calls them, came primarily from New York, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and
Kansas. Their buying spree began slowly, totaling only 2,095 acres in 1877,14,262 in 1878, and
16,836 in 1879. By 1880, sales reached 86,873 acres and two years later increased to nearly ten
times that. In 1883 sales topped one million, with much o f the acreage selling for between SI
and $ 1.25 per acre. As large northern concerns gobbled up the best timber land, southern
congressmen hurried to reverse the 1876 change to the Homestead Act. But before the March
1889 renewal of federal land purchase restrictions, lumber men pressed to take advantage of the
liberal sales policies, purchasing a record 1,223,772 acres in 1888. Although some southern
investors purchased some o f these tracts, northern financiers and groups purchased the majority
of the 5,692,259 acres sold between 1877 and 1888.45
Large tracts of state or privately held land could also be purchased cheaply. In 1872 a
member of a family which controlled about 200,000 acres in the vicinity o f the Brunswick and
Albany Railroad reported that the pine lands in his state could “be bought very cheaply at an
average of $ 1.00 to $2.00 p acre.”46 Florida sold an enormous tract o f timber land to a New York
45 Between 1877 and 1888 the following number o f acres were sold in the five southern
public land sale states: 1877 2095 acres, 1878 14,262 acres, 1879 16,036 acres, 1880 86,873
acres, 1881 212,488 acres, 1882 835,710 acres, 1883 1,103,407 acres, 1884 891,836 acres, 1885
212,863 acres, 1887 882,817 acres, and 1888 1,223,772 acres. Over these ten years the number
of federal acres sold in Alabama was 878,413, in Arkansas 628,744, in Florida 1,021,112, in
Mississippi 1,296,775, and in Louisiana 1,867,215. T. Clark, Greening o f the South. 16;
Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 38-42; R. J. Duhse, “Timber Pirates to Tree Farms,”
North Florida Living (March 1985): 44; C. L. Peek to Donald MacRae, 13 April 1886, MacRae
Papers; Drobney, “Transformation o f Work,” 97-98; Frank Bedingfield Vinson, “Conservation
and the South, 1890-1920,” (Ph-D. diss., University of Georgia, 1971), 101-102; Ayers, Promise
of the New South. 124; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South. 1877-1913. (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 116-117; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 111112.
46 Henery C. Day to Judge Pierreporch, 29 February 1872, letter attached to James R.
Butts, 150.000 Acres Yellow Pine Timber. Turpentine and Cotton Lands. (Macon: Georgia
Telegraph Steam Printing House, 1858) in Special Collections Division, The University of
Georgia Libraries, University o f Georgia.
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lumber company for the bargain price o f ten cents per acre. By 1886, the price o f privately held
land in Florida sold for about the same as federal land. Even land located near a railroad line
could be purchased for less than $2 per acre. As with the federally-owned timber lands, large
lumber companies purchased most of these tracts. A few turpentiners, however, also took
advantage o f the low land prices. By the early 1880s, one producer controlled 52,000 acres on
which he worked 700,000 boxes with ninety hands.47 In the late 1890s, a factor advised a
prospective buyer o f Florida turpentine land that real estate prices there varied from fifty cents to
two dollars per acre. The factor had purchased 20,000 acres within twenty miles o f Jacksonville
for seventy-five cents an acre. He advised that o f course “the value of lands in Florida, for
turpentine purposes depends on a good many contingencies,. . .distance from transportation and
primary market: class o f timber on lands, whether sappy or heart: thickness o f timber per acre
ect., and competition for same.”4* When considering working a stand of trees, producers wanted
to know “how near the river—how much, if any is cleared, How many crops o f turpentine trees on
it. How many old + how many new.”49 Georgia land prices also remained low. In 1889,9,015
acres in Coffee County sold for $3,OOO.so
The same developing rail network that aided naval stores producers also helped the
lumber industry make its swift move to the region. Before railroads, large commercial lumber
mills were located in port cities where they could collect timber sent down river from different
sections o f the interior. As railroad expansion coincided with frenzied land purchases during the

47 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 51-52.
48 J. A. G. Carson to H. C. Harwood, 8 May 1897, Carson Papers.
49 Kerrhners and Calder Brothers to Thomas David Smith McDowell, 6 February 1877,
McDowell Papers.
50 Deed o f Conveyance, 8 July 1889, William C. Powell Papers, Special Collections
Library, Duke University.
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1880s, the large lumber companies ran spur lines from the mine line into the timberiand. Now
mills could be more conveniently located beside the main line. Michael Williams explains that
not only did railroads serve as a route to market, but also as a means o f exploiting the forests.51
The combination o f southern railroad expansion, cheap timber, and well-financed
northern investors created a burgeoning lumber industry. Southern lumber production grew
steadily during the 1870s and 1880s and absolutely exploded by the 1890s. On the eve o f the
Civil War, southerners cut only about half a billion board feet o f longleaf pine a year. By 1870
southern lumber production had surpassed output on the eve o f the Civil War. In 1875 southern
lumber production in the eight longleaf pine states reached one and a half billion board feet and
in 1880 that figure reached two billion. Even with this rapid rise, the South in 1880 still
contained twice as much pine timber as the rest of the nation. The number of southern saw mills
grew correspondingly from 3,969 in 1860 to 5,304 in 1880. But these mills possessed a small
cutting capacity and only modest timber cutting was required to supply them. During the 1880s,
as the large northern companies pushed headstrong into the region, not only did the size o f the
property holdings swell, but the mills grew larger and, unlike the earlier southern mills, which
were dismantled and moved to the timber, remained in place while the logs were transported to
them. Companies like the Georgia Land and Lumber Company, which controlled between
300,000 and 400,000 acres o f choice pine land in the early 1880s, came to dominate production.

51 By the late nineteenth century, most mills were located as near as possible to the
timber supply. The expansion o f rail lines and the rise o f large scale lumber operations worked
together. Historian Jeff Drobney explains that because only well-financed, large companies
could afford spur lines, and large timber tracts were required to ensure enough timber to make
the lines profitable, timber land became concentrated in fewer hands. Plus, the freedom to move
away from the river courses enabled the heavily capitalized companies to grow and operate as
year-round businesses, unhampered by freezing waterways. Williams, Americans and Their
Forests. 253,280. Ida Belle Williams, History of Tift Countv (Macon, GA: The J. W. Burke
Company, 1948), 44. Carswell, Holmesteading. 98-99; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers.
74. C. Clark, Florida Trade Tokens. 2-3; R. D. Forbes, “The Passing o f the Piney Woods,”
American Forestry. 29 (March 1923): 135.
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Such businesses prized the region’s unspoiled longleaf belt. Its large pines were of common age
and size and perfect for harvesting. In addition, the level ground made transportation out o f the
forest relatively easy. With these larger companies in place, the South’s lumber output grew
exponentially. In 1870 the South produced eleven percent o f the nation’s timber. By 1910 that
amount had grown to forty-five percent.52
The lumber industry’s southward migration in the late nineteenth century pushed the
turpentine industry ahead o f it. The same desire for cheap accessible pine land that attracted
northern lumber men also interested turpentiners. The two businesses were not, however, at first
viewed as compatible. As historian Thomas D. Clark observes, lumber men and turpentiners had
the same relationship in the southern pine forest that cattlemen and sheep herders had on the
western prairie. Lumber companies and consumers incorrectly believed that turpentined timber
made an inferior grade o f lumber, so lumber men and turpentiners did not use the same timber
and competed with each other for tracts. Because the lumber producers usually had better access
to capital than the turpentiners, they could squeeze the naval stores operators out of areas where
timber stands became scarce.53
Declining available pine acreage, especially near transportation lines, caused timber
costs to rise. In April 1893 Savannah naval stores factor James Carson complained that, despite
the decrease in the price o f provisions, turpentine cost more to make than it had in the 1880s. He
52 W. G. Wahlenberg, Longleaf Pine: Its Use. Ecology. Regeneration. Protection.
Growth, and Management. (Washington, DC: Charles Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1946),
8; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 25; Gavin Wright, Old South. New South:
Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986),
161; Clark, Greening o f the South. 15, 25, 157-160; Thomas F. Armstrong, “The Transformation
of Work: Turpentine Workers in Coastal Georgia, 1865-1901,” Labor History 25 (Fall 1984):
519; Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 238; Ayers, Promise of the New South. 125;
Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 113.
53 Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current
Problems o f the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. Diss., University o f North
Carolina, 1942), 94-95; Clark, Greening o f the South. 23.
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explained that. By the late 1890s the cost o f leasing turpentine tracts was also on the rise, from
$100 to $200 per crop (10,000 boxes) in 1896 to around $500 in 1899. Producers had moved
stills a greater distance from transportation sources to ease the expense of hauling the gum out o f
the woods, but as the forests disappeared, production continued to move further away from the
still. Consequently the cost o f hauling increased. In 1896 The Northern Lumberman estimated
that producers required $5,000 for a still, barrels, advances on labor, rent, houses, sheds, tools,
wagons, and mules. To operate a single crop for four years required $2,808.50, much o f which
went to labor costs. A twenty-crop operation, a large turpentine business by any standard, would
therefore require $50,000 and would produce 120,000 gallons o f turpentine and 12,000 barrels o f
rosin, which would bring $60,000 for a profit o f just $ 10,000 over four years.54 The article
reported that “profits are not large enough to attract any except men who have been brought up in
the business and know no other.”55
It does in fact appear that North Carolina turpentiners and their descendants dominated
the industry throughout the South in the late nineteenth century. Their relocation to other
southern states predated the Civil War. In 1860 only three o f the eighteen producers in Georgia
had been bom in that state and, o f these three, two were sons o f North Carolinians. O f the
remaining fifteen, however, more than half came from Virginia and probably had little
knowledge o f the naval stores industry. By 1880, immigrants from the old turpentine region

54 The practice o f setting lease prices according to the number o f years a stand had been
worked continued. A Lexington County, South Carolina timber owner leased his trees for
turpentining by the year. Beginning in 1895 he leased virgin boxes for $200 per crop for the
year. The second year the crop rented for $100 and the year after that for $50. Michael David
Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern Turpentine Industry, 19001930,” (Ph.D. diss., The University o f Florida, 1996), 61; Lease for boxes, 14 January 1895,
Belton Decator Clark Papers, The South Caroliniana Library, University o f South Carolina; John
Avery Gere Carson to Editor Morning News. 17 April 1893, Carson Papers; “Turpentine
Orchards.”
55 “Turpentine Orchards.”
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continued to dominate turpentine production in Wiregrass, Georgia. Seventy-three percent came
from North Carolina and fifteen percent from Virginia. Moreover, the newly transplanted
Georgia turpentiners shared many similarities with those still in North Carolina. Most were
family men in their thirties and forties and many had other occupations such as merchants,
factors, and lumber cutters.56
An analysis o f individual turpentine producers reveals that not only did the majority
originate from the turpentine area o f North Carolina, but that many pioneered the development of
a middle class business community in the previously sparsely settled southern pine region. The
Peacock brothers were such men. They helped introduce the naval stores industry in southcentral Georgia and their children became early members of the piney wood South’s town-based
middle class by opening factorage houses, banks, and helping to found towns. Albert Peacock,
one of the first North Carolinians to come to Georgia as a turpentiner, was bom in 1826 in
Wayne County, North Carolina. Peacock married Virginia O’Berry o f Winfield, Virginia, in
1859 and soon afterward the couple moved to south Georgia. They first settled in Burnt Fort,
near the present town o f Folkston and the same area where Dr. Benjamin Williams, a turpentiner
from Greene County, North Carolina, settled a few years earlier. Here Peacock began operating
one of the first turpentine distilleries in the state. Although he found adequate timber in the
region, the river was often unreliable and prevented him from shipping his product to Brunswick.
At the beginning of the Civil War, Peacock joined the Georgia forces and sent his wife and their
young son to Suffolk, Virginia, where she soon died. In 1866 Albert married Ely Jane Wooten of
Whiteville, North Carolina, who was twenty years his junior. Between 1867 and 1889 they had

56 O f the remaining fifteen, more than half came from Virginia. They probably
represented naval stores producers who began the business in the Old Dominion around 1840 but
moved southward into Georgia as the pines in their home state disappeared. Dobson and Doyon,
“Expansion o f the Pine Oleoresin Industry in Georgia,” 48; Wetherington, New South Comes to
Wiregrass Georgia. 116-117; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 10; P. L. Buttrick,
“Commercial Uses o f Longleaf Pine.” American Forestry. 21 (September 1915): 905.
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eight children, seven o f whom lived to adulthood. With the expansion o f rail lines through south
Georgia, Peacock moved back there in 1875 with his rapidly growing new family. He began a
turpentine operation near the town o f Eastman. When his oldest child was eleven he again
moved the family to Cochran, Georgia, about twenty miles northeast o f Eastman, where his
children would have better access to education. Here Peacock died in 1890.57
Albert’s brother Peter Lewis Peacock arrived in Georgia in 1873. Bom in North
Carolina in 1834, he attended Wake Forest College from 1856 to 1858 and later fought in the
Confederate Army. In 1873 he and another man purchased a large tract o f forest land near
Cochran, Georgia, where they began a turpentine operation. They also built a horse track which
wound through the pine woods and held races. Peter excelled in the turpentine business,
progressing from producer to factor with the establishment o f the Peacock-Hunt Naval Stores
Company in Savannah. Another Peacock brother joined Albert and Peter in Georgia in 1881 and
although the brother does not appear to have entered the turpentine business, his son went to
work for Peacock-Hunt.58
The other Peacock children joined the New South’s growing middle class. Albert’s son
Zebulan Vance Peacock, bom in 1873, attended college in Georgia before organizing the first
bank in Baxley, Georgia, the First National Bank in Cockran, and becoming president of the First
National Bank o f Hawkinsville after the turn o f the century. He served as state representative
and senator and sat on the Hawkinsville board o f education. Peter’s daughter, Virginia Peacock,
bom in 1871 and Zebulan Vance Peacock’s cousin, married John Harris, who became a partner
in the family factorage business. Harris moved to Jacksonville, Florida, where he organized
Flynn, Harris, Bullard Company, Naval Stores Factor and served a director o f the Atlantic

57 Harris, History o f Pulaski and Blecklev Counties. 574-576.
58 Ibid., 582-585.
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National Bank o f Jacksonville. Peter’s son John attended the University o f Virginia and
graduated with honors from The Johns Hopkins University Medical School. Dr. Peacock
returned to Cockran and served as the president of the First National Bank o f Cockran, president
of the chamber o f Commerce, mayor o f the town and, school board member.39
Other turpentine producers also helped the region develop economically. North
Carolinian Arthur T. Wiggs, bom in Goldsboro in 1839, came to Pulaski County, Georgia, with
Peter Peacock and J. E. Obery. He settled first in the town o f Chauncy before finally moving to
the community o f Dubois. There he began acquiring farm and turpentine lands and, with his
partner J. W. Hunt, established the firm Hunt and Wiggs, which ran a turpentine still, cotton gin,
and store. The Bush Brothers of Bladen County, North Carolina, also sought the opportunities
offered in south Georgia’s growing economy. Owen Bush, bom in 1841, and his brother
Madison, bom in 1842, both served in the Confederate Army and entered into business for
themselves afterwards. In 1876 Madison moved to Towns, Georgia, in Wheeler County, where
he worked as a naval stores manufacturer and merchant. In 1878 his brother Owen moved to
Chauncy, Georgia, about twenty miles from Towns, where he manufactured turpentine and
entered general merchandising. In September 1883 he was elected the first mayor o f Chauncy.60
Yet another North Carolinian, Robert T. Gupton, moved with his wife Dolly and their
daughter to south Georgia in 1899. At first he leased timber but later bought his own tracts.
However his turpentine represented only a portion of his business, R. T. Gupton, Manufacturer
of Naval Stores, Dealer in Dry Goods, Fine Shoes, General Merchandise. Gupton’s brother-in-

59 Ibid., 576-577, 586, 589-591.
60 Ibid., 687; Biographical Souvenir. 127-128.
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law operated the turpentine operation’s commissary and another brother-in-law served as the
distiller.61
Not all Georgia turpentiners came from North Carolina. Edward P. Rentz, an Alabamian
bom in 1862, was a partner in an expansive naval stores operation by the time he was thirty. His
business holdings spread across parts o f Georgia’s Emanuel and Montgomery Counties, and
annually produced three thousand barrels o f spirits and eleven thousand barrels o f rosin. Seizing
the opportunity to acquire one of the last substantial virgin pine stands in the region, he
purchased a large tract in neighboring Laurence County and established a timber and turpentine
camp named Rentz. To reduce the cost of transporting lumber and naval stores to the nearby
town of Dillon, he constructed a rail line that, in the early twentieth century, he extended to
Eastman, about thirty miles to the southeast.62
By the late 1890s, producers in areas o f South Carolina and Georgia, where the pine
forests were entering decline just as they had earlier in North Carolina, relocated to regions
where turpentine was less extensive and the pine forest more plentiful. Georgia was not the final
destination o f all North Carolina transplants. Elliott E. Edge, raised south o f Fayetteville, tired
of working for others in the North Carolina turpentine industry and moved with his wife to
Georgia to begin a business for himself. After only a short stay in Georgia he sought out the less
exploited pine forests in Lake County, Florida, midway down the peninsula. There, in 1893, he
formed Edge Mercantile Company, which included a turpentine business, a sawmill, and a citrus
orchard. Edge raised enough capital to finance partnerships with men who knew the turpentine
61 A little is known about how the Guptons lived. The family made their home in a Civil
War-era house to which they added a separate room, connected to the rest o f the house by the
front porch, which served as a school room for their daughters. Two servants, a couple named
Abe and Susan Mason who lived in separate quarters behind the house, tended to the Guptons.
Susan kept the house and Abe cared for the yard and tended to the horses and mules used in the
turpentine operation. Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 198-199.
62 Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 60.
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business but lacked the means to begin their own operation. His partners ran the operations
while Edge took care o f marketing the product Edge’s operation lasted well into the twentieth
century. In 1925, he entered a partnership with his son-in-law who carried the business into the
1940s in S t John County, Florida. In 1899, a Mr. Both and Mr. Decker o f Columbia, South
Carolina, began a five or six thousand acre operation near South Lake in Lake County. They
hauled their turpentine for three miles to the lake and brought it by boat to the railroad station at
Clermont Duncan Wilks, a South Carolina native who came to Holmes County, Florida seeking
its pines, was so taken with the area’s opportunity for turpentining that in 1898 he named the
little community that developed on the county’s west edge Prosperity. Others, like the Carr
brothers who settled in Bond, Mississippi came from Georgia after the timber there grew scarce.
In the fall 1896 one brother came ahead and leased timber for three years. The following spring
the other brothers arrived in Mississippi with their equipment and twenty-six black workers. The
Carrs worked ten or eleven crops as long as the timber in the region lasted and when leases were
no longer available near Bond, they moved to a new area.63
The experience of Hervey Evans who, at the age of thirty-seven, moved from North
Carolina to Florida, reveals much about the experiences o f men who came south to enter the
naval stores business. When Evans married businessman John McNair’s daughter Martha,
McNair brought Evans into his business. In July 1899, after the wedding, Evans left North
Carolina for Florida to oversee McNair’s turpentine business in Fairfield, about fifteen miles
south o f Gainesville, and prepare for his new wife to join him. Before making the trip Evans
worried about health risks o f Florida’s climate but was assured by a doctor that living there
would not be hazardous. When Evans arrived he thought the region to be the prettiest he had
63 Harvey, “Maguire Bom into Turpentine Family,” 8-9; Maguire interview, St.
Augustine Historical Society, S t Augustine, FL; Maguire interview, author; Kennedy, History of
Lake Countv Florida. 101: Carswell. Holmesteading. 99: Hickman. Mississippi Harvest. 131132.
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ever seen; the undulating land covered with beautiful forests which, possessing no undergrowth,
allowed clear visibility for long distances. But he found the weather hotter and more debilitating
than he was accustomed to in North Carolina. After more than a week, he complained that
Florida had more gnats, frogs, fleas, and mosquitoes as well. He was also surprised at how
frequently it rained and how little business activity other than turpentining, lumbering, and
phosphate mining took place in the state. He expressed amazement at the large number o f
abandoned and dilapidated houses that dotted the countryside, no doubt the result of the transient
nature o f Florida’s principle industries. The region’s population likewise failed to impress
Evans. “All the people I have met are ignorant, indolent, and clever.. . , ” he reported.64
His house did little to lift his spirits o r arouse his wife’s anticipation about joining her
husband in Florida. It sat on a large treeless tract which provided a full view o f the turpentine
operation’s still, commissary, and workers’ quarters. Nine windows provided ventilation for the
house’s five small rooms and kitchen. Its three-foot wide hallway probably did not give adequate
cross breeze to cool a house that sat fully exposed to the sun. Not only was the house likely hot,
but also filled with vermin. Its sparse furnishings included two beds, a dinning table, five chairs,
a rocker, and mosquito nets. Hogs, chickens, and a cow provided meat, eggs, and milk. The well
water was “awful” but Evans had a barrel o f drinking water brought from Gainesville once a
week and he planned to begin having ice brought in as well. Barreled water and ice represented
the few minor luxuries available in only portions of the deep South’s pine forests. As Evans’
experience demonstrates, the turpentiners who moved into Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and
Mississippi found themselves more isolated, their living conditions more primitive, and the

64 “Inventory,” 16, Hervey Evans to Mattie McNair, 5 June 1899, Hervey Evans to
Mattie McNair Evans, 13 July 1899,30 July 1899, and 16 August 1899, Hervey Evans to Susan
Murphy Evans, 22 July 1899, Patterson Papers.
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climate less comfortable than what they were accustomed to in North Carolina. The relocation,
for many, represented nothing short of a move to the frontier.65
Some men moved to the piney woods not to begin turpentine operations but to establish
support businesses for these enterprises. Men such as William A. Rough, who was bom in Ohio
in 18S6, found a great need for barrels in the South. When he arrived in Charleston at age
sixteen to sell peach trees, he noticed a demand for rice barrels in the port city. Familiar with the
coopering business in which his family in Ohio engaged, he soon found local investors to help
him start the Palmer Manufacturing Company. As the naval stores industry pushed southward
out of North Carolina, in 1883 he began a turpentine barrel factory at Hartford, Georgia in
Pulaski County. In 1889 he moved to Macon, where he and his brother-in-law established the
Macon Cooperage Company, which became one o f the largest cooperage plants in the Southeast
Other businesses such as the Council Tool Company in North Carolina and Blount Turpentine
Tool Company in Quitman, Georgia manufactured the instruments turpentiners required for their
work. Another man who became a naval stores factor immediately following the war had also
experimented with other emerging industries in the South before the Civil War. In the late
antebellum period John Judge and his partner tried and failed to establish a paper mill in
Wilmington. However, his sock and yam factory in Columbia, South Carolina succeeded in
making socks for the Confederate soldiers.66
Southern businessmen involved in the late-nineteenth-century turpentine industry
differed from those employed by the lumber companies in that they were only indirectly

65 Hervey Evans to Mattie McNair Evans, 21 July 1899 and 30 July 1899, Hervey Evans
to Augusta Evans Currie, 31 July 1899, Patterson Papers.
66 Harris, History o f Pulaski and Blecklcv Counties. 580-581; Martha Green Hayes,
“General History o f the Turpentine Industry,” Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 13; Collection
Description, John Judge Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University o f North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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dependent on the larger and more developed northern economy. The lumber industry’s growth in
the South after 1880 supports C. Vann Woodward’s description o f the South as a colonial
economy. Northern investors typically owned the companies whose regional operations
employed local men as no more than middle managers. These managers, representative of
Woodward’s new class o f southern businessmen, served as agents, retainers, and executives, but
it was the northern owners who benefited from better capitalization and technical sources who
were the principal figures in the operations. Turpentiners, on the other hand, were typically
native southerners who operated independently o f a larger company, financed their operations
through southern-owned factorage houses, and purchased barrels and turpentining tools made in
the South. Yet, naval stores men were connected to the northern economy in important ways. In
many cases the operating capital they obtained through the factors came from northern financiers
and northern firms bought the majority o f naval stores which they used to manufacture finished
products.67
Men involved in all areas of the turpentine business, as well as with the lumber
companies with whom they competed for timber, revolutionized the piney woods economies in
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi. Attracted by the plentiful and inexpensive land
which the railroad made accessible, these entrepreneurs moved land-use practices in isolated
areas o f the southern states closer toward a market orientation. Michael Williams explains that
the railroads, which enabled the naval stores business’s expansion into the area, “introduced
industry and industrial ways to remote and backward rural areas in what was a conservative
society and culture that had not altered radically for nearly two centuries.”68 New South
developers represented a shift in the region’s power from the independent subsistence farmer

67 Woodward, Origins o f the New South. 114-117, 292, 317.
68 Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 253.
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antebellum planter to the postbellum businessman. The railroad and timber industries were not
integrated into the area’s traditional economy and therefore represented an invasion o f both the
forest and economic life.69 Not only did they help subvert the independent Wiregrass farmers
dominant position, but they spurred the region’s shift toward a more market-oriented agricultural
economy. In her socioeconomic study of six counties in Wiregrass Georgia, for example, Ann
Patton Malone finds that in the 1880s and 1890s the railroads’, lumber companies’, and
turpentine operators’ infusion o f capital, technology, and a wage-labor system challenged the
area’s largely self-contained economy. Bypassed during the three decades preceding the Civil
War by settlers seeking rich new cotton land, the typical Wiregrass farmer in the 1880s raised
subsistence levels of com, oats, sweet potatoes, and rice as well as grazed cattle, hogs, and sheep
on the open range. Only nine percent of farmers raised cotton. By 1880, however, eighty-nine
percent o f farmers planted cotton and raised only half the amount of livestock as in 1850.70
69 Mark Wetherington describes the introduction of these new businesses, as well as the
growth of cotton cultivation, as a “process that destroyed a local, self-sufficient culture o f small
farmers and livestock herders and established in its place a society more commercial and marketoriented in outlook.” The naval stores industry, for instance, depended on the immigration of
outsiders, particularly North Carolinians. Using the example of the Sugar Hill community in
Georgia, he explains how the region changed. In 1860 this area was nothing more than a farming
community of families who depended on open-range herding. One fifth of the farmers owned
slaves, and blacks made up twenty-three percent o f the 151 residents. But, in 1880, he explains,
“the homogeneous, antebellum farming community had been fragmented, first by the
construction o f the Macon & Brunswick Railroad through the settlement in 1869 and
subsequently by the arrival o f newcomers.” The yeoman community was replaced by railroad
agents, clerks, carpenters, coppers, and laborers. Black turpentine laborers made up seventy
percent o f the population. He argues that such post-war invaders as “railroad construction, inmigration, industrialization, town growth, and community farming—shattered the sense o f
community and ‘republican simplicity’ that had existed during the antebellum years.”
Wetherington, New' South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia, xviii, xxii, 46, 116-117, 264-265; David
L. Carlton, “The Revolution from Above: The National Market and the Beginnings o f
Industrialization in North Carolina,” The Journal o f American History 77 (September 1990):
446-447; Mart A. Stewart, “What Nature Suffers to Groe:” Life. Labor, and Landscape on the
Georgia Coast. 1680-1920 (Athens: The University o f Georgia Press, 1996), 207,211.
70 The six counties in the study are Irwin, Berrier, Coffee, Colquitt, Wilcox, and Worth.
Malone concludes that only a few o f the native Wiregrass residents became involved in the new
industrial development and that most did not benefit substantially from the area’s economic
transformation. Ann Patton Malone, “Piney Woods Farmers of South Georgia, 1850-1900:
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An analysis o f state naval store production statistics reveals how rapidly the industry
moved into these relatively economically undeveloped areas. When naval stores production
resumed following the Civil War, North Carolinians held their dominant position in the industry,
operating more turpentining establishments with a higher product value than all other naval
stores-producing states—South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi—combined
(fig. 5.4). By 1880, however, both the disappearance o f the longleaf pine in the older turpentine
areas o f North Carolina and the spread o f railroad lines, especially in Georgia, had pushed
production southward. South Carolina, at this time, replaced North Carolina as the industry
leader, producing naval stores valued at nearly $1,900,000. North Carolina manufactured
turpentine valued at just over $1,750,000, a 25-percent drop from its 1870 production, and
Georgia made $1,455,739, an impressive 1500-percent rise in production over the previous
decade. The other producing states’ combined product was valued at nearly $765,000.
Throughout the 1880s the naval stores industry continued its movement South so that by 1890
Georgia lead the business, its manufactured value o f $4,242,255 representing over half of the
total United States production. North Carolina ranked second with $1,705,833 worth and South
Carolina, which only ten years earlier had ranked first, dropped to third place with $1,524,100.
The other three producing states combined made just over $600,000 worth. Georgia maintained
its leading position during the 1890s, nearly doubling its production value by the turn of the
century. Florida, however, with an astonishing industry growth of nearly 3400-percent from
$191,859 in 1890 to $6,469,605 in 1900, ran a close second and within the next ten years
overtook Georgia. Alabama, which experienced a similarly impressive growth in 1890s, ranked
third with a value o f $2,033,705. Mississippi was fourth with $1,772,435; North Carolina fifth
with $1,055,695; and South Carolina, which just twenty years earlier had lead the industry,
Jeffersonian Yeomen in an Age of Expanding Commercialism,” Agricultural History. 60 (Fall
1986): 56, 59-60, 81, 83.
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ranked second to last after Louisiana, which for the first time since the war reported production.
This phenomenally rapid shift southward at the end o f the nineteenth century resulted from the
culmination o f three influences—forest degradation, railroad expansion, (both o f which had
begun in the late antebellum period), and competition with the lumber industry for pine acreage,
which accelerated the turpentiners’ movement. As forests disappeared, a trend started by the
turpentiners and intensified by the lumber companies’ widespread southern logging activities,
naval stores producers used the newly constructed railroads to relocate to areas where
competition was not yet so intense.71
The naval stores industry’s southward movement influenced activity at southern ports.
Wilmington, North Carolina had been North America’s principal naval stores port from the
colonial period to the late nineteenth century. As the industry pushed into South Carolina,
Charleston rose in importance, but it never surpassed Wilmington’s naval stores volume. The
naval stores industry quickly exhausted South Carolina’s pines and turpentining there began to
decline shortly after 1880. The volume of naval stores exported through the port at Charleston
illustrates South Carolina’s rapid rise and fall as a naval stores producer. In 1865/1866 3,000
packages of naval stores (one package being either a cask of spirits or a barrel of rosin or gum)
passed through Charleston. Five years later the volume reached 90,000 and rose to 366,000 by
1882/1883. But as naval stores production declined in South Carolina, just as it had in North
Carolina, Charleston’s importance in the trade faded. From its high in the early 1880s,
Charleston naval stores exports declined to 200,000 in 1885/1886, 81,000 in 1895/1896 and
20,000 in 1900/1901. In fact, industry observer Thomas Gamble explained in the 1920s, South

71 The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry o f the United States. 494, 503, 508, 538, 556,
569; Report on the Manufactures o f the United States at the Tenth Census. 89, 103, 106, 141,
161, 174; Report on Manufacturing Industries in the United States at the Eleventh Census, part 1,
308-309; Manufactures. 1905. part 3, 650.
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Carolina represented merely a way station for North Carolina turpentiners who eventually ended
up in Georgia.72
As production continued to move southward, Savannah saw an increase in trade and in
1882 its naval stores volume surpassed Wilmington’s.73 In fact Wilmington’s decline was so
rapid (Fig 5.7) that in 1891 Garden and Forest magazine reported that “Wilmington, which was
once the most important shipping-point in the world for naval stores and the principal shippingpoint for southern hard pine, has now lost entirely its commercial importance as a point of
distribution for forest-products, the North Carolina Pine-forests being no longer a considerable or
even an important factor in the country’s supply.”74 The 1882/1883 season Savannah handled
naval stores worth $4 million, representing a six hundred percent rise over the previous eight
years. In 1891 Savannah’s naval stores volume reached one million barrels. By 1896/1897 the

72 After the war, Fayetteville resumed its role as North Carolina’s inland naval stores
marketing center. A traveler found that post-war Fayetteville seemed to serve more as a business
center for the surrounding countryside than as a place of residence. John R. Dennett, who
traveled through the South one year after the war observed that “the chief business of
Fayetteville is the shipment o f tar, rosin, and spirits of turpentine down the river to Wilmington,
and the sale of manufactured goods to the farmers around about.” To Dennett it appeared “to be
a busy and thriving town.” John Richard Dennett, The South As It Is. 1865-1866. (reprint; Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 174-175; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 184;
Dwight Wilson interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical
Society, St. Augustine, FL; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 9, 13-14; Richard C. Davis,
ed. Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores;” Thomas Gamble, “Charleston’s Story as a Naval
Stores Emporium,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed.
Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 35-36.
73 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 13-14.
74 C. G. Pringle, “Waste in the Turpentine Industry,” Garden and Forest. 4 (4 February
1891): 50; For figures related to late nineteenth-century naval stores exports from Wilmington
and United States exports o f turpentine and rosin see Appendix A.
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Exports of Rosin and Turpentine from Wilmington, NC
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Figure 5.7. Exports of Rosin and Turpentine from Wilmington, NC, 1873-1893
W. W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products o f Eastern North Carolina (Raleigh:
North Carolina Geological Survey, 1894), 81.

port of Savannah handled 1.6 million barrels o f naval stores, the largest volume ever handled by
any port in the industry’s history.73 And in 1900 the port’s naval stores yards were said to
contain barrels “as far as the eye could see.”76
The Florida naval stores industry’s growth, like Georgia’s, was reflected in the increased
traffic of the state’s ports. Jacksonville saw a significant rise in activity, but the port at
Femandina, just north of Jacksonville, handled the majority o f Florida’s early naval stores

751. James Pikl, Jr., A History of Georgia Forestry (Athens: Bureau o f Business and
Economic Research, The University of Georgia, 1966), 8.
76 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 14; Thomas Gamble, “Savannah as a Naval
Stores Port, 1875-1920,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption.
ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 60-61.
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exports. Whereas Jacksonville exported $83,366 o f lumber and $2,249 o f naval stores in 1880;
the same year Femandina handled $129,944 o f lumber and $17,522 o f naval stores. By the end
of the nineteenth century, however, trade was shifting toward Jacksonville, which became the
major one. Jacksonville’s growth began during the 1850s when its population grew four fold—
from five hundred to two thousand people. During the same decade, Jacksonville began to gain
importance in the lumber industry. In 1850 seven sawmills, mostly northern-owned, operated on
the St. Johns River about a mile from the waterfront. By the eve o f the Civil War, after *
completion o f a railroad from Jacksonville to Lake City, which lay to the south-east in Columbia
County, the city became a link between Florida’s interior counties and the coastal market. Also,
weekly steamboat service between Jacksonville and Savannah began. But it was Jacksonville’s
growing importance as a railroad center after 1880 that increasingly attracted trade. During the
1880s, three important new lines ran through Jacksonville: the Savannah, Florida, Western
Railroad; the Jacksonville, Tampa, & Key West Railroad; and the Florida East Coast Railroad.
In the 1890s a fourth arrived when a lumber operator who ran a large mill at Fargo, Georgia,
about eight miles from the Florida line in Georgia’s southeastern comer, tired o f using a
primitive logging railroad to move his lumber, formed a partnership, and constructed a line from
Valdosta to Jacksonville. With a brief interruption caused by an 1888 yellow fever epidemic,
Jacksonville’s population grew steadily. By 1900, the population o f Duval County reached
39,733, a forty-eight percent increase in ten years. O f this population, 28,429 lived in
Jacksonville, which felt so confident about its growth and prosperity that, in 1900, it made an
unsuccessful move to become the state capital.77

77 A. Stuart Campbell and Alvin Cassel, The Foreign Trade o f Florida (Gainesville: The
University o f Florida, 1935): 28,41, 83; Pleasant Daniel Gold, History o f Duval Countv.
Including Early History o f East Florida (St. Augustine, FL: The Record Company, 1929), 123124,126, 178, 184, 196; William Thomas Cash, The Storv o f Florida, vol. 1 (New York: The
American Historical Society, Inc., 1938), 796-798.
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Pensacola handled the export trade for Florida’s western panhandle counties. Lumber
export values climbed from $934,993 in 1870 to $1,913,731 in 1880. The rise in naval stores
exports was even more impressive, from $300 to $15,751. The naval stores industry in Florida’s
western panhandle received a boost when the L&N Railroad completed its Pensacola and
Atlantic line across the panhandle in 1883, providing easy access to the port city. The town of
Chiply in Washington County, located between Pensacola and Tallahassee, served as that area’s
collection point for naval stores and achieved notoriety as the world’s largest inland shipping
center for these products. Pensacola served as the principal marketing and export center for the
Gulf coast area producers. From 1870 to 1900, Florida’s export values consistently rose in
relation to U. S. exports, largely because o f an increase in lumber and naval stores exports, much
of which left through Jacksonville. In 1870, Florida exports were valued at approximately
$1,346,000 or three-tenths percent of total U. S. exports. By 1880, the value had risen to
$3,347,000 or four-tenths percent o f the U. S. total. By the late 1890s the amounts jumped
substantially higher. In 1897 export values reached $11,400,000 and by 1900 $20,556,000 or 1.5
percent of U. S. exports.78
The naval stores industry recovered rapidly after the Civil War and resumed its
antebellum development patterns. The New South’s railroad building boom provided access to
more and more previously isolated tracts o f longleaf pine ju st as had the antebellum
transportation improvements in the Caroiinas. The old harvesting process, which dated back to
colonial times, persisted and, consequently, the destruction o f the turpentined timber stands
continued as well. These practices and their effect on the forest perpetuated the industry’s

78 Cedar Keys handled large quantities o f lumber and naval stores shipped from the
Peninsula’s northwest comer. Jerrell H. Shofher, “Negro Laborers and the Forest Industries in
Reconstruction Florida,’’ Journal o f Forest History 19 (October 1975): 185-186; Campbell and
Cassel, Foreign Trade o f Florida. 11,33; E. W. Carswell, “‘Naval Stores’ Industry Came to
Northwest Florida in 1883,” Pensacola News-Joumal file, Pensacola Historical Resource Center,
Pensacola, FL.
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transient nature, forcing turpentiners to move, not only out o f the Carolinas and into Georgia and
Florida, but throughout the pine forests o f Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana in search o f new
trees. Competition with the northern-owned and well-financed southern lumber industry, which
grew rapidly after the 1870s, forced turpentine operators to seek out the region’s increasingly
scarce timber supplies in more remote areas. Their efforts to keep ahead of the timber cutters
drove them southwards at a quicker pace than before the war. Throughout the industry’s
migration, North Carolinians and their descendants continued to dominate production. These
Carolina turpentiners pioneered a middle-class business community in the thinly settled pine
forests into which they introduced a more market-oriented economy. By the beginning of the
twentieth century, the transient naval stores men were well-established in south Georgia and
north Florida where the industry would remain centered. The turpentiners’ southward movement
was, however, but one o f the industry’s several features that continued after the Civil War.
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Chapter Six
Trapped in the Past:
The Naval Stores Industry’s Failure to Innovate

In the late nineeenth century, naval stores men, who represented the initial wave of
southern businessmen moving into the economically undeveloped piney woods South, were
unsuccessful in their efforts to modernize the turpentine industry. Between the Civil War and
1900, not just the southward migration of naval stores production, but two other o f the industry’s
most distinctive characteristics—reliance on factors and destructive practices—continued despite
both unintended changes in the marketing of other southern commodities, especially cotton, and
deliberate efforts to reform production methods. The role of factorage houses in turpentine
marketing and production rose as they led moderately successful efforts to improve naval stores
pricing methods, regularize product standards, and increase marketing efficiency. Though most
southerners accepted forest loss as the inevitable consequence of industry, by the 1890s, the
enormous timber depletion made it very clear that the naval stores business could not continue
for much longer without significant changes in manner gum was collected. Efforts by the naval
stores producers to alter these practices, however, failed completely and by the end of the
nineteenth century the industry conditions remained remarkably similar those o f its antebellum
past.
As the naval stores industry moved southward, factorage houses in the old turpentine
region o f the Carolinas lost business and new establishments appeared in the more southerly port
cities: Savannah, Brunswick, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans. Factors in such
ports as Wilmington and Charleston had to change their product focus or face certain financial
ruin. Sprunt and Son o f Wilmington, for example, in the 1870s began a transition from naval
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stores to cotton marketing that it completed by the late 1880s. At the end o f the century, the firm
controlled Wilmington’s cotton exports. In some cases the factors, ju st like many o f the
turpentiners, came from North Carolina. The Peacock family who moved to Georgia from North
Carolina in the 1870s established factorage houses in Savannah and Jacksonville. In 1876 Sprunt
opened one o f the most important houses in Brunswick, Georgia. After only three years in
business he sold out to A. V. Wood, also o f Wilmington. In 1883, the business was once again
bought out, this time by Downing, Buck, & Company and, in 1890, it became just the Downing
Company. By the early 1920s Downing Company remained the only factorage house in
Brunswick.1
Naval stores factors such as Downing grew increasingly powerful between the Civil War
and the turn o f the century, the reverse o f the development Harold Woodman describes in the
cotton trade during the same years. The decline of the cotton factor after the Civil War
represented a continuation o f a trend already underway in the 1850s. Transportation
improvements across the South during this decade made it possible for itinerant merchants to
gather together the product from individual growers in the inland crop-growing regions and to
send it to market. The merchants’ efforts made it easier for smaller growers to market their crops
and gave large producers an opportunity to sell theirs more quickly than if they had waited for
the bales to reach their factor in a port town and for the factor to find a buyer. However, the

1Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia of American Forest and Conservation History
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores;” Wallace Leigh Harris,
History of Pulaski and Blecklev Counties. Georgia. 1808-1956 (Macon, GA: The J. W. Burke
Company, 1957), 583-585, 589-591; C. Downing, “Brunswick as a Naval Stores Port and
Market,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas
Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 105; Robert J. Cain,
“Cotton for the Kaiser. James Sprunt, Contraband, and the Wilmington Vice-Consulate,” The
North Carolina Historical Review 74 (April 1997): 162-163.
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itinerant merchants worked in conjunction with the factors who continued ultimately to market
the crop. Nevertheless, the factors lost strength as the merchants gained it.2
Woodman identifies four determinants that encouraged the cotton factors’ continued
decline after the wan expansion o f the railroad network, emancipation, development of the
tenancy system, and the spread of the telegraph and later the telephone system into the South. As
rail lines spread across the South, factors began securing cotton shipments by financing local
merchants who bought as much of their area’s crop as possible and shipped it to the factor at
their port location. As the merchants’ business rose, they were able to separate themselves from
financial dependence on the factor and market the cotton directly to consumers or exporters.
Consequently, cotton marketing moved inland. As the South’s transportation improvements
enabled growers to get their supplies locally, they began to acquire their credit from local
sources. Sharecroppers needed to obtain their own supplies and the merchants provided the only
means to do so. These growers were required to market their cotton quickly to cover their debts.
Not only did they lack the financial ability to delay sale while a factor searched for the best
buyer, but it was cheaper to sell to a merchant and avoid the factor’s 2.5 percent commission.
The merchant also had the advantage over the factor of displaying ready-to-take-home
merchandise and, living in close enough proximity to production, of seeing that the cotton came
to them to be marketed. Technological improvements other than the railroad made this inland
marketing more feasible. Beginning in the early 1870s, powerful gin presses were constructed in
the interior which were capable of compressing cotton bales so tightly that they effectively
doubled the cotton-carrying capacity o f railroad cars. Also, the telegraph, transatlantic cable, and
later the telephone permitted inland merchants to keep abreast of moves in the cotton markets.

2 Harold D. Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the
Cotton Crop of the South. 1800-1925 (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1990), 8485,95.
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As general merchandisers, creditors, and often land holders, the South’s merchants replaced the
cotton factors to become the economic powers of the inland agricultural producing areas.3
But while the role o f the factor declined in cotton marketing, special features of naval
stores production required factors to continue serving as the financial and marketing agents for
turpentine producers into the 1930s. Economist Donald F. Martin lists five reasons why the
naval stores industry required factors. First, he argues, producers were relatively small and
found it too expensive to establish their own marketing organization. Second, by the late
nineteenth century, turpentiners were spread from North Carolina to Texas and thus located such
a considerable distance from the principal areas of consumption outside the south that they
required factors to sell to customers. Third, their products ranged widely in quality and required
grading by uniform standards which the factor performed. Fourth, producers lacked storage
facilities for their seasonal production and required the factorage houses’ port-side naval stores
yards. Finally, producers needed agents who were better informed than they were about
marketing conditions and procedures.4
Martin’s explanation appears inadequate because cotton growers faced strikingly similar
situations, and yet the factor became obsolete in the making o f their product. The principle
differences, which Martin fails to recognize, were the naval stores industry’s transient nature and
different labor system. Where cotton production could be relatively guaranteed to remain in the
local area, thus providing a stable business environment for merchants, the destructive turpentine
harvesting practices, which rendered the pines useless after several years, required that producers
continually search out ftesh stands. An operation might move only a few miles or a few hundred

3 Ibid., 96-97, 269-273, 282-285, 296-297, 301.
4 Donald Fraser Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems
of the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. Diss., University of North Carolina, 1942),
249-250.
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miles. Consequently, there was very little reason for a merchant to believe that local turpentiners
would remain his steady customers for longer than several years. However, factors located in
port cities could be relatively assured that turpentine producers, although located many miles
inland and not necessarily working in the same area each year, would use the rail lines to ship
their product to the factor’s location. Second, the industry’s unique post-war labor arrangement,
which will be discussed in the next chapter, left the largely black work force dependent on the
producers, not the local merchant, for supplies. Whereas tenant cotton farmers required the
services o f the merchant, the turpentine worker did not. Third, the turpentiner had little to offer
as collateral except his livestock and equipment. Merchants were not interested in securing loans
with pine land which after a few years o f turpentine work would be rendered virtually worthless.
Moreover, turpentiners commonly worked leased tracts, which could not be used for collateral.
For the same reason that merchants refused to finance producers, banks avoided them as well.
Emancipation and the improvements in transportation, which led to a shift in cotton marketing
away from factors, served to intensify the role of the factorage house in the production and
marketing o f naval stores.5
Because factorage houses had to take relatively unsecured risks with their clients, they
kept a careful watch over each producer’s activities and, through the last decades of the
nineteenth century, increased their control over the industry. They sold producers all equipment
and supplies, often on credit, and in many cases even leased them the timber tracts they worked.
Factors also provided the advances that producers required to support themselves during the
winter season, when work continued but no gum was harvested, to cover operating costs.6 In
5 A. Stuwart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blanchard, The Naval Stores
Industry (Gainesville: Bureau o f Economic and Business Research, College of Business
Administration, The University o f Florida, 1934), 13.
6 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 256; Herbert L. Kayton, interview by
Roy R. White, transcript, 7 October 1959, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 4; Davis,
Encyclopedia o f American Forest. 475.
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January 1900, for example, Hervey Evans complained that he was spending about $1000 a month
with no money coming in and his workers were busy cutting boxes, not harvesting gum. “It will
be two months before any thing will be coming in—it is all spend spend now.”7 As during the
antebellum years, factors tended to focus on one commodity. In 1888 one Savannah factor
explained that “we have too large a naval stores business to occupy our minds with cotton

”*

Factors stayed informed on labor, weather, and market conditions, anything that could affect
business, and remained in continuous contact with their clients regarding these matters. They
advised producers on leasing and purchasing timber as well as on matters relating to their
business operation policies. Because their enterprises depended on their clients’ success, factors
encouraged a good business environment, and sound decisions.9 In 1891 one Savannah factor
resigned as a member o f the Georgia Railroad commission’s Savannah branch when the
commission voted to allow a rate increase for naval stores and lumber that he believed would
“injure the causes o f the mill and naval stores men

” “As a naval stores factor,” he explained,

“I represent the producer to a certain extent and I do not care to remain in an association whose
president’s interests are inimical to my own.” 10
Although factors usually made a profit from each o f their clients, losses occasionally
occurred. It was a common practice to roll accounts over year after year, but when the factor

7 Hervey Evans to Susan Murphy Evans, 6 January 1900, Martha Virginia McNair Evans
Patterson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
8 John Avery Gere Carson to J. P. Williams, 10 September 1888, John Avery Gere
Carson Papers, Manuscripts Collection, Georgia Historical Society.
9 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 256; Kayton interview, 4; Davis,
Encyclopedia of American Forest 475.
10 John Avery Gere Carson to Savannah Branch, Southern Travelers’ Association, 30
May 1891, Carson Papers.
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sensed serious problems at an operation, he protected himself by taking possession o f the leases
or mortgage on the land, animals, and equipment He then sought another producer to take over
the operation. Factors ordinarily did not market naval stores directly to consumers. Rather, the
majority of their sales were to dealers who resold the products mostly to the industrial
manufacturers who ultimately used the goods.11
During the last three decades o f the nineteenth century, producers and factors, dependent
on each other for successful business, began efforts, not always jointly agreed upon, to improve
the naval stores market In 1874, a group of turpentiners met in Florence, South Carolina, to
organize the Turpentine Manufacturing Association in an effort to coordinate business policies
they hoped would improve the trade, which at the time was suffering from a recent economic
depression. Like the Grange, which addressed farmers’ needs, this association hoped to improve
the life of turpentine operators. Action was required, the producers argued, to protect themselves
and their factors from a “common calamity,” they then set out to identify the principal causes for
declining business. They complained that the world’s markets were “copiously supplied” with
turpentine. The high cost of marketing and transporting their produce also cut into profits. Not
only were the fees o f factors, railroads, and shipping lines excessively high, they complained, but
“the irregular manipulations of inspectors and weighers together with the impervious regulations
of the Chamber o f Commerce, do not comport with the constant decreasing price of produce.”
Finally, “the high rents, high labor and low prices for Turpentine are simply preposterous.”12
At the same meeting, organizers unanimously elected officers and adopted several
resolutions, including a promise to discharge all workers laboring on old and unprofitable boxes

11 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 256; Kayton interview, 4; Davis,
Encyclopedia o f American Forest. 475; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 13.
12“Turpentine Manufacture,” Marion. South Carolina Star. 15 July 1874, Darlington
County Historical Commission, Darlington, SC.
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and any other unneeded workers. This measure probably represented an effort to raise market
prices by reducing production. Members were to request rate reductions from transportation
lines and commission merchants as well as relaxed regulation by chambers o f commerce. Any
producers in the southern states not represented at the meeting were to organize themselves into
councils, elect officers, and report to the Florence association, which would furnish them with
information and instruction about the organization. Copies of the meeting proceedings were to
be sent for publication to the Charleston and Wilmington papers and local papers in South
Carolina.13
Most important, the Association recommended that producers and factors work together
since their interests were intertwined. Because of declining prices, producers were becoming
increasingly indebted which not only jeopardized their own business but threatened to bring the
factors down with them. They recommended that producers put themselves in the factors’ hands
and appealed to “the factors, transportation lines, and the good sense o f any party anywise [sic]
connected with the turpentine business to do their utmost in restoring life to its wasting
prosperity, in order to avert a pecuniary and commercial calamity to the whole country.. . . ”
Their success with this organization, the producers believed, was assured by their past
perseverance. “We belong not to any despondent or croaking class of men,” they declared,
“having heretofore bravely withstood the most ingenious machinations o f speculators,
irregularities o f weighers and inspectors, the reverses o f Yankeedom, the uncertainties of
negrodom, disease, disaster and almost death, yet in the face o f defeat many by perseverance and
energy have achieved splendid victories and established industry and economy in many wild and
desolate places.”14 The success o f this organization is uncertain because nothing is heard about it

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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again. Given the record o f cooperative schemes, however, the organization probably dissolved
quickly. Not only did the factors of this period lack the size and coordination to effectively
direct the market, but operators rarely adhered to their directives regarding production. Prices
fluctuated widely over time and, when they declined, producers often decided to reduce the
number o f boxes they would cut for the coming year. But an operator might plan to increase his
production instead, planning to profit from the other’s inactivity. Many o f his fellow producers,
however, had the same idea and overproduction usually continued. Also, because the association
was organized in northeastern South Carolina, an area which quickly passed from prominence in
turpentine production after the 1870s, its organizers would have either left the business or
scattered to other areas with fresh pines, making the group’s cohesion nearly impossible to
maintain. It is known that Henry L. Morris o f Timmonsville, South Carolina, one o f the leaders
of the turpentine producers meeting, later joined other Darlington County men who moved to the
Florida panhandle in the 1870s and 1880s to continue in the turpentine business.IS
When, in the late 1880s, factors initiated efforts to influence prices by controlling
production, they met with little more success than had the turpentine producers in the previous
decade. For much of the 1880s turpentine prices remained relatively steady, between 30.750 and
34.50 per gallon, although they did dip as low as 28.750 cents in the 1884/1885 season.
Moreover, rosin prices dropped so low that speculators, almost certain values could not go any
lower, were ordering thousands of barrels with the intention o f unloading them when prices rose.
However increasing production costs rendered the industry less and less profitable. In 1888
Savannah factors put out a circular asking producers to stop barreling their rosin. The factor’s
plan would help those who would lose profits from reduced handling and commission fees, but
benefit as the value o f their rosin stock rose. In the long run producers would also benefit from
15 Richard C. Cook, “The Forgotten Industry in Tar Heel State,” Naval Stores Review
(July 1967), 9; Horance F. Rudisill to author, 3 June 1996, letter in author’s files.
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the rise in prices, but in the immediate future take a loss by discarding, rather than selling their
rosin, which would have brought in low returns but returns nonetheless. It is uncertain what role
the factors’ program played in influencing market prices, but rosin values did indeed rise.
Between 1889 and 1892 prices rose to an average o f 38.50, but dropped in 1893 with the
depression o f that year to around 270.16
In February 1894, Savannah factors tried a more direct approach to reduce production;
they restricted capital advances to manufacturers. The factors feared that at the rate producers
were cutting boxes that year, by mid-March there would be ten percent more new boxes than the
year before, resulting in a glutted market of virgin turpentine and high grade rosin by late spring
at a time when prices were already depressed from the Panic o f 1893. From the factors’
perspective, production limits were necessary for two reasons: to prevent naval stores prices
from sinking more, further reducing the value o f their stock, and to help already-overdrawn
producers avoid further credit problems. Producers, however, saw the factors’ move as
strangulation and hoped to compensate for the lower prices by increasing their production of high
grade turpentine and rosin by chopping new boxes. But despite the factors’ efforts, turpentine
production continued to increase. By the last half o f the 1890s, the value of naval stores
production reached nearly $10 million with 2.5 million acres under harvest and nearly one
million acres o f virgin boxes begun each year.17
In their effort to compensate for the low prices, turpentiners continued to overproduce,
but since prices remained low, the business remained unprofitable. Conditions became so

16John Avery Gere Carson to J. P. Williams, 11 September 1888 and John Avery Gere
Carson to Editor Momine News. 17 April 1893, Carson Papers.
17John Avery Gere Carson to F. W. B., 6 February 1894, Carson Papers; ‘‘Naval Stores
History.’’ Naval Stores Review 100 (March/April 1990): 7; W. G. Wahlenberg, Loneleaf Pine: Its
Use. Ecology. Regeneration. Protection. Growth, and Management. (Washington, DC: Charles
Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1946), 18.
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desperate that producers agreed to work with factors to reduce the number o f boxes. As one
factor explained, “the factors and operators realizing that they were fast using up their best asset
(Virgin Pine Timber), without profit and without hope o f replacing same, determined to bring
about some united action that would put their business on a profitable basis once more.” Their
dramatic plan called for cutting only one-third the number o f boxes that producers cut for the
previous season, thus reducing the production o f fine turpentine and rosin by sixty-six percent.
By reducing the number of new boxes so dramatically, the plan was expected to cut overall
turpentine production in 1897 by twenty percent. Producers still had much of the current year’s
high grades at their camps, but, with the support of the factors, agreed no to ship it out at the low
prices. Even the few producers who worked using their own capital and “who are not
controlled,” were reportedly agreed to this plan. “For the first time factors and manufacturers are
united and in accord on this subject,” a factor explained.18
Their cooperative plan failed and prices dropped even lower than those o f 1893. By May
1897 they reached between 25.50 and 260.19 Persistent low prices and the continued reliance on
factors for operating capital drove out many small producers. The Northeastern Lumberman
reported that:

it looks as if this industry ought to give consistent independent work to every
unemployed man in the South, as if a man need only to buy a few acres of pine land at $2
to $3 an acre, or better yet, rent a tract for the purpose of ‘Turpentining’ it, as it is called,
and be sure o f making a good living for the next four years by tapping the trees all on his
own account; in other words, to be as independent as the small farmer who raises his
own crops. This was so once, but it is not the case now. Capital has been as busy with
turpentining as it has been with the other industries, and it is practically impossible for a
small owner to get even the price o f his labor by turpentining his own little tract. The
big producers set the pace, and there is no longer any chance for small operators.20
18 John Avery Gere Carson to J. P. Williamson, 21 September 1896, Carson Papers.
19 John Avery Gere Carson to Thomas Gamble, 8 May 1897, Carson Papers.
20 “Turpentine Orchards,” The Northeastern Lumberman. 22 August 1896, in Turpentine
Newsciipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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Whether initiated by producers or factors or through a cooperative effort by both, the
failure of their schemes to raise prices by reducing production was not an uncommon result.
Similar plans in other industries often yielded the same outcome. In general, the formation of
specialized business associations occurred most frequently among industries, such as
turpentining, in which the individual producers were evenly matched in manufacturing
capabilities. Turpentiners also displayed typical behavior in that their voluntary agreements to
reduce output tended to collapse during periods o f depression when producers commonly tried to
manufacture at full capacity to compensate for low prices. During such periods of economic
decline, it was usual for evenly matched firms to continue production. According to this fixedcost theory, Naomi Lamoreaux explains, “prices might hover indefinitely at a level too low to
enable firms to break even, but too high to compel them to shut down.”21 Thus, during the 1870s
and especially the 1890s, when low naval stores prices drove small producers out of the business,
medium- and small-sized operators either held steady or increased their production.22
Since attempts to reduce production failed, factors looked for more efficient ways to
handle and store turpentine to save both them and the producers money. As early as the late
1870s, railroads began using 3,500-gallon tanks, originally intended to store kerosene, to
transport turpentine, saving producers the cost of barrels and shipping them. In the 1890s the
factors in Savannah, whose port in the early 1880s had replaced Wilmington as the largest naval
stores exporter, began constructing a storage tank for their turpentine marketing. Their plan
involved a 12,700-barreI-capacity tank, which would cost SI0,300 and reduced the need for and

21 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business. 1895-1904
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 25, 27,45, 52.
^Although turpentine production declined by 6.3 percent between 1893 and 1894, from
1895 to 1898 output rose nearly 37 percent over that o f the depression year. Joseph B. Hosmer,
Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School o f Technology, 1948),
35.
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expense associated with barrels. Orders for turpentine could be either sold in barrels, which the
factor resold for 50 each and filled by an automatic system, or piped into a tanker waiting at the
wharf. When a producer brought in his turpentine, the factor would issue him a tank receipt for
the number o f barrels negotiable with the dealer upon payment o f all charges. The factor stored
the barrels in which the producers shipped their turpentine and opened a barrel account. Because
an increasing number o f barrels were machine made, and thus nearly identical, it was
unnecessary to keep track o f each barreFs original owner.23
Both factors and producers benefited from the tank. Not only did the tank lower costs,
but it made handling costs for producers more predictable. The cost o f storing turpentine in the
tank was fixed. Costs associated with turpentine leakage and the required cooperage to repair the
barrel, however, depended on what condition the barrel arrived to the factor. The average cost to
the producer for the factor to store a barrel of turpentine was to 36.50. Because o f leakage, the
cost rose in proportion to the length of time the barrel sat on the yard. However, the monthly
charge for storage in a tank was only 26.50—130 for storage, 12.50 for labor, 10 for storing the
empty barrel. The monthly revenue generated for the factor by the 12,700-barrel tank was
estimated at $1714.5—$1587.50 for storage of 635,000 at .250 per gallon and $127 for storing
127,000 empty barrels at 10 each.24
Not only did Savannah’s naval stores interests demonstrate innovation and the growing
efforts to limit production and improve marketing efficiency, but they also improved the pricing
structure and standards for naval stores products. Savannah’s control o f the naval stores trade

23 Franklin B. Hough, Report Upon Forestry, vol. I, (Washington, DC: United States
Department o f Agriculture, 1878), 139; John Avery Gere Carson to J. W. Blount, 11 May 1894,
Storage Tank descriptions and estimates in letter book 2, and Carson to G. F. Stahl, 19 June
1893, Carson Papers.
24 John Avery Gere Carson to J. W. Blount, 11 May 1894, Storage Tank descriptions and
estimates in letter book 2, and Carson to G. F. Stahl, 19 June 1893, Carson Papers.
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tightened as increasing amounts o f turpentine moved through the port. In 1874 the city’s only
daily paper began quoting rosin and turpentine prices. Only one factor specialized in naval
stores, although other commission merchants would handle any naval stores products sent to
them. The next year naval stores traders formed an informal association to maintain statistics on
the trade and post prices. In the next five years, naval stores traffic through Savannah exploded
and, by 1883, it was the busiest naval stores port in the world. To manage this increased trade,
the port’s naval stores factors founded the Savannah Naval Stores Exchange in July 1882, but the
next year amended the charter to create the Savannah Board of Trade which oversaw all the
port’s activity. Three factors and three brokers or exporters sat on the Board’s division that
handled naval stores. Board members served revolving terms so that every two months one
factor and one broker were replaced. Their duties included enforcing inspection regulations,
setting standards o f quality and grade, settling disputes among its members, promoting its
members’ interests, and expanding Savannah’s trade facilities. However, their most important
job was setting the daily price quotes. At the beginning of each morning, factors made offers and
the brokers placed bids. From these figures the quotation committee made up o f factors, brokers,
and exporters, arrived at a quoted price for the day and posted the market’s “tone:” strong, firm,
steady, quiet, weak, dull, etc. Savannah’s Board of Trade daily set the standard naval stores
prices for United States until 1950.25

25 Thomas Purse, “How the Savannah Board o f Trade Fixes Prices and Regulates the
Trade,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas
Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing Company, 1921), 56, Thomas Gamble,
“Savannah as a Naval Stores Port, 1875-1920,” in Naval Stores: History. Production.
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing
Company, 1921), 59-61; Davis, Encyclopedia of American Forest. 478-479; I. James PikI, Jr., A
History of Georgia Forestry (Athens: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, The
University o f Georgia, 1966), 8; Eldon Van Romaine, “Naval Stores, 1919-1939,” Naval Stores
Review 100 (July/August 1990): 10.
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In the absence o f national naval stores standards, the Savannah Board o f Trade made
efforts in the 1890s to institute more uniform industry product regulations than the chaotic, stateby-state system that then existed. In the late 1870s North Carolina and Florida had the most
extensive naval stores regulations. North Carolina’s standards differed little from its antebellum
requirements. Turpentine barrels had to weigh 280 pounds gross and all naval stores products
were to be free o f fraudulent mixtures. Barrels were to be well-made and o f specified
dimensions and well-hooped. North Carolina also required that barrels be branded with either an
“S” for soft or “H” for hard. South Carolina only asked that a barrel o f turpentine weigh 280
pounds gross and Georgia had few requirements of its own, it only asked that naval stores were
to be barreled “as in North Carolina.” Florida’s requirements were considerably more complex
than even North Carolina’s. In the Sunshine State, barrels were marked with either a “V” for
virgin gum, “D” for yellow dip, or “S” for scrape, and if the virgin or yellow dip was impure it
was to be marketed with either a “V” or “D” and the letter circled. Barrels were to be the same
size as those in North Carolina. Florida gave inspectors a number o f reasons to penalize
producers for inferior naval stores. If the dip and scrape contained burnt cinders, sand, chips,
straw, bark, or any other impurities, if virgin or yellow dip were mixed together or with scrape, if
it contained water or had been injured by long standing or leakage or if it was packaged in
unmarketable barrels, inspectors would order deductions. To remedy this confusing system
which resulted in product inconsistency, in 1894 the Savannah Board o f Trade established the
Office of Supervisor to ensure naval stores standards. The requirements set up by this office
applied only to naval stores leaving the port of Savannah. But as the most important exported of
these products, Savannah’s standards increasingly set the rule for the whole industry. When the
federal government established standards in the 1920s it would use Savannah’s .26
26 Hough, Report Upon Forestry. 139-140; Purse, “How the Savannah Board of Trade
Fixes Prices,” 56; “Savannah as a Naval Stores Port,” 59-61; Davis, Encyclopedia o f American
Forest 478-479; Pikl, History o f Georgia Forestry. 8.
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Although the marketing o f naval stores unproved in some respects during the late
nineteenth century, production methods, except for slight advancements in distilling, remained
essentially unchanged. There was one significant improvement to distilling after the Civil War,
the addition of water during the distilling process. Without water, gum begins to distill at 363°
F. Rosin, however, starts to decompose at 392° F, meaning that distillers, without the benefit of
temperature gauges, were required to regulate the still temperature within a 29° range by
listening to the sound o f the boiling gum and observing the rate o f spirits o f turpentine running
from the worm. But by adding water, distillers did not need to bring the still temperature so
dangerously high. Liquids boil when their vapor pressure equals or slightly exceeds the
atmospheric pressure. Water boils at 212° F., spirits o f turpentine at 313° F., and gum, which is
a combination o f spirits and rosin, at 363° F. However, when mixed together, water and gum
will boil when the sum o f their pressure equals the atmosphere vapor pressure. Thus the mixture
of water and gum allowed turpentine distillation at a temperature o f only 302° F. which not only
increased the yield and quality of the turpentine, but also provided a fine, light-colored rosin.27
After one-and-a-half hours o f distilling, the original water ran out and more needed to be added.
It was said that at this point the still had “gone to water.” After charging the still and heating the
gum enough to melt it, the distiller began the flow of a small stream o f water from the
condensing tank. Lower grade gum required more water to be added. The water continued to
flow into the still until the spirits stopped flowing from the worm.28

27 A.W. Schorger and H.S. Betts, The Naval Stores Industry (Wahington, DC: United
States Department o f Agriculture, 1915), 12-14.
28 Charles Mohr, Timber Pines o f the Southern United States (Washington, DC: United
States Department o f Agriculture, 1897), 70; Robson Dunwody, “Proper Methods o f Distillation
and Handling in the Production of Turpentine and Rosin,” in Naval Stores: History. Production.
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing & Printing
Company, 1921), 128; James Berthold Berry. Farm Woodlands (Yonkers-on Hudson, NY: World
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But whereas the addition o f water allowed for the production o f a somewhat higher grade
of spirits and rosin, distillers continued to face the challenges o f regulating the devices by the
most primitive o f methods, necessitating a clear understanding o f their limitations. Forester
Charles Mohr discovered that the average still in use in the 1890s had a capacity of about eight
hundred gallons, which could hold a charge o f twenty to twenty-five barrels of crude turpentine.
Mohr estimated that each still required about four thousand acres o f pine forest or twenty crops
to receive two charges a day during the gum-yielding months. At this rate such a still would
produce 120,000 gallons o f spirits and 2,800,000 pounds o f rosin in four years.29 The size of a
charge a distiller loaded in was determined by the character of the gum. Generally, newer gum
allowed for larger charges. When distilling virgin dip, the still operator could fill the still to
three-fourths o f its capacity, but for dip and scrape from boxes over four to five years old, onethird capacity was allowable. This limitation was a result o f the older dip and scrap’s tendency
to rise and foam into the still head where it could force its way out through the collar which
connected the worm head to the top o f the still body. Such a leak could result in a fire on the
platform which could easily consume the entire facility.30 Mohr observed that distilling “requires
care and experience to obtain largest quantities of rosin o f highest grade and to guard against
overheating.”31

Book Company, 1923), 344; A. David King, ID, interview by author, 14 June 1996, Georgia
Agrirama, Tifion, GA.
29 The term twenty or twenty-five barrel still referred to the still’s total capacity, not the
number a barrels in each charge. Mohr, Timber Pines o f the Southern United States. 69, 71;
Thomas D. Clark, The Greening o f the South: The Recovery o f Land and Forest (Lexington: The
University Press o f Kentucky, 1984), 22; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 27.
30 Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 27-28.
31 Mohr, Timber Pines o f the Southern United States. 70.
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Harvesting and distilling practices used after the war and into the early twentieth century
remained identical to those used during the antebellum period. Producers continued to instruct
their laborers to cut multiple boxes in the pine’s bases and to chip the faces wide and deep.
Conservation was never a consideration, only working one tract until it was exhausted and then
moving on to the next. The tools and equipment also remained the same. Boxing axes, hacks,
puller, dipper, scrapers, and stills were neither improved or replaced. This lack of advancement
was not an unusual characteristic of southern industry. In the cases o f lumber and textile
manufacture, both o f which employed the most up-to-date equipment, the technology was
developed outside the South. Gavin Wright characterizes southern industry as low-wage, lowskill, and employing not only imported technology, but usually imported machines. The South
did not develop an indigenous base o f mechanics and engineers who could develop the
technology required by the region.32 “It was a ‘country’ that was not large enough or strong
enough or cohesively organized enough to have its own technology, its own industrial standards,
specifications, techniques,” Wright maintains.33 Because the naval stores industry was almost
completely southern-owned and operated and had not existed outside the region since the
colonial era, the techniques remained stagnant.
Not surprisingly, the continued use of traditional turpentining practices produced the
same destructive results that they had in North Carolina before the war. To understand fully the
potential environmental devastation caused by the turpentine industry, a late nineteenth-century
observer argued, “it is only necessary to examine the condition of the Pine-forests in eastern
North Carolina, where the turpentine industry was first established and has thus been longest
32 “The Changing Situation in the Naval Stores Field,” address to members of the
Georgia Forestry Association, American Turpentine Farmers Association Papers, Georgia
Agrirama, Tifton GA; Gavin Wright, Old South. New South: Revolutions in the Southern
Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), 60-61, 173.
33 Wright, Old South. New South. 157.
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practiced, to realize the effect it has on our forests.”34 In the second half o f 1893, two
particularly powerful storms significantly damaged North Carolina turpentine orchards. One in
August harmed only abandoned orchards, but an October storm caused considerable damage to
ail trees, especially boxed pines. Severe damage was scattered across southeastern North
Carolina, but its force was not uniform, with the heaviest damage occurring in Columbus,
Bladen, Sampson, and Johnston Counties. Round timber survived surprisingly well, but boxed
pines tended to break at the box. Several thousand acres o f abandoned turpentine pines blew
down and most o f the timber was a total loss.35
Like the traditional harvesting methods, the folk practice of burning the forest also
continued. Each spring piney woods people fired the woods to kill pests and vermin, drive out
game, and encourage grass growth.36 One witness reported that when fires were set around the
turn of the century “huge clouds of smoke would rise skyward and, depending on the wind
direction, would come over our neighborhood for days.”37 As during the antebellum period,
southerners raked the pine straw and debris from the trees’ base so that fire would not damage
them. However, when these fires got out of control, they not only destroyed seeds and seedlings
but injured the older trees as well. In the long run, they interfered with reproduction and, if hot
enough to consume all vegetation, caused significant erosion.38 The South’s lower classes were

34 C. G. Pringle, “Waste in the Turpentine Industry,” Garden and Forest. 4 (4 February
1891): 50.

35 W. W. Ashe, The Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products o f Eastern North Carolina
(Raleigh: North Carolina Geological Survey, 1894), 92.
36 Clark, Greening o f the South. 7.
37 Erwin Duke Stephens, “Longleaf Pine Country,” 26 September 1984, Erwin Duke
Stephens Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
38 S. G. Thigpen, A Bov in Rural Mississippi and Other Stories (Picayune, MS: S. G.
Thigpen, 1966), 181; Stephens, “Longleaf Pine Country;” Clark, Greening of the South. 9.
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viewed in the late nineteenth centuiy as the leading culprits in forest burning. W. W. Ashe in
1893 maintained that “the danger and loss occasioned by fires in the forests is not sufficiently
understood by the class o f persons who are generally the cause of them.”39 The poorer piney
woods classes were not, however, the only ones burning the forest. Turpentine producers
continued the practice as well and exhibited a similarly stubborn persistence in burning. Because
their economic needs called for the practice and their cultural patterns encouraged its
continuation, it was a difficult task for the increasing number of professionally trained foresters
to end the burning.40
The combination o f destructive gum harvesting practices and negligent burning had the
same harmful effect on the southern pine forest that it did in the antebellum years. By 1860, the
pines around Washington, North Carolina were nearly exhausted. New Bern, however, saw a
flow o f naval stores from the region served by the Neuse for a few more years. But just after
production recovered following the war it soon began a decline and virtually ended by the 1880s.
Within ten years, eighty percent o f the small amount o f naval stores still produced in North
Carolina came from back-boxed trees. Whereas, in 1860 North Carolina produced 96.7 percent
of the naval stores in the U.S., in 1870 that percentage had dropped to 65.2; by 1880 it had fallen
to 29.9 and, in 1890, to 21.1.41
When forester W. W. Ashe surveyed eastern North Carolina’s forests in the early 1890s,
he found that “the distribution o f the pines and the respective area occupied by each in this State

39 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 91.
40 Clark, Greening o f the South. 10; Thomas Hansbrough, “Human Behavior and Forest
Fires,” in Southern Forests and Southern People, ed. Thomas Hansbrough (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 23-24.
41 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 76; Cook, “Forgotten Industry,” 9;
Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 160.
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has changed a great deal since the first exploration of the country.”42 Much o f the living longleaf
stands in the state consisted o f abandoned turpentine trees left to the mercy o f the wind and fire
and a small number o f round trees rapidly consumed by saw mills. As late as 1893, there were
718,000 acres o f abandoned turpentine orchards in North Carolina. The greatest majority of
these tracts were to be found in the Cape Fear Valley counties. Only 55,876 acres of round
longleaf pine remained, less than ten percent o f the area covered by abandoned turpentine trees,
down from the four to five million acres that grew in the state when turpentining first began to
boom in the 1840s, and about the same number o f trees put into turpentine production on a yearly
basis during the industry’s heyday. And just as late antebellum observers had reported, Ashe
found that the destroyed longleaf forests were more often replaced by thickets and other pine
species than by second-growth longleaf. The nature of the vegetation that replaced the pines
depended on the area’s soil composition. Eastern North Carolina possessed two different soil
types: level sandy loam soils and deep sandy soils, the latter located primarily in the sandhill
region. Loblolly and oak replaced the longleaf on the level soils, but only scrub oak and an
occasional loblolly grew in the sandhill. Whereas much of the former longleaf area came back in
loblolly, over 400,000 acres had grown up into what Ashe termed “wasteland.” He explained
that “owing to the grossest neglect, large portions of these forests have either been destroyed
entirely or reduced to such a condition that there is neither mill not turpentine timber on them ...
.” He predicted that the declining North Carolina turpentine production in the 1890s would soon
end forever because the remaining longleaf grew in such small and widely spaced bodies that
they were not worth the cost o f boxing and because the longleaf was not reproducing itself.
These forests were disappearing at the rate that lumber companies cut them. Ashe estimated that

42 Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 18.
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in 1880 there were over five billion board feet of marketable longleaf pine in North Carolina but
between then and the early 1890s, that amount had dropped by two billion board feet.43
By the 1890s, North Carolina’s southern neighbors could foresee a similar devastation.
In fact South Carolina entered an advanced stage o f depletion as early as the 1880s. The rapid
destruction o f that state’s longleafs was reflected in a pessimistic South Carolinian’s comment in
1884 that “business this year is uncommonly dull + the outlook anything but cheerful. Many
planters are forced into liquidation the area of new planting very small, + the turpentine business
almost at an end as the trees are skinned to death so our future is not rose-colored.”44 Even in
Georgia producers by the 1880s moved after exploiting the original acres they had come to
turpentine. In 1881 Joseph A. Backer & Company, which had begun turpentining land served by
the Brunswick and Albany Railroad, had already exhausted fourteen thousand acres and was then
working ten crops on about two thousand acres with twenty laborers.45
In states where turpentining remained vigorous, increases in production came at the
expense of younger and younger pines as the virgin stands disappeared. In an 1897 report
prepared for the Department of Agriculture’s new Division of Forestry, forester Charles Mohr
explained that turpentine orchards were commonly abandoned after four years because the gum
quality was not thought to be profitable enough to justify working the older boxes. As a result,
larger trees were disappearing and producers were forced to use smaller pines. Before the late
1890s, producers rarely boxed tress with a diameter smaller than fourteen inches. But by 1897
they worked trees smaller than ten inches across. The disease, decay, and fire that commonly

43 Ibid., 42-44, 51-52, 86, 89.
44 T. P. Baily to Doctor, 16 February 1884, Thomas J. Makie Papers, Special Collections
Library, Duke University.
45 Joseph Tillman and C. P. Goodyear, Southern Georgia: A Pamphlet (Savannah, GA:
Savannah Times Steam Printing House, 1881), 49.
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killed abandoned turpentine trees prevented these smaller trees from maturing and reproducing.
“In consequence,” Mohr explained, “the forests invaded by turpentine orcharding present, in five
or six years after they have been abandoned, a picture o f ruin and desolation painful to behold,
and in view o f the destruction o f the seedlings and the younger growth all hope o f the restoration
o f these magnificent forests is excluded.”46
Lumber companies, which had an economic incentive to cut the forests cleanly and
rapidly, contributed even more to the South’s forest loss.47 Lumber companies added to the
damage by not only cutting quickly, but clear-cutting as well. They paid high taxes on standing
timber which, if felled, drastically reduced the property’s value. Selectively cut forests often
failed to relieve the company’s tax burden because tax assessors were reluctant to reevaluate
timber stands which companies only partially harvested. Also, clear-cutting provided the most
efficient means to convert the timber stand to cash when companies became overextended.
Finally, companies saw no benefit from allowing the fully mature trees, as most were, to
continue standing. The longer they were left, the more opportunity rot and insects had to damage
their value.48
46 Mohr, Timber Pines o f the Southern United States. 69, 70, 72.
47 Stockholder investors, who financed the large lumber companies and expected
dividends, made immediate profits more important than efforts toward sustainability. Also,
many o f the large lumber companies were heavily indebted for the tens and hundreds of
thousands of acres they purchased and were thus forced to cut as fast as they could to gain the
quickest short-term profits needed to make payments on interest and principle. Moreover, states
taxed farm and timber land at the same rate even though forests brought no annual return. To
avoid another year o f taxes, timber companies cut their stands as soon as possible and then
abandoned the property. Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 92-93, 101-103;
Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 279, 283-284.
48 Lumber companies attempted to market cutover land as farm property. The plan was
welcomed by states seeking to increase their tax base and by railroads hoping to haul the new
farmer’s freight. Promoters o f cutover land in Georgia claimed that “our pine lands have an
intrinsic value for agricultural purposes not dreamed o f by their owners.” One even claimed that
“the pine lands were worth more per acre with the timber off than with it on.” But much of the
former timber land was too infertile to sustain agriculture and more farmers left such plots than
stayed. Turpentiners faced a similar problem in their attempts to divest themselves of property
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Although the destruction associated with turpentining, lumbering, and burning the forest
was widely recognized by nineteenth-century southerners, most viewed the forest clearance as a
sign o f spreading civilization and as the inevitable price o f progress. Thomas Clark explains that
a large percentage o f the population held the folk belief that untamed forests represented a
barrier to civilized society, just as Europeans had thought centuries before.49 Agriculture, not
timber product production, they believed, was the way to regional development. In fact they
viewed the timber almost as a nuisance. One southern booster explained that “to utilize the land
for agriculture the timber must be cut off. That is the timber and lumberman’s mission. It is
fortunate that our timber has great commercial value, because the process o f clearing the land
brings a handsome return to the land owner, but if the timber was commercially valueless, we
should then be forced to cut it down and bum it

”s0

Many southerners saw the rapid and complete exploitation of timber as their only means
of raising their standard o f living. Even if they viewed the large companies as resource
exploiters, lumber products were so central to the late-nineteenth-century way o f life that both
the public and the federal government saw no choice but to tolerate their practices.51 James C.
Cobb explains that “in cases where residents o f the New South were expected to choose between

rendered essentially worthless through years o f harvesting. When two partners divided their
holdings in a Manatee County, Florida operation after the timber was worked out, they argued
over who would have to take the valueless property. James C. Cobb, Industrialization and
Southern Society. 1877-1984 (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1984), 127; Karen Harvey, “Maguire
Bom Into Turpentine Family: Industry Once Had Major Impact on County,” The Compass. 26
April 1990, 8-9; Elliott Maguire, interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St.
Augustine Historical Society, St. Augustine, FL; Elliott Maguire, interview by author, St.
Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996.
49 Clark, Greening o f the South. 14.
50 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 59.
51 Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 20.
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conservation and economic gain, the latter almost always won out.”52 While ignoring the
problems of forest depletion, southerners, like the forest product producers, accepted the
fatalistic view that exploitation was inevitable. A pamphlet promoting Georgia commented that
turpentine orchards “already cover large areas, and the industry is not likely to slacken till the
pine is exhausted.” The pamphlet admitted that “timber once cut from these lands cannot be
replaced. It is the growth o f centuries.”53 As late as 1921 Thomas Gamble, the editor o f the
Weekly Naval Stores Review, argued that although lumbermen and turpentiners might have
exploited the deep South’s timber resources, their activity was necessary to build up the region.

The pine trees o f Georgia and Florida and Alabama brought fortunes to many
among the factors and operators. There is a feeling, more sentimental than
practical, that this section gave away its heritage in the sacrifice o f its forests and
the sale of its timber and lumber and naval stores at low values. It is true that in
some reasons the financial returns were unsatisfactory. But the states in question
could not remain a wilderness o f pines. The advancing wave o f humanity
demanded homes and the fact that while the lands were being cleared thousands
and tens o f thousands derived a livelihood from turpentining and saw milling,
while many acquired a comfortable cometence and some large fortunes, and that
the wealth thus derived was used for the upbuilding of this section in railroad
construction and in agriculture and industrial development, compensated for this
passing of the pine.54
Some producers simply ignored the reality of the pine’s consumption, incorrectly
believing that ample resources remained and complete depletion lay only in the distant future.55
For instance, prospective settlers to south Georgia were assured that although “the lands about

52 Cobb. Industrialization and Southern Society. 125.
53 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 48, 59.
54 Gamble, “Savannah as a Naval Stores Port,” 61.
55 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 92-93, 101-103; Williams, Americans
and Their Forests. 279, 283-284.
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Hoboken and Schlatterville have been turpentined and partially denuded by cutting for the m ill,.
.. there is still a superabundance o f timber for all practical and desirable purposes.”56
By the late nineteenth century, however, the American public, including many
southerners, began casting off their fear of the forest as a wild, threatening, and uncivilized place
and adopted ideas that intellectuals and artists had begun advocating decades earlier.57 They
started to view forests as national treasures which benefited man as well as nature. Not only had
Americans witnessed the deforestation o f New England, New York, and the Great Lakes region,
but increasing numbers lived in cities where they could afford to cast o ff their fear of the
unknown in wild areas and see them instead as quiet, peaceful places o f escape.58 Consequently,
readers o f tum-of -the-century muckraking periodicals were horrified to learn from exposes of
the southern pine forest’s rapid disappearance. Writing in 1891 for the magazine Garden and
Forest, published in New York City, C. G. Pringle revealed to a popular audience that “o f the
extravagant methods which prevail in the United States none certainly exceeds in extravagance
than that under which the turpentine industry o f the south is conducted; and there is no business
connected with the products of the soil which yields so little return in proportion to the
destruction of material involved.” Pringle explained how the harvesting o f gum to supply one
still for three years used up fifteen thousand acres. At the time, 266 turpentine stills operated in
Georgia, therefore every three years nearly four million acres in Georgia alone was consumed for

56 Tillman and Goodyear, Southern Georgia. 52.
57 In 1864 George Perkins Marsh’s Man and Nature: The Earth as Modified bv Human
Action introduced the understanding that the use of one natural resource had profound effects on
other resources. The next year Frederick Starr published the first warning o f a timber famine if
American clearcutting practices continued at their mid-nineteenth-century pace. In 1877, Carl
Schurz, Secretary of the Interior, predicted that at the existing rate o f consumption, U.S. timber
supplies would fall Short o f needs in twenty years. Donald J. Pisani, “Forests and Conservation,
1865-1890,” in American Forests: Nature. Culture, and Politics, ed. Char Miller (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1997), 16, 18,23.
58 Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 18-19.
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turpentine.59 In a 1903 issue o f The World’s Work Overton W. Price, Assistant Forester for the
Bureau o f Forestry, explained to reform-mined readers that “there is no more deplorable sight to
the man who has a sense o f the value o f trees than the abandoned turpentine orchard—a grim
array o f mutilated trunks, scorched and charred where the box is made, broken by the wind,
infested by insects, and worthless except to illustrate the futility of killing the goose which lays
the golden eggs. The South is full o f such pictures.”60 Revelations like this led Americans
gradually shifted from understanding timber depletion as unfortunate but inevitable to viewing it
as a national threat.
Alarmed by the rapidly approaching disappearance o f the longleaf pine forest, both the
federal and state governments, as well as individual producers, made attempts in the late
nineteenth century to improve the turpentine industry’s efficient use of the South’s declining
timber supply. One o f their few successful efforts was the use o f turpentined timber for lumber.
Until the mid-1890s both lumbermen and consumers believed that turpentined pines were unfit
for lumber because the drain o f resin from the wood reduced its strength. The lumber and naval
stores industries consequently used different timber tracts. The loss of wasted boxed timber in
each o f the states o f North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi
amounted to between three and ten billion board feet, worth several million dollars, each year. In
the 1890s the Department o f Agriculture conducted investigations on the mechanical, physical,
and chemical attributes o f turpentined and unturpentined wood. Tests showed that turpentined
trees were just as strong as round timber, and that turpentining did not affect the wood’s weight
or shrinkage. Also, bled trees contained the same amount o f resin as unworked pines because
resin only flowed from the sapwood on the very outside o f the truck, just underneath the bark.
59 Pringle, “Waste in the Turpentine Industry,” 49-50.
60 Overton W. Price, “Saving the Southern Forests,” The World’s Work 5 (March 1903):
3214.
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The experiments also revealed that the quantity of resin in pines varied greatly naturally, even in
trees growing side-by-side. Thus the Agriculture Department concluded that turpentined timber
was appropriate for the same uses as was round timber. The discovery made more timber
available for sawmills, but did nothing to reduce the destructiveness o f gum harvesting.61
In a small area of the naval stores manufacturing region producers adopted sustainable
harvesting practices based on the traditional methods. The change, however, was by forced
necessity more than by choice. North Carolinians had almost completely eliminated the longleaf
stands in the southeastern comer o f their state, but, by the 1890s, the few remaining turpentiners
had turned to more conservative practices. In the Cape Fear area small producers were said to
work their trees for ten or more successive years, all the while protecting them from fire. After
allowing the trees to rest for a few years, producers then cut new boxes in the space left between
the old, or back boxing. These orchards had been harvested for twenty to thirty-five years. Some
stands in Sampson and Bladen Counties were said to have been worked intermittently since 1845
and by the early 1890s continued to yield considerable quantities o f gum.62
In areas where longleaf depletion was not yet as widespread as in North Carolina, a
search continued for a way to harvest gum intensely without destroying the tree. Some efforts
were more practical than others. An invention by a Savannah man in the early 1880s proved far

61 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 91-92; Schorger and Betts, Naval
Stores Industry. 40; Nelson Courtlandt Brown, Forest Products: The Harvesting. Processing, and
Marketing o f Materials Other Than Lumber. Including the Principal Derivatives. Extractives, and
Incidental Products in the United States and Canada (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950),
181-83; Charles Mohr, “Effect o f ‘Boxing’ or ‘Bleeding,’” Austin Cary Memorial Forestry
Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, The University of
Florida, 1-2; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 92; Asa L. Brower and John O.
LaFontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry and Statistics o f the
Production of Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons of 1907-8 and 1908-9,” Olustee Experiment
Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 26-27.
62 Mohr, Timber Pines o f the Southern United States. 70; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands,
and Forest Products. 85-86.
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too technical and cumbersome to receive producers’ consideration. It consisted o f a steam boiler
mounted on a set of wheels, that could be drawn through the woods by two mules. Ten fortyyard long flexible steam hoses were attached to the boiler and wound on reels. The inventor
expected workers to move this apparatus through the forests, intermittently stopping to hook the
hoses up to ten trees which, because o f the machine’s long hoses, could be spaced out over
several acres. At the end o f each hose was a light frame that fit completely over boxes up to
twenty-one inches wide and secured by four hooks driven into the tree. Once all the frames were
in place, workers would run steam through the hoses to the boxes and melting the gun for
effective harvesting. The inventor expected only four hands to be able to perform these tasks
every three minutes. Not only would the steam system save on labor costs, he believed, but
would improve gum quality because new gum would not have to flow over old gum. Since all
the gum would be removed from the face by the steam jet, the trees would be rendered less
flammable. The industry, however, never adopted the system, This remarkably complicated and
cumbersome contraption reflected the inventor’s complete unfamiliarity with the pine forests’
unpredictable terrain, the turpentine producers’ undercapitalization, which prevented investment
in such expensive technology, the industry’s unskilled work force, which would have to be
retrained to incorporate this system into the existing work pattern, and the fact that blasting a box
with steam would do nothing to melt gum dried at the top of a high face.63
A more promising improvement appeared at the 189S Atlanta Cotton States and
International Exposition where several exhibits focused on southern trees and the naval stores
industry. The Division o f Forestry exhibited the branches, flowers, foliage, fruit, and wood from
280 species of southern trees. In another exhibit hall the Savannah Board o f Trade set up an
instructional exhibit which, by the display o f tools, a model of a turpentine still, and samples of

63 “A New Idea in Turpentine Orcharding,” Manufacturers Record. 6 October 1883,
Turpentine Newsclipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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different naval stores products, explained the industry’s method o f manufacturing. At yet
another exhibit, J. C. Schuler, a German-born turpentiner who had been producing in the South
since the Civil War, displayed a method o f using clay cups to collect turpentine. The method
was said by a reporter to have “the advantage o f reducing considerably the danger which ‘boxed’
trees are subjected to by fire, while the quality of the product is improved and the individual tree
is less injured than it is by the method now generally adopted in the United States.” The fair’s
exhibit judges awarded Schuler’s invention the silver medal.64
Despite its acclaim, Schuler’s system was not new; French turpentiners had made regular
use of a similar method for over thirty years. Until 1860, French producers collected resin in
small holes that they dug in the sand at the base of the tapped trees. Not surprisingly, this
method resulted in an inability to collect all the resin and the contamination o f what was gathered
with sand and debris. The replacement o f sand holes with clay cups began in 1840, but failed to
gain much attention until the early 1860s when world turpentine prices soared because o f the
interruption in the United States’ trade. As French production leapt into high gear the drive for
greater productivity made the cup system popular. The system followed roughly the same
production schedule as the box system. In February workers chipped o ff thin layers of bark at
the tree’s base, where the cup would be placed, so bark would not contaminate the gum when it
began to run. In March they made an incision at the tree’s base into which they hammered a
gutter used to guide the gum into a one-quart clay pot, or sometimes a zinc cup hung at the end o f
the gutter. The French chipped the faces above the cup from forty to fifty times each season,
around fifteen more times that U. S. producers. But in both countries the face rose to a height o f
twenty inches because the French made smaller scares with each chipping. The French also
differed from the Americans in their more restrained harvesting practice. In France trees were

64 “Exhibitions,” Garden and Forest 8 (November 1895): 449.
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worked for five years with only one or two faces per tree. Then they permitted the tree to rest for
several years before the process began again. Their system had two distinct advantages over the
American. It prolonged the tree’s use for turpentine by reducing injury to the trunk and it gave a
higher grade product because the cups could be raised each year preventing the gum from having
to run down the ever-increasing length of the face.65
Americans learned about the French innovation soon after the Civil War ended. In 1868
a Mr. A. Pudigon o f Moncks Comer, South Carolina, a community about twenty miles north o f
Charleston, patented a gum-catching receptacle based on the French method but abandoned his
project for unknown reasons. Information o f the French system became more widely available in
1878 when it was described in the Department o f Agriculture’s Report Upon Forestry, authored
by Franklin B. Hough. In 1892 forester Charles Mohr performed a study, sponsored by the
Division o f Forestry, o f the French practice. Two years later, William Witland Ashe, a forester
with the North Carolina Geological Survey, began experiments with the French method near
Bladenboro, North Carolina, about fifteen miles east of Lumberton. Conducted at three different
stations, Ashe’s experiments showed that cups produced one-seventh more turpentine by weight
than boxes. This amounted to 3S.8 barrels o f dip per cup more than the 250 barrels usually
yielded. However, other commitments prevented Ashe from completing his work with cups. In
all, between 1868 and 1895 inventors, including Pudigon and Schuler, registered eleven patents
for turpentine-collecting devices.66

65 Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 19,32; Ashe, Forests. Forest Lands, and
Forest Products. 94, 96-99; Charles H. Herty, “A New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding,”
(Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1903), 15-16.
66 C. Dorsey Dryer, “History of the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The AT-FA Journal 25
(January 1963): 7; Hough, Report Upon Forestry. 140-142; Davis, Encyclopedia o f American
Forest 475-476; Germaine M. Reed, Crusading for Chemistry: The Professional Career of
Charles Holmes Herty (Athens: The University o f Georgia Press, 1995), 19; Ashe, Forests.
Forest Lands, and Forest Products. 100-103; Herty, “New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding,”
15; Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 19; Carroll B. Butler, Treasures o f the Longleaf
Pines: Naval Stores (Shalimar, FL: Tarkel Publishing, 1998), 44-45, 227.
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By 1895, Schuler’s Atlanta exhibit represented the only sustained effort to develop the
cup system in the U.S. Beginning his experiments around 1870, he first tried collecting gum in a
tin cup, but the rosin produced from this gum came out dark and therefore less valuable. The
first earthen cup he tried could not withstand the gum’s acidity and came apart. Compressed
paper cups held the gum well but burned when the forests were fired. After the failure of paper
cups Schuler quit his experiments for a time, but resumed them in 1893 when after requests at
forty-three different pottery plants he found one manufacturer who could produce a clay cup to
his specifications. Working on a tract of land owned by a railroad company and located about
twenty-five miles north o f Lake Charles, Louisiana, Schuler experimented with the cup system in
three crops. Within a year this cup proved a success and Schuler patented it. Using turpentine
laborers from Georgia, who had to accustom themselves to covering the cup to prevent chips and
bark from falling into the gum when they used their hacks, he was able to collect twenty-five
percent more gum o f a higher quality from his cup than from a box. This method of turpentining
was, however, more expensive than using the traditional box method. The cost o f working a crop
for two seasons rose from $ 190 to $460. But this increased cost was expected to be offset by the
cups increased yield and the higher turpentine and rosin grades that the gum produced.67
Moreover, Schuler claimed that his less-damaging method made turpentining a sustainable
practice. “There is no logic in the argument that a tree has only a certain amount o f sap, and
when that is exhausted it dies,” he argued. “A tree will yield for an indefinite number o f years if
proper precautions are taken.”68

67 J. C. Schuler to B. E. Femow, 5 October 1894, Turpentine Newsclipping File, Forest
Histoty Society, Durham, NC; “Turpentine Orchards in South-West Louisiana—A New Process,”
Southern Lumberman. (April 1895), Turpentine Newsclipping File, Forest History Society,
Durham, NC; Mohr, Timber Pines o f the Southern United States. 71-72; Herty, “New Method of
Turpentine Orcharding,” 15.
68 “Turpentine Orchards in South-West Louisiana—A New Process.”
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Although Schuler received some coverage in timber industry periodicals, his limited
means left him unable to continue his experiments or promote his system. He claimed to have
made money in turpentining but lost these profits in “other investments.” In 1894 he wrote to B.
E. Femow, the Division o f Forestry director in Washington, describing his new process.69
Schuler apparently received no support from Femow. By 1895 he was making his best effort to
promote his system himself. His Atlanta exhibit was one method. It must have made somewhat
of an impression for one visitor wrote that his system “either in its present form or with some
further modifications seems destined to add millions o f dollars to the productive value o f the
Pine forests of the southern states.”70 Schuler also printed his own pamphlets advertising the
benefits o f his “Great Timber Process o f the South.” The fliers explained that his new method
would not only prevent the extinction of turpentine timber, but would provide a better yield and a
higher quality gum. One leaflet pictured the bottom portion o f a pine trunk with his round clay
cup attached. Another depicted a dumbfounded and exhausted turpentine man gazing at his dead
and fallen boxed timber juxtaposed with a contented and relaxed turpentiner surrounded by the
bags of money he had made by using Schuler’s cups, which were seen attached to still-healthy
pines in the background.71
But despite Schuler’s attempts, his cup system failed to attract wide attention and his
efforts soon ended. Although his Louisiana experiment o f 1895 was considered a success, it was
also expensive and his backers ended their support of the project.72 By the end of the nineteenth
century, the old destructive box method remained alive and well. In 1897 the Jacksonville.
69 J. C. Schuler to B. E. Femow, October 5, 1894, Turpentine Newsclipping File.
70 “Exhibitions,” 449.
71 J. C. Schuler, “The Great Turpentine Saving Process o f the South,” Turpentine
Newsclipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
72 Dunwody, “Proper Methods o f Distillation and Handling,” 127.
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Florida Citizen reported that “many inventors have tried to devise an artificial box to be tacked or
glued to the tree, in order to obviate the necessity o f weakening the tree by the savage wound
which is required to constitute a box. But all these inventions have proven a failure, and have
been discarded by practical men.”73
The difficulty that the turpentine industry experienced in improving technologically was
typical o f other southern industries. Inadequate investment capital, absence of industry
researchers and engineers, and producers who preferred traditional and proven methods made
innovation unlikely. Most turpentine producers lacked the capital to invest in equipment like
cups. By the 1890s especially, narrow profit margins prevented the accumulation o f money
necessary to purchase new technology. Furthermore, turpentine producers lacked the resources
required to hire scientists and engineers to develop, demonstrate, and endorse improvements.
The newly created U.S. Bureau of Forestry and the state of North Carolina expressed interest in
developing a new system but failed to follow through with experiments. It is true that J. C.
Schuler developed a system, but he lacked the means to convince an understandably skeptical
group of producers to pay a large sum and go through the difficulty o f converting to the system.
Schuler had no special training in forestry or biology. He was merely a producer who claimed to
have developed a new system through years of dabbling with different methods in his own
operation. The fact that he eventually went broke did nothing to enhance the cup system’s
financial feasibility. In 1921, naval stores researcher Robson Dunwoody recounted that “the
advancement or reward o f individuals because o f better methods introduced or results obtained,
was seldom encouraged. As a consequence, few men o f technical or other training particularly
fitting them for this work, were attracted to the industry, and this has no doubt accounted for the

73 “Big Florida Industry,” Jacksonville. Florida Citizen. 7 September 1897, Turpentine
Newsclipping File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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slow progress along these lines, that has always characterized the manufacture o f naval stores.”74
Neither Dunwody’s observation, Schuler’s failure, nor the overall lack o f innovation in the
industry undermines Donald F. Martin’s explanation that turpentining was a backwoods industry
whose producers held the attitudes of “frontiersmen” and were therefore unreceptive to new
ideas or advice which could improve their business.75
Asides from relatively minor changes in marketing procedures in Savannah, the naval
stores industry o f the latter third of the nineteenth century differed little from the antebellum
period. Producers continued their reliance on factorage houses for financial support and
marketing expertise. And despite efforts by both factors and producers to improve market
conditions, prices and profit margins remained low. The old harvesting process, which dated
back to colonial times, also persisted and, consequently, the destruction o f the turpentined timber
stands continued as well. These practices and their effect on the forest perpetuated the industry’s
transient nature, forcing turpentiners to move, not only out o f the Carolinas, but throughout the
lower southeastern pine belt, in search of new trees. As a result, the timber supply which had
seemed endless in the late 1860s was so seriously diminished by the 1890s that several inventive
foresters and producers experimented with less destructive methods o f harvesting gum. Their
unsystematic and amateurish attempts, combined with the undercapitalized producers’ inability
to afford equipment, however, doomed their efforts to failure. The use o f traditional harvesting
practices represented ju st one o f several connections the naval stores industry maintained with its
antebellum past. Along with the domination by Carolinians, the role of transportation
improvements in allowing the industry to spread, the continued reliance on factors, and
persistence o f primitive harvesting practices, the industry’s labor system and working conditions
represent one more strand o f continuity with its antebellum past.
74 Dunwody, “Proper Methods o f Distillation and Handling,” 129.
75 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 95,97-98.
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Chapter Seven
Narrow Freedom:
Coercive Labor Efforts in the Turpentine Industry

Despite the temporary interruption in production caused by the Civil War and
emancipation, the lives o f naval stores laborers in the post-war years remained much unchanged
from the antebellum period. In the absence o f slavery, producers, who required cheap and
reliable labor in the southern pine forests where few blacks lived, devised new methods to force
newly-freed African American man and women to work for them. With the passage o f labor
laws and the leasing of state and county convicts, blacks found their decisions regarding work
narrowed. Moreover, the tasks they performed and the living conditions in the camps were little
changed from those of antebellum days.
The turpentine producers who moved into the pine forests o f Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
and Mississippi during the years from the end o f the Civil War to 1900 faced many challenges in
securing adequate labor. Few native whites would agreed to the hard work, so blacks remained
the bulk o f the industry’s work force. But few blacks lived in the piney woods because the area
had contained little antebellum plantation agriculture. In Georgia’s Wiregrass region, for
example, the antebellum black population had been, in some cases, less than five percent of the
total population and no more than twenty-five percent in others. By comparison, blacks
represented over half the total population in many of Georgia’s Black Belt counties. Until the
1880s the great majority o f the South’s pine belt residents were small white farmers who worked
in turpentining infrequently and gladly left it when the opportunity for different work arose.1

1 E.W. Carswell, Holmesteadine: The History of Holmes County. Florida (Tallahassee:
Rose Printing Company, 1986), 143; Ann Patton Malone, “Piney Woods Farmers o f South
Georgia, 1850-1900: Jeffersonian Yeomen in an Age of Expanding Commercialism,”
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They viewed turpentine work as black work and most refused to have anything to do with the
difficult and low-paying occupation. The manager o f several Florida turpentine camps in the late
1870s and 1880s explained that turpentine “work is severe to a degree almost impossible to
exaggerate, and it is very difficult to control a sufficient quantity o f free labor to properly
cultivate any great number o f trees.”2
Changes in black work habits following emancipation also challenged producers’ search
for labor. Freedmen reduced their pace and the number o f hours they would work to levels
closer to those o f other free laborers. In addition, the amount of labor performed by black
women and children, who had performed such relatively light tasks as dipping, declined
significantly as freedmen attempted to create the same domestic work pattern enjoyed by whites
and lifted the burden o f physically exhausting work from family members with less strength. As
a result, by 1890 ninety-eight percent o f laborers were men and only 1.9 percent were women.
Women and children might perform odd jobs to supplement the family income, but families
typically did not work turpentine forests together.3 Their actions created a severe labor shortage
Agricultural History 60 (Fall 1986): 51, 54, 75; Sam Bowers Hilliard, Atlas o f Antebellum
Southern Agriculture (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 32-34; J.C. Powell,
The American Siberia or Fourteen Years’ Experience in a Southern Convict Camp (Montclair,
NJ: Patterson Smith, 1970), 27.
2 Powell, American Siberia. 27.
3 Dobson and Doyon argue that Georgia’s turpentine labor force was not derived from
the declining industry in North Carolina. Although they assert that most o f the workers were
immigrants to the region, they find that only forty percent came from the Tar Heel State. In 1880
the number o f naval stores workers from North Carolina was either equal to or exceeded by those
from Virginia. These figures, however, are not entirely reliable because many naval stores
laborers apparently escaped the eye o f census takers. Dobson and Doyon find that for 1870 only
48 o f 138 workers were listed in the population schedule. Jeffrey R. Dobson and Roy Doyon,
“Expansion o f the Pine Oleoresin Industry in Georgia: 1842 to CA. 1900,” The Southeastern
United States: Essays on the Cultural and Historical Landscape 18 (June 1979): 49, 51; William
Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial Control.
1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 14; Thomas F. Armstrong,
“The Transformation o f Work: Turpentine Workers in Coastal Georgia, 1865-1901,” Labor
History 25 (Fall 1984): 529.
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for turpentine operators who, like other white southerners, expected blacks to work as long and
as hard as they had as slaves and for almost as little compensation. A post-war De Bow’s
Review article bemoaned that “before the war negroe women and boys used to be employed to
dip. It is very difficult now to find any hands willing to execute this branch o f the business.
Their hands and clothing become smeared with the gum, and even two dollars per diem will not
now induce a piny [sic] woodsman or freed man to dip much turpentine.”4
Making the situation even more difficult for producers, laborers were not only hard to
find, but difficult to keep. The postbelium turpentine industry suffered from challenges typical
of southern manufacturing o f the period. It was a highly competitive industry which required
successful producers to control strictly costs since profit margins remained low. Because labor
was such a significant portion o f the operators’ cost, the workers felt the brunt o f the sharp
competition through lower wages. Low wages undermined worker loyalty as naval stores
producers competed with the area’s growing number o f commercial farmers and lumber
producers for the scarce labor. The migratory nature o f the turpentine industry and the seasonal
cycle o f work also made it difficult for producers to maintain a steady and dependable labor
force. During slack periods in the winter months and when an operator moved to fresh pine
stands, some laborers took the occasion to seek other employment.5 In August 1867 Georgia
4 “The Pine Forests o f the South,” De Bow’s Review. After the War Series 3 (February
1867): 197.
5 Jerrell H. Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests, 1880-1950,” Journal of Forest
History 25 (January 1981): 14; Jerrell H. Shofner, “Mary Grace Quackenbos, A Visitor Florida
Did Not Want,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 58 (January 1980): 273; Thomas F. Armstrong,
“Georgia Lumber Laborers, 1880-1917: The Social Implications o f Work,” The Georgia
Historical Quarterly 67 (Winter 1983): 439,444; Pete Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery: Peonage
in the South. 1901-1969 (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1990), 9; Nollie Hickman,
Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Loneleaf Pine Belt. 1840-1915 (University: The
University o f Mississippi, 1962), 141; Mark V. Wetherington, The New South Comes to
Wiregrass Georgia. 1860-1910 (Knoxville: The University o f Tennessee Press, 1994), 119;
Stanley C. Bond, Jr., “The Development of the Naval Stores Industry in St. Johns County,
Florida,” The Florida Anthropologist 40 (September 1987): 198; Dennis Eagan, The Florida
Settler, or Immigrants’ Guide (Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian, 1873), 20; Gavin Wright, Old
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turpentiner Benjamin Williams’ wife Sara complained about the high turnover among their
operation’s new hired help. She explained that “three have run awav during the last few months
that we had clothed up to be decent, they came to us naked, (all but)[.] They are an ungrateful
race, they drive me to be tight and stingy with them.”6
The turpentine operators who left the Carolinas and formed the backbone of the industry
in Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama attempted to remedy one o f these problems, the o f
the scarcity o f blacks in the piney woods South, by bringing their laborers with them. Producers
such as George T. Holland, who moved from Virginia to Telfair County, Georgia in the late
1880s, brought with him his foreman and twelve workers who labored on his farm and in his
turpentine business. Not just the dearth o f available piney woods workers led producers to bring
their own laborers with them. Turpentining was very specialized work, requiring skills learned
in no other occupation. To increase their odds o f success, producers preferred to bring along
laborers already familiar with the tasks, rather than train new ones. Turpentine workers, for their
part, perhaps moved willingly as the industry in North Carolina declined. Trained in turpentine,
not in agricultural production, they commonly agreed to cast their lot with their employer rather
than venture into a new occupation. It remains unclear as to whether their employers’
compulsion played any role in their decision to head southward.7
South. New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic
Books, 1986), 187; Hervey Evans to Susan Murphy Evans, 22 July 1899, Martha Virginia
McNair Evans Patterson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill; Malone, “Piney Woods Farmers o f South Georgia,” 79.
6 Sarah F. Williams to Mother, 27 August 1867, Sarah Hicks Williams Papers, Southern
Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
7 Dobson and Doyan offer the questionable argument that young black men chose to
enter the turpentine industry because no special skills were required and the pay and fringe
benefits were good. However, turpentine work did indeed require unique skills. Furthemore, the
pay remained low, even compared to sharecropping. Dobson and Doyan also claim that black
men liked the freedom for independent work offered by the pine forest. Yet workers actually
possessed little freedom. The woodsriders constantly managed laborers and in many cases
managers forced them to remain in their employment after they expressed a desire to leave.
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The influx o f the turpentiners and their workers into the pine region helped alter the
area’s demographics. Between 1870 and 1890, the Georgia Wiregrass region’s population
doubled, and from 1890 to 1910, doubled again. In Georgia counties most active in naval storesproduction, the black population grew at a rate that surpassed both the increase in the state’s
white population and the overall rise in the state’s black population. From 1860 to 1880 the
black population in the state’s southeastern counties that manufactured naval stores grew about
225 percent while the state’s overall black population rose 155 percent. A 175 percent growth in
the white population in the important turpentine counties also exceeded the state’s average of
138 percent. The increase from 1880 to 1900 was considerably more dramatic. During these
years Georgia’s naval stores-producing region saw an increase in black population of over 500
percent when the state’s black population rose just 142 percent. Certain counties recorded
increases in black population growth that far exceeded these averages. In Berrien County the
black population increased 710 percent, in Coffee county 634 percent, and in Irwin County 874
percent. Most amazingly, Colquitt County, which actually experienced a decline in black
population from 1860 to 1880, saw a rise in its numbers from 1880 to 1900 o f 3,430 percent,
from 105 to 3,602. At the end of the period in 1900, most counties that produced naval stores
had ten times the black population that they had in 1860. Since the expansion of the area’s white
population, although higher than in the state as a whole, was at a lower rate than that of the
African American population, by 1900 forty percent of Wiregrass residents were black.8

Dobson and Doyan also maintain that blacks preferred forest work for it shared few
characteristics with plantation agriculture which they associated with servitude. But it was gang
labor, not crop production, that blacks opposed. Moreover, sharecroppers were most likely to
enjoy more self management than turpentine workers who made no decisions regarding their
work routines. Dobson and Doyon, “Expansion of the Pine Oleoresin Industry,” 51;
Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 86.
* Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 76,119; Malone, “Piney
Woods Farmers o f South Georgia,” 75. Statistics of the Population of the United States at the
Tenth Census (Washington, DC: Department o f the Interior, 1883); Population. Twelfth Census
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A profile o f late nineteenth-century Georgia turpentine workers demonstrates their origin
from other states and thus their influence on the region's population change. The typical
turpentine laborer in Wiregrass Georgia in the 1870s was a young, single, illiterate, black man
from North Carolina. Of 178 turpentine laborers working at camps along the Macon and
Brunswick railroad in 1879, eighty percent were black, seventy percent were illiterate, sixty-six
percent were single, eighty percent were in their teens and twenties, and seventy percent were
bom in North Carolina. By 1900, this profile had changed only slightly. The typical worker
remained black and from the Carolinas, but more came from South Carolina than North Carolina
and more were married, their wives typically being native Georgians. Not only were most
workers in the Georgia turpentine industry black, but the rate of labor participation in the
business was higher among African-Americans than was their proportion of the general
population. As before the war, the vast majority o f forest laborers were black and the naval
stores operators, distillers, and woodsriders were usually white. However, black producers were
not unheard of. One African-American producer in Pierce County, Georgia, worked ten crops
covering 2,500 acres, a relatively large operation which would have required the assistance o f
hired workers.9
A similar population shift occurred in other naval stores-producing states. Growth
occurred in the black population o f Florida’s turpentine region but, because production took hold
more slowly there than in Georgia, the rise in the number of blacks in the population also began
later. From 1860 to 1880 the black population of Florida’s piney wood counties actually grew at

of the United States Taken in the Year 1900 (Washington, DC: Department o f the Interior,
1901); Armstrong, “Transformation o f Work,” 525.
9 Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 119; Armstrong,
“Transformation o f Work,” 525; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 440,447; Joseph
Tillman and C.P. Goodyear, Southern Georgia: A Pamphlet (Savannah: Savannah Times Steam
Printing House, 1881), 49.
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a slower pace than the state’s overall black population; some counties even saw a decline. After
1880 a few counties experienced a surge in their number o f black residents. In Clay county, for
example, the black population grew 265 percent, but in others, like Lafayette County, it grew
only 138 percent After 1890, however, many piney woods counties experienced a rise in black
population o f around 250 percent, well above the state average of 138 percent The white
population growth o f the counties between 1890 and 1900, 131 percent was around the state
average.10 In southern Mississippi, where the number o f blacks was small as well, forester and
historian NoIIie Hickman explains that because of the growing naval stores industry in the latenineteenth century, “trainload after trainload o f black families arrived in the virgin pine country
of South Mississippi.” 11
Although turpentiners reduced the level of labor competition by bringing in their own
workers, local farm owners did complain about their workers entering the employment of both
turpentine and lumber producers.12 As early as 1875, the Hinesville. Georgia Gazette.
complaining that “the loss o f laborers” to the turpentine industry “works a greater injury” to the
farmers “than many are willing to admit.”13 In 1899, the Wavcross. Georgia Weekly Herald
expressed its regret “that the introduction o f such industries as mills and stills has had the
unhappy tendency o f drawing away from the farms the younger element o f the colored people.”14
One year later the Brunswick. Georgia Call complained that “many [of the farm laborers] are

10 Statistics o f the Population of the United States at the Tenth Census: Population.
Twelfth Census o f the United States Taken in the Year 1900.
11 Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 131; NoIIie Hickman, “Black Labor in Forest Industries
of the Piney Woods, 1840-1933,” in Mississippi’s Pinev Woods: A Human Perspective, ed. Noel
Polk (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1986), 29.
12 Armstrong, “Transformation o f Work,” 524.
13 Quoted in Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 447.
14 Quoted in Ibid., 447.
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going into the towns and villages and many more into districts where public works such as saw
mills and turpentine stills, are in operation.”15
Although turpentine producers may have met with some success in attracting agricultural
workers, competition for labor remained intense and they, along with other southern whites
affected by the relative unavailability o f reliable, cheap labor, sought to protect their businesses
by assuming firm control over their employees. Although turpentine producers’ involvement in
the passage of enticement, emigrant agent, vagrancy, and false-pretenses legislation is unclear,
such laws served them well. These acts were first passed by state legislatures during
Reconstruction, strengthened during the late nineteenth century, and by around 1900 reached
mature development. Enticement acts outlawed one employer hiring a laborer away from
another. This legislation intensified the employer’s control over a worker by establishing an
owner-type relationship that resembled that between slave and master. It also outlawed whites
from competing with each other in the labor market and thus driving up the cost. Adopted by ten
southern states from 1865 to 1867, laws to restrict labor recruitment were the most commonly
used measure to control black labor following emancipation. As companion legislation to the
enticement acts, emigrant-agent laws imposed prohibitably high fees on labor agents who
attempted to move workers from one state to another. Such laws first appeared in states that
believed themselves most threatened by black out-migration. Like enticement legislation,
emigrant-agent laws regulated black labor by controlling the activity o f whites. However,
resourceful whites attempted to skirt the law by using black agents and informal recruiters who
not only could enter and leave black areas with less notice than white agents, but knew the best
places to find black workers willing to leave for a new employer. Another type of legislation,
vagrancy laws, represented one of the earliest and most widely adopted black codes. These

15 Quoted in Ibid., 447.
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statutes enabled law enforcement officials to force unemployed blacks to work during periods o f
labor scarcity and to sign and keep contracts. To ensure that blacks signed labor contracts,
vagrancy laws criminalized the failure to make such agreements and those individuals convicted
o f the offense were hired out.16
Many turpentine operators encouraged debt among their laborers and used it to coerce
them to remain in their employment. When a laborer began work for a new employer, he
received an advance o f tokens with which to purchase supplies and his payroll account was
debited. Thus workers began their employment in debt. At month’s end the worker’s earnings
were applied to his account; if the credit for wages exceeded the debit for commissary purchases,
he received the difference in commissary script. Many workers, however, borrowed on their
account as fast as they earned wages. If a laborer broke even he had to borrow again to cover the
next month’s expenses. Turpentine workers commonly owed their employers between $200 and
$300, the balance o f which they had to pay to end their employment. As long as the indebted
laborer continued to work, his debt was o f little concern to him or his employer. It only became
an issue when the worker attempted to leave. In such an instance an employer could have one of

16 William Cohen identifies four stages o f legislation leading to limitations on black
mobility and the establishment o f rigid legal peonage. White southerners made the first attempt
with the black codes immediately following emancipation. However Congressional
Reconstruction undid much o f this legislation. From Reconstruction’s end to the mid 1890s,
emigrant agent and contract enforcement laws arose. At the turn o f the century legislatures
enacted a flurry of enticement laws, legislation against breaking contracts, laws against vagrancy,
and measures that made the activity o f labor agents all but impossible. Cohen, At Freedom’s
Edge. 31, 202,228,245-246; William Cohen “Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 18651940: A Preliminary Analysis,” The Journal of Southern History 42 (February 1976): 33-36;
Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests,” 16,18; Georgia, which experienced
exceptionally heavy black movement to the West, in 1876 passed the first o f the laws imposing a
$100 annual tax for each county in which a labor recruiter worked. Soon afterwards it raised the
tax to $500 a year. Other states followed Georgia’s example: Alabama in 1879, North Carolina
and South Carolina in 1891, Florida in 1903, and Mississippi in 1912. In 1900, the United States
Supreme Court confirmed the rights o f states to license emigrant agents at their discretion.
Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 33, 39-42,47-51; Sylvia H. Krebs, “Will the Freedmen
Work: White Alabamians Adjust to Free Black Labor,” The Alabama Historical Quarterly 36
(Summer 1974): 158-159: Cohen. At Freedom’s Edge. 31.
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three general responses. He could allow the labor to leave peacefully as long as the new
employer paid off his account. The producer could threaten the employee with violence and
forced return, but then not cany out the action. Or the employer might physically prevent the
worker from leaving or return him against his will if he did escape. One Mississippi turpentine
laborer recalled that workers who had left their jobs owing as little as fifty cents were tracked
with bloodhounds and returned to work o ff their d eb t17 The turpentine workers plight under
forced labor is captured in the late-nineteenth-century work song “Fse Gwine to Georgy.”

When I left old South Ca’lina,
I left in the winter-time.
“Where you gwine, nigger?”
“I’se gwine to Georgy, I’se gwine to Georgy,
To work in the turpentine.”
When I gits in Georgy,
They gimme a hack and stock
And put me in a crop; they say,
“If you wants to see that double line,
You shorely got to chop.”
You see that Woodsman comin, ridin through the pine;
He turns round and ‘gins to peep;
You hear him say to the black man,
“Old nigger, sink emin deep!”
The nigger pull off his hat,
And throwed it on the ground;
You hear him say to the Woodsman,
“Do you want me to cut em down?”
They worked this nigger all year long;
It’s time for him to go home.
You hear the Bossman say to the Bookkeeper,
“How do this nigger stand?”

17 Jane Twitty Shelton, Pines and Pioneers: A History o f Lowndes County. Georgia.
1825-1900 (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1976), 201; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest.
143-144.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

298
The Bookkeeper goes in the office,
He sit down and ‘gin to figger;
Then he say to the Bossman,
“That nigger’s just even now!”
When I libbed in Georgy I heard a lion sing,
And I didn’t have long to stay;
I got in debt, and I had to run away.
The Woodsman went to the Bossman,
And begin to fret; he said,
“I’ll bet that nigger has left in debt!”
The Woodsrider caught me and brought me back;
He said, “If you don’t work, I’ll beat your back!”18

It is often difficult to distinguish between the common situation of the indebted laborer
and the peon, for only a thin line separate the two.19 Indebtedness to employers was the key
component for holding laborers in peonage but, as historian J. William Harris points out, debt did
not necessarily lead to peonage. “It is important to remember,” he explains, “that debt pervaded
every level of postbellum southern agriculture, not just the bottom level of sharecroppers.”20
Laws supporting peonage in no way indicate its widespread practice. Many sharecroppers were
poor and indebted but were never tied to the plantation by their condition.21 Merely becoming
indebted to an employer did not constitute peonage. Pete Daniel explains that “peonage occurred
only where the planter forbade the cropper to leave the plantation because o f debt.”22 He
18 Another version o f the song has the turpentine worker leaving “old Virginny.” Stetson
Kennedy, Palmetto Country. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 257-258; Florida
Writers’ Project, “The Story o f Naval Stores...,” Florida Highways 2 (May 1943): 14.
19 Daniel, Shadow o f Slavery. 24.
20 J. William Harris, “The Question o f Peonage in the History o f the New South,” in
Plain Folk of the South Revisited, ed. Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1997), 104.
21 Ibid., 104,106, 111, 116-117.
22 Daniel, Shadow of Slavery. 24.
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explains that three general labor divisions emerged in the post-war South. Most southern
workers were free and moved about selling their labor on a free market. Another group
languished in debt peonage and was coerced to work to repay what they owed. Daniel identifies
a third group which lived in a perplexing state somewhere between freedom and force labor. In
this middle ground a laborer who ended the year indebted to his employer and who voluntarily
agreed to stay on and work off his debt was technically free. But if the employer used coercion
to force the worker to remain, the worker then entered a state o f peonage.23 Daniel explains that
‘The line was that thin. No doubt many workers drifted from freedom to peonage often in their
lifetimes, never realizing that they had crossed the line.”24 He further argues that because of this
uncertain status, it is difficult to determine how many of the South’s laborers were caught
between slavery and freedom, consequently, “the number of blacks, or whites for that matter,
who were working involuntarily remains a part of the equation that has not been measured.”23 It
is within this gray area between freedom and compulsion in which probably most naval stores
workers labored.
Turpentine producers strongly resented others hiring their hands and swore out warrants
against them if they discovered who was involved. Operators supported enticement legislation
that prohibited others from hiring any o f their workers and there was a general, informal
agreement among producers not to recruit each others’ labor. It was not only illegal but
dangerous to be caught at the practice. Despite the consequences, however, operators did
attempt to lure workers to their camps, usually relying on their most trusted black employees to
perform the risky task. Itinerant preachers were often in the best position to move

23 Pete Daniel, “The Metamorphosis o f Slavery, 1865-1900,” Journal o f American
History 66 (June 1979): 89.
24 Ibid., 89.
25 Ibid., 74.
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unsuspectingly in and out o f neighboring camps on recruiting missions. They promised better
pay and living conditions and commonly offered advances to encourage dissatisfied workers to
leave their employers. Some recruiters received a commission for each man they attracted to
their employer’s camp. By the 1890s it cost roughly $15 to $20 per worker to recruit labor for
twelve months. Both the worker and the recruiter faced considerable danger. If the recruiter
allowed his cunning to slip as was discovered, he might face a severe whipping or even death.
His employer would usually deny any association and take no responsibility for his actions. On
the occasions when a producer permitted his indebted employee to move to another operator, the
new employer was required to pay the worker’s account.26
Once in an operator’s employment, turpentine laborers were not paid by the hour but for
piece work, the actual amount o f labor they performed each day. It was a practice not unknown
in agriculture, especially on sea-island cotton plantations. Such a wage system provided
producers with more control over their workers than a pay system based on shares. The pay
scale varied for different tasks and the pay for each task depended on how much work was
actually completed. In the 1870s, unskilled turpentine workers in Georgia earned between $.60
and $ 1.50 a day and skilled laborers from $ 1.50 to $2.00 a day. Box cutters earned $.0175 for
each box cut and rakers earned $.0035 per tree. Dippers, who were paid by the amount o f gum
collected, received 200 to 300 per barrel. Like farm wages, turpentine pay declined in the late
nineteenth century. In the 1880s the amount paid for boxing declined nearly thirty percent from
$.0175 per box to $.0125 per box. Pay rates apparently differed by place, as well. In most cases
operators in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas paid more than those in the East, probably
because of a scarce labor supply. Whereas producers in the eastern areas paid between 450 and
26 Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 202; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 125, 141-142; Albert
Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” in Naval Stores: History. Production.
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing
Company, 1921), 103.
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550 per thousand faces chipped in 1896, operators in Mississippi paid from 550 to 600. Because
of the practice o f paying according to piece work, there could be considerable difference between
individual laborers in the amount o f work performed and the pay they received. This pay
variation is illustrated by two boxers who labored for Kittrell and Smith, turpentine producers in
Georgia. Edward Gillam cut 313 boxes one week in November 1881 and 200 boxes the next
week. For this work he received $5.48 and $3.50 respectively. However Joe Stevens, a
obviously a faster worker, cut 500 boxes one week in January 1882 and 505 one week later. He
was paid $8.75 and $8.84, forty-nine percent more than Gillam for working the same amount of
time. Wages could also vary depending on the worker's sex. Women, who typically did little
work in the forest after the war, received about eighty percent o f men’s wages.27
The unique labor characteristics and challenges of the southern naval stores industry
explain why a wage system based on piece work, not sharecropping, emerged following
emancipation. Far fewer blacks were familiar with the techniques involved in turpentine
production than were knowledgeable about farming. Thus turpentiners had a far smaller pool of
experienced labor from which to draw compared to farmland owners. Also, in the piney woods
of the deep South—into which the industry moved after the Civil War—the extremely small native
black population offered virtually no hope o f supplying adequate labor. Moreover, work in the
naval stores industry was well known for a difficult and demanding schedule that did nothing to
attract new workers. For turpentine producers the resulting labor scarcity necessitated the tight
27 Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 443; Ralph Shlomowitz, “‘Bound’ or ‘Free’?
Black Labor in Cotton and Sugarcane Farming, 1865-1880,” The Journal o f Southern History 50
(November 1984): 584, 589; Ralph Shlomowitz, “The Origins o f Southern Sharecropping,”
Agricultural History 53 (1979): 562; Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia.
121; Franklin B. Hough, Report Upon Forestry, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1878), 139. Wright, Old South. New South. 202; Matthew J. Mancini, One Dies. Get
Another: Convict Leasing in the American South. 1866-1928 (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1996), 54. Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 125; Armstrong, “Transformation of
Work,” 527; Sandra Jo Fomey, “The Importance of Sites Related to the Naval Stores Industry in
Florida” (paper presented at the thirty-seventh annual meeting o f the Florida Anthropological
Society, Daytona Beach, Florida, 1985), 2.
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control o f workers that a wage system facilitated. Farmland owners, on the other hand, who did
not need to worry so about securing labor to plant their fields, could afford to compromise with a
sharecropping system that gave the workers more autonomy than a wage system, but not as much
as cash renting. That a share cropping arrangement was possible in turpentine production is
demonstrated by the practice in French gum harvesting in the late nineteenth century.28
Under the wage system some producers took measures to reduce pay either out of sheer
greed or as punishment. Two partners in a Georgia turpentine operation docked workers’ pay as
a penalty for not completing their task, for performing sloppy work, or for losing work time. The
most unscrupulous producers practiced a deception called “loading the boxes.” They reduced
their workers’ pay by adding boxes to the standard crop size o f ten thousand boxes, thus making
their employees perform extra work without added compensation.29
The seasonal variation in the work schedule, combined with piece work pay scale and the
occasional unscrupulous increase in crop size, presented special challenges. As before the war,
producers tried to keep their workers busy throughout the year in an effort to prevent workers
from leaving to find employment to carry them through the winter.30 A Florida producer advised
to “keep all hands at work doing something. It never will do to let them start to scattering.”31
However, operators found it virtually impossible to provide constant employment. Boom and
bust economic cycles subjected workers to layoffs, pay reductions, and periods of only partial
employment. The seasonal nature o f production also worked against laborers who found
employment opportunities scarce during the winter months when only boxing and raking were

29 Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 443; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 125.
30 Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography o f the South: A Study in Regional Resources and
Human Adequacy (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press, 1935), 122.
31 Hervey Evans to Susan Murphy Evans, 6 January 1900, Patterson Papers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

303
performed. In fact, raking was done for only a brief period and paid little. It was not uncommon
for producers to contract with workers for only the ten busiest months o f labor.32 And bad
weather could halt work even during the busiest period. In September 1889, for example, a
series o f storms and subsequent floods seriously hurt the industry in parts o f Georgia. “Whatever
dip was in the boxes was washed out,” one operator complained. “Nothing has been done for
two weeks and the bad condition of the woods will prevent work o f any consequence being done
for a week or ten days.”33 During such times, workers received no wages, but had to continue
buying supplies from the commissary.
Some turpentine workers attempted to stay busy by exercising considerable versatility
and mobility within the turpentine labor force. One Georgia laborer, for example, worked in
December 1889 as a teamster, but in January 1890 as a boxer. Another worker at the same
operation labored at the still in early November but by the end of the month was hauling barrels.
In early December he was back at the still but then moved to cutting boxes for the remainder of
the month. Yet another turpentine hand’s activity varied among dipping, driving a wagon,
performing general labor, dipping again, and, finally, cutting boxes—all within two months. For
each task he was paid a different rate. One laborer went to work as a boxer for a South Carolina
producer in February 1872. By June he was cornering and chipping. Other turpentine workers
stayed busy by alternating between turpentine and agricultural labor. In the early 1880s a
Georgia farmer who raised horses and grew com, cotton, cane, and potatoes, began turpentining.
His hands alternated between work in the forest and work in the field as the needs demanded.34
32 Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 438-439; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 200201; Account book, 1872, Thomas H. Osteen Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University o f
South Carolina.
33 John Avery Gere Carson to J.P. Williams, 15 September 1888, John Avery Gere
Carson Papers, Manuscripts Collection, Georgia Historical Society.
34 Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 411,444; Account book, 1872, Osteen
Papers.
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However, workers were somewhat limited in their ability to perform both agriculture and
turpentine work. Because farming and turpentining shared the same seasonal production cycle
and were both similarly affected by adverse weather conditions, it was rare that one job offered
work opportunities when the other was at a slack time.
Along with job variation, turpentine workers with families sometimes enjoyed the
addition o f wages, earned by wives and children, to their household incomes. In December 1890
two boys contributed to their family’s commissary account by working in the potato fields
associated with the turpentine operation. Again in April 1891 they contributed $3.39 to the
family account by raking leaves. In another case during the 1890s all members o f the Alton
family at a Georgia operation contributed to the household income. Mr. Alton dipped and he, his
wife, son, and daughter also raked around the pines.3s
Unlike agricultural workers, who commonly received a portion o f their compensation in
kind, turpentine workers most often received only wages, with which they were expected to
purchase everything they needed from the commissary. Most turpentine operators paid their
employees in script—tokens, coupon books, and punch cards—redeemable only at the camp store.
Coin-size tokens, with the producer’s name usually stamped on the face, were issued in values of
five, ten, twenty-five, fifty cents, and one dollar. Operators occasionally issued one-cent pieces,
but only rarely did they use tokens valued at two, five, or ten dollars. Coupon books and punch
cards were more often used for issuing these larger denominations. Workers either signed the
coupon book authorizing the amount to be deducted from their pay after spending it at the
commissary or had the purchase amount punched out on the card. Because the commissary

35 Armstrong, “Transformation o f Work,” 527-528.
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played suck a pivotal role in the turpentine wage system, producers required that only the most
trusted managers run i t This often meant family members.36
The camps’ isolation and lack o f transportation to the nearest town ensured that most
workers traded at the commissary. However, in some instances, workers had more choice. At
camps located closer to a town, workers had the option o f shopping at some private stores which
accepted tokens at seventy percent o f their face value. In other cases merchants would exchange
the script for United States currency at the same discount Some operators opposed the use of
their tokens at other stores and indicated on the tokens that they were for commissary trade only.
Conflicts often erupted between town merchants and operators when the turpentiner refused to
redeem the tokens at face value or in some cases would not buy them back at all.37
Although the introduction o f a wage system and commissary represented a significant
break from the laborers’ pre-war years as slaves, other areas of their experience changed little.
Very little about the actual work in the naval stores industry changed after the war. The work
remained hard and the standard of living low. Typically turpentine workers awoke at around
4:30, began work at sunlight, and continued until sundown with breaks for breakfast and lunch.
The various jobs, the tools, and the ten thousand box-size task all remained virtually unchanged
until the turn o f the century.38 Boxing, cornering, chipping, dipping, scraping, and distilling all
remained primitive processes, exposing workers to the same hazards as in the antebellum era.

36 Ibid., 529-530; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 199.
37 C.R. Clark, Florida Trade Tokens (St. Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors Publishing Co.,
1980), 3-4, 6-8.
38 Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of the South: The Recovery o f Land and Forest
(Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky, 1984), 22; Vance, Human Geography o f the
South. 122; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 443; Shlomowitz, ‘“ Bound” or ‘Free’?,”
584, 589; Shlomowitz, “Origins o f Southern Sharecropping,” 562; Hough, Report Upon Forestry.
139.
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Like work patterns, the characteristics o f camp life survived the Civil War intact. As
during the antebellum period, post war turpentine camps tended to be isolated and temporary. As
railroad trunk lines spread across the southeastern pine belt and branch lines opened up the most
uninhabited areas to turpentine production, workers found themselves living and working many
miles from any community. These camp sites served primarily to locate workers near the forests
in which they worked. However they also served to keep the workers well away from other
potential employers and free from the distractions offered by a more populated area. With the
camp located far back in the unsettled forest, workers seldom traveled and visitors were rare.39
When a producer relocated from one remote area to another, he closed his existing camp
in the fall and began construction of the new one. The turpentine labor force, which commonly
followed the operator, did most o f the work building the new camp. They first erected fifteen to
forty cabins, depending on the number of workers. They next constructed a building to serve as a
store, office, and warehouse. In the area near the office, the owner built for himself a
comfortable house and a somewhat smaller dwelling for the woodsrider. Not far from this
central area, the workers constructed a barn for the horses and mules. Once these essential
buildings were complete, the workers moved from the old camp to the new and the new
commissary was stocked with groceries and supplies. Once the move was completed the men
began cutting boxes to begin production for the coming year. When all other buildings were
completed and work in the woods begun, the still went up. Workers first built the furnace, a steel
structure with a bricked exterior. Once they had completed the furnace, laborers placed the
copper still on top and constructed a wooden platform around the still base. They then built yet
another platform at the top o f the still with a ramp connecting it to the lower platform.40

39 S.G. Thigpen, A Bov in Rural Mississippi and Other Stories (Picayune, MS: S.G.
Thigpen, 1966), 177; Gene Burnett, “To Bum in a Turpentine Hell,” Florida Trend (October
1976): 100.
40 Thigpen. Bov in Rural Mississippi. 176-179.
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With a still, cooperage shed, glue shed, pump house, spirit shed, stable, blacksmith shop,
commissary, and workers’ quarters, many camps represented self-contained piney woods
enterprises. Operators tried to locate their camps near clear running streams that could furnish
water for the still’s cooling tank, for the mules and horses, and for washing clothes. A well in
the middle of the quarters provided drinking water. The cabins sat about fifty feet apart and were
arranged in rough rows, forming a grid pattern about one-fourth mile from the still. The owner’s
house, and often the overseer’s as well, sat a moderate distance from the quarters. The workers’
cabins, intended to serve only as temporary structures, were crudely and cheaply constructed,
often costing no more than $200 a piece to build. O f all workers in the postbelium South,
turpentine laborers endured perhaps the poorest housing. The typical turpentine laborer lived in
a two-room cabin with batten siding, wide pine boards nailed together either horizontally or
perpendicularly across the side with laths covering the cracks. Few cabins had screened
windows, but shutters were common. None had indoor plumbing. Many had dirt floors but it
appears that, over time, more and more were built with wood floors. A stick and clay fireplace
sat at one end of the cabin. For heating and cooking workers burned wood gathered from the
neighboring forest and, sometimes, dross, the residue that collected in rosin strainers. Nollie
Hickman finds that Mississippi turpentine workers lived in poorer quarters than the workers in
other states. Many o f the Mississippi cabins represented nothing more than one-room huts
constructed of pine poles and lacking floors, doors, and windows. When a family grew large, a
second room, really nothing more than a lean-to, was added. More skilled workers tended to live
in somewhat better housing. Dwellings for distillers, foremen, and woodsriders often had more
room and were better constructed than those of the regular workers. In some cases they cost
twice as much to build.41

41 Sandra Jo Forney, “Naval Stores Industry in North Florida Pine Flatwoods” (paper
presented at the sixteenth annual meeting o f the Society for Historical Archaeology, Denver,
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Turpentine workers usually ate three meals a day, all usually prepared by their wives
over the primitive cabin fireplaces. They ate breakfast in the woods between 8:00 and 9:00 after
they had been at work for a few hours. In the early afternoon, when the day’s heat was at its
greatest, they took a break for lunch. Supper, the heaviest meal o f the day, was eaten after work.
Molasses, bacon, and combread or maybe biscuits provided the bulk o f the turpentiner laborer’s
and his family’s diet. Workers supplemented these staples with coffee, mackerel, peas, beans,
rice, sugar, and occasionally beef, mutton, and cheese. All these foods they obtained from the
commissary. On occasion fresh fish or salted mullet arrived in the commissary or from peddlers
who traveled as far as fifty to sixty miles inland from the coast.42
The commissary account ledgers o f turpentine laborer, Tom Lud, who was employed by
South Carolina producer Thomas H. Osteen in 1872, provides insight into the purchasing
patterns of naval stores workers. Lud contracted to work for ten months from February 1 to
December 1. He was to work five days each week in both Osteen’s agricultural fields and
turpentine forest. Soon after Lud began work, he made some grocery purchases: one peck of
meal, one pound o f bacon, and a dozen eggs. He also brought a pair o f shoes for $2.25. On six
occasions he drew cash against his account, all withdrawals totaling $2.05. From the end of
March to mid June Lud’s pattern o f purchases remained relatively constant. He continued to buy
com, bacon, and other groceries, but his most frequent purchase was tobacco, which cost $.30 a

Colorado, 1983), 4; Thigpen, Bov in Rural Mississippi. 174-177; Carswell, “Holmesteading.”
143; Bond, “Development o f the Naval Stores Industry,” 200; Dwight Wilson, interview, tape
recording, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, St.
Augustine, FL; Wetherington, New South Comes to Wiregrass Georgia. 238; Hickman, “Black
Labor in Forest Industries,” 88; Account Book, Osteen Papers; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest
146-147; Armstrong, “Transformation o f Work,” 531; Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia of
American Forest and Conservation History (New York: Macmiliian Publishing Company, 1983),
s.v. “naval stores;” Vance, Human Geography of the South. 122; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber
Laborers,” 445.
42 Thigpen, Bov in Rural Mississippi. 177; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 150. Account
book, 1872, Osteen Papers.
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plug. One o f his most important buys was a stove for which he paid $1.60. He also continued to
debit his account periodically for cash. From mid-June to the end of December his grocery
purchases became more frequent and varied. To his staple o f flour and bacon he added molasses,
sugar, coffee, mackerel, beef, and mutton. The latter three items, however, appeared only
occasionally on Lud’s account During September he appears to have quit chewing. On several
occasions Lud’s account was deducted for missing work, at least once because he was sick. In
the last half o f the year he lost $12.24 for missed work. In October Lud’s account reached a
credit o f $ 16.21, but by the end of the year it had declined to only $ 1.89. Although Tom Lud
appears not to have made seasonal purchases, workers in other camps bought special items for
Christmas. In December 1882 Tom Sweath who worked for a Georgia turpentine operation
earned an extra $4.80 for cutting boxes beyond his task and, with the earnings, purchased
oranges, suspenders, four pounds of meat, candy, and cologne.43
Turpentine workers did not purchase all their food from the commissary, however. They
supplemented their diets with squirrels, possums, raccoons, rabbits, turtles, and other wild game.
They fished in local rivers and streams as well. Women and children not only tended gardens,
which grew turnips and collards, but raised pigs and foraged in the woods for edible herbs and
berries. Palmetto buds were reported to taste like cabbage and banban twigs resembled snap
beans in flavor.44
Women did not usually work at turpentining, except maybe dipping gum, but they often
supplemented their family’s income by cooking, cleaning, and washing for the producers’ and

43 Account book, 1872, Osteen Papers; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 443;
Mart A. Stewart, “What Nature Suffers to Groe:” Life. Labor, and Landscape on the Georgia
Coast 1680-1920 (Athens: The University o f Georgia Press, 1996), 216.
44 Forney, “Importance of Sites,” 2; Account book, 1872, Osteen Papers; Carswell,
“Holmesteading”. 143; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 202; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 150;
Bond, Jr., “Development o f the Naval Stores Industry,” 198.
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overseers’ wives. Chloe Lud, Tom’s wife, labored for such wages and contributed to her
household’s income. By working between four to twelve days each month at such jobs as
spreading manure, planting potatoes, dipping gum, chopping cotton, and, most commonly,
washing clothes, she was able to earn over $13.00. With these earnings she purchased bacon,
flour, mackerel, sugar, potatoes, cheese, and tobacco. She also contributed cash to the family.
At year’s end her account contained a credit of $ 1.11.45
Despite the presence o f families in camps, many turpentine workers were not legally
married. Instead, a couple might ask the camp manager for living quarters to share, upon which
he would ask them if they took each other as man and wife. Despite the informality of the
arrangement, these unions were respected, considered binding, and could last for decades. To
gain a divorce the couple also consulted with the boss who then assigned each to different
quarters.46
Few camps offered much by way o f diversions for the men and women living there. A
reporter noted that “while traveling through those pine woods, and seeing nothing but the few
huts and the turpentine still amid such a wilderness, I often wondered how man could thus
content himself.”47 Some workers found fulfillment by attending church. If camps lacked a
church, operators made arrangements for Sunday services to be led by one of the workers or an
itinerant preacher. Gambling and drinking were, however, more popular camp pastimes.
Payday, when workers received the balance of their monthly wages after their commissary

45 The account book does not identify Chloe Lud as Tom’s wife but the fact that they
share the same last name and Tom withdraws cash on her account makes it reasonable to assume
their relationship. Account book, 1872, Osteen Papers; Bond, “Development of the Naval Stores
Industry,” 198.
46 Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 148-149; Hickman, “Black Labor in Forest Industries,”
89.
47 “The Pine Plantation,” New York Tribune. 17 March 1866.
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accounts were deducted, was the most lively time in the camps.4* In the 1890s a Florida producer
complained that “I do not feel good one bit today. We paid off yesterday, and the negroes
gambled, sang, danced and caroused all night long. Some o f them are lying around asleep now,
while others are still gambling I guess from what I see. During the night the lucky ones would
come and call me to keep their winnings lest they lost them and the unlucky to beg an advance o f
a quarter or so.”49 Producers often found it very difficult to get any work done in the few days
following payday. However, they usually overlooked drinking and gambling and made no efforts
to control their workers as long as they were able to perform their jobs at a minimal level. Some
producers arranged for their workers’ transportation to the nearest town where goods unavailable
at the commissary could be purchased. Here workers received a break from the monotony of
camp life and could socialize with laborers from other turpentine operations.50
In most camps, located far from towns, the owner and overseer served all law
enforcement functions. Producers preferred to run their camps as they saw fit and resented the
intervention by outside authorities. The boss settled differences between the workers and
decided guilt and punishment. Most used their authority with moderation, adopting policies that
facilitated the camps smooth operation and maximum production. Justice ranked second in
importance. In cases where one black worker killed another the incident was rarely reported to
outside authorities and, if the murderer was a good worker, he was rarely punished. He would,
though, have to face retribution from his victim’s friends and relatives. Other bosses, however,
abused their near-absolute power in the isolated camps. One Hancock County, Mississippi camp
48 Bond, Jr., “Development o f the Naval Stores Industry,” 198; Hickman, Mississippi
Harvest. 149; “Peculiar to the South,” Indianapolis. Indiana Sentinel. 15 November 1896,
Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, North Carolina.
49 Hervey Evans to Mattie McNair Evans, 16 August 1899, Patterson Papers.
50 Hervey Evans to Mattie McNair Evans, 30 July 1899, Patterson Papers; Hickman,
Mississippi Harvest. 149-150.
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had such a bad reputation for violence against workers that many laborers avoided it. Another
camp in Harrison County was nicknamed “the graveyard” by area blacks because it was rumored
that many o f its workers disappeared, never to be heard from again.51
In many respects, life for turpentine workers changed little after the Civil War. Various
laws and practices restricted laborers movement between employers and the work remained
rooted in primitive technology. Turpentine workers occupied the lowest rung of black society.
Their standard o f living, education, and work were lower than that o f most other blacks who
worked in agriculture or at sawmills and viewed the turpentine laborers as backwards strangers
with little world experience. Historian E. W. Carswell maintains that the poor and transient
turpentine workers contrasted significantly with Florida’s established black families who entered
the state with white settlers during and after its territorial period.52 And Noliie Hickman argues
that “because o f his low income, his utter dependence on the white man, and his slave-like status
in relation to his employer, the turpentine Negro was considered inferior by others of his own
_ n53
race.

A comparison o f turpentine laborers with logging and sawmill workers reveals that,
despite similarities, those employed in the naval stores production endured harsher working and
living conditions. During the 1880s and 1890s, logging and lumber work increasingly became a
specialized, wage-earning occupation. The work, however, remained regular and reliable.
51 Dobson and Doyon suppose that black turpentine workers found camp life picturesque
and communal. They maintain that the camp offered a simple, secure existence and that workers
were attracted to the industry for its positive qualities. Dobson and Doyan, “Expansion o f the
Pine Oieoresin Industry,” 51; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 144-145, 152.
52 Michael D. Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern Turpentine
Industry, 1900-1930” (Ph.D. diss., University o f Florida, 1996), 23, 25-26; Forney, “Importance
of Sites,” 4; Hickman, “Black Labor in Forest Industries,” 88; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest.
139-140. E.W. Carswell. Washington: Florida’s Twelfth County (Chiplev. FL: E.W. Carswell,
1991), 255.
53 Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 139-140.
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Wages were low, although relatively adequate and attractive considering the alternatives, but
finances could become tight when the mill ran at reduced capacity, laid o ff workers, or reduced
hours. Poor market conditions or inclement weather, which prevented timber harvesting or its
transportation to the mill, could cause a slowdown at any time with little warning, just as in the
naval stores industry. However, even when the mills failed to run, the company continued to
charge the workers for rent, board, utilities, and commissary charges. Blacks, who represented a
significant portion of the timber industry work force, were attracted to lumber camps by the
demand for unskilled manual labor and the relatively stable cash income the industry offered,
which at least exceeded that in sharecropping. The constant competition for labor made workers
reasonably assured that they could ultimately find employment with another company.54
Both black and white workers spent a large part of their day with each other, especially
at logging camps. They rode to the logging site, worked, and spent much o f their free time
together. Both groups labored for the same hours at the same wage and even wore the same
uniforms. However, as in the naval stores industry, blacks rarely received the highest-paying
skilled jobs. Some companies, in fact, used only blacks in logging operations and just whites at
their sawmills. At logging camps whites filled the managerial and skilled labor positions. The
best opening blacks could receive was as log sawyer. At the mills whites and only select blacks
held positions, there too blacks performed the jobs that required the least skill. Blacks who did

54 Clark, Greening o f the South. 158-159; Jeffrey A. Drobney, “Company Towns and
Social Transformation in the North Florida Timber Industry, 1880-1930,” The Florida Historical
Quarterly 75 (Fall 1996): 122-124; Jeffrey A. Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers: LifeLabor. and Culture in the North Florida Timber Industry. 1830-1930 (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 1997), 112, 122, 124, 147, 180-181; Jerrell H. Shofner, “Negro Laborers and
the Forest Industries in Reconstruction Florida,” Journal o f Forest History 19 (October 1975):
183-184; Clark, Florida Trade Tokens. 3; Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers,” 447-449.
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labor in saw mills commonly enjoyed a standard o f living higher than that o f other loggers and
turpentine workers.55
As with turpentine camps, logging camps were transient, appearing in areas where
lumber companies planned to begin logging and disappearing when the trees were gone.
Buildings were consequently only temporary structures. The construction o f churches, schools,
or recreational areas was unfeasible. Few families lived in the logging camps. Most often these
camps worked twenty to forty men But as lumber companies began constructing their own
railroad tracks, they replaced the shanty camps with “camp trains.” Boxcars served as
dormitories, tool sheds, blacksmith shop, commissary, kitchen, segregated dinning halls and
private quarters for the foreman. Dormitory cars measured about twelve feet by forty feet and
were fitted with bunk beds. The kitchen car was normally in the middle of the camp train with
segregated dinning cars for whites and blacks on either side. The segregated dormitory cars were
attached to their appropriate dinning car. However some camps, instead of providing sleeping
cars for black workers, set up portable shacks which could be taken down and moved when the
camp train relocated. Meals, unlike sleeping and dining arrangements, were normally the same
for black and white workers. Workers received grits and oatmeal for breakfast but the staples for
other meals included pork or beef, combread or biscuit, peas or beans, and coffee. As with
turpentine laborers, timber workers purchased their supplies from the commissary using a ticket
system. At the end o f each month the commissary charges were deducted from wages and the
employees received any remaining amount in cash. It was not uncommon for workers to receive
nothing at month’s end. Many such camps had a juke joint where itinerant musicians, often hired
by the boss, provided entertainment But as rail lines and roads improved transportation in the

55 Drobney. Lumbermen and Log Sawvers. 85-86, 184-185; Drobney, “Transformation of
Work,” 106; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 140; Edward L. Ayers, The Promise o f the New
South: Life After Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 126; Clark,
Florida Trade Tokens. 3.
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southern pine region, companies no longer found it necessary to keep the workers in isolated
logging camps. Instead, they could live with their families in more permanent communities
established by the company and transported to and be from the logging site for work during the
day. These new communities resembled towns more than camps, housed several hundred people,
including women and children and offered far more conveniences and comforts than the typical
turpentine camp.56
Where virtually all turpentine workers endured living and working conditions worse than
those later lumber towns, leased convicts, suffered conditions even harsher than that of most.
During Reconstruction, first southern counties and then states began to lease their convicts as a
solution to rising prison populations and empty treasuries. They sought the maximum amount of
punishment at a minimum cost to the government. By 1880 all of the former Confederate states
except Virginia leased their convicts and in 1890 over 27,000 convicts performed labor in the
South.57
Georgia and Florida, the two principal naval stores-producing states during the late
nineteenth century, quickly established the practice after the war. With nowhere to house its

56 Jeffrey A. Drobney, “The Transformation o f Work in the North Florida Timber
Industry, 1890-1910.” Gulf Coast Historical Review 10 (Fall 1994): 99, 105-109.
57 However, the lease system, like peonage, predated the Civil War. Most southern states
had some system o f convict leasing—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North
Carolina, and South Carolina. Convicted criminals, who were unable to afford their fines, could
be hired out to anyone who paid it for them. If no one paid the fine, the sheriff would turn the
convict over to whomever bid the highest for a certain period o f labor. Under this system
laborers could find themselves forced back to work for employers who paid their fines. N.
Gordon Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida, 1866-1923” (Ph.D. diss., Florida State
University, 1964), 3-5; Jonathan M. Wiener, “Class Structure and Economic Development in the
American South, 1865-1955,” American Historical Review 84 (October 1979): 981; Jeffrey A.
Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing: Convict Labor in the North Florida Turpentine
Industry, 1877-1923.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 72 (April 1984): 413,416; William
Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 55; Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and
Punishment in the 19th-Century American South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984),
212 .
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prisoners once federal troops burned the state penitentiary, Georgia passed its first convict lease
act in December 1866. But it was not until 1868, when a hundred black prisoners went to work
constructing rail lines, that the provisional governor leased the first convicts under this new
legislation. In 1897 the Georgia General Assembly passed a new convict lease law that made the
system even more flexible. It prohibited the leasing o f convicts for longer than five years,
permitted subleasing, and placed bidding on a per-convict basis instead o f on the entire
population regardless o f number. Because convicts could now be sublet, employers no longer
had to pay for unneeded ones when business slowed. Also, because lessees paid for each
convict, the state could boost its revenue by increasing its number o f convicts. Thus between
1870 and 1910, the number o f convicts in Georgia grew ten times faster than the general
population. Most of the increase came from a sharp rise in the number of incarcerated young
black men who served increasingly lengthy sentences. In 1882, for example, the state’s black
convicts on average received sentences twice as long as whites for burglary and five times as
long for larceny.58
Florida, like Georgia, lacked the facilities in which to house them. The state’s first
solution was to incarcerate them at the old U.S. armory at Chattahoochee, which by 1869 held
three hundred convicts. The next year, however, it began experimenting with leasing by
contracting to lease fifteen convicts to cut and hew 200,000 feet o f lumber for a railroad trestle.
Over the next ten years, instead of developing its penitentiary system, Florida gradually moved
toward full-scale convict leasing. Under the Bourbons, the system received a boost from long
term leases and especially the allowance of subleasing. White support for the institution

58 E. Merton Coulter, James Monroe Smith. Georgia Planter: Before and After Death
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961), 64; Alex Lichtenstein, Twice the Work o f Free
Labor: The Political Economy o f Convict Labor in the New South (New York: Verso, 1996),
123; David M. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery:" Parchman Farm and the Ordeal o f Jim Crow
Justice (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 63.
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intensified with the discovery o f phosphate in the state in the 1880s, which spurred further
demand for convict labor. It was during this decade that convicts probably began work in the
naval stores industry.59
Like virtually all wage laborers in the naval stores industry, the great majority o f convict
workers were black. Whereas before the war most prisoners were white, after the war blacks
made up ninety percent. Historian Edward Ayers points out that the transformation in the
southern prison population resulted from the states’ assumption o f control over blacks after
emancipation freed them from their masters’ control. The measure rested on southern whites’
belief that blacks were innately criminal, would never work unless compelled, and that the white
south was entitled to cheap black labor for society’s good.60 To this end the white legal
establishment targeted blacks. J.C. Powell, a former turpentine camp captain, observed that in
the 1870s and 1880s “it was possible to send a negro to prison on almost any pretext, but difficult
to get a white man there, unless he committed some very heinous crime.”61 He asserted that “the
bulk of our convicts are negroes who could not by any possibility learn a trade, and how to
employ them at anything save the simplest manual toil is a problem not yet solved.”62 Whites
could and did become ensnared in the South’s lease system, but most camp captains, including
Powell, preferred to work black convicts. Because it required a serious offense for whites to be
sentenced to the penitentiary, white convicts tended to be more dangerous criminals than black
prisoners. White convicts typically resented work in the turpentine industry, labor they, like the

59 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 184; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,”
415; Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 25-26, 36,45-46, 109; Powell, American
Siberia, forward.
60 Ayers, Vengeance and Justice. 150,197, 199; Liechtenstein, Twice the Work of Free
Labor. 25,29; Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 34; Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge. 227.
61 Powell, American Siberia. 332.
62 Ibid., 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

318
rest o f the white community, viewed as fit only for inferior blacks. Whites therefore had a
reputation for working less, complaining more, and rebelling with greater frequency than black
convicts. Their resistance took the form of assaulting guards, escaping, attempting suicide,
performing low-quality work, and mutilating themselves in the hope o f receiving a hardship
pardon.63
Although a large percentage o f convicts labored in the turpentine production, especially
in Florida, their number remained a relatively small part o f the overall industry work force. In
1890, when turpentining in Florida had only just begun and a mere five hundred Floridians
worked in it, state convicts made up thirty-nine percent o f the labor force. Even then, fewer than
ten percent o f producers worked state convicts. On average, between 1880 and 1910 only seven
to eight percent o f naval stores workers were state convicts. In 1898, 734 Florida convicts,
seventy-one percent o f the state’s prison population, labored in the turpentine industry.64 Thus,
whereas naval stores production played a large role in the world o f convict leasing, the reverse
cannot be claimed; prisoners represented only a small portion of workers.
An analysis o f the Florida state convicts who labored in the turpentine industry in 1898
reveals a profile that changed little during the leasing program’s existence. The great majority of
prisoners, over eighty percent, were black men. Fifteen percent were white men, four percent
black women, and less than one percent white women. Over two-thirds o f the convicts sentenced
in 1898 were between the ages o f sixteen and thirty. One was as young as eleven and the oldest
was sixty-seven. More than half o f Florida’s convicts were sentenced for some type o f theft or

63 Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 212-213; Oshinsky, “Worse Than
Slavery.” 72, 165; Powell, American Siberia. 332.
64 Robert S. Blount, “Spirits in the Pines” ( M A thesis, Florida State University, 1992),
162-163: Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State o f Florida for the Period
Beeinning January 1. 1897. and Ending December 31. 1898 (Tallahassee: Tallahasseean Book
and Job Print, 1899), 93-99.
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breaking and entering and around twenty-two percent were serving time for either murder or
attempted murder. Only one percent were committed for rape or attempted rape. Just over sixty
percent were sentenced for less than three years, around fifty-seven percent for two years or less,
and thirty-eight percent for one year or less. Nearly a quarter received sentences of ten years or
more. O f the 734 convicts, fourteen were reported to have escaped, and two were killed by
guards while attempting escape. Thirty-five, or nearly five percent o f the convicts, were reported
to have died that year. It appears that Florida convicts leased to turpentine operators differed
little from the overall state convict population. This profile also resembles that of twenty-nine
Georgia convicts who labored at a Berrien County turpentine operation around the turn of the
century. O f these convicts, all but one were between the ages of fourteen and thirty-seven and
most were sentenced for gaming, larceny, carrying a concealed weapon, and attempting escape.65
Convict turpentine laborers performed the same tasks as free workers, almost always at
separate camps, but usually at a quicker pace. Convicts rose at 4:30 AM and by 5:00 AM were
on their way from the stockade to the forest work. They trotted to and from work on a squad
chain, by which the men were attached together at the waist. Once in the woods, a few miles
from the camp, they worked under the task system in three or four squads, each squad watched
by one or two guards. Guards followed the convicts through the woods, keeping as much
distance as would allow them to prevent a possible escape attempt. After resting for thirty
minutes for lunch, convicts resumed work until completing their tasks, which often kept them
busy until dusk. They then marched back to camp the same way they had left.66 Powell reported
that “they kept this gait up all day long, from tree to tree, and as the labor is exhausting in the
65 Report of the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida. 1897-1898, 81-85,
93-99; Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor. 130.
66 As during the antebellum period, the task system was necessary in turpentining to
gauge the amount o f work performed. Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 419-421;
Powell, American Siberia. 22,29; Lichtenstein, Twice the Work o f Free labor. 128-130.
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extreme, I have frequently seen men on their way back to camp drop o f fatigue, and their
comrades on the squad-chain drag them a dozen yards through the dirt before the pace could be
checked so as to enable them to regain their feet. There would be a prodigious clatter o f iron, a
cloud of dust, a volley o f imprecation, and the fallen man would stagger up, dash the dirt out of
his eyes, and go reeling and running on.”67 It was not uncommon for convicts to endure this
schedule six and even seven days a week.68
Not all convicts could withstand the intensity of such a demanding schedule.
Handicapped convicts presented special challenges to camp managers who were required to find
some niche for them. At one camp a blind convict was given work at a pump to which he learned
to find his way over time. An insane convict, described as an “idiot,” proved less useful. When
put to work in the forest, he attempted to eat the raw turpentine and returned to the camp with it
caked in his mouth. New convicts were ofren unable to keep up the prescribed pace and entered
a period o f depression and despondency. But within time, most reportedly developed the
physical stamina to endure. Depression associated with loss of family contact, however,
probably continued longer. According to one turpentine camp manager, convicts’ relatives and
friends usually forgot about them after a short period of incarceration. Within the first year of
their sentences convicts began receiving increasingly fewer letters and inside o f two years
correspondence usually ended completely. Many convicts lost their spouse as well. It was
widely believed that because a felony conviction was grounds for divorce, a prison sentence
automatically constituted one.69

67 Powell, American Siberia. 22.
68 Shelton, Pines and Pioneers. 202; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 141-142.420.
69 Powell, American Siberia. 17,122-123, 332-333.
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The chaplain who attended to Florida’s largely forgotten convicts faced the daunting task
of single-handedly ministering to the dejected population o f all the camps. Even he admitted that
“'owing to their scattered condition under subleases, [I] cannot effect much good.”70 During the
second half o f the 1890s, the chaplain visited fifteen o f the sixteen camps every nine weeks,
requiring him to travel annually between 2250 and 2500 miles, and preached between eighty-five
and ninety sermons. He went to the camp at Palatka in eastern Florida’s Putnam County only
twice because it required a hundred miles of extra travel and contained only sixteen convicts.71
From his rapid tour he concluded that “the health o f the camps . . . was very good, and they
seemed to be very well cared for.”72 He lamented, however, that the “morals o f all the camps
[were] as good as could be expected under the circumstances. We have one grand evil that exists
on some of the camps, to-wit: gambling.”73
Despite the chaplain’s claim to good “health o f the camps,” conditions at these scattered
facilities, in fact, varied greatly. Like all turpentine operations, those employing convicts
periodically moved to isolated areas in search of fresh pine stands. The initial camps at a new
site tended to be the most primitive. At one such camp in the late 1870s, convicts slept in a
twenty-foot by forty-foot log house on sloping platforms that ran one over the other down both
sides of the structure. At night a long chain running the length o f the bunk house was used to
secure smaller chains running from the convicts’ leg irons. The spaces between the building’s

70 Report o f the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State o f Florida for the Period
Beginning January 1. 1889. and Ending December 31. 1890 (Jacksonville: DaCosta Printing and
Publishing House, 1891), 141.
71 His effort, he reported, produced more than ten conversions a year. Report o f the
Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State o f Florida. 1897-1898,92; Report o f the Commissioner
of Agriculture o f the State o f Florida. 1895-96, 79.
72 Report o f the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State o f Florida. 1897-1898,92.
73 Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State o f Florida. 1895-96, 79.
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logs were not sealed, allowing wind, cold, and dampness to enter. However, during the summer
heat, the cracks, no doubt, provided welcome ventilation. Pine knots which burned in the middle
o f the floor, provided light. At night an armed guard kept watch at the front Guards stayed in
another primitive building constructed near the cell house. A simple lean-to served as the camp
kitchen where cooks prepared food on a dirt bank and hung their pots and kettles from pieces of
wire attached to its roof. Under these primitive conditions food preparation was hopelessly
unsanitary, especially in the summer when a layer of gnats often covered meals as they cooked.74
Within a short time more substantial camp facilities were constructed. A high stockade
typically surrounded turpentine convict camps. Inside the yard little vegetation grew. Most
buildings were constructed o f rough pine boards and whitewashed. The bunk house resembled a
warehouse and was the largest building in the camp. As much as one-hundred-feet long, both
houses usually had uncovered rafters and boards and, except for barred windows and postings of
the state prison authority’s rules, bare walls. Some even lacked floors, and in cold weather a fire
was built on the ground and the smoke allowed to escape however it could.
At many camps the structure was divided into a dining hall and sleeping quarters.
Bedding varied greatly; convicts at some camps had individual cots, but most slept on long
platforms covered with hay and blankets, with no sheets. In some cases unchanged bedding grew
disgustingly filthy. At one Florida camp bedding went unwashed for nearly a year. Sleeping
convicts were chained by their waist chains to a chain that ran the length o f the bunkhouse. At
night guards inspected each link to ensure its security. If a convict wished to change his sleeping
position, he had to call to the night guard and get his permission. The dinning hall contained a
heating stove, tables, and boxes and broken chairs for sitting. It appears that at some camps,
however, convicts came directly from work to the bunk house, chained a t their portion of the
74 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 418; Powell, American Siberia. 17-21,
275; Drobnev. Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 157.
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bedding platform, and ate their supper there. Convicts ate their fare using dishes, pans, and
spoons. Knives and forks were forbidden since they could be used as weapons. For bathing
convicts used barrels o f water placed in the sleeping quarters. Twenty-five to thirty convicts
used each barrel, which was commonly not emptied or cleaned, favoring the spread o f disease
and infection. In addition to the bunk house, camps contained a commissary, kitchen, pig pen,
and garden plot.75
Segregation policies appear to have varied among camps, despite state legislation that
forbade housing black and white convicts together. In the mid-I880s, Alabama forbade the
chaining of black and white convicts together when not at work. The rule applied to both state
and county convicts. The Georgia legislature, in 1891, went one step further and made it a crime
for convict lessees to chain blacks and whites together, even at work. Compared to Georgia,
Florida was slower and less radical in its requirement of separating prisoners. In 1905, it simply
forbade chaining men o f the two races together and four years later required counties to house
the races separately. Florida said nothing about work. Mississippi’s legislature in 1906 and in
1908 prohibited housing or feeding convicts together and stated that the races should work
separately when a separate arrangement was feasible. In his recollection o f experiences as a boss
of convicts at a turpentine camp, J.C. Powell makes no mention of separating convicts by race at
the camps he managed except in the case where a sublessee requested an all-black work unit. It
also appears that if a camp contained female convicts, special quarters were reserved for them.76

75 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 418-419; “Horrible Treatment o f
Convicts,” Jacksonville. Florida Times-Union and Citizen. 20 May 1899; Tenth Biennial Report
of the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida for the Period Beginning January 1.
1907. and Ending December 31. 1908 (Tallahassee: Union Label, 1909), 383-384; Powell,
American Siberia, forward, 18,21,39, 123-124, 289,338-339; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log
Sawyers. 156-157; Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 130.
76 Franklin Johnson, The Development of State Legislation Concerning the Free Negro
(New York: The Arbor Press, Inc., 1918), 64-65,93-94, 88,90, 135.
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As with housing arrangements, the quality of food in convict camps could vary from
adequate to condemnable. Diets typically consisted o f salt pork, pork fat or “white bacon,”
combread, black-eyed peas, rice, beans, sweet potatoes, and occasionally beef and fish, but at
one camp located twelve miles outside o f Palatka, Florida, convicts subsisted on meat and bread
that was not fully cooked.77 According to one observer, the camp commissary keeper exercised
considerable influence over provisions. He “is generally a very important individual in a convict
camp, for he controls, to a large extent, the food given not only to the men, but to the guards, and
to the captn., consequently the captn. and he are usually very good friends, each knowing that he
is to a certain extent, dependent on the other, and it often happens that the commissary man is the
real ruler of the camp, though nominally the captn. is responsible for what is done.”78 At some
camps convicts took the initiative themselves to supplement their diet. Because fresh pork was
rarely included as part o f camp meals, convicts sometimes killed and ate hogs stolen from either
the camp or neighboring farmers. They also foraged in the woods for wild game. One Florida
convict died after attempting to dig a ground tortoise from his burrow using a turpentine dipper.
When he crawled head-first into the hole to retrieve his prey, the ground caved in over him.79
Convicts leased to turpentine outfits

usually at the mercy o f incompetent guards.

Guarding convicts was a difficult and low-paying job Guards did not have to perform physically
exhausting labor, as did the convicts, but they did have to keep the same long hours guarding the
prisoners both in the camp and in the woods. They also lived in the rustic and isolated camps.
Because producers needed to keep costs low in order to make a profit in the frequently depressed
industry, guards received little compensation for their long work and primitive living condition.

77 “Horrible Treatment o f Convicts.”
78 “White Slavery in Florida,” New York Evening Post. 12 February 1898.
79 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 419; Powell, American Siberia. 21,
123-124, 338-339.
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The occupation, therefore, attracted generally unreliable workers. Most guards were young men
who lacked better prospects in the area surrounding each camp. Many worked sloppily, caused
trouble, and stayed at the job only a short time. There was, consequently, a constant turnover in
personnel. The inability to attract reliable white men as guards led some producers to use trusted
convicts to oversee other prisoners. Known as the trustee system, the practice was relatively
common but posed its own shortcoming. One camp manager found that trustees inspired
confidence in themselves by preventing other convicts from escaping, only to later use that trust
and the loosened restrictions it brought to run away themselves.80
Although convict camps provided employment for local men, many whites living in areas
surrounding the facilities strongly opposed their introduction into the community. Local whites
were especially averse to the trustee system. According to one report, frequent escapes did “not
give the citizens in the vicinity of the convict camps much feeling of security.”81 After trustees
reportedly committed a series of crimes in the early 1890s, concerned local citizens complained
to the Florida Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions and petitioned that the trustee system
be abolished. In other localities citizens protested by more direct means. At one Taylor County,
Florida, turpentine operation a black convict who became lost in the woods was marched back to
camp at gun point by an angry white man. Another black convict from the same operation found
himself fired upon as he approached a house to have an ax sharpened. Other local whites
sabotaged turpentine operations that used convict labor by removing the gum from boxes,
throwing it on the ground, and replacing it with dirt. More cunning protesters drove nails into
the pines just above the last chip. The next swipe with the hack resulted in a broken blade. As a

80 Powell, American Siberia. 29, 41-42, 304-305; Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 74;
Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 116,230-231; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are
Blowing,” 418.
81 Report of the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida. 1889-1890, 141.
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result o f such action at one camp a dozen hack blades broke in one day, greatly interrupting
work.82 In 1896 the neighbors o f an Alachua County, Florida, turpentine operation complained
about the inhumane treatment of the convicts and threatened that “if the county or state officers
do not do something to prevent it, they will rise en masse and release every convict in the
_ _ _ _ _ ii83
camp.

Camp bosses and guards maintained order and an exhausting work pace through the use
of brutal punishment, most commonly with beatings. It appears that, beginning in the 1870s,
most convict camps replaced the whip with a strap of tough leather measuring one and a half feet
by three inches and attached to a wooden handle. Until the turn o f the century there was no legal
restriction on the number o f blows a convict could receive or on the frequency they could be
administered. Whippings could easily become uncontrolled, sadistic forms o f torture and even
death. At their discretion, a warden could turn the event into a cruel game for his amusement.
For example, when a Florida camp boss caught one of his convicts stealing dinner rations, he
forced a woman with whom the prisoner collaborated to administer the first blows. She made
gentle strokes with the strap until the boss threatened her.84 “At this stage,” he explained, “the
negress fully believed that her life depended upon her vigor, and she beat a devil’s tattoo upon
the prostrate trusty.”83 Once satisfied that the woman had exhausted her physical strength, the

82 The Board’s subsequent resolution that forbid the use of trustees outside the stockade
without the presence o f armed guards met with opposition from lessees who complained that
such action would bring an expensive hardship. Report o f the Commissioner of Agriculture o f
the State o f Florida for the Period Beginning January 1. 1893. and Ending December 31. 1894
(Tallahassee: John G. Collins, State Printer, 1895), 62-63; Powell, American Siberia. 327-328,
332-333.
83 “Trouble Threatened,” Jacksonville. Florida Times-Union. 9 February 1896.
84 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 429; Powell, American Siberia. 21,
130-131; Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 75-77; Clarissa Olds Keeler, The Crime o f Crimes or
The Convict System Unmasked (Washington, DC: Clarissa Olds Keeler, 1907), 11.
85 Powell. American Siberia. 131.
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warden took the strap and continued beating the convict himself. The boss then forced the
convict to beat his female accomplice. The warden described with amusement how “the scene of
their late loves reechoed to the thuds of the strap and the screams, pleas, and protests o f his
quondam sweetheart.” Once the ordeal was complete, the boss pronounced the convict’s
flogging “artfully performed.”*6 He believed that such punishment was neither harsh nor
unjustifiable. “The life o f the convict was hard,” he explained, “and the punishments often
severe, but they were not inhuman, and were invariably necessary, not only for our safety but for
the safety o f the peaceably disposed prisoners.”87 Moreover, the boss added, the rough nature of
the convicts, whom he characterized as ‘“Cracker outlaws’ and cut-throat negroes,” necessitated
harsh punishment.88 Powell also believed that severe punishment was required because
discipline was more difficult to maintain when convicts spent most o f their days outside the
camp. Other captains, however, apparently relied (ess on the strap. At one especially well run
camp near Floral City, Florida, beatings occurred only six times a year.89
Beating was not the only method of discipline in turpentine convict camps. Some
wardens devised more cruel and unusual forms o f punishment. They had convicts strung up by
their thumbs and left teetering on their toes for hours. At the largest turpentine business in
Florida, a sick convict who failed to work was hung by handcuffs from a tree branch so that his
feet dangled above the ground. When he screamed from the pain after twenty minutes, a guard

“ Ibid., 131-132.
87 Ibid., 118.
88 Ibid., 30
89 Matthew Mancini puts the late nineteenth century use o f the lash in the perspective of
its time. Flogging, he explains, did not carry today’s connotation o f cruelty and was generally
regarded by older Americans in the late 1800s as a common and acceptable form o f discipline
within the home, school, farm, and factory. Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 77; “White Slavery
in Florida.”
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severely beat him with a grape vine. Others endured the especially cruel “ordeal by water” in
which guards strapped down a prisoner, forced a funnel into his mouth, and poured water down
his throat. The victim’s expanded stomach caused great pain and sometimes death.90
Georgia records for 1895 and 1896 indicate that turpentine camps had a much lower rate
of hospitalization, twelve percent, than did the overall convict population, thirty-nine percent.
However, this statistic no doubt says more about the primitive and isolated nature of turpentine
camps-which were notorious for lacking hospital facilities—than about the frequency o f illness or
injury.91 In fact the Georgia penitentiary physician complained that “under the present
management the prisoners are frequently moved to places where there is no preparation to care
for them, and on this account they suffer a great deal.”92 However, those turpentine camps that
reported hospitalization indicated that convicts working in the naval stores industry suffered
from the same illness and injuries as did those in other work camps. Respiratory diseases,
bilious fever, intestinal ailments, and cuts were common in all camps. Some camps experienced
attacks from contagious diseases. For example, one-half o f the convicts hospitalized at Camp
Magnolia in Clinch County, Georgia, in 1895-1896 had influenza. Prisoners suffered the greatest
amount o f illness and death during the summer months when the heat was most intense. The
rainy months of July and August also adversely affected convicts who caught chills, fever, and
pneumonia afrer working in water. Convicts also contended with diseases they brought with
them into the camps, especially tuberculosis and venereal disease.93 In the late 1890s the
90 Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 115; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are
Blowing,” 429.
91 Annual Report o f the Principal Physician o f the Georgia Penitentiary from October 1.
1895. to October 1. 1896 (Atlanta: George W. Harrison, State Printer, 1896), 117-142.
92 Ibid., 110.
93 Ibid., 109, 117-142; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 428-429; Blount,
“Spirits in the Pines,” 164.
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managers o f a Florida turpentine camp that employed convicts reported that “the main sickness
we have to contend with is bilious attacks. We have to give quite a lot o f them blood medicines
to keep their blood in condition, as they have old cases o f different kinds that return
occasionally.”94
Although it is difficult to know the exact rate of mortality for convict laborers in
turpentine, it appears to have been twice as high as the overall prisoner population’s. In general,
mortality among all leased convicts varied depending on their treatment and the business in
which they worked. Convicts leased to plantations tended to have a better chance o f surviving to
the end o f their sentence than those who worked in coal mines, railroad camps, and turpentine
operations. At their very worst, death rates could run as high as twenty-five percent. Historian
Robert S. Blount, however, finds that official reports list prisoner death rates over the years of
Florida’s leasing practice at between one and four percent. But at some camps the frequency was
higher. In 1899 twelve out o f fifty-five convicts who labored at a Padgett, Florida, turpentine
camp died. Located in a low palmetto flat, the camp was wet much of the year.95
Convicts who endured these terrible working and living conditions had little means of
voicing complaint. State prison officials visited the isolated camps infrequently and, if a prisoner
had the rare opportunity to speak to a state official, it was the convict’s word against the guards’
and warden’s. Except for the name of the lessee, Florida had no knowledge o f exactly who was
in charge o f the convicts, under what conditions they worked and lived, or how often or brutally

94 Report o f the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida. 1897-1898, 88-89,
98.
95 As high as the mortality rate could climb in the worst turpentine camps, convicts in
other states had an even lower chance o f survival. In two years, 101 o f324 convicts who worked
for the Sloss Steel and Iron Company in Alabama died, half from tuberculosis. In 1895 and 1896
tuberculosis and pneumonia killed another 265 convicts. Keeler, The Crime of Crimes. 7;
Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”. 67; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 428;
Blount, “Spirits in the Pines,” 164; Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 66; Carper, “Convict Lease
System in Florida,” 130.
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they were punished.96 By the late 1890s, however, Florida began limited efforts to bring convict
leasing under tighter state control. The Commissioner o f Agriculture who had charge o f the
Florida convict lease system, a state legislative committee, inspection agents who reported to the
Commissioner o f Agriculture, and a prison chaplain all made periodic visits to the convict
camps. Every twelve to fifteen months the Commissioner of Agriculture made a short visit to
each camp and interviewed the convicts to see if they had any complaints. Only rarely though
did prisoners report any problems, knowing that, although their discussions with the
Commissioner were conducted in the warden's and guards' absence, the trustees would report the
conversation. Convicts also understood all too well that the captain and guards would tell a
different story and that they would more likely be believed. The same circumstances prevented
convicts from discussing grievances with the legislative committee that visited camps every two
years. In the days preceding the committee’s visit, which was announced in advance, camp
conditions underwent a transformation. Living quarters and clothes were cleaned, the food got
better, and whippings decreased.97 State inspectors made more frequent visits than the legislative
committee, but the law seriously restricted their ability to thoroughly examine camp conditions.
In 1896 a frustrated agent asked the governor that “the law be amended so as to enlarge the
duties of the Agent, authorizing him in his visits to inspect the quarters, and look after the
management and treatment o f the convicts, and see that the contracts with the lessees are
complied with. Under the present law, the Agent has no authority to look after these matters.”98

97 Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 116; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log
Sawyers. 156: Tenth Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State o f Florida.
1907-1908, 384; “White Slavery in Florida.”
98 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture o f the State o f Florida for the Period
Beginning January I. 1895. and Ending December 31. 1896 (Tallahassee: Florida Printing
Company, 1897), 78-79.
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Inspections were typically superficial and uncritical. One agent, for example, found all
camps in generally good condition but at one recommend that a new bunk house be built99
Another reported that he made “a tour o f inspection o f the several convict camps of the State, to
correct certain abuses and improper use o f authority which had been reported. In every camp
except one—o f which due report was made—we found the convicts well cared for, well fed and
clothed, and but little sickness among them.”100 The fact that at least one agent was a naval
stores manufacturer himself calls into question the reliability o f both the inspectors and the
system reliability.101
Although they possessed severely limited ability to complain to officials, convicts in
turpentine camps resisted harsh conditions in other ways. One convict feigned insanity to avoid
work. He began speaking gibberish and cut down a tree which he was supposed to be boxing. In
response he was whipped, the camp manager reported, “until he admitted the ruse and promised
to drop it in the future. He had no more attacks after that, and made it a point to take new
prisoners aside and warn them in a fatherly way against the insanity dodge.”102 In a more
dramatic attempt to avoid the hard work, another convict, while cutting boxes, he drove his ax
through his foot, cutting a severe gash. The wound, however, healed well enough for him to get
about sufficiently to split wood. Still miserable, he again cut his foot, but this time the deep
wound refused to heal and he died o f gangrene after suffering in agony. Other more desperate
convicts attempted suicide. When a guard threatened to whip a convict for not working hard

99 W.J. Hillman to W.D. Bloxham, 25 July 1903, Convict Lease Program Subject Files,
1889-1916, Board of Commissioners of State Institutions, Florida State Archives.
100 Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State o f Florida. 1895-1896,78.
101 W.J. Hillman to W.D. Bloxham, 25 July 1903, Convict Lease Program Subject Files,
1889-1916.
102 Ibid., 64.
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enough, the distraught prisoner, a black preacher sentenced for stealing cotton, used a boxing ax
to slit his throat. Missing his jugular vein but severing his windpipe so severely that his tongue
dropped through the gapping cut, he was capable o f only making a faint whistling sound to get a
guard’s attention. He recovered after receiving stitching for the wound. In yet another instance a
poor white man sent to prison for murdering his brother-in-law refused in disgust to chip faces.
When threatened with a whipping, he defiantly ordered a guard to shoot him, then attempted to
break his skull with the weighted end o f his hack. He, too, survived his self-inflicted wound.103
Escape, however, was the most common form o f resistance. Escapees represented a
double loss for the camp. Not only did the producer loose the labor for which he had already
paid, but if the convict was not caught within two months, the operator had to pay a twohundred-dollar fine. Some convicts appear to a have attempted escape spontaneously out of
desperation. One Florida convict in the 1890s tried to escape after the entire camp received fifty
lashes one night for not chipping their required task. When they were threatened with the same
punishment the next day, he tried to get away. Another convict used more cunning in escaping
from a Florida turpentine camp. One night he succeeded in cutting his chain and sneaked off his
bunk and toward the cell house door. When the patrolling guard turned his back, the convict
pushed the backdoor wide open, blocking the guard’s view o f him, slipped around the side of the
building, and left the camp never to be seen again. In Georgia, where figures are relatively
complete, 1,174 convicts escaped during the lease’s forty year existence. In the 1890s the typical
escaped convict laborer in Florida was a black male who fled after serving less than one year for
either robbery or murder.104

103 Ibid., 60-63.
104 Coulter, James Monroe Smith. 69; Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 118.
Powell, American Siberia. 79. For five o f these forty years the number for escapes is unavailable.
Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 68; Report o f the Commissioner of Agriculture o f the State of
Florida. 1897-1898, 90.
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Because recapturing convicts proved difficult once they made their way away from
camp, if guards happened to see them on the run, they shot them. Apparently guards used little
restraint with their aim, shooting to kill rather than merely to halt the fleeing prisoner. At one
Florida turpentine camp three convicts out o f around fifty were killed in escape attempts. At
another Florida camp a guard shot an escaping convict twice and, once he was down, shot him a
third time. He lingered before dying. In Florida from 1874 to 1920, an average o f seven state
convicts died each year from gunshot wounds they received while trying to escape.10s
Once convicts successfully made it out o f the camp, four conditions aided them in
alluding authorities. First, there existed no procedural method for capturing convicts. Camp
bosses and guards coordinated the effort as best they could. If a convict successfully slipped
away from a camp, guards used hounds to track him. Camp managers trained young hounds for
this job by ordering trustees to run through the woods and putting the pups on his trail soon
afterwards. Many convict camps used fox hounds for this task because their slower speed
enabled the guards on horseback to keep up with them. However, if the hounds failed to track an
escapee within a few hours o f his departure, his likelihood of recapture dropped to less than
thirty percent.106 Second, within the surrounding areas there was a great demand for black labor,
especially workers who already possessed skills in turpentining. Escaped convicts found little
difficulty in securing employment in out-of-the-way naval stores operations, which hid them
from recapture. Third, the area’s white citizens, who tended to despise the black convicts but
often hated the convict lease system even more, sometimes agreed to assist escapees in an effort
to discredit the system. Fourth, the wild, inhospitable countryside surrounding camps offered a
safe haven for runaways. Some parts o f the turpentine belt, especially the area closest to the

105Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 118; Blount, “Spirits in the Pines,” 164;
“Horrible Treatment o f Convicts.”
106 Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 162; Powell, American Siberia. 24.
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Gulf, were vast swamps with virtually impenetrably thick vegetation and with very little
settlement, even by the standards o f the sparsely-populated piney woods region. The escapees
who lived in this coastal area survived off what the wilderness provided. Deer, black bear,
caterouts, wild hogs, foxes, wolves, rabbits, raccoons, and panthers were plentiful in the dense
woods. Escapees built log huts with dirt floors and animal skin bedding. They occasionally
emerged from their hideouts only to purchase such supplies as powder and shot.107 Historian
Matthew Mancini concludes that “literally thousands o f escaped convicts must have inhabited
the late-nineteenth-century Southern landscape.” 108
A comparison o f convicts involved in turpentine manufacture and those involved in other
types o f business reveals that prisoners who labored in naval stores production both experienced
unique conditions and shared experiences with other convicts. Of the convicts leased to
Florida’s railroad camps, phosphate mines, and turpentine operations, reportedly “none can
suffer more than the convicts sub-let to work in turpentine forests.”109 The convicts at one
turpentine camp dreaded the work so much, they rejoiced when the state leased them to a
planter.110 “The fact was that the work at the pine woods, particularly the chipping, had broken
down most of the long-time men,” J.C. Powell explained. “They were eager to exchange the
hack and dipper for the plow and hoe.”1" The convicts who were fortunate enough to be spared

107 Powell, American Siberia. 31, 324-325,324-326.
108 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 68.
109 Keeler, Crime of Crimes. 13.
110 In Florida a division of the state convicts occurred every few years. When it
occurred, the lessee and the sublessees often changed. All convicts were collected at a central
point for redistribution, an ordeal that no doubt resulted in considerable stress from being
uprooted from one area and sent into unknown conditions. Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are
Blowing,” 427-428; Powell. American Siberia. 134, 138.
111 Powell, American Siberia. 341.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

335

turpentine work, had good reason to feel thankful. Powell reported that farm work proved “much
more satisfactory to the convicts themselves than any other at which they have ever been
engaged. In point o f severity it is not to be compared to turpentine culture, and the facilities for
obtaining fresh vegetables on the farm is a matter of the first importance.” 112 But although work
and punishment at turpentine convict camps were more difficult and harsh than those at other
types of operations, in other ways conditions appear to have closely resembled camps for
convicts engaged in other types of work, both industrial and agricultural. In the late 1880s and
early 1890s, seventy-five percent o f convicts who worked in Tennessee coal mines were black.
Most lived in rough board structures and slept on planks covered by filthy ticking stuffed with
straw. Their diet consisted o f combread, pork, black-eyed peas, beans, and coffee. Whipping
was the most common form o f punishment. Convicts leased to agricultural operations
experienced similar conditions. At one Georgia plantation convicts lived in a long bunk house
and were chained in at night. The entire camp was surrounded by a stockade.113
Despite convict leasing’s characteristically brutal nature and distinction as a form o f
forced labor, the practice, whether in industrial pursuits or agriculture, represented neither a form
of slavery nor a functional replacement for it. Although both systems were forms of forced
labor, they each operated quite differently. First, slaveholders carried the cost of sustaining the
entire slave community which included such relatively unproductive members as the elderly, the
sick, and young children. Convict employers concerned themselves mostly with productive men.
A second difference is the low financial interest that the lessee had in the convict. Whereas each
slave represented a considerable investment to his owner, lessees had little long-term financial
stake in the individual convict. The latter’s death, release, or escape consequently did not

112 Ibid., 349.
113 Keeler, Crime o f Crimes. 4-5. Coulter, James Monroe Smith. 74-75, 79.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

336
represent a significant loss.114 As capital, slaves were important individually where as convicts
were only collectively so. As one early twentieth century reformer found, “the lessee has no
interest in the convict except to secure the largest amount o f labor in a given time. What matters
it to him if the convict’s health is broken down? There are plenty o f more convicts.” 115 This
endless supply reinforced the cruel treatment o f convicts who were important to their employer
only as a group not as individuals. But despite the less individual value of convicts compared to
slaves, financial cost o f convict leasing could present a greater problem than the experience of
slave ownership when seasonal work cycles or economic downturns created periodic idleness
during which time the maintenance cost for the entire convict work force continued. Whereas
individual slaves could be sold or hired out, convicts were leased in lots and, until changes in
state legislation, could not be subleased.116
Despite this economic drawback, analysis o f convict leasing in the turpentine industry
largely supports recent scholarship that argues that convict leasing helped to modernize the
southern economy by providing a cheap and reliable labor force for a region short o f investment
capital. Edward Ayers contends that the convict lease system helped in the transition from an
agricultural economy to one o f fuller capitalist development by providing a reliable labor at a
fixed and predictable price and therefore helping produce quick profits.. Convicts could be
driven to work at a more rapid pace and for longer hours than free workers would tolerate and at
difficult jobs that free workers shunned.1'7 Charles K. Dutton, a New Yorker and head of a naval

1,4 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 20-24.
115 Keeler, Crime o f Crimes. 14.
116 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 24.
117Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 49-50, 143-144; Drobney, Lumbermen
and Log Sawyers. 151; Shofner, “Negro Laborers,” 183; Clark, Greening of the South. 22;
Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”. 70; Ayers, Vengeance and Justice. 4,185, 191-193.
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stores company, explained that he leased Florida convicts because “turpentine culture was
exhausting work, and it was difficult to obtain enough labor for the proper cultivation o f any
great number o f trees. Natives o f Florida’s piney woods would quickly abandon the work when
any other type o f livelihood became available.”118
Alex Lichtenstein agrees that convict leasing supplied a reliable and predictable labor
force required o f the South’s developing iron mines, railroad construction, brick yards, sawmills,
and turpentine camps. Instead o f repressing the region’s industrial economy, he argues, “convict
labor was a central component in the South’s modernization.”119 The region was poor in capital
and rich in natural resources and convict labor offered a solution for industrial growth.
Lichtenstein finds that economic modernization is commonly tied to forced labor as producers
attempt to control workers who resist entering wage labor relationships, a situation that was
especially so among naval stores producers. Lichtenstein explains that “the combination of labor
uncertainty, production on a narrow margin, destructive methods o f extraction, seasonality,
geographic mobility, and isolation encouraged many turpentine operators to look to the county
courts for their labor supply. Forced labor, he argues, is also often a necessary phase in the
process of capital accumulation that enables capitalist development. Finding itself at an
economic disadvantage with so little investment capital, the South used forced labor to spur its
economic progress without upsetting the traditional racial order.120 Thus instead o f repressing
the region’s industrial economy, Lichtenstein argues, “convict labor was a central component in
the South’s modernization.”121 He concludes that “progress is not necessarily progressive for all

118Quoted in Ayers, Vengeance and Justice. 192.
119 Lichtenstein, Twice the Work of Free Labor, xvii.
120 Ibid., xv-xvi, 4-5,11-13, 19-20, 170-171, 187-188, 195.
121 Ibid., xvii.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

338
peoples, and that the bearers of modernity frequently carry with them its antithesis.”122 But
whereas the manner in which producers employed convicts in the naval stores industry certainly
fits this argument, the relatively small number o f such workers involved in turpentine
manufacture, less than ten percent, calls into question the degree to which production owed its
continuation to convict leasing.
When combined with similar findings by other scholars who examine the restricted
freedom o f wage laborers, the broader argument that varying forms and degrees o f forced labor
helped the South develop economically appears valid with regard to the naval stores industry,
which with slavery’s end, turned to two alternative means o f forcing blacks to work, debt
peonage and convict leasing. David L. Carlton maintains that although peonage was not unique
to the South, the practice was more widespread in the region because of the undercapitalized
economy that consisted primarily o f export agriculture and extractive industries that required
routinized and relatively unskilled labor. It is, therefore, not surprising, Pete Daniel adds, that
the cotton belt, especially the Mississippi Delta, the turpentine region, particularly south
Georgia, North Florida, and southern Alabama and Mississippi, and railroad construction camps
throughout the South produced the most peonage complaints.123 In his doctoral dissertation
Michael Tegeder, like Lichtenstein, finds no contradiction between forced labor and economic
development as well as no significant divide between planters and industrialists or antebellum
and postbellum economics. He maintains that “continuities in the development of forced labor in
southern turpentine production were not incompatible with the postbellum process of
modernization.”124 Turpentiners, who commonly struggled under debt themselves and could

122 Ibid., 195.
123 David L. Carlton, “The Revolution from Above: The National Market and the
Beginnings of Industrialization in North Carolina,” The Journal o f American History 77
(September 1990): 447; Daniel, Shadow o f Slavery. 21; Tegedar, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 14-15.
124 Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines,” 21-22.
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expect low profit margins at best, sought financial relief by reducing their labor costs to barely
more than subsistence wages. Labor expenses accounted for between fifty and sixty percent o f
production costs and, unlike expenses o f leases, tools, and supplies, which were fixed, the
producer had some control over them. Forced labor offered the turpentiner the ability to pay low
wages and still enjoy a relatively reliable labor supply.125
In the three decades following the Civil War, considerable continuity existed between
the naval stores workers’ antebellum and postbellum experiences. Labor laws—enticement,
emigrant agent, vagrancy, and contract legislation—and the movement o f free labor that they
restricted, combined with convict leasing, forced many southern blacks to toil at turpentine
production against their will. Although most such workers received wages, often low and based
on piece work, the legal system commonly left them little choice in terms o f their employment.
Laborers continued to work at the same tasks as before the war and to lived in camps that
remained isolated, primitive, and transient. For convicts, work requirements were greater, the
living conditions more isolated and crude, and the brutality visited upon workers more intense
than those o f wage laborers. Although these conditions could also be found in other areas of
southern business such as agriculture and especially the lumber industry, they were perhaps
more broadly characteristic o f the naval stores industry.

,25 Ibid., 13,49, 52.
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Chapter Eight
Change at Last:
Government Involvement and Naval Stores Industry Innovation

During the first decades of the twentieth century, the naval stores industry, with
considerable assistance from the newly formed federal Bureau of Forestry, at long last began
successful efforts to adopt less destructive production methods than those employed since the
business began in the American colonies centuries earlier. University-trained researchers
pioneered practices that not only produced a higher-grade gum than the older practice o f boxing,
but also caused less harm to the tree. Their successes then fostered a more receptive
environment for scientific forestry among many producers, which allowed for further
improvements. These innovations ultimately averted the impending forest depletion that had
brought the industry to the brink of collapse. The naval stores industry not only benefited from
federal forestry efforts, but also from research and experiments conducted by the Bureau o f
Chemistry. Where the Bureau of Forestry focused on improving gum harvesting, the Bureau of
Chemistry worked to advance distilling and marketing o f turpentine and rosin. Together, these
government agencies introduced significant changes to the conservative industry.
Indeed, the likely threat of deforestation spurred many turpentine producers to consider
at last alternative, less-destructive methods o f harvesting gum. By the early twentieth century,
the naval stores industry’s growth, its continued movement into the deep South’s dwindling
virgin pine forests, and producers’ persistent use o f destructive harvesting practices presented
manufacturers with an impending crisis. Operators began to take note when their production
costs rose in relation to returns and, more ominously, when their most conservative estimates
predicted that, at the then current rate o f boxing, virgin timber supplies would disappear before

340
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1920.1 The reduced timber acreage by the turn o f the century was not only reflected in higher
prices, but was visually obvious as well. In 1901, one Georgia resident recalled that “in 1864
when I first went over the railroad from Savannah to Thomasville there was an almost unbroken
forest o f magnificent pines extending from Bryan to Thomas Co. through which the railroad cut
its way like a ditch—but now one may go over the same rout [sic] and scarcely see a merchantable
pine—From most o f the visible land the timber is entirely gone and the same state o f things
prevails in much o f the piney woods part of the state—If these lands were covered with well tilled
farms it would be well enough but most of them are barren desolate wastes.”2 About the same
time, a naval stores factor complained that “the people o f Georgia are disposing of one of
themost [sic] valuable assets o f the state without receiving adequate compensation therefor.” He
argued that “if the law making power of Georgia had taken up actively the preservation o f the
forests twenty years ago, the value o f real estate within the pine belt would have been many
millions more than it is to-day.”3
Similar conditions existed in Florida. In 1902, a naval stores factor explained that during
the short time the turpentine industry had existed in that state rapid tree loss “has brought about
conditions which the people o f the South have too long ignored, and the time is fast approaching
when the method employed by the native turpentine operators must be replaced by a more
scientific and less extravagant mode o f operation. Other nations and other people long since

1Charles H. Herty, A New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding (Washington, DC: United
States Department o f Agriculture, 1903), 9-10; A.W. Schorgerand H.S. Betts, The Naval Stores
Industry (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 19 IS), 1-2; Thomas D.
Clark, The Greening o f the South: The Recovery o f Land and Forest (Lexington: The University
Press o f Kentucky, 1984), 162; J.P. Williams to Charles H. Herty, 20 November 1900, Charles
Holmes Herty Collection, Special Collections, The Robert W. Woodruff Library, Emory
University.
2 Archibald Smith to Charles H. Herty, 7 June 1901, Herty Collection.
3 J.P. Williams to Charles H. Herty, 20 November 1900, Herty Collection.
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went the way we are so blindly pursuing and have perceived the error of that way, and have
forced private greed to give way to the public good by a wise and efficient system o f forestry.
And why may not the people o f the South profit by their dearly bought experience and take steps
to profit and maintain the wealth still stored up in their forests? Such protection cannot come too
soon.’'4 Others were concerned about the effect that the unsightly, denuded forests would have
on Florida’s growing tourist industry.5
Despite the failure o f late-nineteenth-century efforts to develop a less destructive gumharvesting technique to help avert the destruction o f the forests, an inventor, in 1900 attempted to
find a new way. Bom in Milledgeville, Georgia, in 1867 and educated at the University of
Georgia and The Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Charles H. Herty sailed to Germany in 1899 to
continue his chemistry studies. Although trained as a “pure” chemist in the United States, his
experiences in Germany led him to believe that he could best use his education for practical ends.
He was especially interested in advancing his native South’s economic condition by improving
the region’s existing industries and helping it develop the technology to start new ones. His
interests in the turpentine industry were stirred by his favorite lecturer in Charlottenburg,
Germany, who described the American turpentine industry as “butchery” and insisted that,
without change, it would disappear. Transforming the naval stores industry was just the crusade
Herty sought.6

4 “Turpentine Industry,” New York Tribune. 26 January 1902, Turpentine news clipping
file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
5 Winthrop Packard, Florida Trails: As Seen From Jacksonville to Key West and From
November to April Inclusive (Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, Publishers, 1910), 279.
6 Gerry Reed, “Saving the Naval Stores Industry: Charles Holmes Herty’s Cup-andGutter Experiments, 1900-1905,” Journal o f Forest History 26 (October 1982): 168; Germaine
M. Reed, Crusading for Chemistry: The Professional Career o f Charles Holmes Hertv (Athens:
The University of Georgia Press, 1995), 12, 14. Until the early twentieth century, the United
States relied on Germany, France, and Sweden to train foresters and advance research. Clark,
Greening of the South. 37.
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Herty spent the academic year of 1900/1901 serving on the faculty at the University of
Georgia and contemplating the problems of American turpentine production methods. He
corresponded with producers and visited south Georgia to view first-hand the effects that
traditional gum harvesting practices had on the pine trees. He learned how the destructive
methods had driven the industry southward and closely examined the problems boxing caused.
The box, he discovered, not only weakened the tree’s structure, left it open to infection and
insect attack, and reduced its vitality by interfering with the circulation o f sap between the root
and the needles, but it also reduced the pine gum yield. Weaker trees produced less gum than
those not stressed by having a cavity cut into their bases. And because the box received the gum
at a fixed point, no matter how high the face climbed, in all but the first years of harvesting the
traditional system delivered resin that had deteriorated from ever-increasing exposure to light and
air.7 Herty found the naval stores industry wasteful in several other ways. First, the persistent
deterioration o f the forest and the utter absence of any effort to encourage new growth doomed
the industry’s future. Next, the gum collection method was inefficient, leaving portions o f each
year’s harvest wasted on the ground. “We are not only killing the goose that lays the golden
eggs,” Herty lamented, “but we are actually failing to pick up all o f the wealth during the dying
process.” Third, he faulted the antiquated distilling method that continued to rest entirely on
distillers’ experience and most often failed to produce rosin that reached its full quality
potential.8 Along with field observations, Herty studied literature that fully explained the French
system of gum collection and reviewed the U.S. Patent Office records to determine what had
already been tried. He was fully aware that French turpentine producers had used the cup and
gutter system for decades and that American inventors had attempted similar methods in this
7Charles H. Herty, “The Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” Journal o f the
Franklin Institute 181 (March 1916): 346-347; Hertv. New Method o f Turpentine Oracharding.
12-13; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 16-18.
8 Charles H. Herty to John M. Egan, 18 January 1901, Herty Collection.
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country. What was needed, he believed, was an economical system that allowed the harvesting
practices to remain as little changed as possible.9
Despite his enthusiasm for the project, Herty doubted his efforts would succeed. He
feared “that the end o f the turpentine industry is so rapidly approaching in our state it is possible
that even should I succeed in the work I may be too late to be of any real service to this sector of
the South.”10 He also worried about the “question o f negroe labor,” whether black workers
would be able to learn the new and somewhat more tedious method. “As to whether this labor
can perform the work under another system,” he concluded, “experiment only can tell.”11 Along
with timing and labor concerns, Herty worried that even his best effort might meet the same fate
as earlier attempts to introduce new methods. On his trips to operations in the Valdosta and
Fargo, Georgia, area, he was “amazed to find in each case that the turpentine people showed so
little regard to the future of the industry in that they ‘box’ not only the good sized trees but also
trees almost small enough to be called saplings.”12 Herty believed that turpentine producers’
traditional conventions had prevented the naval stores industry from adopting innovation.
Although Herty believed them to be robust and hard-working—especially noble characteristics in
the Progressive era—he thought producers resisted change because they lived “on the outer edge
of developing civilization, with few of the comforts and conveniences o f life, indifferent to the
utter lack o f efficient business methods in their operations, and strongly wedded to work

9 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States, 346-347; Herty, New Method of
Turpentine Orcharding. 12-13: Reed. Crusading for Chemistry. 16-18.
10 Charles H. Herty to John M. Egan, 18 January 1901, Herty Collection.
11 Ibid.
12 Charles H. Herty to Byron B. Brower, 24 April 1901, Herty Collection.
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practices which have been handed down from generation to generation as they steadily moved
from North Carolina toward Texas.”13
With deep questions about his acceptance by producers, in the spring of 1901 Herty
began to lay the ground work for his initial experiment. He first contacted the leading naval
stores factors in Savannah for permission to experiment on their land. Not all were encouraging.
One part-owner o f a Savannah factorage house responded that he “had no confidence in the
project, that I had already made some experiments myself and do not believe any new method
could be invented to take the place o f the old way.”14 JJ*. Williams, a cotton and naval stores
factor, believed differently, however, and granted his permission to conduct experiments on his
company’s forest near Statesboro, in southeastern Georgia. With a test area secured, Herty next
visited Gifford Pinchot, the head o f the recently created Bureau of Forestry, in his Washington,
D.C. office. After listening to Herty’s plan, Pinchot agreed to lend assistance, beginning a
pattern of cooperation between federal agencies and the naval stores industry that would last for
over half a century. He offered Herty a position as collaborator with the Bureau, an appointment
that only paid three hundred dollars a year, but came with invaluable fringe benefits: access to
scientific instruments, a travel allowance, Bureau stationary—which lent greater prestige to
Herty’s efforts—and a chance to publish his results. Another $150 raised by the Savannah factors
also helped pay for equipment. Herty also sought broad support from producers through a
presentation on his plan before the actual work began. To reach an even wider audience, he ran a
description of his proposal in the Atlanta Constitution.15 Bewildered by his need to act as a

13 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 339.
14 J.B. Chestnett to Charles H. Herty, 5 September 1901, Herty Collection.
15 Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 19,21; Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern
States,” 348; Maxwell Taylor Courson, “Here Began a Revolution,” Southerner 1 (Fall 1979):
33.
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public relations man, he complained that “in Germany the practical man seeks the help of the
scientific man, with us the scientific man seeks the help o f the practical man.”16
Herty knew that his system had to incorporate eight important features in order to be
accepted by both American producers and workers. First, turpentine operators needed to be
assured o f greater profits; otherwise, they would have no direct interest in adopting the system.
Second, the equipment should cause the tree as little injury as possible. Next, the system had to
allow the task o f chipping to remain unchanged, otherwise labor difficulties could develop and
threaten the system’s acceptance. Fourth, the placement o f the equipment must require no
special skill not already possessed by the average turpentine worker. Fifth, equipment
construction should be as simple as possible and unaffected by the hardening o f resin. Next, the
equipment had to be adaptable to the widely varying sizes o f trees used in turpentining. Seventh,
it needed to hold so tightly to the tree that it could not accidentally fall off, but also had to be
easily and cheaply removed to allow it to be installed at the beginning of each season. Lastly, for
the resin to be scraped out of the cup most efficiently, workers needed to be able to remove the
cup without difficulty from the tree, but it had to hang securely enough that grazing canle could
not knock it off. Although the French method provided many o f these characteristics, its use in
the United States, Herty believed, would require the workers’ complete retraining. The French
method employed a one-streak chip, that created a flat face, where Americans used two-streak
chipping which created a V-shaped pattern. Any system used in America needed to
accommodate that style o f chipping.17
Although similar to the French system, the method o f collecting gum that Herty
discovered did not require unfamiliar tools, new techniques, or expensive retraining of workers.

16 Charles H. Herty to John M. Egan, 18 January 1901, Herty Collection.
17 Herty, New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding. 14, 16.
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It permitted chipping to continue as usual. The only change in turpentining came when instead
of boxing, workers hung cups and gutters, and, rather than dip gum from boxes with spade
shaped dippers, laborers scraped gum out of cups with trowels. To install the system, two
workers used cornering axes, just as they would in cornering a box, to create a smooth face by
removing the bark. Then, swinging the ax sideways, the laborers removed just enough bark and
sapwood to create a flat surface half the width o f the smooth face. Next, they used broad axes to
cut incisions about one-fourth inch deep at the top o f the flat surface. Both incisions inclined
toward the center, but they did not meet One extended an inch beyond the end o f the other. Into
these incisions the workers inserted the gutters—galvanized iron strips about two inches wide and
from six to twelve inches long. The upper gutter declined to the center o f the face and the lower
gutter extended a little beyond, forming a spigot that channeled gum into the cup hung by a nail
below.18
On July 20, 1901, Herty and his team hung the first cup and gutters. Because he could
not find a pottery manufacturer to make his small order of earthen cups, Herty used galvanized
iron cups instead. Under the eye of a local woodsrider hired by Herty, baffled and amused
workers hung the equipment in four groups, representing first, second, third, and fourth year
boxes. Each group contained one hundred trees, half from which gum was harvested employing
the box method and the other half using cups and gutters. Herty kept records o f the quantity and
quality o f gum collected using the two different systems. He also noted the effect that
temperature and rain had or resin flow.19 Within days o f the experiment’s start, southern
newspapers reported “that no more important public work than this has been undertaken in

18 Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 19-21.
19 In spring 1979 a historical marker was erected at the site o f Herty’s Statesboro
experiments, now a part of the Georgia Southern University campus. Courson, “Here Began a
Revolution,” 10, 12; Hertv. New Method of Turpentine Orcharding. 16.
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Georgia in many years, and that if Prof. Herty accomplishes the task he has set for himself the
state will be Mncaluably benefited.’”20 By the fall, Herty’s data indicated that his method held
great promise. The cupped trees produced 186.06 barrels of gum while the boxed ones yielded
only 86.06 barrels. However, scrape from the boxed trees brought their total yield to 177.06
barrels. Although the cupped trees thus provided only ten pounds more in resin, the benefits of
the cup remained significant Because the cups yielded far more spirit-rich soft gum than boxes,
their use resulted in more turpentine produced at the still. Not only that, but the rosin was o f a
higher quality. Furthermore, cupped trees proved to withstand the wind better than boxed ones.21
Most informed observers expressed great faith in Herty once his results indicated initial
success. Pinchot, in fact, offered him a full-time position at the Bureau o f Forestry, which Herty
joined at the beginning o f 1902 after resigning from the University o f Georgia.22 Many
turpentiners also supported Herty’s efforts, as did The American Forestry Association, which
endorsed Herty’s project stating that “his work, in line with the movement for practical forestry
in the United States, promises to preserve a source o f great wealth for the South. That he has the
support of the national bureau o f forestry (sic) is a source o f encouragement.”23 In 1902, one
industry official reported that turpentine men “now all see the necessity o f preserving the timber,
and getting as much o f the gum as possible, or in other words preventing the great waste that has
in the past robbed the producer o f much o f his profits.”24 But given the history of failed efforts at
20 “Destroying Pine Trees,” Tampa. Florida Tribune. 26 July 1901, Turpentine
newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
21 Courson, “Here Began a Revolution,” 12.
22 Herty, New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding. 17; Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the
Southern States,” 348; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 21.
23 “Guarding the Forests,” Macon. Georgia News. 28 October 1901, Turpentine
newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
24 D.H. Ketchum to Charles H. Herty, 13 September 1902, Herty Collection.
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innovation, not all were convinced Herty could succeed in saving the industry. In October,
Georgia’s Assistant Commissioner o f Agriculture argued that the pine forest was certain to
disappear. “There is no help for i t The trees cannot live longer than four years after they have
been tapped. If we could preserve the forest it would accomplish a great deal, but the demand for
naval stores calls for wholesale and almost indiscriminate destruction o f the pines.”25 The
Atlanta Journal defiantly responded to the commissioner’s doubt by explaining that boxing, not
the tapping itself, killed trees and that otherwise stands could potentially be worked for
decades.26
With growing industry support and the resources o f the Bureau o f Forestry behind him,
Herty began a larger-scale experiment in 1902. The Bureau financed the needed equipment and a
large turpentine-producing outfit, Powell, Bullard and Company, allowed the use of their timber,
located near the town o f Ocilla in southeastern Georgia. Using the producer’s labor to determine
how easily the transition to cups could be made, Herty outfitted one-, two-, and three-year old
crops (10,000 faces), half with his cups and gutters and the other half with boxes. Workers were
instructed to chip, dip, and scrape normally. The gum collected using the two different systems
was distilled separately. To render accurate dipping results, measurements were made of
distilled products, not dip, which contained trash and water. The company sent the rosin to the
Southern Naval Stores Company in Savannah for grading. The land-owning company kept the
yield and profit records, which they later furnished to the Bureau.27

25 “Can Forests be Saved?” Augusta. Georgia Herald. 20 October 1901, Turpentine
newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
26 Turpentine Operating in Georgia Forests, Atlanta Journal. 31 October 1901,
Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
27 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 348,350-351; Herty, New
Method o f Turpentine Orcharding. 18; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 21-22.
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Problems plagued the experiment from the beginning. The cup manufacturer was slow
to deliver. Herty had placed an order for 31,500 clay cups with the Chattanooga Pottery Co. of
Downing, Tennessee. However the cups arrived a week late and with freight costs that nearly
doubled their expected price. They were also not o f the design Herty had specified; he requested
oval bottoms, but instead received cups with flat ones. Labor problems also troubled the
experiment’s launch, a difficulty that was anticipated but not for the particular reason it occurred.
Producers, and Herty himself, suspected that the industry’s all-black Iabor-force “could not be
taught to work in any but the orthodox way.” However with proper instruction, Herty found
early on that workers could learn the new tasks well in only a few hours. Difficulties arose
because the laborers had little faith in the strange new system that they were asked to install and
felt it was beneath the dignity o f good turpentine workers. As relatively light work, they
believed it was more suitable for women and children. Those who reluctantly performed the task
condescendingly termed themselves “cup niggers.” Herty, in exasperation, found that ‘"the Negro
laborers proved even more conservative than the white operators.” Eventually the workers were
convinced to cooperate, squads were organized, and the work proceeded smoothly.28 Once the
experiment was underway, there were early doubts that the new system was performing as hoped
when the boxes showed greater output that the cups early in the season.
By the end o f the season, however, records indicated that the cup system performed far
better than the box. The virgin cups yielded sixteen percent more gum than virgin boxes, and the
cup-collected gum produced eighteen percent more spirits than that harvested from boxes. When
amounts o f spirits derived from scrape were also considered, the difference was even greater—
23.43 percent more spirits derived from gum collected in a cup. Although the second-year
cupped faces collected gum that produced only 5.51 percent more spirits than boxes, the third
28 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 349-351; Herty, N ew Method of
Turpentine Orcharding. 18-19; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 24-26.
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year yield was a substantial 58.58 percent greater and the fourth an impressive 66.29 percent
more. The yield, combined with the superior quality o f the gum, made profit percentage rise
above yield percentage increases. Based on Herty’s Ocilla experiments, producers could expect
to net $412.54 more from their crop o f first year faces, $341.54 from second year, $513.38 from
third year, and $516.48 from fourth year. The increase in the third- and fourth-year faces was
largely explained by reductions in the distance the gum had to travel to reach the receptacle,
since cups, unlike boxes, could be raised. New faces showed increased yield because of the
cupped trees’ greater vitality over boxed ones and because less gum was lost in dipping cups than
boxes. When removing the gum from a box, workers separated out the contents and transferred
them to a bucket sitting several feet away. With cups, however, laborers removed the cup, held it
directly over the bucket and scraped the gum out. The experiment also demonstrated that
cupping proved less fatal to pines than boxes. Less than half the number o f trees cupped blew
down or died compared with boxed ones. Because it cost around $350 per crop to purchase and
install cups and gutters, the expense could be made back in the first year of use. Although none
o f the tools except the gutter benders were specialized, all tools—cutting shears, broad axes, and
claw hatchets—could be purchased from Chattanooga Pottery Company and shipped with the first
shipment of cups.29
Despite the praise heaped on him by the press as the Ocilla study concluded, Herty made
clear that he did not invent the concept o f the cup and gutter system. He had merely devised a
method whereby the lateral placement o f the gutters, one about an inch higher than the other,
facilitated the American style of chipping, thus making it adaptable to the American method of
production. In fact, by the time Herty received his patent in 1903, at least fourteen other cup29 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 353,356; Herty, New Method o f
Turpentine Orcharding. 20,24-25,31-32. Charles H. Herty to Vickers and McKenzie, 30
December 1903 and Charles H. Herty to J.E. North Lumber Co., 31 December 1903, Herty
Papers.
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type devices for collecting raw turpentine were already registered. He openly acknowledged
having read bulletins on the French method, especially a publication prepared for a recent Paris
Exposition.30 “I have gained the confidence o f the turpentine people by being absolutely fair and
truthful in every statement I have ever made them,” he proclaimed, “and I would not have this
record sullied by a silent assertion o f credit to which I do not believe I am entitled.31
Herty did not wait for the season to end before proclaiming the Ocilla experiment a
success. He used both newspapers and trade journals to publish his efforts. Most importantly,
he delivered the keynote address at the newly-chartered Turpentine Operators Association
meeting in Jacksonville on the night o f September 10,1902. After listening to the Florida
governor, the leading turpentiners in the South, many no doubt anxious over approaching timber
depletion, eagerly listened to Herty explain his system that promised larger yields, less tree
damage, and would pay for itself in the first year.32 Despite the interest o f his Jacksonville

30 E. Moulie to Charles H. Herty, 15 September 1902, Charles H. Herty to E. Moulie, 22
September 1902, and Charles H. Herty to George W. Wilson, 29 September 1902, Herty
Collection.
31 From early in Herty’s experiment, J.C. Schuler, who had developed his own cup
system in the late nineteenth century, regularly contacted him, offering his assistance and
reminding Herty of his own patented device. Despite Schuler’s apparent belief that Herty was
merely copying his earlier design, the two inventions were indeed different Schuler’s device
consisted o f one piece and gutters, and when raised could only be reinstalled on the barked tree
surface, thus reducing the potential area of a tree’s face. Schuler’s method also required that
deep incisions be cut in the tree to support his apparatus. The cut weakened the tree’s structure
and vitality. J.C. Schuler to Charles H. Herty, 25 July 1901, J.C. Schuler to Charles H. Herty, 5
September 1902, D.W. Ketchum to Charles H. Herty, 13 September 1902, Charles H. Herty to
John C. Powell, 21 October 1902, Charles H. Herty to Commissioner o f Patents, 16 December
1902, Charles H. Herty to John R. Young, 11 October 1903, and Charles H. Herty to George W.
Wilson, 29 September 1902, Herty Collection.
32 In 1905 Herty estimated the cost at around $370, $260 for 10,000 cups and 1800
pounds o f galvanized iron, $45 for freight, $4 for cutting and bending gutters, $ 1.50 for nails, and
$60 for labor. This did not include the cost o f tools. Chattanooga Pottery Company sold broad
axes for $12 per dozen, claw hatchets for $6 per dozen, tin snips for $ 1.50 for two, gutter benders
for 750 each, gutter boxes for $50 each, gutter pullers for $ 1.50 each, and dipping knives for $6
per dozen. Hertv C u d Hand Book. 1905, Herty Collection; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 23;
“To Save Forests,” New York Evening Sun. 10 September 1902, Turpentine newsclipping file,
Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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audience, Herty continued to find many producers cautious o f change. He took hope, however,
that their disposition would actually work toward the industry’s advantage: “Our Southern
people are conservative, they are not prone to run after novelties, but where conviction is based
on careful thought success is assured by reason o f the same elements o f strength which are the
basis o f that conservatism.” He felt confident that the entire industry would eventually be won
over to the new system.33
Also excited by the results, Pinchot encouraged Herty to prepare a report on his success.
Herty eagerly complied, desiring to put his beneficial information in as many producers’ hands as
possible. The Bureau, however, was slower to publish his report than he hoped. By late January
1903, Herty detected that interest in his system was decreasing as producers began preparations
for the upcoming turpentine season and still no bulletin appeared answering questions and
addressing concerns. To stimulate the use of cups, Herty, by that winter, began a tour o f Georgia
and Florida, explaining the benefits of his system and helping pioneering producers install their
new cups and gutters. If Herty could not travel to an individual producer, he sent one o f his
assistants who had worked with him at Ocilla. Finally in May 1903, A New Method of
Turpentine Orcharding was published. A forty-three-page Department o f Agriculture bulletin
with illustrative plates and drawings, it guided producers through the basic principals of the cup
and gutter method. In it, Herty described the current boxing method and carefully identified its
faults. He then gave an overview o f his own experiments before detailing the directions and cost
for installing, using, and raising cups and gutters.34

33 Charles H. Herty to Thomas Gamble, Jr., 12 July 1904, Herty Collection.
34 Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 22,27-28; A. Sessoms to Charles H. Herty, 4 October
1902; A.G. Paul to Charles H. Herty, 26 September 1902, Denton Brothers and Company to
Charles H. Herty, 16 March 1903, A.G. Paul to Charles H. Herty, 8 October 1904, Charles H.
Herty to John C. Powell, 21 October 1902, Charles H. Herty to A.G. Paul, 15 October 1902,
Charles H. Herty to A.G. Paul, 20 January 1903, Mixon Lucas to Charles H. Herty, 26 February
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A New Method of Turpentine Orcharding outlined a procedure that differed little from
the original method Herty first developed in 1901. Before work in the woods began, thirty-inch
galvanized strips were cut into lengths o f between six and twelve inches and placed in a special
device that bent them. This preparation was usually performed in the cooper shop. Around midFebruary the various sized gutters were separated and loaded onto a wagon along with cups for
distribution in the woods. Once the equipment was placed in the forest, two ax men worked as a
team to prepare each tree. Using broad axes, they created two flat subsurfaces about eight to
twelve inches high by six to ten inches wide, beginning about one inch above the ground. The
flat surfaces met at a wide angle ju st below where the season’s chipping would begin, each half
the width o f the face. At the top o f this flat surface, the ax men made two incisions, one on each
side of the face, declining downward, with one side about an inch above the other. Once the
incisions were made, workers inserted the gutters into the slits, the bottom one first. In time the
green wood tried to return to its former position and created the tension needed to hold the
gutters in place. After the gutter was secured, a claw hatchet was used to even off the trunk
where the cup would rest Then another worker drove a nail two-thirds o f the way into the tree
just below the end o f the lower gutter from which he suspend a cup. Usually two ax men and a
cup man worked as a team.35 When dipping, workers slipped the cup from its nail and, using a
1903, A.H. Norwell to Charles H. Herty, 1 September 1903, A.G. Paul to Charles H. Herty, 15
September 1904, and Charles H. Herty to C.A. Howell, 10 January 1905, Herty Collection.
35 An alternative method was, however, soon available in a cup and apron system. The
apron installed much like the gutters and also served to guide the resin into the cup. But unlike
the gutters, the apron consisted o f one piece of curved galvanized iron and it also served to hold
the cup which inserted into a specially-designed grove. The apron was curved on one side to fit
the tree’s round face and bent to prevent the gum from running over the edge, but guided it
toward its slopping center where the gum then spilled into a cup. Asa L. Brower and John O. La
Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry and Statistics on the
Production o f Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons of 1907-8 and 1908-9,” 15 March 1909,
Austin Cary Memorial Forestry Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A.
Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, 12-13, 15; James Berthold Berry, Farm Woodlands
(Yonkers-on Hudson, NY: World Book Company, 1923), 339-340; Hertv C ud Handbook: Herty,
New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding. 32.
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metal knife, scraped the gum from the bottom and sides o f the cup into a ten-gallon bucket placed
directly below. Once filled, workers emptied the bucket into barrels placed intermittently
throughout the woods. Dippers occasionally had more than a single cup to empty at each tree.
Chippers sometimes removed full cups and replaced them with empty ones, especially during
July and August when gum flow was the heaviest. The full ones were hung on nails about the
trees’ base and emptied by dippers on their next pass through the forest.36 Before scraping,
which continued despite the reduced build-up o f dry gum, workers removed the cups and gutters,
dipping the former and cleaning the latter, and inverted the cups on the ground. After scraping
the face, gutters were raised, allowing the entire winter for the wood to grip them.37
Just as producers began studying Herty’s publication, he resumed his naval stores
research with a European tour sponsored by the Bureau. He visited Austria, Holland, Belgium,
and England, but his most fruitful study came during visits to France and Switzerland. In France
he observed how naval stores production was carried on in cooperation with lumbering and
attentive reseeding. Although the French system was admirable in its conservation, Herty
concluded that it was too expensive for practical adaptation in the United States. In Bern he
visited a Swiss scientist who worked on discovering how resin formed in conifers. Here Herty
learned of the surprising discovery that the number of resin ducts increased in the new wood of
wounded trees.38
Most o f Herty’s time in the years following his return from Europe was consumed with
efforts to manage the company he co-founded to manufacture cups. Unable to find a producer of

36 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
12, 15-17; Berrv. Farm Woodlands. 341-342.
37 Hertv C u p Handbook: Herty, New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding. 38.
38 Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 30,32.
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clay cups for his 1901 experiment and unsatisfied with the design, cost and late delivery o f the
cups used in the 1902 study, Herty faced even more trouble in securing a manufacturer for cups
to manufacture producers for the 1903 season. He failed to locate a company that would agree to
produce enough cups o f the correct design at the right price. He requested that the cups have
oval bottoms, which the Chattanooga Pottery Company failed to provide in 1902, and he wanted
the cups bigger to prevent a run-over o f gum from especially productive trees. C.L. Kreger, the
manager o f Chattanooga Pottery, suggested the construction o f a plant in the heart of the pine
belt to specialize in turpentine cup production. After careful consideration, Herty, John H.
Powell—manager o f the firm on whose land Herty conducted his 1902 experiment—and other
naval stores interests in Savannah and Jacksonville, principally Consolidated Naval Stores
Company, put up the money for a plant. Because Herty, a modestly paid Bureau of Forestry
researcher, lacked investment capital, Powell loaned him $1,000. In the end, the group did not
build a new plant, however. Instead they bought Chattanooga Pottery. Powell served as the
company’s president and Kreger remained as general manager.39
Herty continued as a researcher with the Bureau, which showed a continued interest in
improving the naval stores industry, but persistent problems with the new company and conflicts
with Pinchot strained Herty’s position there. Herty made it no secret that he intended to profit
from his invention, at a rate o f twenty-five cents per one thousand cups. Under the assumption
that the Bureau knew o f his plans, he began application for a patent which he received in early
February 1903. But once Pinchot heard o f these activities, he telegraphed Herty explaining that,
as a Bureau employee, Herty could not charge for the use o f the system. Herty reluctantly agreed
to stop receipt of royalties. But activity with the company grew complicated. In order to move
their supply, Chattanooga Pottery was selling cups at too low a price to profit and, by 1904, it

39 Ibid., 23-24,26, 29.
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still operated in the red. Now neither Herty1nor his company was benefiting financially from the
sale of cups. With Pinchot unwilling to budge on the royalty question and the company in need
of his expertise, Herty respectfully resigned from the Bureau in March 1904.40
Pinchot offered Herty a considerable raise to stay at the Bureau, but Chattanooga Pottery
offered a far greater return and became the company’s director. As an employee of Chattanooga
Pottery, not only did Herty enjoy a far more lucrative position than he had held at the Bureau o f
Forestry, he could work at the same project as he had under Pinchot. In return for exclusive right
to manufacture and sell Herty’s patented cups and gutters through the end o f 1910, the company
agreed to pay Herty S20 for each set o f ten thousand. Herty would also work full time for the
company from April 1, 1901 to April 1, 1908 at an annual salary o f $2,400. His duties included
promoting the cups, stressing the importance o f early ordering, assisting producers with
installation, and instructing workers in how to use the system. He was also required to defend
the patent and protect it from infringement at his own expense. At the end of 1910 Herty was
promised the opportunity to purchase the plant at a fair price.41
As director Herty saw the company through several crises involving the cups. First, in
January 1905, a bitter freeze hit the southern naval stores belt causing the water in hanging cups
to turn to ice, cracking them. Damage varied considerably among producers. One in
Apalachicola, Florida, lost twenty-five percent of two crops, around five thousand cups. In other
areas damage was heavier. A Shellman, Georgia, producer lost ninety percent of his cups, a total
of 15,000. Some very large producers lost as many as 80,000 to 90,000 cups. The producers hit
hardest by the freeze unfortunately were the first ones to show confidence in the system. After
investigation, Chattanooga managers realized that fifty percent of cups at least half full of water,

40 Ibid., 28-29, 34-37.
41 Ibid., 41-43; Charles H. Herty to C.A. Howell, 10 January 1905, Herty Collection.
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broke in freezing temperatures. Luckily for Chattanooga Pottery Company, few producers
demanded that the company replace the broken cups at its own expense. However, the company
did face a problem filling the sudden flood o f orders from turpentiners hoping to replace their
broken cups before the next season. Lacking the capacity to fill the orders, Chattanooga had to
turn to other potteries for help. After the 1905 freeze, Chattanooga recommended that producers
remove the cups and set them inverted on the ground during the winter months. Second,
following the 1905 freeze, the American Can Company began marketing galvanized metal cups
as winter-proof substitutes for clay ones. Chattanooga reached an agreement with American
Can, which claimed to know nothing o f the patent, whereby American Can sold metal cups
through Chattanooga to operators who preferred them over earthen cups.42
Each type o f cup possessed both benefits and disadvantages. Clay cups cost half as
much as metal cups, but clay cups were more likely to break. If they remained on the tree all
winter, they could break during freezes. During summer fires, water standing in the clay cups
caused the same result by cooling the cup’s interior so that it expanded less than the hot exterior,
causing breakage. Clay cups were also heavier and therefore more expensive to ship from the
factory to the producer. Although metal cups were cheaper to ship and did not break as easily,
they tended not to perform as well as clay ones. Because the gum clung more stubbornly to their
sides, workers used a metal knife to scrape the cups which wore away the galvanizing, allowed
rusting, and shortened the cups’ lives. The rust also, no doubt, colored the gum, lowering its

42 John Henderson to Charles H. Herty, 19 January 1905, Herty to Brower, January 23,
1905, John Henderson to Charles H. Herty, 18 January 1905, J.F. Dusurberry to Charles H.
Herty, 30 January 1905, D.R. Stewart to Chattanooga Pottery Company, 3 February 1905,
Charles H. Herty to D.R. Stewart, 10 February 1905, and Charles H. Herty to East Coast Lumber
Company, 2 March 1905, Herty Collection; Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 41-43.
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grade. Producers also complained that the metal cups heated more on sunny days, causing the
evaporation o f some o f the spirits.43
With either type o f cup, however, Herty’s system possessed all the benefits he intended
and at an affordable price. The expense o f beginning the new method was more than offset by
the higher quality and greater quantity o f gum as well as through the preservation o f the timber
that boxes damaged. The cup reduced the mortality of turpentined trees by reducing the
interruption in sap flow and structural weakening o f the tree. The cup also lowered the
turpentine forests’ susceptibility to fire by eliminating the box—which allowed the damaging heat
from fire to penetrate deep into the trees’ base—and by reducing the amount o f hardened gum
collected on the face at any given time of the year. Also, the ability of producers to move cups
up the side o f the face each spring facilitated a more efficient gathering of soft, high-grade gum
throughout each harvest season. The improved method permitted turpentiners to manufacture
rosin o f a high quality that could not have been imagined before the twentieth century. Where
No. 1 rosin was the very best for which producers could have hoped before, by the 1910s there
were at least five grades above that. The best quality, Window White, sold for around twentyfive percent more than No. 1. And because the cups could be removed and emptied directly over
the dip buckets, workers could more efficiently harvest the gum. Moreover, the ability of
chippers to replace full cups with empty ones between dippings enabled better collection from
particularly productive trees. Around 1910, this improved grade raised returns by one to two
dollars per barrel. In years when depressed markets drove profit margins down, the use of cups
could make the difference between a net profit and a loss for the year. The use o f cups also made
the formation o f scrape consistent from year to year, ranging between fifty and seventy barrels

43 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
13-14.
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per crop.44 As early as 1903 Progressive Fanner extolled the virtues o f Herty’s system. “The
cup-and-gutter system,” it reported, “works to great advantage both for the turpentine operator
and the owner o f timber lands. It assure [sic] the former an immediate profit at very little
additional expense, and the latter by inflicting the least possible damage to his timber.”45
Some producers, however, negated the benefits of the cup by putting too many faces on
their trees. Twice as many faces did not yield twice as much gum per tree. On pines eleven to
thirteen inches in diameter two feet from the ground, two faces yielded only fifty percent more
gum than one face. In one crop this reduced the yield per cup by ten to fifteen barrels. The trees
also suffered from the extra chipping which reduced the amount o f cambium tissue. At best the
tree’s growth was severely reduced. At worst the pine was essentially girdled and died. The
larger surface o f the wounded trunk left weakened trees more vulnerable to insects and disease.
Weakened trees were also more susceptible to wind.46 Only pines sixteen-inches in diameter or
larger could yield enough gum to justify the cutting of two faces.
The worst abuse of the cup system, however, was the effort to harvest gum from trees
under six inches in diameter. As the amount of virgin timber declined and second-growth
appeared in some areas, desperate producers fitted saplings, that would have been far too small to
box, with cups and gutters. Not only did the yield from such small trees rarely cover the expense
of their operation, but the shock halted their growth and weakened many to the point of death.
Moreover, in cupping small pines, producers were ensuring that second-growth stands of
44 Berry, Farm Woodlands. 336-337,343; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the
Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 22-24.
45 “Larger Profits in Turpentine,” The Progressive Farmer (15 June 1903), Turpentine
newsciipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
46 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
24-25; “Good Naval Stores Practice” (Washington, DC: United States Department o f
Agriculture, 1927), Cary Collection, 3; Charles H. Herty to Thomas Gamble, Jr., 12 July 1904,
Herty Collection.
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sufficient size would never permit the industry’s continuation. Even by the late 1920s this abuse
remained a persistent problem.47
Despite occasional misuse, producers generally recognized the cup and gutter system’s
benefits and, after a slow initial start, began a steady adoption of the method. In the first year,
only a few producers had access to the limited supply o f equipment but, by 1904, cups and
gutters were more readily available. Several events in the first decade o f the twentieth century
helped the situation. The endorsement o f several forestry organizations and support o f the
factors, who agreed to lend the capital for investment in cups and gutters, aided sales.48 The
Executive Committee o f the Consolidated Naval Stores Company, for example, pledged “to use
every influence to our respective commands toward bringing about as near as possible the
universal use of cups as against boxes in the production o f naval stores.”49 Then in September
1905, a hurricane crossed southern and western Florida, blowing down ten percent of the boxed
trees and none of the cupped ones. After this natural demonstration orders rose.50 However, a
rise in naval stores prices at the same time prevented sales from reaching their potential and the
pottery facility’s capacity went untested.
By around 1910, the use of cups showed promising expansion in first-year crops,
especially among large producers whose substantially-sized operations were the most threatened
by the reduction in large timber tracts. Where only fourteen percent o f all spirits produced in

47 Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 40; Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the
Southern States,” 364; Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation
History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores.”
48 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
17, 55.

49 “Turpentine Makers Advocating Conservative Methods,” Turpentine newsclipping
file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, I.
50 Charles H. Herty to Dixie editor, 1 August 1904, Herty Collection.
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1908 and 1909 came from cupped trees, about a quarter of the spirits from virgin crops did.SI In
his 1910 travel account o f Florida, Winthrop Packard expressed relief that “the old crude method
of boxing the trees is fortunately, rapidly passing and in the place o f the great hole cut in the base
of the trunk one often passes through miles o f trees that have flower-pot like receptacles hung
beneath them to catch the pitch.”52 Five years later, two industry experts found that “the damage
to standing timber due to turpentine operations has been considerably reduced.”53
However for total gum production, including both old and new crops, cup use was much
higher in the western areas o f the longleaf pine belt (fig. 8.1). In Mississippi and especially
Louisiana and Texas a few large and well-financed corporations owned large areas of the
remaining virgin forests and either adopted the cups, if they worked the timber for turpentine
themselves, or insisted that their lessees adopt the system. In 1909 34.S percent o f the total
southern turpentine yield was collected in cups. In some states the percentages were much
higher, 44.7 in Louisiana and 43.5 in Texas. By contrast, Herty’s system was responsible for
collecting only one percent o f all gum in Georgia, 16 percent in Florida, and 8 percent in
Alabama. There was an equally great divide between the East and West in terms o f first-year
crop use o f cups. In Georgia, where turpentine had been produced longer and smaller and mid
sized operations were common, only 10.5 percent of gum came from cupped trees where in
Texas and Louisiana, the newest producing states with the greatest concentration o f larger
producers, 59.5 percent came from cups. Regional difference in cup use was a major
contributing factor, along with better quality timber, in the larger yields produced in the more

51 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
54-55; Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 43.
52 Packard, Florida Trails. 281-282.
53 Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 40; For figures related to the number o f
crops employing boxes and cups see Appendix A.
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Figure 8.1. Percentage o f Crops Worked by Cup System by State, 1909, 1914, 1919
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
318.

western areas (fig. 8.2). In 1919 Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi had a combined average yield
of forty-three barrels o f turpentine per crop, compared to Georgia and Florida’s yields o f slightly
less than twenty-six barrels. Although this regional disparity persisted, cup use continued to
grow in all areas. Across the South from 1909 to 1914 its use increased 39S.7 percent and the
number of crops using the box system declined by 64.3 percent. By 1916 an estimated 75
percent of crops used the cup and gutter method and in 1919 over 80 percent (fig. 8 J ) . 54
54 Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current
Problems o f the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North
Carolina, 1942), 116-117; Carl F. Speh, “The Naval Stores Industry in the Western Territory,” in
Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble
(Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 112; Brower and La Fontisee,
“Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 55-58; Schorger and Betts, The Naval
Stores Industry. 43; C. Dorsey Dyer, “History of the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The AT-FA
Journal 25 (January 1963): 7; Carroll B. Butler, Treasures o f the Loneleaf Pines. Naval Stores
(Shaiimar, FL: Tarkel Publishing, 1998), 46.
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Turpentine Yield Per Crop
1909 and 1919
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Figure 8.2. Turpentine Yield Per Crop, 1909 and 1919
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942),
318.

Total Number o f Crops Worked by Cap and Boxing Systems
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Figure 8.3. Total Number of Crops Worked by Cup and Boxing Systems, 1919, 1914, 1919
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942),
318.
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For a variety o f reasons some producers refused to adopt the cup and gutter system.
Despite ample evidence that the system would quickly pay for itself, in the first years after its
development there remained uncertainty. Even if the equipment would pay for itself within a
year, its adoption required a large initial capital outlay that some financially-strapped producers
could not afford. Although Herty developed his system to deviate as little as possible from the
traditional turpentining method, other producers objected to the training their workers required to
use the cups. These operators believed cupping represented too great a departure and, realized
that if inadequately trained, laborers could cause the near complete loss o f gum by improperly
installing the system. Also, many workers complained about the new extra work of hanging and
removing cups. Chippers did not like the added burden, required by some producers, o f
performing their job at each face after placing a shield over each cup to prevent pieces o f bark
and wood from falling in. There were also problems with the cups themselves. Careless workers
broke them accidentally and, despite manufacturer’s suggestions to prevent it, freezing
temperatures caused many to crack. One Georgia producer had to remove his clay cups from
roadside trees after passing travelers shot at them.ss In response to that percentage of producers
who continued to use boxes, Weekly Naval Stores Review editor Thomas Gamble complained
that “the method o f exploitation commonly followed during the last hundred years is crude,
wasteful, destructive, and sadly shortsighted.” He blamed “inertia, not financial obstacles” as
“the chief reason why these conservative methods have not been more generally employed.”56

55 Carl E. Ostrom, “History o f Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The Chemureic Digest 4(15
July 1945): 221; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores
Industry,” 15-16, 24.
56 “The Life o f the Naval Stores Industry as at Present Carried on in the South,” in Naval
Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah:
Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 90.
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The conservation efforts that began to spread across the South in the early 1900s and of
which Herty was a part, had their origin outside the region where they began three decades
earlier. In the mid 1870s, concerned Americans, many o f them from the North who had watched
their own disappear into sawmills, began efforts to conserve the nation’s forests. George Perkins
Marsh advocated the preservation o f large timbered areas in a “natural” or “primitive” condition.
At the same time the American Association for the Advancement of Science established a
committee to promote federal and state legislation to protect forests and encourage timber
cultivation. Partly as a result of its efforts, Congress in 1876 appropriated funds for a forestry
agent at the Department o f Agriculture. By 1890, conservation was becoming popular in the
South. Albert Cowdrey identifies three late-nineteenth century developments that pushed the
region toward support o f conservation: depletion o f resources, growth o f organization, and the
development of science. The South by 1900 could find much about the conservation movement
to support. It offered the region improvements in agriculture, forestry, river basin planning, and
public health. These improvements fit well with the New South Creed, which sought efficient
resource use and development and was not shy about accepting outside help or leadership to
accomplish these ends. Pinchot, as director of the Division of Forestry, won the region’s timber
product industries over to scientific forestry by offering considerable assistance to their resource
management efforts, help they readily accepted.57
Southerners grew even more interested in forestry and government research assistance as
Herty’s argument that the cup and gutter system alone could not save the naval stores industry
proved accurate. He maintained that “so long as the system of leasing turpentine privileges from
timber owners continues, whereby the turpentine operator has but slight direct interest in the

57 Michael Williams. Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 18-19; Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land. This South: An
Environmental History (Lexington: University Press o f Kentucky, 1996),103, 119-120, 135-136.
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future of the timber, and so long as the saw mills continue active in cutting small trees along with
large ones, while the native follows with burning the woods each spring for his cattle thus
preventing reproduction there can be but little hope of permanency. The rich harvest provided by
past centuries is limited. It is being rapidly garnered. Unless something be done for
reproduction in the waste places the end will be reached before very many years pass by.”58
With the increasing timber scarcity, forest products manufacturers attempted to make the best use
of what little remained. Turpentiners and especially large lumber companies invested in
remaining virgin forests in excess of the near-term needs.59 In June 1901, the Atlanta
Constitution reported that “Savannah naval stores factors and shippers have long realized the
condition o f affairs in Georgia and it is only within the year that several firms there have
purchased in the aggregate hundreds o f thousands of acres o f turpentine land for the purpose of
keeping their business going. They went to Florida because there they could get the virgin
forest.”60
The lumber industry was responsible for a large portion of the forest’s rapid loss. In
1909, lumber production peaked at twenty-one billion board feet, nearly half of the country’s
total. Although it declined after that, southern sawmills remained busy for the next two decades.
Turpentining, however, also took its toll on timber stands. By 1909, the turpentine industry was
responsible for the lose o f an estimated thirty-seven billion board feet of southern timber.
Georgia lost more than any other turpentine-producing state, ten billion board feet. Thirteen

58 Charles H. Herty to Dixie editor. August 1, 1904, Herty Collection.
59 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 104-106.
60 Over a month later, W. D. Wood o f Darlington, South Carolina, complained in a letter
to the editor o f the Charleston News and Courier that the region’s rapid deforestation was certain
to result in soil erosion and flooded streams. “Plea for Long Leaf Pine,” Charleston New
Courier. 25 July 1901, “Would Preserve Pine Forests.” Atlanta Constitution. 2 June 1901,
Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
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billion disappeared from the Carolinas. Florida, where the industry had only recently expanded,
lost five billion; Alabama, where the industry had continued steadily since the Civil War, saw a
reduction of six billion; and Mississippi fell by three billion. By 1915, the supply o f longleaf
was growing acutely short in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia and, although
considerable stands remained in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, most were
controlled by large syndicates who refused to permit turpentining. Florida offered the best
turpentining opportunities, because a large portion o f the timber was owned by small investors.61
But, by the 1920s, Florida too suffered from timber depletion. After 1923, the state lost its status
as the leading naval stores-producing state, its timber worked out, cut out, and consumed by
widespread forest fires. In 1920 the United States Secretary of Agriculture reported to the Senate
that “so pronounced is depletion o f the timber upon which our naval stores industry depends for
its supplies that it is commonly regarded as a dying industry in the United States.”62 By 1923,
only between one-fifth and one-sixth of the original pine forest in the South remained. O f the
roughly one hundred million acres that had been cut over, one-third lay wholly empty o f new
growth. In a few areas of the South, sizable tracts o f virgin pine remained, but many counties
had lost their forests entirely.63

61 “The First Forest,” Southern Forest Institute Papers, Special Collections Division, The
University of Georgia Libraries, University of Georgia, 1; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of
the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 28-29; Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores
Industry. 40-41,
62 Thomas Gamble, “Mining for Rosin in the Old North State,” in Naval Stores: History.
Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing
and Printing Company, 1921), 37.
63 R.D. Forbes, “The Passing of the Piney Woods,” American Forestry 29 (March 1923):
184-185; A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, The Naval Stores
Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau o f Economic and Business Research, College o f Business
Administration, The University o f Florida, 1934): 10. E.A. Ziegler, A.R. Spillers, and C.H.
Coulter, Financial Aspects o f Growing Southern Pine. Washington County Florida (Tallahassee:
Florida Forest Service, 1931), 37.
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By encouraging reseeding, the development o f the southern pulpwood industry helped as
well make forestry appear more attractive. The industry first emerged in the South in Hartsville,
South Carolina in 1891, and by 1930, two dozen small mills had opened. Pulpwood processing
became a significant factor in the southern economy by providing a steady market for small trees.
Owners of clear-cut land could replant and wait but a few decades, if they so desired, before
selling the immature trees for pulpwood. When stands were now thinned, the small trees
selected for cutting provided an early, although small, return from forest land. Thus forest
owners did not have to wait for the trees to reach full maturity to realize a return.64
Along with the continued loss of timber and the pulpwood industry’s encouragement of
reseeding, Herty helped promote conservation in the South. His success inspired continued
applied research at the Forest Products Laboratory in Madison, Wisconsin, established in 1910,
and at government experiment stations set up in Florida and Mississippi. And because Herty had
developed such a useful system with which the producers’ needs were made central and since he
had proved so genuinely eager to work with them in improving the industry, more naval stores
men were afterward willing to consider other conservative methods developed by foresters.65
Herty’s work began when the South’s conservation movement was in its infancy. As early as the
late nineteenth century a few state efforts had begun. In 1894, North Carolina produced a report
on the condition o f the timber lands in the eastern portion of the state and two years later
Alabama began a similar study. The most important and sustained effects originated in the early

64 “The First Forest,” 3.
65 Herty’s greatest achievement in southern forest use, however, came nearly three
decades later when as the director o f the Savannah Pulp and Papers Laboratory, funded by the
City of Savannah and the Chemical Foundation, he demonstrated that with the proper treatment,
southern pines could be used in newsprint manufacture. Before Herty’s later efforts, newsprint
producers avoided southern pines because the excessively-pitchy southern pine pulp gummed up
paper-making machines and the sheets that did make it through were too dark in color to use.
Reed, Crusading for Chemistry. 47; Courson, “Here Began a Revolution,” 12-13.
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twentieth century. In 1904, progressive Louisiana lumberman Henry E. Hardtner, who in the late
nineteenth century began purchasing cut-over land and reseeding it, convinced the Louisiana
state legislature to create a Department o f Forestry. However, the state never funded the project.
By the 1910s the pace o f southern forestry development quickened. Virginia, Texas, North
Carolina, and Louisiana organized divisions of forestry and some southern colleges began
offering courses in forestry. In 1914 Georgia established the region’s first forestry school. Later
that same year, the Southern Pine Association was organized, and in 1916 the Southern Forestry
Congress held its first meeting. Organized by the North Carolina state geologist Joseph Hyde
Pratt, forester John S. Holmer, and Hardtner, the Congress sought to address the region’s forest
problems. Meeting into the 1920s, it campaigned for additional national forests, reforestation,
more scientific methods of naval stores production, creation of a research organization, the
passage o f the Clarke-McNary Act o f 1924—which provided for state and federal cooperation in
forest management—and the development of state forestry departments. In an effort to encourage
the regrowth o f forests, between 1924 and 1927 all the naval stores producing states established
forest extension services.66
With all these efforts in place by the mid 1920s, optimism settled over the South.67 In
1923, the American Forestry Association magazine reported that “provided that forestry is
practical in the piney woods of the South, southern pine can maintain and even increase its
ascendancy in the lumber markets o f America and the world.”68 One year later, Thomas Gamble,
editor o f the Savannah Weekly Naval Stores Review, expressed relief that “a new sentiment has

66 Frank Bedingfieid Vinson, “Conservation and the South, 1890-1920,” (Ph.D. diss.
University of Georgia, 1971), 124-125; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 137; Davis,
Encyclopedia o f Forest and Conservation History. 476; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical
Approach,” 139-140.
67 Martin, “An historical and Analytical Approach,” 138.
68 Forbes, “Passing of the Piney Woods,” 136.
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sprung up in the last few years through education and the spreading o f more exact knowledge as
to actual conditions, and there is apparent today in every state a group working for the protection
o f the young pine.”69
Despite the considerable attention focused on forest conservation, the naval stores
industry itself failed to create any association strong enough to address effectively its specific
problems. Charles Herty found it “strange that an industry as large as this one has no
organization o f any kind, no meetings for the discussion o f subjects pertaining to its welfare.”70
This situation did not result from a dearth o f organizing initiatives, but from the failure o f
producers to maintain interest in such organizations once formed. Since the late-nineteenth
century efforts to establish regional associations had produced only short-lived groups. Another
attempt was made in 1901 with the formation of the Turpentine Operators Association, which
hoped to respond to the diminishing supply of virgin timber, overproduction, and soaring labor
expense. The association met with very limited success in its short life, however. There was a
small decrease in production in the following years, but it was probably a result of declining
timber availability. Other efforts at organization met similarly short-lived and disappointing
results. In 1909, Texas and Louisiana producers created the Western Naval Stores Association
headquartered in Beaumont, Texas. Producers, factors, and dealers in 1914 created the
Turpentine Farmers Association, headquartered in Savannah. In the late 1910s the Turpentine
and Rosin Producers Association of New Orleans formed. All of these groups lasted for short
periods and suffered from the turpentiners’ inability or unwillingness to cooperate in lower

69 Thomas Gamble, “The Naval Stores Industry o f the South,” in The South’s
Development: A Glimpse of the Past, the Facts of the Present a Forecast o f the Future 86 (11
December 1924): 325.
70 Charles H. Herty to John M. Eagan, 18 January 1901, Herty Collection; George B.
Tindall, The Emergence o f the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1967), 130-134.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

372

production. When naval stores prices declined, producers were more likely to increase
production, the greater output seeming the best way to preserve cash flow. Because o f
paternalistic labor policies and multi-year timber leases, even financially independent operators
faced difficulty curtailing production. Few operators who owned their own land increased their
production during periods of low prices.71
In the 1920s, turpentiners experienced somewhat more success in addressing their own
concerns. Founded in 1925 and based in New Orleans, the Pine Institute of America conducted
experiments to discover the chemical properties o f turpentine and rosin and to develop new uses
for these products. It also sought improved marketing, encouraged scientific forestry, and
lobbied for government experiment stations. But it closed within a decade because of
insufficient financial support. Turpentiners also benefited from such groups as the Georgia
Forestry Association, which focused a portion o f its attention on naval stores production.
Organized in 1921, the Association included among its aims preserving the naval stores industry
and perpetuating of the new pulp and paper industries from what appeared as a certain
devastation of the state’s forests and then the eventual loss of these businesses. The Association
worked to encourage cup use and limit the size o f trees worked. It also advocated fire
protection.72

71 Turpentine Operators Association members agreed to pay 1.250 for each box cut, $22
for chipping each crop, 33 1/30 per barrel dipped, 200 to 250 per one hundred trees racked, $16
for driving a two-horse buggy a month, and $20 for driving a four-horse one. Butler, Treasures
o f the Loneleaf Pines. 247; A. Vizard to Charles H. Herty, 19 December 1900; Herty Collection;
Herty, New Method o f Turpentine Orcharding. 9; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical
Approach,” 14-15, 107; Brower and La Fontisee, “A Report of the Investigation on the Naval
Stores Industry,” 50.
72 Butler, Treasures of the Loneleaf Pines. 247-248; George H. Priest, Jr., Naval Stores:
Production. Consumption and Distribution (Washington, DC: United States Department of
Commerce, 1927), 3; Thomas F. Armstrong, “Georgia Lumber Laborers, 1880-1917: The Social
Implications of Work,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 67 (Winter 1983): 438; Brower and La
Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 1,70; Campbell, et. al.,
Naval Stores Industry. 77; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 112, 140; L.F.
Hawley, “Forest Service Investigations of Interest to the Naval Stores Industry,” in Naval Stores:
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In the absence o f a strong organization to focus on improving the naval stores industry,
most efforts were initiated by the federal government. The government-supported conservation
agenda represented a new cooperation between business, state, and federal agencies in the South,
an alliance also seen in the first decades o f the twentieth century with efforts to fight the boll
weevil and improve public health. At the federal level, one means used to encourage improved
practices was by placing leasing conditions on public pine land used for turpentining. Beginning
around 1910, for example, turpentining was permitted in the Florida National Forest as a means
to add income to the site’s management. When the Forest Service leased boxes it demanded the
strictest adherence to the improved methods. Only timber in an area designated by a forestry
officer could be worked. Pines smaller than ten inches in diameter at breast height were off
limits. Trees sixteen to twenty-five inches in diameter were allowed two cups and pines larger
than twenty-five inches in diameter were permitted three cups. Cups and aprons had to be placed
as near to the ground as possible. No nails could be used to attach the cups or aprons to the tree
and, when the aprons were removed, it had to be done by pulling, not chopping. Chipping
streaks were not to exceed one-half inch in height and the face was not to rise more than fourteen
to sixteen inches each year. And the hack or puller used had to satisfy the Forestry Service
officer. During July and August, the most productive months, two streaks could be made on a
face in a week but the height could still not increase more then one-half inch. If the forester
discovered the chipping process was in violation of regulations, he could remove cups.
Producers had to pay for any badly damaged trees. Each tree was worked fourteen out o f fifteen
years. Front faces were worked for seven years. Following a year o f rest, back faces were
worked for another seven. Producers had to agree to expend all possible means to suppress
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 139; “Welcome to Annual Meeting Georgia Forestry
Association, at Savannah,” 8 May 1942, Georgia Forestry Association Papers, Special
Collections Division, The University o f Georgia Libraries, University o f Georgia.
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forest fires, even placing their workers at the disposal o f Service officers to fight the blazes. If
laborers were impressed to fight fires more than one mile from the lessees timber the producer
would be compensated for their service. As a precaution against fire, a space o f three feet was to
be raked around each tree. Finally, Forestry Service officers had unlimited access to records of
production, cost, and yield to ensure that all requirements were met.73
Then, in 1908, an Agricultural Appropriations Bill allotted ten thousand dollars for a
study of how the turpentine industry contributed to the death of the southern forest. By 1917, the
United States Forest Service had published seventeen bulletins on naval stores production,
Herty’s 1903 booklet on his new harvesting method being one of the most important. Within a
few years, the Forest Service operated two experiment stations in the South, one in Asheville,
North Carolina, and another in New Orleans. Both worked on efforts to reduce forest destruction
caused by turpentining. In 1923, tests began at a branch station at Starke, Florida, on private
second-growth tracts granted for the Service’s use. Here foresters experimented with methods
that would result in profitable turpentining, high gum yield, and conservation o f the harvested
pines. The men who worked for the Service at this time received pay from the government, but
large naval stores companies and factors had to cover the cost of their travel and accommodation
when they worked in the field. At times foresters found themselves staying in private homes.74
73 Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 127-135; Dereland Turpentine Company, C.B.
Ferden, and Doe and Roe naval stores lease agreements, and sample crop inspection report, Cary
Collection; United States Forest Service, “U.S. Government’s Turpentine Experience in the
Florida National Forest,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption.
ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 227.
74 In 1911 and 1912, the Forest Service conducted experiments on different pine species
in Arizona, California, and Oregon to determine their feasibility for producing turpentine.
Although the pines o f the West yielded sufficient gum, the cold weather in Arizona, which began
earlier than in the Southeast, shortened the production season there. There was also a dearth o f
skilled labor. AH potential workers, whites, Indians, and Mexicans would have required
extensive training and the cost of importing experienced black workers from the South was
deemed too expensive. Schorger and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 44-46; Vinson,
“Conservation and the South,” 154; “First Forest,” 2; Lenthall Wyman, Experiments in Naval
Stores Practice (Washington, EX2: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1932), 5; G.P.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Austin Cary was arguably the most influential federal forester to bring improved
scientific management to the turpentine industry during this new era o f government involvement.
Bom in Massachusetts in 1865, he studied biology at Bowdoin College where he received his
undergraduate and graduate degrees. He also attended The Johns Hopkins University and Yale
University. Cary entered the new field o f forestry after a 1892 chance meeting with Bernard
Femow, the head o f the U.S. Division o f Forestry, who hired Cary as a forestry surveyor and
investigator. With practical knowledge o f forestry and an academic mastery o f natural sciences,
Cary went on to teach at Yale in 1904 and the next year at Harvard. He also authored a Manual
For Northern Woodsmen, a well-known, straight-forward guide to land surveying, forest
mapping, timber estimating, and log and wood measurement. As an advocate of private
enterprise and believer that economic motivation was the best road to conservation, Cary drew
strong opposition from Pinchot, who promoted govemment-ownership and control o f forest
resources. But with Pinchot removed from office in 1910, Cary’s forestry career advanced; Cary
would remain with the Service for twenty-five years, until his retirement. His first assignment
was on the West Coast, but his graceless and unsociable behavior, combined with his resentment
o f government over-regulation, caused him to clash with his supervisors and eventually led to a
transfer. From several options he chose the South, where he began work the next year.75

Shigler, interview by R. White, 30 June 1959, Oral History Interview, Forest History Society,
Durham, NC, 4.
75 “List o f Materials in the Austin Cary Memorial Forestry Collection,” Department o f
Special Collection, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, i; Gloria Hutchinson,
“Pioneer Maine Forester, Austin Cary: A Diamond in the Rough from East Machias, He Wrote
the Book on Modem Forestry,” Austin Cary file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 51-53, 68,
71-72; Vinson, “Conservation and the South,” 159-160; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 137138; Shingler interview, 6; Peter Koch, Utilization o f the Southern Pines (Washington, DC:
United States Department of Agriculture, 1972), 1478; “Austin Cary,” Austin Cary File, Forest
History Society, Durham, NC, 28-29; Berry, Farm Woodlands. 345.
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Headquartered in Florida, Cary was left to operate on his own as the Forest Service
concentrated most of its efforts in the West. Here he set about achieving his goal o f stabilizing
the southern forestry industry. His straight-forward manner (which had caused problems in the
West), his support for private property rights, and his opposition to government regulation helped
him win southerners over to forestry, his greatest career achievement. Cary understood how to
approach the individual producers and gradually convince them to accept his scientific ideas.
First he asked producers if they had any problem with their operation, then walked into the
woods with them, evaluated the situation with the producer, and suggested solutions. Through
his efforts, turpentine operators learned the best size of steaks, the most productive chipping
frequency, the optimal diameter tree for gum production, the appropriate number o f faces per
tree, the effects o f turpentining on tree growth, and the benefits o f the cup and gutter system.
They so trusted Cary and his recommendations that, at their request, the Forest Service sent him
on a trip to France in 1924 to observe the conservative management of the maritine forests there.
Cary continued his work in the South even after his retirement in 1935. By this time many in the
region considered him the father o f southern forestry. He was visiting forestiy students at the
University o f Florida when he died of a heart attack in 1936.76
Whereas Austin Cary is perhaps most notable for his successful efforts to advance
applied conservative methods, another federal forester made the most numerous research

76 Cary conceived a plan, apparently based on the French method, whereby, he believed,
the turpentine industry could make the maximum use of timber. According to his proposal, trees
should be bled for the first time at twenty to twenty-five years o f age and worked for three years
before allowing them to rest for another ten. After this period they could be cupped again and
trees larger than fifteen inches could be fitted with two cups. After three years o f work and
another ten years of rest, the process would be repeated. “List o f Materials in the Austin Cary
Memorial Forestry Collection,” i; Hutchinson, “Pioneer Maine Forester,” 51-53,68, 71-72;
Vinson, “Conservation and the South,” 159-160; Cowdrey, This Land. This South. 137-138;
Shingler interview, 6; Koch, Utilization o f the Southern Pines. 1478; “Austin Cary,” 28-29;
Berry, Farm Woodlands. 345; Richard C. Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and
Conservation History (New York: Macmillian Publishing Compnay, 1983), s.v. “Austin Cary.”
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contributions. Eloise Gerry, who sometimes worked with Cary, pioneered studies into a problem
that continued to plague turpentine producers after the development o f the cup system. Although
the cup reduced the damaging effects o f turpentining a tree, the wound created by chipping
continued to harm the pine. Herty himself recognized that “if the tree is not wounded, turpentine
is not produced; if it is girdled, the tree dies. Somewhere between these extremes lies the most
efficient operation.”77
Gerry, who held a Ph.D. from the University o f Wisconsin, undertook research to
discover this balance. Trained as a wood anatomist and specializing in the study o f wood
formation and development, she focused on discovering what caused gum to flow from
turpentined trees. Working at the Forest Service’s Forest Production Laboratory in Madison,
Wisconsin, Gerry discovered that resin ducts were much more numerous in the trunk just above
the most recent streak.78 Geriy examined the development of resin duct tissue, refining the data
produced from earlier studies. Her work led to the recommendation that producers follow the
installation o f cups and gutters with an immediate chipping and allow the tree to stand for about
a month before regular chipping began.79

77 Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 363.
78 Dryer, “History o f the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 7; Ostrom, “History o f the Gum
Naval Stores Industry,” 221; Elwood R. Maunder, Voices From The South: Recollections of
Four Foresters (Santa Cruz, CA: Forest History Society, 1977), 124.
79 Her work continued studies that had begun in the first decade of the 1900s. While in
Europe in 1903, Herty learned that extra resin ducts formed in trees above and below the worked
face after two to four weeks. This explained why the boxes had yielded greater amounts o f gum
with the first dipping than had the cups in the 1902 experiment. With boxing, the practice o f
cornering caused the extra ducts to form early, before the first chipping. In using the cup system,
resin ducts did not begin to increase until after the first chip o f the season, meaning the increased
resin flow did not come until later. Herty, “Turpentine Industry in the Southern States,” 360-362;
Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 10.
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Gerry’s work also provided a scientific basis to explain the benefits o f lighter chipping, a
justification many operators required before altering their practices.10 One o f the greatest
obstacles to light chipping was a persistent belief that originated with the naval stores industry’s
introduction into America, that gum was tree sap. By the first year o f the twentieth century,
American scientists understood from Gerry’s work that unlike sap, which was water-based and
circulated between the roots and the needles, gum was manufactured by the resin ducts in the
layers o f new wood just below the bark. At the time a tree was chipped, it contained no gum.
Rather, the trees’ exterior wood cells manufactured gum following the wound as a way to protect
the exposed wood from insects, disease, and evaporation. Although many producers accepted
the finding, the older idea persisted among some into the 1920s. One forester now found that “it
seems difficult to get away from the notion that by tapping gum is drained from a reservoir in the

Gerry further discovered that the extra resin passages that formed as a result of wounding
were most numerous in the rings nearest the bark and extended up the trunk from two to three
feet from the point that chipping began each year. Narrow streaks kept the face in the maximum
area o f production throughout the year. If producers chipped three-fourths to one inch each time,
the face would rise out o f the region with the largest number of resin ducts. Narrow streaks also

*° Before 1910, Forest Service experiments at Walkill, Florida, demonstrated that
chipping only one-half inch wide and deep would provide the same gum yield as broader and
deeper chips while a the same time doubling the working life of the tree and reducing mortality.
Beginning in 1910 government turpentine leases in the Choctauhutchee National Forest in
Florida required lessees to chip no more than one-half inch each week at a time when chippers
commonly removed three-quarters to one inch of bark. Over the next decade some producers
switched to lighter chipping. Eloise Gerry, Improvement in the Production o f Oleoresin Through
Lower Chipping (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 1931), 3; Dyer,
“History o f the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 7; T. F.P. Veitch and V.E. Grotlisch, “What Uncle
Sam Does for the Naval Stores Industry,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and
Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921),
136.
81 Hawley “Forest Service Investigations of Interest to the Naval Stores Industry,” 140.
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protected a layer o f sapwood behind the face, which kept the tree vibrant by severing only a few
o f the passages used to carry sap between the roots and the needles. They also helped protect the
resin-producing cells from the damaging effects o f drought. If chips were cut too deeply or the
gutter or apron driven too far into the trunk, the sap wood could be cut through. Very large trees
were especially susceptible to this threat because the sapwood tended to be thinner. If the sap
became severed the tree would begin to dryface.82 It was important to keep the tree healthy to
ensure that it achieved optimal annual ring growth. Gerry researched the O hack, whose .75-inch
blade was designed to make a smaller streak. However, the O hack required more effort to make
a chip and workers complained that they could not make their tasks as quickly as with the No. 1
hack. Workers also had difficulty beginning light chipping on a virgin year because o f the
difficulty involved in stooping to reach such a low point on the truck. Workers were perplexed
when they received instructions to chip lightly. For all the previous years they had worked in
turpentine, they were taught that “The deeper you go into the meat, the more blood you get.”83
By 1931 Gerry’s continued experiments showed that one-fourth inch chips yielded the
best results. Although wider chips could yield more gum initially, the shorter chips allowed
longer production from some of the short resin ducts that Gerry discovered. One-fourth inch
chipping provided for better wood development and greater growth of oleoresin-yielding tissues.
There was no need, she believed, for faces to exceed eight to twelve inches per season. The low
chipping exposed less wood to pitch soaking and insect attack. It also helped maintain the tree’s
vigor and wood formation, which later made trees more valuable for timber.84 Gerry forthrightly

82 Eloise Gerry, “The Goose and the Golden Eggs or Naval Stores Production a la
Aesop.” Southern Lumberman (25 August 1923), 1-3; L.A. Ivanov, “Scientific Principles
Underlying the Technique o f Streaking Pines,” Cary Collection, 49; “Good Naval Stores
Practice,” Cary Collection, 2; Butler, Treasures o f the Longleaf Pines. 23.
83 Maunder, Voices from the South. 36.
84 Such narrow chipping required the O hack or even the newly invented OO hack with a
.625-inch wide blade. Low-faced trees continued to produce new wood growth, even during the
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conceded that if producers were harvesting for the short-term before logging their timber, they
could indeed collect more gum through moderately high chipping. Lessees too might opt for
more intensive chipping since their short-term interests might be best served in this manner.
Ultimately, however, producers could gain more gum in the long run from a forest worked using
lower chipping.85
Although working in a field almost completely dominated by men, Gerry was highly
respected by both the foresters and producers with whom she worked. Her research and
publications were taken seriously and her recommendations adopted.86 Her presence in the field,
however, caught the foresters o f the 1910s and 1920s, who politely referred to her as “Miss
Gerry,” off guard. One, for example, described her as “a very bright able woman.” He also
found her “very attractive. She had a good figure, a pretty face, a good complexion, but she
couldn’t talk about anything but her job. She was just as sexless as old Doc Caiy.”87 The
southern racial climate demanded that special arrangements be made when Gerry journeyed to
the region for her research. On one trip, her studies required that she collect fresh wood chips by
following a black chipper through the woods for a day. The forestry supervisor, however,
“couldn’t hear to that. A girl would have been in great danger right off the bat.” So, for several

later years o f harvesting. The pines apparently adjusted to the continued production o f oleoresin.
Where severely chipped trees slowed their growth by one-third to one-half, low-chipped trees
reduced their growth only a little, even above the face where the growth was most affected. In
the healthier, low-chipped pines the face healed over quicker with new wood growing at the
sides.
85 Eloise Gerry, “More Turpentine, Less Scar, Better Pine,” leaflet 83 (Washington, DC:
United States Department o f Agriculture, 1931), 1-4; Butler, Treasures o f the Longleaf Pines. 23;
Gerry, “Improvement in the Production of Oleoresin,” 3,17-23.
86 Shingler interview, 6.
87 Inman F. Eldredge, interview by Roy R. White, 9 July 1959, Oral History Interview,
Austin Cary File, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 8.
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days, Gerry followed the black worker under the watchful eye of a white ranger who
accompanied her to ensure her safety.88
Along with Herty, Cary, and Gerry, other government-supported researchers made many
new discoveries during the 1910s and 1920s that helped the industry. For one, their studies
showed that lighter methods o f chipping could reduce the frequency o f dryface and the fungi that
often accompanied the ailment. To have the safest assurance against dryface, trees were not to
be worked beyond three years. Researchers also found that older trees with crown lengths less
than one-third the total tree height were deemed to be the most susceptible to dryface and
producers were advised to avoid them. If dryface did occur, producers could let the pine rest for
a few weeks and thereby enable it to better resist the condition. After the period, producers
could either double chip the face each week to rapidly raise the face above the affected area
before it expanded further, or they could ignore the dryfaced area and begin the next streak above
it. Researchers recommended that infested trees be removed after turpentining to prevent the
fungi’s spread and any additional turpentining should be continued with great caution.89
Foresters also explored the problems associated with fire. Fire damage to pines
remained a widespread problem in the first decades o f the twentieth century. Although damage
done by fire was less per average acre in the southern piney woods than in forests of other areas
of the country, such a large percentage o f the southern pine forest was burned that overall
damage in the region was much more extensive.90 Work by foresters in the 1920s demonstrated

88 Ibid., 6-8.
89 C.S. Schopmeyer and Otis C. Maley, “Dry Face of Naval Stores Pines,” Forest Pest
Leaflet 51 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1960), 1, 5, 7; R.P. True,
“Dry Face of Turpentine Pines,” The Forest Farmer 8 (August 1949): 11,14.
90 R.D. Forbes and R.Y. Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices
in the Southern Pine Region (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1930),
3,6,14.
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that persistent burning practices seriously damaged the pines and hurt their gum yield. They
conceded that the practice of yearly raking and burning o f the pine straw, chips, and spilled gum
reduced the amount o f flammable material on the forest floor and, in turn, the later likelihood
that accidental fire would rage out o f control. The practice, however, in no way rendered the
forest fireproof. Producers often finished their raking and burning before needles had completed
their fall in late winter, and occasionally the fire encouraged a subsequent needle release that
could easily feed another fire. Also, longleaf seedlings and saplings, although more fire resistant
than other species, often succumbed to the burning, reducing the chances o f reforestation.
Foresters also discovered what producers had been unable to realize from casual observation,
burning slowed the growth o f trees not directly affected by the fire. Not only did burning
consume the debris, it also damaged the humus layer which otherwise provided nutrients to the
trees. Studies showed that Iongleafs grew eighty percent faster on unbumed land than on burned.
On unbumed land gum production rose between twenty-five and one hundred percent. Thus, in
the most conservative estimates, producers could increase profits by twenty-five percent by
keeping fire out. For some producers, the twenty-five percent loss of potential profits was an
acceptable sacrifice for greater insurance that a conflagration would not consume their entire
stand. With the great threat of fire from lightning and especially herdsmen, producers opted to
bum the forests under conditions over which they had relative control. Eloise Gerry discovered
that in cases where controlled annual burning accidentally spread into the tops of trees, the
consequences could be devastating for turpentiners. If turpentining continued in such stands,
half o f such trees could be expected to stop producing or die, and although surviving trees
appeared to recuperate fully after several years, they actually experienced retarded wood-cell and
resin-tissue growth.91
91 Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 14,26;
O.H.L. Wernicke, “Piney Wood Sense,” Pine Institute o f America General Bulletin, 1926, Forest
Service newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 2-3; Harry Lee Baker, “Fire in
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Foresters discovered that the damaging effects o f fire caused long-term harm to the
industry. Fire killed up to two-thirds of the round trees which left timber tracts sparsely stocked.
Some operators by the 1920s worked tracts containing between fifteen and thirty trees per acre
when, if fire had been repressed, they might have been working forty-five to ninety per acre.
Denser stands lowered operating costs by reducing the time laborers spent walking between trees
and raising the number o f faces each could attend.92 Another problem that persisted was the lack
of care for formerly turpentined tracts. Although the adoption o f the cup system made them have
less flammable, pitchy faces, trees could still easily ignite, especially if debris accumulated at the
their base. Because many producers began harvesting from very young trees, the neglect of these
formally turpentined stands ensured that many would never mature.93
With these findings foresters recommended that producers replace their raking and
burning practices with organized fire prevention methods. According to their strategy, rather
than reduce the risk o f large fires by burning away the small deposits of flammable debris each
year, turpentiners would contain fires and suppress them before they grew too large. The
recommended proposal called for continuing the practice o f raking around the trees as a
precaution. Instead o f setting fires, however, producers were to construct a network of fire lanes
and breaks which foresters assured producers would cost less to construct than their expenditure
for annual raking. Where raking cost between seven cents and fifteen cents per acre, fire
prevention cost just four cents to six cents per acre. Although a risk of a large, disastrous forest
the Turpentine Orchard” (paper presented at the Get-Together Conference of the Pine Institute of
America, Pensacola, FL, February 1929), Cary Collection, 1-2; Lenthal Wyman, Florida Naval
Stores (Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1936), 36; Eloise Gerry, “Oleoresin Production from
Longleaf Pine Defoliated by Fire.” Journal o f Agricultural Research 43 (1 November 1931): 827,
830-833.
92 Baker, “Fire in the Turpentine Orchard,” 1-2; Wyman, “Florida Naval Stores,” 36.
93 Wyman, Experiments in Naval Stores Practice. 4; Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing
and Logging and Turpentining Practices.
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fire was present even with the new protective methods, foresters promised producers that the
increased profits from not burning offset it.94
But the turpentiners were at the mercy o f local tradition that demanded periodic burning.
Cattlemen—invoking traditional custom—believed grass growing on the forest floor was rightfully
theirs to use. They demanded burning to keep down undergrowth and encourage grass for their
livestock. Even if the forest’s owners did not want their property burned over, they raked their
trees in anticipation o f the cattlemen setting fire to it anyway. “The cattleman was your friendly
enemy,” explained the son o f one Florida turpentiner of the period.95 Some farmers contributed
to the problem; believing that the boll weevil thrived in wooded areas surrounding their cotton
fields, they demanded eradication o f the pests through fire. A 1926 Pine Institute of America
bulletin explained that “the turpentine farmer, where fires are allowed to run wild, is really in a
vicious predicament, for when he does bum the woods others may do so at the wrong time with
great damage to him, Yet any burning at any time costs him heavily.”96
As a means o f controlling fire and other resulting forms of tree damage, foresters
advocated an end to the practice o f free-ranging livestock. Timber land owners possessed the
right to use the stands and had the obligation o f paying taxes on the property, but beyond these
legal rights and obligations they had little control over the acreage. The way piney woods
southerners saw it, an investor bought land for the timber and until he harvested it and put the
cut-over to some other productive use, they had a right to the range. Because there were no
fences, livestock was permitted to roam over the countryside, grazing on the native grasses. The

94 Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 36;
Baker, “Fire in the Turpentine Orchard,” 2-3 36.
95 Herbert L. Kayton, interview by Roy R. White, 7 October 1959, Oral History
Interview, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, I; Elliott Maguire, interview by author, tape
recording, St. Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996.
96 Wernicke, “Piney Woods Sense,” 3.
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number o f animals involved was considerable. In Washington County, Florida, for example, the
forest provided grazing for around ten thousand head o f cattle and twenty thousand hogs. Sheep
and goats also browsed the forest, especially during the spring and summer months when the
grasses’ lushness peaked. Goats and pigs damaged stands considerably. Goats were fond o f the
tender tips o f young pine stems and branches. Although hogs obtained most of their forage from
acoms and low-growing plants, they did not hesitate to dig up and devour the starchy roots of
iongieaf pine seedlings. Sometimes they even dined on large saplings. In sufficient numbers
hogs could destroy Iongieaf reproduction over a sizable area. By 1930, foresters concluded that,
in many areas of Georgia and Florida, hogs had killed between five and seven percent o f the
young Iongieaf pines under three inches in diameter and in a period o f several months could
seriously injure between forty-six and eighty-five percent. Except for the danger of fire, cattle
and sheep grazing caused little damage to the pine forest. Although cattle might trample pine
seedlings, they actually benefited the younger trees by consuming much o f the flammable debris.
However cattlemen’s insistence on setting fire to the forest floor ran afoul o f the growing
conservation movement’s stand against controlled burning.97
At one Southern Forest Congress meeting the cattlemen were attacked for their stubborn
persistence in burning. Foresters and land owners wanted to fence in the range and protect it
from fire to encourage regrowth. According to the law at the time, it was the landowners’
responsibility to fence in the forest, not the herders’ duty to fence in their livestock. Controlling
access to the forest was in the land owners’ best long-term interest. Cattlemen, the foresters
complained, had no future stake in the property they harmed each year. Cattlemen consequently
disliked the foresters and their efforts at reforestation, which they viewed as the forerunner o f a
97 Maunder, Voices from the South. 76; Ziegler, Spillers, and Coulter, Financial Aspects
of Growing Southern Pine. 60; Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography o f the South: A Study in
Regional Resources and Human Adequacy (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina Press,
1935), 140; “Annual Report of the Starke Branch for the Year 1929-1930,” Cary Collection, 6.
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stock law. Given that angry free range herders were known to destroy fences in protest, one
ingenious company which owned large tracts o f timber in Georgia enclosed forty-four thousand
acres only after putting their own recently-purchased cattle out to graze on their property.
Because the company had a legitimate purpose for fencing in their property, local residents
accepted the change. It thus appears that piney woods herders o f the early twentieth century
closely resembled similar men in the Georgia upcountry in the second half of the nineteenth
century as described by historian Steven Hahn, in that they did not reject efforts toward property
improvement, but at the same time viewed stock laws as an unjust attack on their economic
welfare.98
Foresters also made efforts to understand other factors associated with yield variation
that were not as obvious as deep chipping, burning, and free-ranging livestock. By the late
1920s, they made significant strides in understanding the variation in gum yields between
different timber stands and individual trees within those stands. In general, researchers found
that all factors that favored the trees’ health favored resin production but that moisture was the
most important factor in gum secretion. The greater the amount o f water in a tree, the greater
absorption by the cells, which created abundant pressure necessary to encourage the open resin
ducts to exude gum. This finding explained the drop in gum yields during drought. Also,
moisture in both the ground and air affected gum yield, which rose appreciably after rains in
warm humid weather. Temperature also influenced resin production. High temperatures
encouraged gum yield and low temperatures, below 10° C., severely retarded it. However, to

98 Vance, Human Geography of the South. 140; Harley Langdale, Jr., interview by
Harold K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 38. The company also took control
of hunting on its property, allowing permits only on the condition that hunters exercise care with
fire and report any that they saw and regulating trapping by leasing rights. Maunder, Voices from
the South. 76-77. Steven Hahn, The Roots o f Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the
Transformation of the Georgia Uocountrv. 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1983), 247.
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affect yields, temperatures bad to remain low for twenty-four hours, meaning that cool evenings
did not necessarily hurt turpentining provided daytime temperatures rose sufficiently. Increased
daylight generally helped gum production, but it also possessed negative effects. By stimulating
photosynthesis in the crown, thus increasing nutrients available to the tree, and heating the trunk,
which favored resin production, the increasing number of sunny hours in summer aided
operators. However, light also increased transpiration from the crown, reducing water pressure
and emission o f spirits. These discoveries explained why spring yields were smaller and
production during July and August rose. In mid-summer, eighty percent of weekly gum flow
occurred within twenty-four hours of chipping, but in the cooler days o f the spring and fall the
same percentage of flow required five days.99
Even under similar growing conditions, researchers discovered, trees in different areas
could have yields that varied as much as three hundred percent. Pine trees growing in sandhills
produced less gum than pines growing in slightly more fertile soil. In the former, trees tended to
grow more slowly, failed to achieve great height, and consequently produced less resin. Thus the
trees in the Carolinas and south Florida, which grew in sandy hardpan land, yielded less than
stands in Georgia, north Florida and across the Gulf coast. Large trees with full crowns tended to
produce more as a result o f their greater strength. Within the same stand, however, certain trees
tended to outperform other seemingly identical trees growing close by. Gerry discovered that
such trees usually grew in more open spaces than the others, possessed broad, large crowns,
straight, not forked tops, long and very green needles, rough, thick bark, and if examined, usually
had wide annual rings. Even with this characterization to go by, woodsmen had difficulty
identifying the most productive trees because the root system of individual trees and deep soil

99 Ivanov, “Scientific Principles Underlying the Technique o f Streaking Pines,” 28,4346; Wyman, Experiments in Naval Stores Practice. 8; Karl Petraschek, “The Further
Development o f the Technique o f Turpentining Pines,” Cary Collection, 16-17.
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conditions, neither o f which was easily detectable, also greatly influenced yield. To confuse
matters more, some trees possessed a genetic orientation toward greater wood growth at the
expense of resin production while others tended to grow less wood, but yield great quantities of
gum once wounded.100
As researchers began to acquire better a understanding of the dynamics of gum
production, they began campaigning for careful resource use to render the industry sustainable.
Scientific study confirmed what informed observers suspected—the pervasive practice of cupping
small trees not only harmed the pines, but produced an unprofitable yield. It was estimated that
seventy-five percent o f the second-growth pines in Georgia and South Carolina that measured
more than eight inches in diameter had already been bled and that many trees even smaller were
in production. Many of these stands were but fifteen years old. Even the trees growing on the
best quality land could not withstand chipping until they were, at the earliest, around twenty
years old. And if young pines survived the drain on vitality caused by turpentining, their growth
was either greatly slowed or stopped. In some cases, producers worked small trees at a loss
because they were mixed in with larger ones, and the workers insisted on working all to make
their crop. Gerry estimated that a very vigorous tree 5.4 inches at breast height yielded only half
as much as 8-inch trees. Pines of the latter size yielded only about half as much as 11- or 12-inch
diameter trees. Gerry recommended that producers ignore trees less than ten inches in diameter
because the small trees yielded so little and their future use was seriously jeopardized by
turpentining. One forester equated the turpentining o f small trees with cutting them down, so
great was the harmful effect on them. In fact, a large portion of the undersized trees did either
stop growing, blow down, bum up, or fall victim to dry face or pests. By exploiting the young,

100 Wyman, Experiments in Naval Stores Practice. 9, 33,36; Eloise Gerry, “A Study of
Externally Matched Southern Pines Which Produce Widely Different Yields of Oleoresin,”
Carry Collection, 2-4.
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second-growth stands, producers were ensuring that the southern pine forest would never
return.101
Not only did foresters encourage the conservation o f young pines, they addressed the
problem o f the growing number of acres o f cut-over wasteland in the South. Much of the land
fell into the hands o f the states and county governments, seized for delinquent taxes. Some states
attempted to sell the cut-over acres as potential farmland. In 1901, for example, the Georgia
Department o f Agriculture made the erroneous claim that “where the trees have been removed
there remains a cleared field well-suited to agricultural purposes, in some instances adopted to
the raising o f the highest priced cotton, the long style or sea-island variety, or other staple crops.”
The same tracts, it claimed were suitable for commercial fruit and vegetable production.102 In
fact the cut-over pine forest land tended to be relatively infertile, which is why settlers had
avoided it in the first place. The application of commercial fertilizers could increase cotton,
com, and wheat yields on it but with the low crop prices o f the time, the added expense of
fertilizer made the land only marginally profitable at best. Some producers searched for
innovative ways to market their used up acreage. In 1906 John D. Robertson purchased land in
Lake County, Florida, and set up a still which he operated for seven years. Over this period he
accumulated over 12,000 acres. When he had finished in the area, he sold the property in 1913
to the Lake County Land Owners’ Association which developed it as a residential area called

101 Forbes “Passing o f the Piney Woods,” 136; Harley Langdale, Jr. interview, 2; Eloise
Gerry, “Recent Observations on the Effects of Turpentining on the Structure o f Second-Growth
Slash and Longleaf Pines,” Journal of Forestry 21 (March 1923): 2-3; “Good Naval Stores
Practice,” 2; Gerry, “Goose and the Golden Eggs,” 2; Brower and La Fontisee “Report of the
Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 29-30; Wernicke, “Piney Woods Sense,” 60; Baker,
“Fire in the Turpentine Orchard,” 1; V.L. Harper, “Progress Report on Influence of Turpentining
on the Growth of Slash and Longleaf Pine,” 1930, American Turpentine-Farmers Association
Papers, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1.
102 Georgia Department of Agriculture, Georgia Historical and Industrial (Atlanta:
George W. Harrison, State Printer, 1901), 355.
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Fruitland Park, a community that remains in existence. Another turpentine operation eventually
sold out to a lumber mill in the 1910s. The mill, in turn sold their one thousand cut-over acres to
the Lake County Groves Corporation which succeeded in cultivating orange groves on the barren
plot. Such successful cases were rare. To address the land use issue, the Southern Cutover Land
Conference was organized in New Orleans in 1917. Although conference goers considered the
option of reforestation, they ultimately settled on the unfeasible plan to turn the land into pasture
and crop fields.103
Factors pushed to reforest denuded timber tracts through reseeding. The more easily
cultivated slash pine, however, and not the once dominate iongieaf, was the foresters’ chosen
favorite. Without periodic burnings, which the forestry establishment then shunned, the longleaf
would be quickly shaded out by faster-growing species. And its long tap root, which even very
young longleafs sent down, made it difficult to grow in nurseries. Although less hearty at a
young age, the slash pine grew faster than the longleaf, making it marketable at an earlier age.
And best o f all, studies showed it could actually yield more gum than the longleaf. Only in the
poorest soils, where no other species could thrive and where vegetation cover was much needed
to curb erosion, did most foresters believe the iongieaf had a place.104
The combination of the improved methods and the conservation efforts made between
1900 and 1920, both facilitated by federal intervention, averted the depletion that forestry experts
had been forecasting. Tum-of-the-century technical changes also helped by reducing the nation’s
over-dependence on wood. Treated railroad ties lasted thirty-five to fifty years instead o f the

103 Vance, Human Geography of the South. 135; Clark, Greening of the South. 29-30.
William T. Kennedy, History o f Lake Countv. Florida. Lake County Historical Society, Tavares,
FL, 43, 74.
104 “Good Naval Stores Practice,” 3. Gerry, Improvement in the Production o f Oleoresin.
2; Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 8; P.L. Buttrick,
“Commercial Uses of Longleaf Pine.” American Forestry 21 (September 1915): 908.
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previous five to ten. Building materials such as brick, stone, cement, iron, and steel replaced
wood in the construction o f buildings, ships, bridges, freight cars, and farm implements.
American wood consumption consequently declined rapidly after 190S and timber supply
estimates became more optimistic. Greater confidence in the forests’ regrowth resulted as well
from improved understanding o f the growth rates for different trees, climate, and topography.105
One naval stores industry observer found as early as 1910 that “young trees grow where the old
ones have been taken out and in many a once-plowed field stands to-day a young growth that will
soon be big enough to yield a ‘crop of boxes.’” 106 In 1923, Eloise Gerry observed that secondgrowth trees had a remarkably rapid rate o f growth which offered much hope for the industry’s
future. In the mid 1920s, Georgia, for example, possessed only one million acres of virgin pine
growth, but had nine million acres of second-growth timber.107 In 1924, Thomas Gamble
explained that “the return of Georgia to first rank this season as a naval-stores state is due to the
working o f trees which have come up since 1900 and, almost without protection, have recovered
the land held for centuries by their forebears. Great sections o f the state possess today a vigorous
growth o f young pines that, with moderate care, will develop in a comparatively few years into
prolific yields o f the oleo-resin from which spirits turpentine and rosin are made.”108 Another
observer jeeringly explained that “people who regret the turpentine camps set the day not far
ahead, in three years or in five, when the smoke o f the last still will have vanished and the
ruthless ax o f the woodsman following will have cut the last tree for the second-quality lumber

105 Donald J. Pisani, “Forests and Conservation, 1865-1890,” in American Forests:
Nature. Culture, and Politics, ed. Char Miller (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1997): 25,
27; Clark, Greening o f the South. 129.
106 Packard, Florida Trails. 277.
107 Gerry, “Goose and the Golden Eggs,” 3; I. James Pikl, A History o f Georgia Forestry
(Athens: Bureau o f Business and Economic Research, University of Georgia, 1966), 20.
108 Gamble, “The Naval Stores Industry of the South,” 325.
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which the turpentine-bleeding process leaves behind. Others say the end of the trees is
something like the end o f the world. It has been prophesied almost since the beginning and has
never yet happened.”109
The passing o f the timber supply crisis won many producers over to the federally funded
forestry efforts. A 1927 U.S. Department o f Commerce bulletin accurately summarized the
impact o f conservation methods on the industry, stating that “the lumber and Naval Stores
industries are now fully awakened to the fact that their natural resources are being depleted, and
they realize that their continued existence is dependent upon scientific measures o f conservation
and reforestation.”110 But despite the obvious successes o f government and business cooperation

109 Packard, Florida Trails. 277.
110 Priest, Naval Stores Industry. 2. The development o f the American naval stores
industry bears a remarkable resemblance to the kauri trade in New Zealand. In the early
nineteenth century Europeans discovered large tracts if virgin kauri trees, some more than sixty
feet in girth. Where these trees had grown for thousands o f years, Europeans found deep resin
deposits, which they soon began mining. Kauri, used in the manufacture of varnishes, linoleum,
glue, and ceiling wax, grew in demand and its production grew into a major industry that lasted
into the twentieth century. At the industry’s peak in 1899, eleven thousand tons o f kauri were
exported. At first producers gathered gum from near the surface, but as these easily-accessible
supplies dwindled, it became necessary to dig for it, sometimes as deep as ten meters. Gum
could also be collected from living kauri trees. Climbers or “tree bleeders” scaled the trucks,
harvested gum in the forks o f branches and on their decent cut incisions in the trucks at two-foot
intervals. Within a few months the climbers returned, gathered the gum which had collected on
the wound, and cut more scars to continue the process. While some entrepreneurs tapped the
trees for gum, others cut them for lumber. Settlers cleared the cutover land o f stumps to begin
agriculture. Because of the damage resin producers caused the increasingly scarce trees, the
bleeding process was outlawed in 1905. For a short while attempts were made to extract gum
from kauri wood chips using solvents. The number o f kauri dwindled to the point that, by 1925,
only five thousand tons o f resin was exported and by 1952 just twenty-one tons. As the kauri
forests disappeared, foresters sought efforts to restore New Zealand’s woodland. Because it
required a century for a kauri seedling to reach marketable maturity, foresters chose to plant
imported radista pine. With its rapid growth, prolific seed production, and adaptability to New
Zealand’s geography and climatic conditions, radista pine was ideal to reclaim forest land. In the
1930s, as part o f a conservation program much like the United State’s Civilian Conservation
Corps, New Zealand pine forests were replanted. By the late twentieth century over one million
acres of natural and planted radista pine forests covered New Zealand and provided the raw
material for an overseas market in lumber, plywood, turpentine, and tall oil. John Drew, “Let’s
Face It,” Naval Stores Review 92 (May-June, 1982): 4.
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and the large operators’ general acceptance of federal and state involvement, in the late 1920s
other producers, especially smaller ones, continued to look on forestry as a meddlesome and
intrusive movement and persisted in their employment o f practices little changed from one
hundred years earlier.
Where federal forestry efforts led to great advances in gum harvesting, another federal
agency, the Bureau o f Chemistry worked as well to improve the quality o f the turpentiners’
product and develop more reliable marketing standards. Beginning in 1915, the Bureau
conducted demonstrations on improved distilling methods, developed both privately and by the
Bureau, which would give better yields. Distillers had relied on their observations o f the water
and turpentine consistency exiting the worm and the sound of the resin in the still to regulate the
temperature. Interruptions or noise from thunderstorms could sometimes make the still
impossible to regulate. Even for the most experienced and astute distiller, the challenges o f such
primitive operating methods produced widely varying results. In an effort to improve the
distilling process, a physician and turpentine producer from Cordele, Georgia in 1908 developed
a still thermometer which allowed for better regulation o f heat. He also calculated out the
optimal temperatures for various grades o f gum, 250° F. for virgin, 260° F. for average, and 270°
F. for old gum. Both the thermometer and temperature recommendations enabled distillers to
produce more uniform results and the greatest quality and quantity. In 1916, another inventor
developed a recording thermometer that gave a charge’s temperature history. Because it showed
the speed and direction of temperature changes, it allowed for even better still regulation. The
Bureau also sent agents into such important naval stores centers as Savannah to work with
factors as well as individual producers on distilling problems. G.P. Shingler, who worked for the
Chemical Bureau in the 1920s, invented a ten-ounce “nursing bottle” marked to indicate when
water should be added, the temperature raised or lowered, or the rosin discharged, by measuring
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the water and spirit consistency o f the fluid exiting from the condensing tube. Because many
distillers could not read, these gauging devices were designed to be used by the illiterate.
Shingler joined Austin Cary and Eloise Gerry in the field, visiting producers and demonstrating
better ways of managing forests, chipping, and distilling. They also printed and distributed
posters and circular letters warning o f wasteful losses through careless handling o f gum,
distilling, and treatment o f the spirits and rosin.111
Perhaps the Bureau’s greatest contribution to production came in the late 1920s with the
introduction of a new kind of refining process, steam distillation. Although first performed in a
crude fashion in 1868 in Georgetown, South Carolina, and improved by the French eight years
later, steam distillation in the United States did not mature until researchers with the Bureau’s
Naval Stores Research Division worked out an acceptable design. Early problems with the
original process involved the discoloration of rosin, by that time the most valuable o f the naval
stores products. Wood chips, one o f the most common foreign particles in raw gum, lodged on
the steam coils, where they charred between still runs and discolored the rosin from successive
charges. The presence o f water vapor in the still also tended to give the rosin a cloudy
appearance. Naval stores researchers solved the problem by developing a method o f cleaning the
gum before it entered the still. By this process, gum was melted to make it more fluid, diluted
with spirits of turpentine to make it more liquefied, then filtered and finally sprayed into water
where it settled. The improvement led to the rapid proliferation o f steam distilleries (fig. 8.4).112

111 Robson Dunwody, “Proper Methods o f Distillation and Handling in the Production of
Turpentine and Rosin,” in Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed.
Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 132-133; Shingler
interview, 1-3; Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines. 81; Veitch and Grotlisch, “What Uncle
Sam Does for the Naval Stores Industry,” 138.
112Ostrom, “History of the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 222.
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Figure 8.4. Percentage o f Gum, Steam, and Destructively Distilled Turpentine, 1900-1930
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture,
1956), 7-8.

The Bureau o f Chemistry was also instrumental in establishing improved naval stores
production standards. By the turn o f the twentieth century, no uniform industry standards of
purity and grade existed and individual ports tended to follow different requirements. In 1869,
the New York Port Authority created standards for rosin, but these did not apply to southern
ports. In 1894, the Savannah Board o f Trade established its own naval stores grades, but its
authority did not extend to other ports. In an effort to remedy the lack o f uniformity and the
increasing problem o f adulterated spirits, Georgia and Florida, the two most important naval
stores-producing states, each passed legislation requiring purity of spirits shipped from their
ports and providing for inspectors to enforce it Although the export o f adulterated spirits slowed
to a trickle following these acts, no safeguard was provided for the quality o f rosin and standards
continued to vary so much between ports that in 1910 there existed sixty different grades. In
some cases, the confusion caused rosin o f presumably the same grade to be, in fact, as much as
two grades different.

Finally, in 1912, the Bureau o f Chemistry established uniform standards

for both rosin and turpentine based on color. W.W. (Water White) and W.G. (Window Glass)
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represented the two palest and thus most valuable grades. Lower grades included N. (Extra
Pale), M. (Pale), K. (Low Grade), I (Good No. 1), H. (No. 1), F. (Good No. 2), E. (No. 2), D
(Good Strain), C. (Strain), B. (Common Strain), and A (Black). The Bureau o f Chemistry issued
sets of glass standards by which inspectors could grade rosin. The original set was kept at the
Bureau office in Washington and matching sets were kept at the major naval stores ports. Once
the standards were in place, prices varied widely between grades. The lower ones sold for
roughly half the price o f the higher ones. The older naval stores region tended to make a larger
percentage of the lower grades while states where the industry was new, especially Louisiana and
Texas, manufacture more better-quality products, which came from gum harvested from virgin
faces and from using improved methods.113
Although the plan helped the industry by providing added assurance to consumers that
the products they purchased were in fact of the standard they expected, some in the business
viewed the government’s increased role with suspicion. The head of one factorage house
believed that “when the Government takes hold of the naval stores business at all it will take hold
of it effectively, and we will have Governmental inspection and supervision from the tree to the
trade

[S]uch work will require a very large number of petty Government officials, whose

stamp will be necessary before a barrel of rosin or turpentine can be marketed or shipped. O f
course the turpentine operator will have to foot the bill.”114 The government’s involvement did

113 Davis, Encyclopedia o f Forest and Conservation History. 476,479; John E. Register,
“The Naval Stores Inspector—His Work and How He Does It,” in Naval Stores: History.
Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing
and Printing Company, 1921), 69; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 108-109;
Veitch and Grotlisch, “What Uncle Sam Does for the Naval Stores Industry,” 137-138; A.
Sessoms, “To Factors and Operators,” Carry Collection, 1-2; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores
Industry. 49; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
10,47-48.
114 C. Downing to W.C. Powell, 13 February 1914, William C. Powell Papers, Special
Collections Library, Duke University.
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not prove to be at all as intrusive as suspected. By around 1920, Savannah had four naval stores
inspectors who each examined 1,200 barrels o f rosin and 300 barrels o f turpentine each day at
the season’s height Producers, however, paid for the service. Inspectors fees cost nine cents per
barrel o f rosin and twelve cents per banel o f turpentine. The factor paid the fee which then
charged to the producers’ accounts. At the urging o f both consumers and producers, the Bureau
in 1918 began collecting and publishing statistics on production, stocks on hand at stills, ports,
dealers, and principal consuming industries.113
The system o f turpentine and rosin standards and inspections reached maturity in the
federal Naval Stores Act o f 1923. Designed with consumer interests in mind, it prohibited
interstate commerce or foreign export o f adulterated or mislabeled naval stores. It reaffirmed the
standard grades for turpentine and rosin, but authorized the Secretary o f Agriculture, who
oversaw the Bureau o f Chemistry, to establish new ones and modify the existing standards if
needed. Enforcement o f the act was the duty of the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration
and violations were to be reported to the Department o f Justice. The act also provided for
inspectors to check products ready for shipment.116
The naval stores industry’s successful efforts to alter production methods represented the
convergence of two significant developments, the near-total loss o f the southern pine forest and
the emergence of federally-backed scientific forestry in the United States. Whereas others had
tried and failed at developing a cup-type system in the nineteenth century, Herty’s success was
owed in large part to producers o f whose mind’s the seemingly impending timber depletion made

115 Register, “Naval Stores Inspector,” 69; Veitch and Grotlisch, “What Uncle Sam Does
for the Naval Stores Industry,” 138; Shingler interview, I.
116 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 81-82; Kenneth H. Thomas, McCranie’s
Turpentine Still. Atkinson Countv. Georgia: A Historical Analysis o f the Site. With Some
Information on the Naval Stores Industry in Georgia and Elsewhere (Atlanta: Georgia
Department o f Natural Resources, 1975), 7-8; Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine: A History
of Florida Naval Stores. 1528 to 1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 28.
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more receptive to alternative practices. His efforts also benefited from his formal training in
forestry and the support o f the nation’s newly-formed forestry establishment. These advantages
permitted Heity to develop a practical and affordable method, qualities that did not necessarily
guarantee its adoption. But the endorsement o f the Bureau o f Forestry helped convince
producers o f its merits. Herty’s demonstrated desire to work in cooperation with producers
ushered in, by the 1910s, an era of forestry experimentation and study unlike anything seen
before in the industry. Although Herty shifted his attention to other areas o f southern economic
improvement, Austin Cary, Eloise Geny, and other foresters continued research and close work
with turpentiners. Their efforts led to far greater understanding o f the influences of deep
chipping, burning, and free-range grazing on turpentine yield. Federal assistance through Bureau
of Chemistry research also helped naval stores producers by developing distillery improvements
and uniform marketing standards. For the time being, their efforts rescued the turpentine
industry from certain doom.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter Nine
Fresh Challenges:
The Naval Stores Industry Faces New Problems

During the first decades of the twentieth century the naval stores industry faced
challenges on several fronts. Although improved methods o f production did retard depletion of
pine timber, overall stands remained scarce, and the industry, with no more fresh pine territory to
exploit, could not solve its resource problem by moving as it once had. As timber grew
increasingly scarce and, consequently more expensive, labor and supply costs also rose, reducing
the industry’s profitability, especially during the First World War. At the same time, producers
had to adjust to a change in market demand that caused rosin prices to rise above those for
spirits. During these difficult years the gum naval stores operators faced growing competition
from foreign producers, most notably the French, whose superior methods were the envy of
American producers. The development o f a revolutionary new way o f manufacturing turpentine
by well-capitalized, heavy industry at home intruded on their market as well. On top of
profitability declines, a change in market emphasis, and new challenges for market share, the
factorage system, which by the late-nineteenth century had virtually disappeared in cotton
production, developed an even firmer grip over the naval stores trade and producers than ever
before. All of these developments created a difficult business environment for naval stores
producers during the first three decades o f the twentieth century.
As southern timber began supplying a growing percentage of national lumber production,
a problem developed as lumber companies grew ever more hostile to the practice of leasing their
pines to naval stores men before chopping the trees or “turpentining ahead o f the cu t” From
1880 to 1920 lumber production in the South increased nearly ten times from 1.6 billion board
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feet to 15.4 billion board feet. The first World War created an immense demand for lumber. The
government needed wood for factories, warehouses, offices, military training camps, and most
importantly, ships. Because pine lumber, especially that cut from longleaf logs, was water
resistant and thus did not require seasoning, it was heavily used in ship construction. By 1917,
the South provided thirty-seven percent o f U. S. lumber. Some lumber companies experimented
with leasing but found turpentining too troublesome and suspended the practice. Despite
requirements to the contrary, some turpentine producers left nails and gutters in trees because
their removal was too expensive and burdensome, especially when nail heads broke off in the
process. Turpentined trees sometimes dryfaced, even with the use of cups, and the fire hazard
associated with turpentining remained a perpetual danger. A growing demand for pine lumber
meant some stands were cut before turpentining could begin.1 When large timber holdings were
worked for turpentine, it was typically done by the lumber concerns themselves or very large
naval stores outfits, not smaller individual producers. Around 1910, the majority of new Georgia
turpentine orchards were operated by timber owners who harvested gum before cutting. And by
1919 corporations employed forty-one percent of the industry’s wage earners, operated fortyseven percent of the distillery operations, and were responsible for the same portion of product
output.2

1Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A Historical Geography (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 238; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening o f the South: The
Recovery of Land and Forest (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 26; George
B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South. 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1967), 55-56; P.L. Buttrick, “Commercial Uses of Longleaf Pine,” American
Forestry 21 (Spring 1915): 904; James H. Jones, interview by Roy R. White, 9 July 1959, Oral
History Interview, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 1, 3-4; Elliott Maguire, interview by
author, tape recording, St. Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996.
2 Asa L. Brower and John O. La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval
Stores Industry and Statistics on the Production of Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons o f 19078 and 1908-9” 15 March 1909, Austin Cary Memorial Forestry Collection, Department of
Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, 27-28.
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Foresters complained about the timber industry’s increased reluctance to capitalize on
such a potentially valuable resource as turpentine and the hardship it placed on turpentine
producers. In the South forester, Asa L. Brower, complained in 1909, “there are large areas o f
round timber present, yet, as far as the small [turpentine] operator is concerned, a scarcity,
artificially induced, prevails, and is beginning to make itself felt as keenly as that in the East.
The ‘round’ timber is held by the large lumber companies, which are usually antagonistic to
turpentine operations. Some few are beginning to permit turpentining, either performing the
operations themselves or else leasing the privilege to large naval stores companies. Generally, it
can be said that the future o f the naval stores industry in these parts is still problematic.”3 The
situation remained the same over a decade later. In 1923, Eloise Gerry admitted that the
increased use of the less-harmful cup and gutter method had prompted some lumber companies
to allow turpentining in their stands. “The additional profits which come from turpentining
longleaf and slash pines before they are cut for lumber,” she explained, “may be likened to the
golden eggs o f Aesop’s famous goose. Treat the goose well and the valuable product continues
without unduly injuring the producer.” However, she complained, “there are still conservative
timber owners, whose interests are centered in the products o f the sawmill, who are inclined to
shake their heads dubiously when asked why they do not turpentine their timber before it is
logged. They remain skeptical even when they are reminded that when they do not turpentine
their timber, or when they work it for two years only, they are throwing away or wasting all or at
least a considerable part o f an important and valuable natural resource.”4

3 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 3031.

4 Eloise Gerry, “The Goose and the Golden Eggs or Naval Stores Production a la Aesop,”
Southern Lumberman (25 August 1923), 1.
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Independent producers suffered from the serious reduction in pine acreage that had
already resulted from both their exploitative practices and lumber companies growing reluctance
to lease stands. By the first decade of the twentieth century both North Carolina and South
Carolina each had about forty naval stores establishments, but the output of their operations was
extremely small. The great turpentine-producing days in these states had passed (fig. 9.1). At

Percentage o f Naval Stores Production by State
Selected Years from 1905-1944
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Figure 9.1. Percentage ofNaval Stores Production by State, Selected Years from 1905-1944
Joseph B. Hosmer. Economic Aspects of the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 4.

this time, Georgia lead in the number of naval-stores-producing establishments with over 650.
However, the industry in many areas of the Peach Tree State was aging, having existed there
since the 1850s. Moreover, independent producers experienced increasing difficulty locating
acceptable tracts since the majority of new turpentine establishments in Georgia at the turn of the
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century were owned by lumber companies that were themselves turpentining before logging. As
a result of the declining number o f available virgin stands, many producers in the state had begun
to back-box, a practice which produced less gum than front-boxing. Despite labor and weather
conditions very similar to Florida’s, Georgia’s turpentine forests yielded less turpentine. Where
Georgia made an average o f 26.5 casks of turpentine per crop in 1909, Florida produced 29.8.s
In Florida, where turpentine production increased very gradually following the Civil
War, turpentiners discovered more available timber than in Georgia. Florida’s rail network,
which expanded more slowly than Georgia’s in the late nineteenth century, made up for its
retarded development during the first two decades o f the twentieth century. New lines improved
access to the previously isolated, and thus relatively protected, pine stands. Producers also
continued to rely on river transportation to move their naval stores to port. At Picalota, a small
St. Johns County community by the river of the same name just below Jacksonville, one large
producer had his own dock from which steam boats could service his operation. Hard surface
roads, however, provided the best access to remote forests during this period. For example,
producers in Walton County, located in the west-central panhandle, claimed in the late 1920s that
it was cheaper to haul their naval stores 135 miles by truck to Pensacola than to transport them to
the nearest railroad depot, load them on the cars, ship them to the factor in Pensacola, and finally
unload them there. Roads also helped producers move their operations. In the 1920s one
producer used Model T trucks to relocate twenty-one families, horses, mules, chickens, and at

5 Ibid., 3, 51, 54, 58-59. As a boy growing up in North Carolina around 1910, Erwin
Stephens discovered such long forgotten relics as a single-loaded musket, powder horn, loom,
and old turpentine hacks and dippers, all stored in an attic. “The Place,” 14 December 1955,
Edwin Duke Stephens Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University, 1-2; For both
combined and separated figures related to turpentine and rosin production see Appendix A.
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least one cow from a Manatee County camp to a new location in S t Johns County 225 miles
away.6
The rapid movement o f operations into the state in the 1890s made Florida the largest
turpentine-producing state soon after the turn o f the century, despite having slightly fewer
establishments than Georgia. By the early 1910s naval stores production was the most important
industry in Florida with 529 establishments representing a combined capital investment o f
$ 14,376,088. The 21,262 laborers it employed earned a total o f $6,047,048/ Because of
Florida’s increased naval stores production, in 1905 Jacksonville surpassed Savannah as the
predominant naval stores exporting port (fig. 9.2). (The title reverted back to Savannah in 1923.)
Jacksonville actually might have overtaken Savannah several years earlier if not for a disastrous
fire in May 1901 which destroyed a large portion o f the city. By 1920, seven naval stores
factorage houses were headquartered in Jacksonville and two others maintained branch offices
there. The Commanders Point Terminal Company operated the largest naval stores yard in the
world on the city’s waterfront. It handled the entire naval stores storage business in Jacksonville,

6 During the first decades of the twentieth century, counties funded most southern road
improvements. Between 1906 and 1917 the southern states created highway commissions. From
1920 to 1929 southern highway expenditure rose 157 percent and over roughly the same time the
miles of paved road rose from 121,164 to 209,880. Draft of agreement with railroad builders,
1913, William C. Powell Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; Elliott Maguire,
interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, St.
Augustine, FL; Tindall, Emergence of the New South. 256-257; E.A. Ziegler, A.R. Spillers, and
C.H. Coulter, Financial Aspects of Growing Southern Pine. Washington Countv Florida
(Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1931), 18. Karen Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into Turpentine
Family: Industry Once Had Major Impact on County,” The Compass. 26 April 1990, copy on file
at Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, St. Augustine, FL, 9.
7 In comparison, there were 528 sawmills in Florida, representing $13,271,658 of
investment capital. Their 13,083 wage earners made a total o f $5,098,568. The only other areas
of manufacturing that approached naval stores and sawmills were phosphate, kaolin, and Fuller
Earth mining and cigar manufacturing. Twelfth Biennial Report o f the Department o f Agriculture
of the State o f Florida from the Years 1911 to 1912 (Tallahassee: T J. Appleyard, State Printer),
428-429.
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thus saving buyers and sellers from having to collect supplies from different yards around the
port to fill an order. The yard possessed storage space for 200,000 barrels of rosin, covered

Receipt o f Naval Stores at Savannah, Jacksonville,
and Pensacola
1914-1930
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Figure 9.2. Receipt of Naval Stores at Savannah, Jacksonville, and Pensacola, 1914-1930
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,”
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 53.

space for 12,000 barrels o f turpentine, and tank storage capacity for another 33,000 barrels of
turpentine.8

8 Pensacola also exported a substantial amount of naval stores. Brunswick, Georgia,
Tampa, Florida, and New Orleans exported these products as well. A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C.
Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, The Naval Stores Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau o f
Economic and Business Research, College o f Business Administration, The University o f
Florida, 1934, 14; William Thomas Cash, The Storv o f Florida (New York: The American
Historical Society, 1938), 798; “Would Preserve Pine Forests,” Atlanta Constitution. 2 June
1901, Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC; Brower and La
Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 64,67; George H. Baldwin,
“Jacksonville as a Naval Stores Port and Market,” in Naval Stores: History. Production.
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing
Company, 1921), 107-108.
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In the first two decades o f the twentieth century, Florida offered good opportunities for
turpentining. The state’s central G ulf coast region, protected up to 1910 by its isolation and the
state’s ownership o f the tracts, contained a considerable quantity of virgin pines. Improved
transportation and the purchase o f timber land by private companies opened the region up to
production. In parts o f south Florida a large percentage o f the original pines remained by 1910,
but much of these stands consisted o f small trees growing far apart, and the even these acres were
widely scattered. In the panhandle, west o f the Appaiachicola River lumber stands were more
readily available. Lumber companies held the majority o f the timber there and seldom permitted
turpentining of their trees. But in the other areas o f plentiful pines, the industry’s vigor led to
rapidly diminishing resources in parts o f Florida just as it had in the Carolinas and Georgia.
Turpentining in such places as Washington County reached its peak around 1905, but within five
years the lumber companies began to remove the timber. By the late 1920s, the county’s naval
stores production came from remnant longleaf and slash pine. At this time the relative
importance of the naval stores industry in Florida declined, dropping behind lumber in the
number of employees and behind both lumber and cigar and cigarette making in amount o f wages
paid.9
In neighboring Alabama, turpentining continued at a steady but less rapid pace than in
Florida. Although areas around Mobile had produced turpentine since before the Civil War,
much o f the longleaf pine in the southern portion o f the state had been left untouched until the
turn of the century. Railroad development made these formerly isolated tracts more accessible.
In 1902, for example, the completion o f a rail line from Georgiana, Alabama, in the south-central
heart o f the state, to Graceville, Florida, in northern Holmes County—a distance of nearly one

9 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 4,
34-36, 49, 54, 59; Ziegler, et al., Financial Aspects o f Growing Southern Pine. 40; Campbell, et
al., Naval Stores Industry. 21.
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hundred miles—provided convenient transportation to the pine region that possessed no water
access. Lumber and turpentine camps quickly developed along the route. Although Alabama
production had long fluctuated, by 1908-1909, the state ranked as the third largest naval stores
producer. With its vast supply of virgin pine, producers enjoyed an average yield o f 35.6 casks
of turpentine per crop, nearly nine casks more than crops in Georgia and six more than those in
Florida. But large corporations controlled much o f the round timber in Alabama so small
producers found little opportunity to move into the state. With only around 190 operations,
however, Alabama had fewer than half as many operations as Florida and Georgia had. And with
the introduction o f such robust naval stores and timber activity, it was estimated that available
round timber in south-central Alabama would be depleted by the mid 1910s. Longleaf pine
stands in northeastern Alabama were largely ignored because they grew too sparsely for
profitable turpentining.10
In Mississippi, where naval stores had been produced since the late antebellum era,
manufacture remained erratic until the late-nineteenth century when declining timber stands in
older producing states drove turpentiners there. Railroad expansion through the southern part of
the state opened fresh areas of virgin pine and linked them with the port at Mobile. As the
inevitable destruction took its toll, small independent producers found little room to expand as
the lumber companies became increasingly reluctant to lease their stands. When they did lease,
it was usually to large turpentine corporations that practiced conservation methods. Declining
longleaf timber stands caused a rapid reduction in Mississippi naval stores activity after 1910.
At the turn o f the century, Mississippi had 145 production establishments which were, on
average, larger than those in the older producing areas of Georgia and still growing. In 1904 the

10 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
54, 59,33, 36-37, 51,4; E.W. Carswell, Holmcsteadine: The History o f Holmes County. Florida
(Tallahassee: Rose Printing Company, 1986), 105.
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number o f producers dropped by fourteen percent but the number o f workers they employed rose,
indicating the increasing size o f the average turpentine business. By 1908 the ninety-four
remaining establishments represented the largest manufacturers who had possessed the capital
resources to weather the decreasing number o f stands. At that time Mississippi was the fourth
largest naval stores producer. Its yield of 34.5 casks of turpentine per crop, slightly less than
Alabama, indicates that, although the timber resources may have been declining, enough virgin
tracts remained to enable a substantial harvest. By 1909, however, nearly half o f the Mississippi
pines had been bleed and, although the pines in the extreme western and northwestern edge of
the Iongieaf belt remained less affected, their scattered growth mixed with shortleaf pines
discouraged extensive turpentining. By the beginning of the First World War, the Mississippi
industry was in rapid decline. The interruption in international export trade caused by the war
resulted in a drop in production by approximately fifty percent. Like cotton, turpentine was
included on the British list o f contraband. Even with the war’s end, the depletion of timber
brought further declines to the naval stores business. By the late 1920s, the little Mississippi
turpentine production that remained could be found only on small, usually scattered tracts.11
In eastern Louisiana, where the naval stores industry was essentially an extension o f that
in Mississippi, the longleaf forest and industry suffered the same fate.12 However, the
southwestern Louisiana pine forest, separated from the east by the lowlands of the Mississippi
valley, experienced surprising success. In this area, as in eastern Texas, pine forests remained

11 Turpentiners were also badly affected by a hurricane in 1906. Nollie Hickman,
Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Longleaf Pine Belt 1840-1915 (University: The
University o f Mississippi, 1962), 133, 135-137; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the
Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 54, 59,4,36-37, 52; James L. McCorkle, Jr.,
“Mississippi from Neutrality to War (1914-1917),” The Journal o f Mississippi History 43 (May
1981): 92-94.
12 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 5,
37.
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largely untouched until the first years o f the twentieth centuiy. The timber was consequently of
exceptional quality and jealously guarded by the few large concerns who owned it. Most land
companies frowned on the often destructive and wasteful turpentining practices. By 1909, only
twenty-five producers operated in Louisiana, most in the eastern pine forest, and but eight
worked in Texas. In 1903, the Houston Texas Post complained that because lumber men were
producing millions o f board feet o f lumber without first turpentining the timber, “millions o f
dollars are being lost annually as a result of neglect on the part of those interested.” Those
companies that did work their timber for turpentine did so themselves, employing only the most
conservative methods. Because they insisted on improved methods, these producers enjoyed
substantially higher yields and less destruction o f the timber than in any other state. Texas
operations yielded 43.5 casks o f turpentine per crop and Louisiana, principally the western area
of the state, collected 44.7 casks, forty percent more than Georgia producers.13 Producers in
western Louisiana and east Texas did face a special problem, however; certain insects indigenous
to the region hampered the regrowth o f pine forests once turpentined and harvested. Pine sawfly
larvae, which hatched from eggs laid in slits in the needles, fed on both new and old needles and
could defoliate young seedlings. Although attacks by this insect only rarely killed the trees, they
could severely stunt their growth. The leaf-cutting ant could also greatly weaken young pines.
During the early winter or in the hot summer, whenever other green vegetation became scarce,
these ants harvested needles on which they cultivated a fungus that they used for food.14

13 Ibid., 5,38-41, 53,48-49, 54, 59; “Turpentine in Texas,” Houston. T e x a s P o s t. 16
September 1903, Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest Histoiy Society, Durham, NC.
14 The naval stores industry failed to establish itself west of Texas. During the Civil War
efforts were made to supply the northern state’s naval stores needs from the Pacific coast forests,
but production there suddenly collapsed with the resumption of southern manufacturing in the
1870s. Although west coast trees could yield substantial gum, their tough, rough bark had to be
removed before chipping could begin, adding a prohibitably expensive procedure to the harvest.
Howard E. Weaver and David A. Anderson, Manual o f Southern Forestry: With Special
Adaptations for Students o f Vocational Agriculture (Danville, IL: The Interstate Printers and
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The rapid decline o f the virgin pine forest, the lumber industry’s tight control of
remaining stands, and these companies’ expansion into naval stores production challenged
producers by creating a timber scarcity that drove up both purchasing and leasing prices
throughout the South. By the early 1900s, Georgia pine lands, which could have been purchased
for from 500 to $ 1.50 several decades before, sold for between $4 and $8. By the 1920s an acre
sold for between $50 and $100 or more. Prices rose in Florida as well. In 1917, a large Florida
timber owner offered 38,000 acres o f timber land for $7.60 per acre. Even his open “prairieland”
was expected to bring $4.75 per acre. Two years later another 28,000 acres were anticipated to
sell for between $5 and $5.50 per acre. At these high prices it was easier for producers to lease
than purchase pine timber tracts; the number o f acres owned by producers dropped as the number
of leased acres grew. Where turpentine makers harvested gum from 3,249,577 acres of land that
they owned in 1909, by 1914 that amount dropped twenty percent to 2,594,331 acres. Over the
same period the number o f leased acres grew nearly eighteen percent from 4,807,338 to
5,833,757.15
Publishers, Inc., 1954), 276-277; A.W. Schorger and H.S. Betts, The Naval Stores Industry
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1915), 46.
15 Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current
Problems o f the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North
Carolina, 1942), 107, 143; I. James Pikl. A History of Georgia Forestry (Athens: Bureau of
Business and Economic Research, University o f Georgia, 1966), 10; Michael D. Tegeder,
“Prisoners o f the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern Turpentine Industry, 1900-1930” (Ph.D.
diss., University o f Florida, 1996), 61; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 125; J. Arthur Johnston to
W.C. Powell, 13 December 1817 and letter to The Germain Company, 17 May 1919, William C.
Powell Papers, Special Collections Library, Duke University; R.D. Forbes and R.Y. Stuart,
Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices in the Southern Pine Region
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1930), 69; Turpentine rent
agreements between L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company and Union Naval Stores Company, 5
February 1901, 5 August 1901, and 11 July 1905, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers, Special
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi State University; Turpentine rent receipt to
B.D. Clark, 16 March 1906, Belton Decatur Clark Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University
of South Carolina; J.A.G. Carson, “The Increased Cost of Naval Stores Production,” in Naval
Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah:
Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 73; Lenthal Wyman, Florida Naval Stores
(Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1936), 9.
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The cost o f leasing, like that of purchasing timber, rose as supplies grew more scarce.
Leases that cost from $100 to $200 per crop in 1896 rose to as much as $500 by 1899. Leasing
costs continued to rise slightly from the turn o f the century into the 1920s. In 1906 one producer
paid $21 to rent three hundred turpentine boxes near Lexington, South Carolina, and another
$120.47 to rent 1721, or about $700 per crop. By 1920, however, prices had risen considerably
to between $ 1,000 and $2,000 per crop for a three year lease. By the mid 1920s lease costs
increased to $2,000 and even $2,500, and some crops in Georgia reportedly reached as high as
$3,000 to $3,500. By the late 1920s, however, leasing prices appear to have declined to around
$1,200 of a four year lease as second-growth stands reached sufficient maturity.16
Because lumber companies, which tended to frown on the turpentining o f their trees,
now owned most o f the pine land, the lease agreements required practices that would ensure
preservation o f the timber quality. In the first years o f the twentieth century, lease agreements
such as the one between Mississippi-based Dantzler Lumber Company and Union Naval Stores
Company allowed for traditional boxing methods to be used provided they were worked in a
“skillful and workable manner, according to the prevailing methods in the naval stores
production trade.” In virgin timber, owners permitted as many as three boxes to be cut in one
tree, as long as 3.5-inch-wide bands were left between each face. However, no trees less than
eleven inches in diameter one foot from the ground could be boxed. Occasionally producers
worked timber on a percentage basis, paying the owner fifteen to thirty percent o f the gross value

16 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 107, 143; PikI, History o f Georgia
Forestry. 10; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 61; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest. 125; J. Arthur
Johnston to W.C. Powell, 13 December 1917 and letter to The Germain Company, 17 May 1919,
Powell Papers; Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 69;
Turpentine rent agreements between L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company and Union Naval Stores
Company, 5 February 1901, 5 August 1901, and 11 July 1905, Dantzler Lumber Company
Papers; Turpentine rent receipt to B.D. Clark, 16 March 1906, Clark Papers; Carson, “Increased
Cost of Naval Stores Production,” 73; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 9.
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of turpentine and rosin produced, depending on the timber’s quality. As the cup and gutter
system became more widely used and its benefits increasingly recognized, landowners required
producers who leased their timber to employ these new methods. Some owners offered reduced
prices to encourage early adoption o f cups and gutters. New agreements insisted that cups were
to be hung at the appropriate time on only trees o f a designated size, usually nine inches in
diameter or larger at breast-height. No more than one face was allowed on trees smaller than
fourteen inches in diameter and no more than two faces were permitted on larger trees. Chipping
was also to be practiced judiciously and fire kept out o f the forest. But in the event a blaze
accidentally started, producers were to rake around the tree. Finally, all o f the equipment,
especially nails, was to be removed from the trees.17
Although naval stores prices—particularly rosin prices-rose in the first part o f the
twentieth century, production cost increases made the business less profitable. Until 1913
profitability declines resulted from overproduction, a condition that worsened in 1914 due to
disruption o f foreign trade caused by the First World War (fig. 9.3). Although demand improved
with the beginning of American war preparations, persistent low prices combined with high next
year costs rose nearly fourteen percent, another twenty percent the next, and an amazing
production costs drove many producers out o f the business. Between 1914 and 1915, overall
costs for a twenty-crop operation increased only slightly, from $25,046 to $25,233. The twenty-

17 Turpentine rent agreements between L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company and Union Naval
Stores Company, 5 February 1901, 5 August 1901, and 11 July 1905, Dantzler Lumber Company
Papers; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 9-11; Deed, Bill of Sale and Assignment o f Leases, A.L.
Marsh and Ruby Marsh to E.E. Edge and Leo Maguire, 16 July 1928, in possession o f Maguire
Land Corporation, St. Augustine, FL; Charles H. Herty, “The Turpentine Industry in the
Southern States,” Journal o f the Franklin Institute 181 (March 1916): 356; Sample mortgage
agreement, 1929, Cary Collection.
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Turpentine and Rosin Exports from the United States
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Figure 9.3. Turpentine and Rosin Exports from the United States, 1901-1930
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,”
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 53.

nine percent from 1917 to 1918. In 1919 they rose a relatively modest 6.6 percent to $55,333.
Over the five years from 1914 to 1918 costs increased a total of fifty-five percent.1®
The prices o f certain supplies like livestock feed and barrels nearly tripled. Other items,
like clay cups, rose in price only slightly. The greatest area of increase, however, came from
labor, an expense that represented between fifty and sixty percent o f production costs (fig. 9.4
and 9.5). During the First World War, the cost of hiring skilled workers like chippers, cup
raisers, and distillers more than doubled, and in some cases tripled, while less skilled workers

18 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 107, 126, 128; Campbell, et al., Naval
Stores Industry. 88; “Production o f Naval Stores;” For figures related to early twentieth-century
naval stores production, prices, and exports see Appendix A.
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Figure 9.4. Average Weekly Gum Naval Stores Wages Per Wage Earner, 1899-1930
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (PhD . diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
339; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
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Figure 9.S. Ration of Estimated Wage Cost to Gum Unit Prices, 1899-1930
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
339.
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saw their wages rise from fifty percent to one hundred percent. At one operation in the Florida
panhandle, the wages for chipping one thousand faces rose from 750 to 800 in 1916, to $1.40 by
1919, and to $2.50 one year later. One worker who typically earned $6.83 per week in 1916, by
1920 made S19.88.19 In 1921 a naval stores man recalled that before these wage increases “labor
was abundant, cheap, healthy, and efficient Every fall and winter trainload after trainload o f
expert turpentine negroes were brought into Georgia, Florida, and Alabama from North Carolina
and South Carolina (the turpentine industry declining in the latter states and undergoing
development in the former). Labor was so abundant that Sambo was willing to work efficiently
for six days in the week and give good value for the wages paid him. Times have changed and
Sambo with them. The competition between the employers o f their labor became so keen that
Sambo’s compensation was increased.”20
Even before the extraordinary rise in production costs associated with the First World
War, entering the naval stores business had become an expensive undertaking. For example, the
expense of beginning and operating a twenty-crop operation in 1909 required building a camp,
purchasing equipment, and leasing timber at a total cost o f around $26,000. The greatest portion
of this capital outlay was the timber lease, which amounted to around $20,000. Eight mules,
three horses and saddles, harnesses, and wagons would run $2,100. Twenty shanties, costing $75
each, along with two substantial dwellings to house the manager and overseer costing $300 a
piece would total $2,100. Producers could expect to spend $1,250 for a twenty-five barrel still.
Bams, a commissary building, and barrels added another $550. After this initial investment,
operating the business over four years required $81,005, mostly for labor costs. Chipping

19 “Division o f Cost o f Producing Naval Stores,” Cary Collection, 1-3; Clifton Paisley,
“Wade Leonard, Florida Naval Stores Operator,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 51 (April
1973): 390; For figures related to annual wages see Appendix A.
20 Carson, “Increased Cost o f Naval Stores Production,” 73.
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consumed the most, $17,400 or just over twenty-one percent o f wages. All other jobs—boxing,
cornering, raking, dipping, scraping, hauling, inspecting, and distilling—would run $22,295 over
the four years. Salaries for the number of white managers and guards sufficient to oversee work
in twenty crops and food for their horses would total $11,280. The 2,360 turpentine barrels and
8,240 rosin barrels required for four years cost just over $10,000. Interest, taxes, depreciation,
and marketing costs added another $20,206, making the total cost over four years $101,211.21
Production costs typically decreased each year a crop was worked, usually by fifteen to
twenty percent each year. The drop in the lease price each year accounted for much o f the
decline. Also the cost o f dipping dropped as gum yields declined, causing less need for dip,
spirit, and rosin barrels as well. It was also half as expensive to raise the cups as to hang them.
However, many costs continue unchanged. The same number of streaks was required in the
fourth year as in the first, so that chipping cost remained constant The expense of hiring a
distiller, teamsters, and woodsriders also stayed the same. Not only did the overall operating
expenses decline after the first year, so did profits. Each year the gum flow decreased and the
grade of rosin it yielded declined. Thus, despite the overall drop in yearly production costs, net
returns diminished even more.22
The experience o f the Leonard brothers reveals how some operators who entered the
business around the turn o f the century withstood the difficult years by expanding their business
interests into areas other than naval stores. In 1900 the three brothers, all in their twenties, left
North Carolina. Samuel and Wade relocated to Florida, where they went to work for other
21 In 1915 the cost of working twenty crops for four years was estimated to range
between $119,480 and $156,040. The primary difference between this and the 1909 estimate
was the expense o f investing in cups and gutters, which ran between $9,450 and $11,550.
Schorger and Betts, Naval Stores Industry. 52; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the
Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 60-61.
22 “Production o f Naval Stores;” Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on
the Naval Stores Industry,” 11.
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turpentine producers, and Henry began his own operation in Mississippi. None, however, found
immediate satisfaction or success. Samuel and Wade were unhappy laboring for others and, in
1906, a hurricane destroyed Henry’s turpentine orchard. That year the three brothers formed a
turpentine partnership ten miles south o f Blountstown in Calhoun County, Florida. With Henry
serving as manager o f their company, H. C. Leonard and Brothers, they began buying property.
With their factor’s backing, they purchased three-fifths interest in Chipoia Turpentine Company,
whose eight thousand acres extended for seven miles along the Chipoia River and Dead Lake in
southern Calhoun County. The factor owned the other two-fifths o f the operation. The brothers
continued their land acquisitions, purchasing majority shares of the Maysville Naval Stores
Company, which owned 20,000 acres near their other holdings in the county’s southern comer.
They also purchased the five-thousand-acre Sterling farm in the northern part of Calhoun
County. This property contained good pine timber as well as several hundred acres of
agricultural land which grew com, cotton, sugar cane, and peanuts. With this operation
conveniently located by the Apalachicola River, the Leonards began shipping their turpentine
and rosin upstream to Chattahoochee by boat from where it went by rail to their factor in
Jacksonville. Before the First World War their annual naval stores shipments reached
approximately $100,000. Though the same channels the Leonards received tools and supplies for
their naval stores and fanning operations and groceries, clothing, and medicine for their four
commissaries, which served one hundred families.
Like other turpentine producers, however, the Leonards’ business suffered with the
beginning of war in Europe. They attempted to hold rosin off the market, hoping for better prices
in the near future, but with no success. To meet their debts, they mortgaged two pieces of
property with a combined value o f $172,740. They survived the industry’s downturn during the
war only by diversifying into other areas. By 1918 they ran six small mills producing cane syrup,
which out-sold their naval stores. The same year they also began a lumber business. By the mid-
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1920s, with the financial disruption o f the war behind them, the brothers branched out even
further, owning a drug company, livestock business, and two car dealerships. They accumulated
$268,772 worth o f land and total assets worth $444,419. However their interests in Miami realestate threatened to undo all they had worked for. When the Miami land boom busted in the late
1920s they had to sell off some o f their cut-over acreage and once again mortgage property.
They survived even this setback, however, and continued turpentining until around 1940.23
The first half o f the 1920s saw a partial industry recovery (fig. 9.6) as timber grew more
available, operating costs decreased (fig. 9.7), prices recovered, and production grew more
profitable (fig. 9.8). Following the First World War, the southern lumber industry entered a
challenging period that required it to squeeze as much profit from its timber holdings as possible.
Before 1910 companies rushed to purchase timber in anticipation o f a predicted future shortage.
The required capital outlay for their purchases, combined with increased taxes on the idle
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Figure 9.6. Total Barrels o f Gum Turpentine and Gum Rosin Produced, 1897-1933
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,”
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 39; For figures related to chart see
Appendix B.

23 Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 381-385,390-394,398-400.
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Figure 9.7. Total Cost Per Unit of Gum Naval Stores, 1919-1930
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
340; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
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Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
338; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.
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property, placed a strenuous financial strain on companies. By the 1920s, lumber owners turned
to turpentining to reduce the economic burden. They either turpentined their timber themselves
or leased it to individual producers before it was cut. By this time companies had less to fear of
turpentining’s damage to timber. In stands where cups were used there was only a two percent
deterioration in the timber following turpentining. Improved transportation facilitated the
movement of logging operations and thus lessened the time from the conclusion of turpentining
to the beginning o f timber harvesting, the period when fired disease, and insects hurt turpentined
stands. Too, the promised timber scarcity failed to materialize, leading owners to relax their grip
on forest resources. By 1920 the growing supply of timber from the Northwest and the increased
use o f other building materials—cement, steel, and brick—made southern timber less valuable.24
The new willingness o f lumbermen to lease their timber opened up the naval stores
industry to a greater number of producers. Price increases after the First World War (figs. 9.9
and 9.10), attracting the smaller producers who had steadily left the business in the first two
decades of the century. Much of the industry growth occurred in the more eastern reaches o f the
pine belt where by 1925, second-growth pines began to grow large enough in the older naval
stores areas to enter production (figs. 9.11 and 9.12). Because this new regrowth tended to be
sparsely scattered and less productive than the larger tracts o f fully mature virgin trees, it
attracted more smaller producers than large operations, the latter requiring greater contiguous
acreage. As a result o f all these factors, after 1920 there was a resurgence of small producers as
timber leases grew more available and naval stores prices temporarily rose. In general, however,
smaller producers lacked sufficient capital to invest in improved methods.25 They thus were less

24 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
27-28; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 122-123; For figures related to naval stores
industry profitability see Appendix A.
25 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 91, 118-119, 125-126; Brower and La
Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 28, 59; Otho Monroe,
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well equipped to take advantage o f an industry shift that had begun roughly ten years earlier.
Employing less than five wage earners on average, these small turpentiners either formed
cooperatives to share the expense o f distilling, sold their gum to larger operators with stills, or
paid a central custom distillery to process it for them. It was difficult for a producer to justify the
expense o f owning and operating his own still with less than five crops. In fact, to run a still full
time, producers needed to work about twenty crops, which covered between four thousand and
five thousand acres. This size business would supply enough gum to run a fifteen to twenty
gallon still twice a day. Small producers most commonly sold their gum to custom distilleries
whose numbers throughout the turpentine belt increased during the early twentieth century.
These still operators did business in areas where naval stores production was concentrated, not in
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Figure 9.9. Season Average Prices of Gum Rosin, 1900-1930
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture,
1956), 22-23; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.

interview by Michael Garvey, 19 March 1975, Mississippi Oral History Program, McCain
Library and Archives, University of Southern Mississippi, 6.
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Season Average Prices of Gum Spirits
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Figure 9.10. Season Average Prices o f Gum Spirits, 1900-1930
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture,
1956), 22-23; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.

Annual Average Number o f Wage Earners
in the Gum Naval Stores I n d u s t r y by State
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Figure 9.11. Annual Average Number o f Wage Earners in the Gum Naval Stores Industry by
State, 1909 and 1919
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
316; For Figures related to chart see Appendix B.
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Number o f Naval Stores Establishments with Wage Earners by State
1900,1909, and 1919
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Figure 9.12. Number o f Naval Stores Establishments with Wage Earners by State, 1900, 1909,
and 1919
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
317; For figures related to chart see Appendix B.

the port cities, which were often too distant from inland forests to justify the expense o f moving
bulky gum. In 1900, for example, Lewis Charles Yaeger, a hardware man in Tallahassee,
purchased land in Wakulla County to the south where he established a custom distillery, the
largest such business between Jacksonville and Pensacola. His operation employed over one
hundred workers and shipped out rosin and turpentine by the barrel by steam boat and railroad.26
Starting in the first decade o f the twentieth century and continuing thereafter, rosin
prices rose, creating a situation in which to survive operators had to shift their production focus
to what heretofore represented nothing more than a byproduct of distillation. Two developments

26 “The Turpentiners,” The Magnolia Monthly 7 (October 1969); Schorger and Betts,
Naval Stores Industry. 18; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval
Stores Industry,” 44-45.
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that caused this shift occurred at roughly the same time, each encouraging the other. Increased
uses for rosin expanded a demand for it. Whereas rosin remained an important ingredient in
soap—improving that product’s ability to suds and fight germs—as well as in the manufacture of
paints, varnishes, and lacquer, its growing use in paper production represented a significant
change. Since around 1820, rosin had been used as sizing to reduce paper’s permeability by
liquid. This use steadily grew until, by 1924, it became the most widespread application for
rosin. Rosin was also used in the production o f plastic compositions such as sealing wax and
roofing cement, in making ointments, plasters, and emulsifying compounds, as well as in
linoleum production, which provided a market for low-grade rosins. As these new applications
grew, they created an increased demand for high-grade rosin and producers increasingly shifted
to the improved methods which were capable o f yielding a better-quality product than older
practices (fig. 9.13). These combined factors brought rapid change to the market.27 In 1908 the
U. S. Forest Service made the startling announcement that “for the first time in the history o f the
naval stores industry, the production of rosin in the United States . . . led turpentine in value”
(fig. 9.14).28
The growing market demand for rosin led to the regular practice of rosin mining. During
the antebellum era only the highest grades o f rosin brought prices that justified the expense o f
marketing it. Consequently distillers disposed of most rosin by emptying in into a channel that

27 “Naval Stores History,” Naval Stores Review 100 (March/April 1990): 6; Eldon Van
Romaine, “Naval Stores, 1919-1939,” Naval Stores Review 100 (July/ August 1990): 8,11;
Bureau of Chemistry, “The Principal Uses o f Rosins and Spirits Turpentine,” in Naval Stores:
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 99-100; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 42; Peter Koch,
Utilization o f the Southern Pines (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture,
1972), 1490, 1492; “Rosin Passes Turpentine in Naval Stores Value,” Turpentine newsclipping
file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC.
28 “Rosin Passes Turpentine in Naval Stores Value.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

425

Percentage of Rosin of Different Grades
1903-1934

Figure 9.13. Percentage o f Rosin o f Different Grades, 1903-1934
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,”
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 46.
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Figure 9.14. Percentage o f Producers’ Net Income from Turpentine and from Rosin, 1907-1930
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,”
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 50.

led from the still to a stream, river, or lake, or by simply dumping it on the ground near the
distillery. The practice o f harvesting the discarded product began just after the Civil War, when
a Union soldier in Sherman’s army learned o f a large rosin deposit near the town of Angier in
Harnett County, North Carolina. The soldier returned two years later, bought the right to mine it,
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and profited from the venture until naval stores prices dropped with the resumption o f southern
production. As new uses for rosin grew in the late nineteenth century, mining revived. Miners
first hacked rosin out of beds created where the content of stills had been repeatedly emptied on
the ground. Although normally covered by several feet of earth, land beds were easier to both
locate and work. Using pick axes, laborers—most o f them black—hacked the dried rosin into
transportable chunks, which when melted possessed the same qualities as the day it had drained
from the still.29 During the first two decades o f the twentieth century, miners probably recovered
more than 100,000 barrels of the discarded rosin.
One o f the most ambitious mining projects began around 1920 at the old Avirett North
Carolina plantation, Richlands, that possessed one o f the largest and most inaccessible rosin
beds. Over the course of half a century, six different stills had operated at Richlands, all within a
radius of four hundred to five hundred feet, and their rosin had flowed into Lake Catherine. Two
brothers named Graham constructed a dam around the most rosin-rich portion o f the lake bed.
After pumping the water out and removing the silt layer at the bottom, they began the laborious
task of recovering the long-discarded product. As the rosin chunks came up from the former lake
bottom, the brothers melted it in a vat at the old still site, ran it through a strainer and dipped it
into barrels. Within less than a year, they had recovered 15,000 barrels of rosin and had yet to
begin recovery o f the main portion.30
29 C. Dorsey Dyer, “Histoiy o f the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The AT-FA Journal 25
(January 1963): 7; “The Place 3,” Stephens Papers, 24; John Drew, “The Early Days o f the Naval
Stores Industry,” Naval Stores Review (November-December 1981): 16; “Naval Stores History,”
6; Thomas Gamble, “Mining for Rosin in the Old North State,” in Naval Stores: History.
Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing
and Printing Company, 1921), 37.
30 The practice of rosin mining could create legal disputes over the ownership of
discarded rosin, as it did in the 1890s in South Carolina. In 1885 a Mr. Outlaw began operating a
turpentine still. He quit after two years and rented the still to D. L. Poison. At that time, rosin
prices were too low to justify transporting the product to market Outlaw and then Poison both
made a practice o f running the rosin into a pit at the still. The still produced so much rosin that it
filled the pit and overflowed into a nearby stream. A dispute over the once worthless rosin’s
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At the same time that the rosin market created a shift in production emphasis to which
operators had to adjust, gum naval stores producers faced growing competition from both
domestic and foreign sources that could offer a superior product Operators found themselves
threatened by American wood naval stores manufacturers who used a radically different
procedure to make similar products. The method o f distilling a wide variety o f products—tar,
pitch, turpentine, pine oil, and charcoal—from pine stumps had been attempted in the early 1840s.
In 1852 a patent was registered for making tar in a retort and, later that decade, James R. Grist
installed one with a 2.5 to 5 cord capacity. The first partially successful plant was built in
Wilmington, North Carolina, in 1872, but it and other late-nineteenth-century attempts at wood
naval stores production only partially succeeded. Increases in naval stores prices around 1900

revived efforts to perfect the process. In 1907 Homer T. Yaryan, a chemist, who years before
had developed an improved linseed oil extraction method and new process to distill water, made
substantial advancements in the technique o f chemically extracting tar and turpentine from pine
stumps at an experimental plant in Michigan. Two years later a plant using the Yaryan design
and financed by a wealthy Toledo stock broker was completed in Gulfport, Mississippi. In 1912
a second such factory opened in Brunswick, Georgia.31

ownership erupted when prices rose high enough to justify mining it and transporting it out o f the
woods. Poison, the renter, began selling it by the barrel. However, Outlaw’s policy while he
operated the still was that if any o f his clients desired the rosin from their gum, they were to
provide the barrels in which to collect it, otherwise it was his. Thus, Outlaw claimed, Poison was
entitled only to the rosin that he barreled during the year that he ran the still. Moreover, Outlaw
argued, the rosin that Poison had sold from the pit was there before he rented the still because all
the more recently produced rosin had spilled out and run down an embankment into a creek. The
outcome of this dispute is unknown. Civil Suit Testimony, B.J.L. Stuckey v M.J. Outlaw and
B.L. Outlaw, c. 1890, Darlington County Historical Commission, Darlington, SC; Gamble,
“Mining for Rosin in the Old North State,” 37-39.
31 Richard C. Crosby, Jr., “Captains o f the Naval Stores Industry,” Naval Stores Review
91 (September-October 1981): 15-16; “Naval Stores History,” 7-8; Drew, “The Early Days o f the
Naval Stores Industry,” 17; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 109-111; Naval Stores
Statistics. 1900-1954. Statistical Bulletin No. 181 (Washington, DC: United States Department
o f Agriculture, 1956), 2; Janice Croft, “A Twin Success Story: Pensacola and Newport,”
Pensacola Historical Resource Center, Pensacola, FL, 5, 7; Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia
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The destructive distillation method involved collecting wood from pine stumps, cutting it
into smaller pieces, and placing it into retorts where it was heated with hot gases to the point o f
charring. A system o f iron pipes kept the heat uniform in the kiln. The temperature could be
controlled to within one degree Fahrenheit of that desired. Distillation o f a charge required
fifteen to twenty hours. By basis o f weight, the process yielded seventy-nine percent rosin, nine
percent turpentine, eight percent pine oil, and four percent other chemicals. The rosin settled to
the bottom o f the retort where it could be drawn off, barreled, and sold without further treatment
or processed into separate products: creosote oils, acetic acid, and rosin oils. The vaporous
extract was further refined into spirits in copper stills to ready them for market. What remained
in the kiln was charcoal.32
The wood naval stores industry got off to a very slow and disappointing start. At first
there were surprising difficulties securing an adequate supply of stumps to run the facilities, even
though stumps were plentiful in the millions of cut-over southern forests. Lumber cutters tended
to leave high stumps. In time their sapwood rotted, leaving only the resin-saturated heart. To get
stump lightwood to the plants, workers had to move into the cut-over areas, blast the stumps from
the ground with dynamite, load the pieces onto wagons, and haul them to the nearest railroad or
river to be transported on barges to the plants. Subsequent improvements made stump
acquisition easier, however. Hercules Powder Company developed a way to blast stumps out o f
the ground without blowing them into tiny pieces. Later, motorized pullers extracted the stumps,
which were then transported to the plants by trucks and trains.33
o f American Forest and Conservation History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1983), s.v. “naval stores;” Carroll B. Butler, Treasures o f the Loncleaf Pines. Naval Stores
(Shalimar, FL: Tarkel Publishing, 1998), 93-95,97.
32 Romaine, “Naval Stores,” 11-12; Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954.2; Richard C.
Cook, “Early Industry Accounts Through 1920.” Naval Stores Review.” 77 (August 1967): 7-8.
33 Crosby, “Captains of the Naval Stores Industry,” 15-16; “Naval Stores Histoiy,” 7-8;
Drew, “The Early Days o f the Naval Stores Industry,” 17; Martin, “Historical and Analytical
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At first the wood naval stores industry had to compete with gum naval stores producers
who manufactured a better product Destructive distillation plants were initially constructed in
anticipation o f such a fast-approaching and devastating domestic pine forest depletion that the
investors building them believed the United States faced a naval stores shortage. However,
second-growth slash pine grew faster than expected, enabling the gum naval stores industry to
continue, against which the wood naval stores industry early on faced a distinct disadvantage.
The destructive distillation process produced only one relatively low grade o f rosin and a
substance known as pine oil. Not only was there was no market for pine oil, but gum rosin was
superior in quality. However, improvements in wood naval stores production following the First
World War allowed the industry to successfully compete with gum products. The well-financed
wood naval stores plants turned to engineering and chemical and market research to develop
superior naval stores of a uniform quality. They studied their consumers’ needs and created
products aimed specifically at certain market sectors. They were thus able to offer buyers the
exact type of turpentine and rosin they required. Wood naval stores makers also provided their
customers technical advice to enable them to use the products most effectively and taught them
about new products the industry developed. In addition, they carefully advertised their wide
variety o f new naval stores. The struggling and unorganized gum industry lacked the resources
to devote such energy to product development and marketing, and their market standards
remained independent o f the customers’ needs. They classified turpentine not by its chemical or
physical properties, the most informative categorization for determining how best to use the

Approach,” 109-111: Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954.2; Croft, “A Twin Success Story,” 5, 7;
Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 476-477; Butler, Treasures
of the Longleaf Pines. 93-95, 97.
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product, but by how it was produced: Gum Spirits o f Turpentine and Steam Distilled Wood
Turpentine.34
As the wood naval stores industry gained stronger footing, more plants sprang up across
the coastal area o f the South. After Yaryan’s wood naval stores facilities went up in Gulfport
and Brunswick in 1909 and 1911, the next two plants to be constructed became part o f a large
wood naval stores-producing operation which remains in existence today. Newport Turpentine
and Rosin Company began as Arinin A. Schlesinger’s effort to provided his family’s small
Milwaukee paper company with a steady and reliable supply of rosin for paper size. In 1913 he
completed a plant at Bay Minette, Alabama, to extract rosin from pine stumps. The plant was
capable o f processing seventy tons of stumps each day. Under a contract with the Bay Minette
Land Company, which wanted to rid its cut-over land o f stumps in the hope of converting it to
farm land, Newport removed the stumps for free. Although Newport benefited from a large
supply of stumps, the rosin it first made was too dark and soft for use as quality-grade paper size
and its turpentine possessed an odd odor and dried too slowly for use as a paint thinner. Over the
next three years, however, Newport researchers succeeded in producing marketable products.
With growing success, Schlesinger moved to expand his operation. A new plant, constructed in
Pensacola where a deep-water harbor, plentiful supply o f area stumps, and three railroads
combined to provide an ideal location, was completed in 1916 and had over twice the production
capacity o f the Bay Minette facility. As Pensacola’s first industry, the plant employed
approximately six hundred workers, the majority o f them technical and managerial personnel
brought from Milwaukee, where they had previous associations with Schlesinger.

34 “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” Olustee Experiment Station Files,
Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4-5; Davis, Encyclopedia of American Forest and Conservation
History. 477; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 184-185; R.C. Palmer, “New
Standard for Turpentines,” Pine Institute of America report, Turpentine Newsclipping file, Forest
History Society, Durham, NC, I.
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Despite its eventual success in claiming a market niche, the wood naval stores industry
developed slowly from 1910 to 1930. In 1910, the first full year o f operation for the initial
Yaryan plant, wood naval stores made up only 0.3 percent o f all naval stores production in the
United States fig. 9. IS). Ten years later wood naval stores comprised only three percent, an
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Figure 9.15. Wood Turpentine and Wood Rosin Production, 1897-1933
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry/'
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 41.

increase o f ten times, but still only a small portion of the total market.35 However with high
product quality and low prices, industry observers predicted a surge in the wood naval stores
market share within the near future. In 1921 Thomas Gamble explained that “no one doubts that

35 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 21; Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954.
2.
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in coming years that industry [wood naval stores] will play an ever increasing part in supplying
the demand for turpentine and rosins as well as the other products of such plants. The
standardization o f such products and the greater capital, business capacity, and technical skill
called into play in the industry as a whole are placing it on a basis o f assured permanency and
bring ready recognition o f the value o f its output throughout the world.”36 During the 1920s
Gamble’s prediction began to come true. The wood naval stores industry’s greater attention to
customer need, combined with the periodically low naval stores prices during the 1920s, allowed
it to gain market share at the gum naval stores industry’s expense (fig. 8.4). Wood naval stores
prices were only loosely based on the rates o f gum naval stores set by the Savannah Board of
Trade. Instead, individual wood naval stores producers set prices that varied somewhat between
manufacturers but were consistently lower than gum naval stores prices. During market
downturns, the lower production costs o f wood naval stores manufacture enabled the plants to
operate profitably and expand where the relatively high operating costs o f gum producers lead to
net losses in their industry. By 1930 wood turpentine made up 12.1 percent o f the spirits market,
and wood rosin comprised 18 percent o f the rosin’s market. Throughout the 1930s the market
gain for wood naval stores would become much greater/7
Newport Company served as a leaders in the wood naval stores industry’s expansion.
Demands for naval stores during the First World War kept both company plants working near
maximum capacity, but an early 1920s recession hurt sales. In response to the downturn, the
Pensacola facility developed extremely pale grades of rosin that could find buyers even in the
poor market. With renewed vigor, Newport expanded again in the second half of the 1920s with

36 Thomas Gamble, Preface to Naval Stores: History. Production. Distribution and
Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921).
37 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 21, 185, 193-194; Naval Stores
Statistics. 1900-1954. 2; For figures related to the number o f wood naval stores establishments
see Appendix A.
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the purchase o f a wood naval stores plant in De Quincy, Louisiana, originally completed in 1922.
Like the Pensacola plant, the one in De Quincy had a 150-ton capacity. Then in 1929 Newport
helped organize Armstrong-Newport Corporation, which used the wood left over from the
chemical extraction process to manufacture fiber insulation board and ceiling tile. After the
1920s other companies moved to Pensacola to operate in conjunction with Newport.38
Although Newport dominated the wood naval stores industry in the 1920s, other
companies contributed to the expansion. In 1920 Hercules Powder Company purchased the
Yaryan plants in both Gulfport and Brunswick and, one year later, the Continental Turpentine
and Rosin Company began operations at a new facility in Laurel, Mississippi. In 1928 Dixie
Pine Products Corporation of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, completed its conversion from a lumber
mill to a wood naval stores facility. The mill had operated at the site since the turn of the
century, but with the exhaustion o f the area’s timber supply in 1926, its conversion allowed the
company to use the only remaining timber remaining, pine stumps.39
The development of the wood naval stores industry, like Herty’s cup system, shows that
despite nineteenth-century efforts by southerners to establish such methods, it was the support of
innovators from outside the region that resulted in the initial successes. Southerners attempted to
produce naval stores products for wood as early as the 1840s, but it was a professionally-trained
chemist, Yaryan, who first designed a viable facility in Michigan and then helped perfect the

38 “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” 4; Croft, “A Twin Success Story,”
4-7; John H. Appleyard Agency, “D raft.. . Newport Talk for Historical Society... April 19,
1984,” Pensacola Historical Resource Center, 8; “Waste Stumps from Dixie Cut-over Land
Become Hundreds o f Products at Plant,” 2 October 1949, Pensacola. Florida News-Joumal File,
Pensacola Historical Resource Center, Pensacola, FL; Charlotte Wittwer, “Stumpwood to
Resins—OIdest Pensacola Industry,” Pensacola. Florida News-Joumal File, Pensacola Historical
Resource Center, Pensacola, FL; “Naval Stores History,” 8.
39 Gum turpentine producers also faced competition from a growing number o f
substitutes manufactured by the petroleum and coal tar industries. Crosby, “Captains o f the
Naval Stores Industry,” 16; T.F. Dreyfus, “Old Stumps Yield New Wealth,” Illinois Central
Magazine (May 1931): 14; “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” 4.
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extraction method once an Ohio-based businessman backed the construction o f a plant in
Mississippi. And a Milwaukee family established the Newport company which broadened the
industry’s market share. Southerners lacked trained scientist and engineers capable of designing
such plants and did not possess the financial resources required to properly construct such large
and technically sophisticated facilities.
Along with the expanding wood naval stores industry introduced from outside the region,
southern gum naval stores producers faced competition from rising foreign manufactures that
seriously threatened their export trade. As the world’s largest gum navat stores manufacturer, the
United States’ production greatly surpassed its consumption, requiring foreign markets to absorb
over fifty percent o f the supply (fig. 9.16). From July 1907 to June 1908, for example, the
United States exported slightly more than half of its naval stores production, over eighty percent
of it going to Europe (fig. 9.17). European countries received 2,203,672 barrels of rosin valued
at $9,013,210 and 16,376,912 gallons of spirits valued at $8,300,679. Just over forty-four
percent o f spirits exported there went to the United Kingdom and 22.4 percent to Germany.
However Germany received more rosin, 40.4 percent, to the U.K.’s 27.8 percent. London was
the world’s largest importer o f naval stores from America, which supplied much of the U.K.’s
annual consumption o f 75,000 tons of rosin and 20,000 tons of turpentine. Because the U.K. had
no domestic naval stores production, all o f its supplies had to be imported. It received seventyeight percent of its rosin imports from the United States, eight percent from France, six percent
from Portugal, and four percent from Spain. It purchased ninety-two percent of its turpentine
from the United States and six percent from France.40 Belgium and the Netherlands were also

40 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the naval Stores Industry,”
62-63, 66; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 188.
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important importers. Canada received most o f the naval stores exports within North America,
Percentage o f United States Rosin Production Exported
1908-1930

Figure 9.16. Percentage of United States Rosin Production Exported, 1908-1930
A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard. “The Naval Stores Industry,”
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida I (May 1934): 41.

and Brazil and Argentina purchased the bulk of supplies sent to South America. Each of these
American regions, though, imported less than ten percent of the United States’ naval stores
output. Asia, Africa, and Oceana, principally Australia, combined accounted for less than five
percent of exports.41

41 Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine: A History o f Florida Naval Stores. 1528 to
1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 26; Martin, “Historical and Analytical
Approach,” 188-189; George H. Priest, Jr., Naval Stores: Production. Consumption and
Distribution (Washington, DC: United States Department of Commerce, 1927), 19-20;
“Turpentine Production for the Year Declined,” Cary Collection, 2.
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Because the industry relied so heavily on exports, the disruption in trade caused by the
First World War was severely damaging. European exports were virtually halted, and naval
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Figure 9.17. Naval Stores Exports to Various Continents, 1907-1919
Thomas Gamble, “The World-Wide Distribution o f Naval Stores,” in Naval Stores: History,
Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing
and Printing Company, 1921), 91-92.

stores deteriorated in their containers at American ports. The United States preparations for war
boosted prices temporarily until they fell off again following the armistice. During the 1920s
European consumption and exports rose, but never reached their pre-war levels. By the mid
1920s the United States exported just over eleven million gallons o f spirits, compared to over
sixteen million during the 1907/08 season.42 Growing competition from foreign production

42 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
62-63,66; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 188.
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explained why (fig. 9.18).43 During the 1920s Spain, Portugal, Greece, and the USSR began
production. By the mid-1920s, Spain ranked as the world’s third largest naval stores producer,
although it produced only five percent of the United States’ volume. European markets,
especially Germany, consumed the bulk of Spain’s 1925 exports.44 Germany also purchased a
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Figure 9.18. World Gum Turpentine Production. 1925
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
325.

43 By the 1920s, foreign countries producing naval stores included France, Spain,
Portugal, Greece, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Poland, India, Poland, Austria, and Mexico. Priest,
Naval Stores.
44 Although during ancient times naval stores were produced in Spain, the modem
industry did not begin until the late-1840s. By the early 1860s Spanish producers began using
the French cup and gutter system. However, the Spanish industry failed to develop as rapidly as
that in France. In 1879 a Franco-Spanish commercial treaty hurt Spanish producers by reducing
their tariff on French naval stores. Spain also suffered from a less-developed transportation
system, the slow growth rates o f its pine trees, and poor resource management which exploited
the trees for gum at the expense o f their wood. Spain manufactured 1,057,000 gallons o f spirits
and 53,000 barrels o f rosin in 1925. One naval stores company, which operated a plant
manufacturing 1,500 tons of paint and vamish, controlled the Spanish industry. That business
consumed a large portion of its production. Romaine, “Naval Stores,” 9; W.L.E. Barnett,
“Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 23 August 1924, Cary Collection, 31-34;
Priest. Naval Stores. 16-17.
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large portion o f Greek naval stores production, which in 1923 amounted to 7,050 tons of gum.
Before the First World War nearly all gum collected in Greece was exported in raw form but in
response to rising world demand by the late-1910s, it began distilling a portion. Greeks used
some of their rosin in soap manufacturing, but most o f the products were sold to other countries,
the majority o f rosin exported to Italy and most o f the turpentine to Germany,4S The Soviet naval
stores industry developed incredibly rapidly in the late 1920s as part of Stalin’s forced
industrialization program. Five thousand hectares o f Russian forests were used to collect gum in
1926, but by 1932, 830,700 hectares were under production. Russian industries could not
consume the vast quantities o f naval stores suddenly flowing from the country’s forests and large
quantities were consequently exported using American commercial grades.46
Despite the rapid rise o f Spanish, Greek, and Soviet production, France developed as the
United States’ greatest naval stores competitor and it ranked second in world naval stores
production. In the first two decades of the twentieth century France experienced a rapid increase
in naval stores exports despite considerable trade interruptions caused by World War I. From

45 Priest, Naval Stores. 18-19.
46 In 1914 Russia produced only 130 tons o f rosin and 1,100 tons o f turpentine, both of
very low quality. It imported most of its naval stores. But beginning in 1926 with governmentforced efforts to develop the industry, naval stores production grew by leaps and bounds. In
1927, production reached 413 tons of rosin and five years later soared to 56,653 tons. The
Soviets developed their industry so rapidly that they were unable to create a system tailored to
their particular pine species—red pine and scotch pine—and climate. Initially they modeled their
system after that o f other countries with mature naval stores industries. Each year workers
chipped faces about three feet up, the faces extending nearly all the way around the tree except
for a two inch strip o f bark used to keep the trees alive. Because the cold climate prevented the
resin from flowing freely, most gum had to be scrapped off after it hardened. The Russians soon
realized they needed their own unique system o f gum collecting and thus began extensive
experimentation in 1930 at the Forest-Chemical Institute of Leningrad. “Recent Developments
in the Naval Stores Industry in the U.S.S.R. (Russia),” Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia
Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1-3; K..M. Osoline and N.A. Oustinov, “Turpentine Experimentation in
Russia,” Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1; “How Russia
Obtains Naval Stores,” Forest Service newsclipping file, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 12.
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1900 to 1905, naval stores exports through Bordeaux rose over 2.5 times, from 27,790 metric
tons to 71,600. Germany, England, Belgium, Holland, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland imported
most of this supply. The war temporarily reversed this rapid growth; by 19 IS Bordeaux exported
just 17,749 metric tons. However, naval stores production quickly recovered following peace
(fig. 9.19) and by 1921, Bordeaux exported 93,732 metric tons o f naval stores to nearly all
European nations and even to the United States, which bought France’s light grade rosin.
Although American naval stores products were reputed to be of higher-grade quality, French
producers had the advantage o f close proximity to the European consuming market and exporters
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Figure 9.19. Value o f French Turpentine Products, 1900-1923
J.F. Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 30 July 1924, Austin Cary
Memorial Forestry Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries,
University of Florida, 13.

could make quicker, on-detnand deliveries. By 1927, France manufactured twenty percent o f the
world’s naval stores.47

47 J.F. Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 20 July 1924, Cary
Collection, 17-18; Priest, Naval Stores. 12.
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Although France produced just a third of the U.S. supply, its superior conservation
methods were the envy o f American observers. Not only did France maintain a vibrant and
sustainable industry, but it did so on land that had once been barren sand dunes. At the
beginning o f the nineteenth century, the Landes area in the southeastern comer of France
represented one of the poorest in the country. Centuries earlier, fire and neglect had destroyed
the original forest and dunes blew up, encroaching inland between two and a half and five miles
for a distance of two hundred kilometers along the coast. The dunes choked steams and villages
and killed the remaining vegetation in the area covering 2,500,000 acres. The region’s
population dropped to 1,600, mostly sickly shepherds who suffered bouts o f malaria.
In the early nineteenth century Napoleon began a program to bring back the forest. He
had the dunes leveled and planted with tough grass and native pine trees. The maritime pine was
well-suited to the area environment. Like the southeastern United States, the Landes region was
very flat and sandy with a hard pan subsoil. The winters remained mild and humid with little
frost and the summers warm and sunny. Rain fell principally in the late spring and autumn and
averages ranged from 29.3 to 47.2 inches. The maritime pine grew rapidly in the area and
formed a protective barrier between the ocean and the agricultural land and mixed forest that
grew in the better inland soil. The French government continued reclamation efforts so that, by
1865, the forest grew over most of the region. In 1892 the remaining portions of the dunes were
planted. By the first decades of the twentieth century, this former barren, sandy wasteland
comprised ten percent o f the forest area in France, its population had grown to 14,000, and it
represented one of the country’s most prosperous areas. The turpentine production area covered
about 2,900 square miles, roughly the size o f four moderate-sized counties in Georgia.48
48 W.L.E. Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” Cary Collection,
2-3, 35; Theodore S. Woolsey, Jr., “Conservative Turpentining By the French,” in Naval Stores:
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 176; Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in
France,” 1-3; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 18; R. Zon, “Notes on French Turpentine
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Unlike American producers, the French followed a forest use pattern that permitted them
both to harvest timber and continuously produce naval stores from the same stands. Tracts were
divided into series, each varying in age by five years. Once a series reached twenty-five years o f
age, some trees were designated for thinning. Those pines chosen to be cut were worked
intensively for turpentine for three or four years. Then the exploited trees were cut and sold for
lumber. The remaining pines were uniformly spaced ISO to 200 per acre. They had more room
to grow, consequently produced large crowns, and thus experienced greater wood growth. They
were allowed to grow another fifteen years before producers cupped them for turpentine. At this
time operators cut only one face per tree which they worked for five years. The pines then rested
for three to five seasons before they were cupped again. By the beginning o f the next cupping
most of the previous faces had healed. This cycle could continue for up to eighty years. Then
once a series was designating for wholesale cutting, the trees were cupped in as many places as
the trunk would permit and worked for four to five years before felled.49
Despite operating the most advanced gum naval stores industry in the world, the French
took steps to ensure continued progress by establishing a research organization to focus
Industry,” 5 December 1918, Files transferred from Olustee Experiment Station, Georgia
Agrirama, 1-3; Thomas Gamble, “The Production of Naval Stores in the United States,” in Naval
Stores: History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah:
Review Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 81.
49 Also unlike the Americans, the French employed a tax system that encouraged sound
forest use. Taxes were kept at relatively low levels and the rate was adjusted every ten years to
reflect the forest’s changing value. To encourage their uninhibited growth, forests were not
taxed at all for the thirty years after planting. The French government also allowed tax
deductions for expenses incurred in preparing land for planting trees, improving drainage, and in
preliminary thinnings. “Good Naval Stores Practice” (Washington, DC: United States
Department o f Agriculture, 1927), Cary Collection, 4; Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval
Stores in France,” Cary Collection, 4-6; “The following brief description o f the management o f
the Government owned Maritime Forests is given,” Cary Collection; I.F. Eldredge, “How the
French Turpentine System Looked to an American,” in Naval Stores: History. Production.
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing
Company, 1921), 169-170; Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” Cary
Collection, 23-24.
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exclusively on production and consumption technology, a move that predated similar efforts in
America by well over a decade. As an outgrowth o f the Chemical Laboratory for the Study of
Resins at the University o f Bordeaux, the Institute du Pin, established in 1909, explored ways o f
harvesting and handling raw gum and searched for new uses for spirits and rosin as well as for
the wood and waste products left after turpentining. An associated agency developed practical
applications for the processes developed at the Institute. Private gifts and government financing
supported these efforts.50
American producers and forestry researchers were awed by the accomplishments o f the
French. Where France had created a highly successful naval stores industry from a once-barren
sand region, the American South had accomplished the opposite, transforming a healthy pine
forest into a near-worthless wasteland. Moreover, the southern United States possessed more
environmental advantages than the Landes region, but was still outpaced. Although the territory
and soil o f the both regions was similar, soils o f the southern U.S. coastal plain were more fertile
than those o f the southern France. Each tree species, the maritime pine and the Iongleaf pine,
produced similar quantities o f gum, but the South enjoyed a longer growing season a climate that
allowed a more constant and greater flow of gum, and more plentiful rain caused the gum to
contain more spirits. Nevertheless, the French industry surpassed that in the southern United
States because the French used superior methods. French turpentiners produced twenty-two
percent more gum than southern producers did in their trees’ first year under production and
twenty-eight percent more during their second. Moreover, the French did this on a sustainable
basis.51

50 Priest, Naval Stores. 14; Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 1617 .

51 Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 3S-36; “Annual Report of
the Starke Branch for the Year 1929-30,” 25 October 1930, Cary Collection, 2.
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In 1924 the United States Naval Stores Commission found that “there are many things
we can learn from France, if we take the pains to do so.”52 The Commission mentioned not only
French production methods but the way the French supported the Institute du Pin to further
research, their use of the Rosin and Turpentine Exchange to sell turpentine more economically to
the customers, and their establishment of cooperative stills that permitted producers to enjoy the
advantages of a state-of-the-art facility without having to carry the total cost individually. French
steam distilleries were reportedly very similar in design principles to American facilities under
construction at the same time. However refinements in design permitted the French not only to
extract a larger percentage o f spirits, but to manufacture higher grades o f rosin as well.
Americans were also intrigued by the French method for paying workers shares o f production.
Because laborers in the Landes region were paid according to the amount of gum they hauled to
the still, they took greater interest in successful production than did American laborers, who were
paid a fixed price per face no matter the amount produced or the state of the market In France,
workers shared the risks with the forest owners.53 To varying degrees, American producers
would eventually adopt these French innovations after 1930.
Intense government involvement explains much of the French system’s advancement
over the American South’s. Beginning with replanting efforts in the early nineteenth century, the
French government had carefully guided the naval stores industry down the path o f sustained
yield by strictly controlling harvesting techniques. On government-owned land, where the state’s
influence was greatest, conservation efforts were more successful. On privately held forest tracts
the timber stands grew less dense and gum yields were lower. Private timber owners greatly
resented the many government regulations and jealously guarded whatever property rights they
52 Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 36.
53 Ibid., 37; Good Naval Stores Practice,” 4; Eldredge, “How the French Turpentine
System Looked,” 171-172.
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could claim. Unlike in France, the American government’s forestry guidelines and regulation
developed only gradually and after 1900. State involvement gained acceptance only after the
industry faced the real threat o f timber depletion. Although some American naval stores
producers grumbled, the benefits o f government research and regulation led many to accept
ultimately its involvement. The threat of substantial foreign competition also made the argument
for government activity persuasive. That the Landes region’s superior timber management
reflected intensive government control, not advanced economic development, is reflected in its
lack of an efficient transportation system and inferior product grading and marketing system
compared to the American South.54
As American turpentine producers struggled to survive in the challenge o f international
competition and reduced business profitability, their factors’ control over production and
marketing intensified. Most o f the turpentiners who survived the 1910s failed to expand into
other businesses areas, as did the Leonard brothers, and ended the decade significantly indebted
to factorage houses. A generally favorable market from 1919 to 1921 allowed some producers to
pull themselves out o f debt, replenish their operating capital, and extend their operations, but
difficulties resumed as prices again dropped in 1924.55
Industry observers estimated that in the first decades o f the twentieth century between
seventy and ninety percent o f turpentiners used factors to finance their operations and market
their products, indication that the South’s banking structure remained immature and that naval
stores production continued as a relatively risky line of business. Once a factor came to know
and trust a producer, he would open an account for the turpentiner and allow him a line of credit
54 Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 3-6; Zon, “Notes on
French Turpentine Industry,” 3, 5; Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 3-4,
14-16.
55 Davis, Encyclopedia o f Forest and Conservation History. 476; “Turpentine Production
for the Year Declined,” I.
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for needed expenses. The producer customarily obtained his loans from the factor with
mortgaged property and agreed to market all turpentine and rosin through him. Factors advanced
operating capital needed to pay workers and sold producers all the supplies and equipment they
needed, the still, and the workers’ houses. The amounts borrowed by producers could become
considerable. In the late 1920s a ten-crop operation required roughly $25,000 to finance, and
factors had to supply nearly half these funds. However, factors usually loaned money relatively
freely. Each house feared losing clients to competing firms if they did not agree to finance them.
The factor charged interest on all sums borrowed, in part to cover its own interest expenses.
Factors had some operating capital o f their own but needed to borrow a portion, typically about
forty percent, from the same banks that would not loan to turpentiners. By mid-season factors
generally had enough cash on hand from their own advances to repay the bank. Once the naval
stores were produced factors sold the operators’ turpentine and rosin and applied all proceeds to
their accounts. For this transaction, the factors charged their clients a 2.5 percent commission, a
rate that had remained unchanged from colonial days.56
Factors usually secured loans to producers with mortgages on land, leases, and
equipment and, to protect their interests, would take control o f poorly managed operations. In
1915, for example, the Peninsular Naval Stores Company foreclosed on a St. Johns County,
Florida, turpentine operation. Between 1912 and 1914, the producer had received loans totaling
$ 19,566.59 by mortgaging his operation. In foreclosing, Peninsular collected 5 mules, 1 horse, 2
56 Factors sold the naval stores products that they controlled to dealers who handled their
distribution to consumers. Dealers bought and stored naval stores products, risking price
fluctuations, fire, theft, and physical deterioration before they were sold to consumers. Most
dealers specialized in either domestic sales or exports. They sold to a variety o f customers:
distributors, who handled the secondary wholesale market; brokers; large industrial users; as well
as individual users and retailers. Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the
Naval Stores Industry,” 5-6; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Interpretation,” 107,258-259;
Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 25; Antwerp Naval Stores Company, et al. to W.F.
Hottsman, 20 October 1933, Carry Collection; Maguire, interview with author; Eldridge
interview, 9; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 40.
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wagons, 1 buggy and harness, 2 saddles, 1 dilapidated turpentine cup boiler, 35 dip barrels, 38
second-hand spirit barrels, 54,000 galvanized cups already attached to trees, 29,000 clay cups
also on timber, 12 barrels o f crude dip, 11 barrels o f cotton batdn, commissary stock, and feed.
The greatest value o f the mortgaged operation, however, was not its livestock, equipment, and
supplies, but the cupped timber’s production potential. To protect the operation against fire,
prevent any profit loss from an interruption in harvesting, or risk losing the assembled labor force
during an idle period, Peninsular moved immediately to place the operation under new
management. In a similar action three years later, Consolidated Naval Stores Company
foreclosed on another St. Johns County operation, no doubt a casualty o f the business slump
experienced during the First World War.S7 When factors came into possession o f such
operations through foreclosures, they commonly went into partnerships with producers, who
worked it for them. The factor retained fifty-one percent of the stock and the producer owned
forty-nine percent. Producers often had to borrow from the factor to buy his forty-nine percent.
In some instances, however, factors sold the operation to someone who could take over the
debt.58
The factors’ overall control o f the industry grew in the first part o f the twentieth century,
not only from individual producers’ greater dependence on them, but increased market control.
As in the late nineteenth century, factors sought during the first decades o f the twentieth century
57 From this foreclosure, Consolidated collected 9 crops o f boxed and cupped timber,
some two and mostly three years old, 3 horses, 9 mules, 2 four-horse wagons and harnesses, one
buggy and harness, 3 turpentine stills and all fixtures, 1 cooper’s shop and tools, 40 shanties, 1
gasoline pump, a commissary building and all stock, 70 turpentine barrels, 1 wagon and harness
shed, 5 houses, 1 artesian well, 2 saddles and bridles, I horse, and 1 glue kettle.
s8 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,’* 256; William L. Jenkins, monthly
statement of account with Peninsular Naval Stores Company, 11 December 1914, Peninsular
Naval Stores Company v Addie Jenkins, Inventory o f receiver, January 21, 1915, Affidavit of
B.W. Blount, 26 December 1914, Special Masters Report, 28 May 1915, and Consolidated Naval
Stores Company v J.A. Miller, et al., 20 May 1918, St. Johns County Court Cases, St. Augustine,
FL.
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to stabilize the industry in an effort to perpetuate their business. They periodically withheld
advances to producers who intended to bring more faces into production during years of
declining prices. This action helped prevent prices from falling further and limited producers to
levels that allowed them to meet their financial obligations. Factors also encouraged producers
to adopt the new improved methods that had been clearly shown to be more economical and less
destructive in the long run. By placing the producers on secure financial footing and prolonging
forest use, factors hoped to keep themselves in operation.59
The rise of a huge new factorage house further intensified the factors’ power over
producers. In 1902, four Florida and three Georgia factors merged to form the aptly named
Consolidated Naval Stores Company, thus creating the largest naval stores trader in the United
States, with offices in Savannah, Jacksonville, and Pensacola. Controlled by a Chicago banking
firm, Consolidated possessed $1,950,000 of working capital and served over seven hundred
operators who in all controlled a total o f five million producing acres. By only the company’s
second year it handled fifty percent o f the United States’ naval stores manufacture. Over the
next few years Consolidated established several other companies to serve producers including
Consolidated Grocery Company and Florida Export Company. Perhaps its most widely known
such enterprise, Chattanooga Pottery Company, profited from government-sponsored research by
manufacturing the cup developed by Hetty a member o f the Bureau o f Forestry. Another
subsidiary, Consolidated Land Company, bought timber land to ensure continued naval stores
resources in the future. By 1922 it owned over 1.5 million acres o f longleaf pine. To control the
spiraling cost o f spirit casks, Consolidated purchased Florida Cooperage Company, giving it the
ability to supply its clients with 390,000 casks annually. With the 1907 incorporation of the
Florida Pine Company, Consolidated began working some o f its pine land itself rather than

59 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report of the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
50; Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 134-136.
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leasing it to independent operators.60 Over the course o f its history, close to forty subsidiaries
belonged to Consolidated Naval Stores Company.61 As both a horizontally and vertically
consolidated conglomerate, the business represented a desire to impose order and efficiency on a
notoriously risky and unpredictable trade and the ability o f northern finance capital to crate such
a large business in the South whose native investors lacked such substantial resources.
Producers held mixed feelings about their relationship with Consolidated and other
factors. Some believed that the factors were fair, at least more so than northern bankers, whom
operators believed would exploit them at any chance. Fellow southerners, producers assumed,
would charge them more reasonable interest rates. Other producers believed factors exploited
them by charging excessive prices for supplies, equipment, and interest on finance capital. Such
turpentiners resented their dependence on the factors and the control over their operations that

60 A fierce battle apparently raged among the company heads over whether to use convict
laborers in its naval stores production business. In 1908 the move failed amid strong discussion
but the board o f directors approved leasing the next year. Three vice presidents submitted
resignations to the board in response. Robert S. Blount, “Spirits in the Pines” (M.A. thesis,
Florida State University, 1992), 83-87, 118; Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine: A History of
Florida Naval Stores. 1528 to 1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 31;
Butler, Treasures of the Longleaf Pines.” 164.
61 These businesses included Arcadia Naval Stores Company; Baker, Fentress &
Company; Barnett National Bank; Barnett National Bank Securities Corporation; Chattanooga
Pottery Company; Citrus Land Company; Clark Meggs Company; Consolidated Automotive
Company; Consolidated Create & Lumber Company; Consolidated Financial Corporation;
Consolidated Grocery Company; Consolidated Land Company; Consolidated Naval Stores
Company; Consolidated Tidewater Pine Company; Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company;
Covington Turpentine Company; Deen Turpentine Company; DeLeon Naval Stores Company;
Downing Company; J.W. Dutton Company; Florida Cooperage Company; Florida Export
Company; Florida Grocery Company; Florida Industrial Company; Florida Pine Company;
Forest McCoy Turpentine Company; Hall Naval Stores Company; Herty Turpentine Cup
Company; Horseshoe Ranch; Kissimmee Island Cattle Company; Lake Childs Company; Lake
Placid Land Company; Lake Wales Naval Stores Company; Naval Stores Investment Company;
Pine Wood Naval Stores Company; Punta Gorda Naval Stores Company; Putnam Naval Stores
Company; Salem Turpentine Company; Singler, Baldwin & Company; Smith-Edwards-Ewing
Company; Tropical Investment Company; Tropical State Bank; and Williams Upchurch
Company. Blount, “Spirits in the Pines,” 104-105.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

449
factors could exert if they disapproved of their management.62 One producer, drawing an
analogy between the operators relationship with their black workers and the producers’
connection to their factor, explained that “we owned the niggers, and the factors owned us.”63
Although factors dominated financing from 1900 to 1930, there was a gradual increase in
the use of banks. Banks began to appear across the South at the same time that the naval stores
industry was growing more stationary. With the disappearance o f virgin pine stands, producers
no longer moved about searching for fresh tracts, but rather remained in one general area and
worked the increasing acres o f second growth pines. Using improved methods, they were able to
harvest gum from the same acreage for more years than before. The increased ability of
producers to work in one place for lengthy periods made banks more willing to accept their
operations as security for loans. An estimated ten to fifteen percent o f producers turned to banks
for financial help. The same changes that allowed turpentine operations to receive bank loans
opened up credit opportunities for them with wholesale grocery companies, permitting even
further independence from factorage houses. Only a few well established naval stores men
operated on a cash basis and thus required the financial assistance o f neither banks nor factors.64
The naval stores industry faced considerable difficulties early in the twentieth century.
Despite a stabilization o f timber resources, pine acreage remained relatively scarce and
expensive, especially after timber companies began efforts to conserve their remaining stands in
the 1900s and 1910s. Other production costs, particularly labor, rose during the period, the
greatest jump occurring during the First World War. Competition from the wood naval stores

62 Maguire, interview with author, Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 25.
63 Gay Goodman Wright, “Turpentining: An Ethnohistorical Study of a Southern
Industry and Way o f Life,” (M.A. thesis, University o f Georgia, 1979), 76.
64 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 107,25S, 13S; William Alonzo
Register, interview, tape recording, Florida State Archives; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores
Industry. 25,26; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 33.
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industry and from foreign gum naval stores production posed another serious threat to producers.
After poor performance in its early years, wood naval stores plants proved capable of providing
superior products possessing the specific qualities for individual consumers’ needs. And foreign
gum naval stores producers, especially the French, were able to supply European consumers with
superior gum naval stores products while operating on a sustainable basis. Largely as a result o f
declining business profitability caused by these challenges, American producers found
themselves more dependent on factorage houses, which increased their hold on the industry.
Although producers faced difficult new circumstances in the early twentieth century, relatively
little changed for naval stores industry workers.
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Chapter Ten
Persistent Patterns:
Constancy in Labor Practices and Camp Life

The naval stores industry’s use o f both peonage and convict leasing and the experiences
of workers under those labor institutions persisted into the first decades o f the twentieth century.
For the many laborers whom producers continued to hold in debt bondage, the work routine—
except for the substitution o f boxing with the cup and gutter system—remained virtually
unchanged, as did life in the isolated camps. Prisoners leased to turpentine operations endured
even harsher conditions than those held in peonage; their conditions were bleaker, the workload
greater, and punishments more severe. For both convicts and peons, the life in the naval stores
industry retained considerable continuity with the late nineteenth century and even antebellum
years.
With the demand for labor so high in the turpentine region, employers went to great
lengths to attract workers; they advanced wages, paid railroad fares, and even hired professional
labor recruiters, despite laws against them. Because turpentiners had so much invested in
laborers before they even began work, operators insisted that employees remain long enough to
justify the expense. And as labor costs rose after the turn o f the century, producers grew
increasingly concerned about preventing the loss of their outlay when laborers left. Operators
sensed an increasing threat to labor stability, believing that high labor prices, especially in the
191 Os, could allow a worker to labor just two or three days to support a spree for the rest o f the
week. Producers also feared that workers might desert their employer for another who offered
substantial incentives, and thus render their business almost inoperable. One report held that a
black worker secured one advance from a south Georgia employer, then left and received the
451
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same from another hirer. From the two men, he collected a total of four hundred dollars for
which he worked three days.1
Evidence suggests that the operators’ fears were not totally unfounded. In 1922,
Johnston, McNeill & Co., a turpentine operation in Okeechobee, Florida, had operating expenses
of $53,026.41. $20,554.72, or nearly forty percent, went toward salaries and wages. The
company spent another $851.57 on recruiting and suffered the loss o f $ 1,411.92 in advances to
workers who apparently left its employment. The company’s loss of advance payments
represented over 2.5 percent of production costs, a significant amount in an industry with narrow
profit margins. It appears that in all, eighty-one workers quit the company that year, only ten o f
them settling their accounts before leaving. The other seventy-one left owing an average o f
$19.89. Some, however, owed considerably more than others. Ten workers, according to the
company’s financial reports, left with money owed to them, though most of them walked away
from less than $1. Only four workers who remained in the company’s employment had accounts
in the black, two with substantial amounts, $132 J 6 and $104.61. For the next year it appears
that, on average workers grew more indebted, although thirteen had credit with the company.2
In their struggle to secure adequate labor, producers repeatedly violated the industry’s
gentlemen’s agreement not to “steal” each others’ workers. For 1912 the four turpentine
operations run by the Ten Mile Lumber Company o f Ten Mile, Mississippi, recorded an average
“recruiting expense” o f $110.72 that most likely went toward advances.3 In the mid-1900s, one

1“Wisconsin to Check Fraud on Employers,” Newsclipping and Frederick C. Cubberly
to H.L. Anderson, 17 August 1906, Frederick C. Cubberly Papers, Department o f Special
Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida.
2 Report, Johnston McNeill Company, 2 April 1923, William C. Powell Papers, Special
Collections Library, Duke University.
3Elliott Maguire, interview by author, tape recording, St. Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996;
Ten Mile Lumber Company ledger, 1912, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers, Special
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi State University; Gay Goodman Wright,
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reporter explained that “each well-equipped place has ‘cruiters’ on the road looking up laborers
from other camps to bring them in by any means—by allurement, by threat, by arrest. Labor is so
precious and so necessary that the getting o f it gilds a crime with virtue.”4 Operators even left
trade meetings early to have an untethered opportunity to steal neighboring producers’ workers.
The weekends offered the best opportunities for recruiting; owners or managers would depart for
a recruiting mission on Saturday with a supply o f moonshine. While clandestinely entertaining
workers o f other camps with alcohol, the manager made extravagant claims about the superior
wages and working conditions at his camp. It was dangerous to attempt to steal or recruit
workers. If caught, the violator could be shot.5
Periods of transition offered recruiters the best opportunity to prey on other producers’
laborers. When turpentine operations relocated, as they periodically did, producers had trouble
keeping their labor force intact. Changes in management also attracted heavy recruiting activity.
The owner o f one St. Johns County, Florida, turpentine business died in August 1914. When a
receiver, sent by the deceased man’s factor to oversee the operation, arrived four months later he
found that the “laborers were gone from the place and it became necessary for me at considerable
expense to engage labor and bring it to the place.”6
Expansion o f the naval stores industry into new regions placed a particularly high
premium on black labor. In the areas where the naval stores industry grew in the early twentieth

“Turpentining: An Ethnohistorica! Study o f a Southern Industry and Way of Life,” (M.A. thesis,
University o f Georgia, 1979), 118.
4 Richard Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” Cosmopolitan M agazine 42 (March
1907): 490.
5Michael D. Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern Turpentine
Industry, 1900-1930” (Ph.D. diss., University o f Florida, 1996), 196-199.
6 Peninsular Naval Stores Company v Addie Jenkins, St. Johns County Court Cases, St.
Augustine, FL.
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century, especially in Florida, the black population was not large enough to supply the operators’
labor needs.7 Forester Asa L. Brower discovered that Florida turpentine production failed to
increase as rapidly as it could in the first decade o f the twentieth century because “operators were
still struggling against the annoying labor condition

Labor was scarce,” he explained, “and

many o f the operators were unable to effectively work all o f the timber they had bled.”8
Compounding the producers’ frustration over tight labor was their persistent belief that
blacks were unwilling to work. One newspaper article explained that white workers could be
counted on to complete a labor contract and work off their debt. “Others, and they are found
largely among the negroes,” the article explained, “seek to shirk the work to slip out of the duty;
to neglect it and to scrap it, hoping that the creditor-employer will become disgusted and tell
them to be gone.”9 One contemporary economist argued that the black man ‘■
‘will probably
continue to operate as a drag on southern progress and will serve to exaggerate the South’s
relatively low standing in such matters as per capita wealth, income, and literacy.”10 Even a
muckraking journalist critical o f the turpentine industry’s labor atrocities believed that “the
negro, as he exists in Florida to-day, is content with merely enough to keep soul and body
together, and this he can earn by working one day a week, since wages are relatively so high.

7 P.L. Buttrick, “Commercial Uses o f Longleaf Pine,” American Forestry 21 (Spring
1915): 901.
8 Asa L. Brower and John O. La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval
Stores Industry and Statistics on the Production o f Turpentine and Rosin for the Seasons o f 19078 and 1908-9,” 15 March 1909, Austin Cary Memorial Forestry Collection, Department of
Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, 50.
9 Untitled newspaper article, Correspondence, Department of Justice Central Files,
General Records o f the Justice Department, Record Group 60, National Archives.
10 R.P. Brooks, The Industrialization o f the South (Athens, GA: Bureau o f Business
Research, 1929), 5.
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Frequently he works not even this necessary one day a week, but prefers to let his wench work
the entire seven.”11
Under such labor conditions and racist perceptions, at the turn o f the century the
southern states intensified the legislation that supported peonage. In the lower South’s piney
woods region, naval stores men joined the Georgia-Florida Sawmill Association in demanding
more effective labor legislation, a demand to which the state legislators complied. The
centerpieces of compelled labor were false pretenses and vagrancy laws, legislation passed in
most southern states during the last quarter o f the nineteenth century.12 In classic terms, as
defined by Assistant Attorney-General Charles W. Russell, the practice was defined “as causing
compulsory service to be rendered by one man to another on the pretext o f having him work out
the amount of a debt, real or claimed.”13 Beginning with Georgia and Alabama in 1903 and
Florida in 1907, southern states passed false pretenses laws making the refusal to work or repay
advances prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud. Before this legislation, workers could
only be held to their work if their employer could prove they intended to defiaud at the time they
contracted to work. Producers, however, could not easily establish liability even in sympathetic
courts. The new false pretenses laws shifted the burden o f proof to the workers. They had to
demonstrate that they did not plan to defraud at the time they received cash or merchandise
advances with a labor contract.14 For example, turpentine worker Jack Richburg was arrested in

11 Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 488.
12 William Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for
Racial Control. 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 239, 243;
Jerrell H. Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests, 1880-1950,” Journal of Forest History
25 (January 1981): 15; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 112.
13 Charles W. Russell, Report on Peonage (Washington, DC: Department o f Justice,
1908), 3.
14 Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge. 231; William Cohen “Negro Involuntary Servitude in the
South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis,” The Journal o f Southern History 42 (February
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1908 under the new Florida law. On December 23, 1907, he had entered into contract with the
Downing Park Naval Stores Company to perform turpentine work. Upon agreeing to the
contract, he accepted cash and goods valued at seven dollars. When he quite the job before his
contract expired, he was arrested for taking the advances with “the intent not to perform such
services.”15
The other important area of legislation, vagrancy laws, strengthened local law
enforcement’s ability to arrest anyone not working. From 1903 to 1909 Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia adopted strict new vagrancy
laws. Florida’s 1905 vagrancy law defined the offense so broadly that anyone deviating from the
white South’s acceptable social standards could be arrested.16 It defined as a vagrant:
rogues and vagabonds, idle or dissolute persons who go about begging, common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common pipers
and fiddlers, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers,
trader in stolen property, lewd, wanton, and lascivious persons in speech or
behaviors, keepers of gambling houses, common railers and brawlers, persons
who neglect their calling or employment and misspend what they earn and do not
provide for themselves or for the support o f their families, persons wandering
from place to place able to work and who are without means and who neglect to
earn their support and live by pilfering or begging, idle and disorderly persons,
including therein those who neglect all lawful business and habitually misspend
their time by frequenting houses o f ill fame, gaming houses, or tippling shops,
persons able to work but are habitually idle and live upon the earnings o f their
wives or minor children, and all able-bodied male persons over eighteen years of
age who are without means o f support, and whose parents or guardians are

1976): 43; Jerrell H. Shofner, “Mary Grace Quackenbos, A Visitor Florida Did Not Want,” The
Florida Historical Quarterly 58 (January 1980): 283.
15State o f Florida vs Jack Richburg, Correspondence, Department of Justice Central
Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
16Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge. 239, 243; Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests,”
15; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 112; Jeffrey A. Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers:
Life. Labor, and Culture in the North Florida Timber Industry. 1830-1930 (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 1997), 176.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

457
unable to support them, and who are not usually in attendance upon some school
o r educational establishments, but who live in habitual idleness.”17
In 1908, a United States attorney in Alabama complained to the Attorney General that “between
the vagrancy law, contract labor law and our new game law, the ignorant farm laborer is
practically reduced to a condition o f dependence on his employer or landlord, and whether he
defrauds him or not he is so harassed by the fear o f prosecution under the various drastic statutes
that he is often times afraid to leave the service o f an employer with whom he would not remain
if he were left to act at will.”18
Besides its strengthened legal support, one o f the new characteristics of early twentiethcentury peonage was the involvement o f white workers in the system. In 1911, the Pensacola
Journal reported that, at that time, fifty white men were serving sixty days for vagrancy. The
article claimed that in ninety percent o f the cases the men had been arrested by a Flomation,
Alabama, officer, escorted to the state line, and arrested by a deputy sheriff in Florida who was
paid a fee for each man he arrested. Recently-arrived Eastern European immigrants, however,
perhaps represented the largest percentage of whites ensnared in peonage. Labor recruiting
agencies opened in the northern cities and targeted immigrants who desperately needed work,
would tolerate low wages, and lacked knowledge o f the nature of labor conditions in the piney
woods. Many recruiters failed to explain to workers the circumstances o f their employment.
Some lied when they told them they would be working in a skilled trade when in fact they were
sent to perform brutally hard turpentine and railroad construction work. Most agents also
neglected to explain that the transportation costs to the South and the advance wages they

17Russell, Report on Peonage. 30.
18 E. J. Parsons to Charles J. Bonaparte, 7 May 1908, Correspondence, Justice
Department Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60,
National Archives.
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received to buy food f r o m the commissary would start them off in debt. One such New York
agent sent an average o f three hundred men a month to work in the turpentine camps.19
The experience o f Sam Fink, a Jewish immigrant from Staten Island, New York, was
typical o f workers duped into agreeing to go South. On June 4,1906, Fink met a labor agent
while hunting for a job in New York City. The agent offered to send Fink to Florida where, he
was told, he could work for $1.90 a day. Each week, the agent explained, 500 would be deducted
to cover the $13 traveling expenses. Fink accepted the offer and joined a group of around fifty
other immigrant men on a ship headed south. They were not given their labor contracts to sign
until aboard the ship, when it was too late to back out. From these documents they learned they
were headed for a place called Buffalo Bluff, Florida, probably located a short distance south of
Savannah, to work at a sawmill. When the shipped docked in Savannah, however, the work boss
who met the men took them to a turpentine camp in the community o f Maytown, located 150
miles south of Jacksonville and accessible only by a train which passed twice each day.
Upon reaching the camp their induction into peonage began immediately. They had had
little to eat on the trip and, once they arrived at the camp, were shown into the commissary and
instructed to buy their food, which would be charged to their accounts. Because the shelves were
short o f provisions the new laborers were allowed to purchase only one box o f crackers for every
two men. When they complained o f hunger, they were told they could receive no more food until
they began to work. They did not start until three days later. Their first work day began early in
the morning when a black guard woke them up and drove them ten to twelve miles through the
woods to a place where two black guards on horses and two on foot showed them how to chip

19“White Prisoners in Jail Sign Statement Telling o f Arrest,” The Penasacola. Florida
Journal. 30 December 1911; Shofner, “Mary Grace Quakenbos,” 274-275; N. Gordon Carper,
“Slavery Revisited: Peonage in the South,” Phvlon 37 (1976): 86-91; Barry, “Slavery in the
South To-Day,” 490; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 119-120.
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turpentine, forcing them to wade through waist-deep water to reach some trees. When the
immigrant men complained about the work and the lack o f food, the foreman threateningly
displayed his pistol and whip. Having had enough of the Maytown turpentine camp, the
immigrants complained to the boss that their papers called for them to work at the sawmill and
lumber business at Buffalo Bluff. The boss granted their request, but charged them the eight
dollars each for transportation there.
Their experience at Buffalo Bluff was no better than at Maytown. They had to sign new
contracts, charging them once more for the transportation, this time, eighteen dollars. The Jews
among the group protested but the Germans signed willingly. The two groups were then
separated, the Germans receiving houses in which to sleep while the Jews were given cabins with
no beds, pillows, sheets, or blankets. The floor was filthy and falling apart. They nailed some
boards together to make a bed. Unable to tolerate conditions at Buffalo Bluff, Fink and three
other Jews escaped early one late-June morning, only to be caught while trying to board a train
and forced to return. Two days later they ran away again. They made it to the third train station
down the line and successfully boarded a passenger car. However, two Buffalo Bluff foremen
also got on the train, recognized the immigrants, and demanded that the conductor remove them
and have them locked up. Because they had paid their fare, the conductor refused. (It is not
clear how the group got the money to purchase their tickets.) They went as far as Bostwick, a
town about twenty-five miles south of Jacksonville, where they set off on foot. They had little
food and asked some women they met on the street o f one town if there was any work available
in the area. They were warned not to seek work there. The community had already received
orders by telephone to lock up any strange white men who came through. So the group o f four
kept to the woods, avoided detection, and, after five days and nights o f walking, arrived in
Jacksonville. The tenacious camp foreman found them there and, at his insistence, the sheriff
took them to jail where they grew veiy sick awaiting their trial. The Jacksonville Jewish
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community attempted to help. It succeeded in preventing the sheriff from chaining the workers,
but he would not accept the money they offered to pay the men’s debts. The Jewish community
continued to support them, bringing them food in jail and paying each one’s hundred-dollar bail.
When finally released the immigrants quickly returned to New York.20
Where peonage carried over from the latter decades o f the nineteenth century, the earlytwentieth-century turpentine laborers’ work routine, despite the replacement o f boxing with the
cup and gutter system, changed little from the industry’s antebellum and, in some instances,
colonial days. When starting a turpentine operation, a woodsrider rode through the forest
marking the trees that were to be harvested for gum. If the operator planed to use the traditional
boxing method in which the worker cut a cavity into the trees’ base, then squads of six to seven
workers went to work with axes in December. These laborers cut boxes in the same manner and
to the same specifications as slaves before the Civil War. In establishments that used the newlydeveloped cup and gutter method, workers began the process known as “putting up virgin.”
Beginning in December, a group o f six or seven workers, a “hanging crew,” each member with a
special task, began the job of installing the clay cups and galvanized steel gutters. An ax man
shaved the bark from an appropriate area of the pine’s base and another worker smoothed the
area with a hatchet. A team o f two other workers cut eight-inch incisions for the gutters, with
one holding a broad ax against the smooth face while the other hit it with a maul. Still two other
workers were responsible for inserting the gutters into these cut grooves and driving in nails from
which they suspended the cups. A six-man team could hang from 6S0 to 1,000 cups a day. For
each year after a crop’s initial preparation, workers used the same procedure to raise the cups and
gutters by two feet. However, instead of smoothing out the trees’ barky exterior, workers shaved

20 Sam Fink Affidavit, 11 October 1906, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files,
Department o f Justice Central Files, General Files of the Department o f Justice, National
Archives; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 125-129.
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down the streaked face to prepare an appropriate surface for the equipment. Because raising the
cups required less ax work than when first installing them, young boys could perform this task.
Most workers quickly learned the squad’s routine and their special function within it. Operators
typically did not push their laborers hard in off-season work since it was not done under critical
time constraints. Such labor during slow months served to benefit the producers’ and workers’
different interests. During the winter months, employers needed to provide work for laborers to
counteract other producers’ enticement efforts. For their part, workers needed the income.21
With the advent o f the cup system, a new off-season job was added to raking and
burning, boiling cups. After several seasons o f use, cups became caked with dirt and dried gum.
To clean them, workers collected them from the trees and placed them by the hundreds in large
vats of boiling water, where the gum melted and washed off. Cleaning their cups periodically
enabled producers to make a higher-grade rosin from the gum. But despite the benefits o f the
higher grades, the cost o f collecting, boiling, and rehanging the cups limited the frequency with
which they could be cleaned. Some producers thus boiled their cups only in preparation for
harvesting virgin gum.22

21In a labor efficiency study, the United States Forest Service estimated that during a day
one worker could cut 500 to 600 faces, another could make 1,000 to 1,500 incisions, and yet
another could hang between 1,000 and 1,500 cups. Federal Writers’ Project, Florida: A Guide
to the Southernmost State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 378; A.W. Schorger
and H.S. Betts, The Naval Stores Industry (Washington, DC: United States Department of
Agriculture, 1915), 15-17; Robert S. Blount, Spirits of Turpentine: A History o f Florida Naval
Stores. 1528 to 1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 37-38; Elliott
Maguire, interview by author, James Berthold Berry, Farm Woodlands (Yonkers-on Hudson,
NY: World Book Company, 1923), 344-345; Lenthal Wyman, Florida Naval Stores
(Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1936), 36.
22 Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 21-23.
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As had been the procedure for over a century, between late February and early March
chipping began, each worker covering between 1,500 and 2,400 faces a day. In the several
decades after 1900, faces rose progressively slower as the hack sizes grew smaller and workers
were instructed to cut narrower and more shallow streaks than in previous years. Although the
hack blade changed slightly, it differed little in the first half of the twentieth century from its
design one hundred years earlier, a blade fastened to a wooden handle with an iron ball on the
end to furnish momentum when a worker swung the tool downward, across the face. Workers
continued to use pullers once the face grew too high for a hack to reach. The puller design had
also changed little.23
Although the exercise of dipping gum from a clay cup differed somewhat from removing
it from a box, little else about the job o f dipping changed. The task was performed by squads of
three or four workers and, because it required so little skill, young boys around twelve years old
could perform it. Depending on the trees’ productivity, dippers harvested gum every two to four
weeks. After removing the dip cup and scooping gum out with a trowel, the workers transferred
it to buckets, usually old nail kegs with gutter iron attached to the edge to scrape off the gum.
Once a bucket was full, weighing about fifty pounds, it was taken to a dip wagon that followed
the squad through the forest. The workers handed their bucket to the driver, often an older man,
who emptied it into a barrel. Some producers, however, dispensed with wagons and simply
placed empty barrels throughout the forest and collected them once the dippers filled them with
gum. According to this routine, a teamster drove through the forest in a drawn wagon, hammered
a lid on each filled barrel, and rolled it on skids onto the wagon. Such teamsters often used the

23 Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine. 39; Berry, Farm Woodlands. 344-345; Asa L. Brower
and John O. La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 8-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

463

same draft animals with whom they reportedly formed a bond, caring for them and growing to
understand their temperament.24
If a producer used the traditional boxing method, which required the gum to run down
the entire length o f the face into the box, workers had to remove the scrape, or dried resin, once
the dipping season ended in the late fall. This operation was unnecessary on pines outfitted with
cups since little gum hardened to their faces. Because the practice o f burning the forest
persisted, workers continued to rake around the trees. Grass, straw, chips, and branches were
cleared from around each tree for a distance o f from two to three feet. Workers could rake
around four hundred to seven hundred trees a day. In raking and all other tasks, the amount of
work expected from laborers depended on forest density more than acreage. More work could be
done in woods with thick tree growth than on sparsely timbered tracts where laborers spent
considerable time walking from tree to tree. Weather could also affect worker productivity. In
1922, for example, work at one turpentine camp ground to a halt during four weeks of hard rain,
which left water standing nearly knee-deep in some areas of the woods.23
The introduction o f the cup method did nothing to relieve the challenge producers faced
in trying to manage their workers who were spread out over as much as thousands o f acres of
forest. Producers continued to organize their operations by crops o f 10,000 faces, although some

24 Maguire, interview by author; Blount, Spirits of Turpentine. 39; William Alonzo
Register, interview, tape recording, Florida State Archives; Berry, Farm Woodlands. 344-345;
Karen Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into Turpentine Family: Industry Once Had Major Impact on
County,” The Compass. 26 April 1990,9; Hulda Summerall Baker, “Summerall Turpentine
Still,” Museum o f Coastal History, Coastal Georgia Historical Society, St. Simons Island, GA,
7; Wright, “Turpentining,” 103.
23 Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
10; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 22; Berry, Farm Woodlands. 344-345; Federal Writers’
Project, Florida. 378; Stetson Kennedy, Palmetto Country (New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1942), 266.
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used a size o f 10,500. As the first decade of the twentieth century progressed, however, the size
of tasks tended to drop in some areas. As turpentiners began moving into second-growth pine
forests, where trees commonly grew farther apart than in virgin stands, it became impossible for
workers to tend 10,000 pines. Some laborers, consequently, found their task reduced to as few as
5,000 trees, representing a considerable decline in their productivity.
Operators continued to rely on woodsriders to supervise their work force. Although
most woodsriders were white, some were black. Black woodsriders had typically begun work in
turpentine when they were young-dipping, raking, and helping around the still. As they gained
experience they became dippers, teamsters, coopers, and distillers. The very best advanced to
woodsrider. But no matter the woodsrider’s race, his principal job was to inspect the quality
with which faces were worked and to make sure no trees were missed. On small operations the
woodsrider tabulated how many trees each worker tended. Many operations, however, were
large and employed too many workers for woodsriders to concentrate on both work quality and
quantity. It was not uncommon for big operators to employ more than thirty men in the forest.
In the early 1920s, for example, one enormous turpentine business near Opal, Florida, was
subdivided into eight operations which together employed four hundred black men in the forest
and nine white woodsriders to oversee them. Workers who collected gum or scrape were paid by
the bucket- or barrel-full, depending on which system o f collection they used. For jobs that did
not create a measured end product like boxing, chipping, or attaching cups, producers used a
tallyman to record each workers’ progress. Camp managers assigned each worker a code made
up of either numbers or names. When a worker finished his task at one face, he called out his
individual code word loudly enough for the tallyman to hear him up to several hundred yards
away. The different codes hollered throughout the forest reportedly took on a rhythmic chanting
sound. Each tallyman could record the work of no more than ten to twelve hands. The tallyman
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needed to be competent, trustworthy, and o f good hearing, but age and strength mattered little.
At one camp a ten year old boy was promoted from toting water to keeping the tally.26
Except for such light jobs as dipping and tallying, turpentining remained strenuous work
requiring considerable physical strength. Evidence suggests that by the early twentieth century
the number of hours turpentine laborers worked dropped to around twenty-five or twenty-six
hours a week.27 “That was all a strong man could take or the hard physical labor would break
him down,” a former turpentine laborer explained.28 One former producer believed that the
'"turpentine man was the hardest working there is in the world for the number o f hours he
works.”29 In the woods, workers had to contend with underbrush and snakes, which made the
work more taxing and dangerous. Snakes were plentiful in the pine forest, but the danger o f
being bitten appears to have been low. As long as workers used the pattern o f foot-wom paths to

26 Albert Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” in Naval Stores:
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 104; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 264-266; Freeman
Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider.” Wakulla Area Digest (September 1996): 13-14,
16, 24; Albert G. Snow, Jr., “Research on the Improvement o f Turpentine Practices,”
Economic Botany 3 (October-December, 1949): 379; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 9; Federal
Writers’ Project, Florida. 378; Blount, Spirits of Turpentine. 36-37; Kenneth H. Thomas,
McCranie’s Turpentine Still. Atkinson Countv. Georgia: A Historical Analysis of the Site.
With Some Information on the Naval Stores Industry in Georgia and Elsewhere (Atlanta:
Georgia Department o f Natural Resources, 1975), 33; Maguire, interview by author, Schorger
and Betts, The Naval Stores Industry. 15; “The Pine Forests of the South,” De Bow’s Review.
After the War Series, 3 (February 1867): 196; Register, interview; Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into
Turpentine Family,” 9; Becky Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers "Hard Old Days’ in Woods,”
Newsclipping File, Lowndes County Historical Society, Valdosta, Georgia.
27 Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into Turpentine Family,” 9; Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers
"Hard Old Days’ in Woods”; Register, interview.
28 Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers ‘Hard Old Days’ in Woods.”
29 Register, interview.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

466
move between trees and made noise while at their work, snakes kept their distance. In the
untouched underbrush, however, snakes and workers might meet. Workers feared the red-headed
skink more than snakes. They incorrectly believed the skinks were poisonous and sighting one
alone was thought to bring bad luck.30 While the work remained strenuous and dangerous, it
continued as well to be extremely dirty. The men working around the gum got so much o f it
spilled on their overalls that the cloth became stiff once it dried. When workers undressed at
night they were unable to fold their overalls away and instead left them standing in the comer of
their cabin.
Not only did labor in the forests remain difficult, but distilling persisted as a primitive
craft. Producers continued to distill their gum in copper stills of the same design as those
introduced in the 1830s, but in the early twentieth century technological innovations improved
the regulation o f the process and thus the quality o f the finished product. The addition o f water
to the still at the beginning and during the distilling process continued from the late nineteenth
century and enabled producers to extract more spirits and also resulted in both spirits and rosin of
a somewhat higher quality than before. Along with the continued practice of adding water, the
introduction o f a still thermometer helped in regulating temperature. The device, developed by
Stephen Neal o f Cordele, Georgia, in 1907, took some o f the guess-work out of heating the still,
gauging the time to add water and timing the release o f the rosin. However, older distillers, who
had honed their skills in controlling the process by the sound of the boiling gum and the
appearance o f the liquid that drained from the condensing tube, refused to use it, believing it
degraded their craft. Younger distillers, though, found the thermometer invaluable. Even with

30 Diane Fisher, “Florida’s Turpentine Industry,” Florida Living Magazine 15 (October
1995): 29; Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers ‘Hard Old Days’ in Woods;” Wright, “Turpentining,”
103-104.
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the thermometer, the art o f distilling remained a highly sought after skill, and distillers continued
to hold the highest status among turpentine workers. They usually lived in one of the best houses
in the quarters. Distillers also received a higher wage and, unlike most workers, who were paid
by piecework, the distiller received a salary. In many camps the distiller was black and
responsible for the still’s operation, although the producer and woodsrider frequently checked on
his work. At large camps that employed a manager to oversee the entire operation, the manager
might supervise the distilling. At one camp the distiller’s position was so high, he served as the
producer’s overall assistant31
As with distillers, technology changed but did not transform the role of coopers.
Although many turpentine producers began buying factory-made spirit barrels, coopers also
retained their status as skilled workers. At some operations the distiller served as the cooper,
constructing barrels during the winter months when there was no gum to refine. By the earlytwentieth century, few coopers’ jobs included collecting the wood with which to construct
barrels. Instead, producers purchased machine-cut staves in bundles and hoop iron, which came
in spools. Despite the use of machine-cut pieces, the cooper’s job remained little changed from
years earlier. He began constructing a barrel by quickly stacking the staves up around a wooden
hoop. Once the staves were in place, the cooper wrapped a cable around the ring of staves and
tightened it. Once the staves were squeezed together, the cooper fastened on the hoops, which he
created by cutting hoop iron the appropriate length from a coil and riveting each end to form a

31 Berry, Farm Woodlands. 344; Robson Dunwody, “Proper Methods of Distillation and
Handling in the Production o f Turpentine and Rosin,” in Naval Stores: History. Production.
Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review Publishing and
Printing Company, 1921), 128; A. David King, III, interview by author, Georgia Agrirama,
Tifton, GA, 14 June 1996; Carl E. Ostrom, “Histoiy of Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The
Chemureic Digest 4 f IS July 1945): 222; Wright, “Turpentining,” 106,108; Baker,
“Summerall Turpentine Still,” 9-10.
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ring. He beat the hoops around the staves using a special hammer-like took working his way
around several times. Some coopers beat out a rhythm as they hammered the hoops on, and a
few reportedly even did a dance. As had always been the case, rosin barrels were less wellconstructed than turpentine casks. Although the latter were not purchased ready-made, only the
most skilled coopers constructed them. Even though a high standard was required for spirit
casks, problems with their quality persisted. Some producers supplied their coopers with lowgrade glue that failed to seal the cracks between the staves. Problems also occurred when barrels
were constructed o f incompletely dried staves to which the glue refused to adhere securely. To
ensure a properly sealed cask, coopers added three coats o f glue. Because leaks were especially
common around the casks’ heads, coopers had to turn the cask on each end for thirty minutes to
permit glue to collect around the edges. No matter how well a cask was glued, however, if it did
not dry for a sufficient time, the warm spirits sometimes dissolved the glue, causing the cask to
eventually leak. Even the best producers sometimes neglected to allow the glued casks to
properly dry.32
Turpentine workers received wages based on the difficulty o f the tasks they performed;
however, even skilled workers like distillers and coopers earned little. Turpentine wages closely
resembled farm wages between 1900 and 1930. Before the outbreak of the First World War,
wages paid to both farm and naval stores workers laboring for the same Florida employer
averaged around $1 for a twelve to fourteen hour day. Between the outbreak o f the World War I
and the United States’ entry into the war, turpentine wages dipped, just as they did in agriculture
jobs. The outbreak o f war interrupted trade causing naval stores prices to fall. To compensate,
producers lowered wages. The Leonard brothers’ turpentine operation in Calhoun County,

32 Maguire, interview by author; A.V. Wood, “Notes on Glue for Sizing Turpentine
Barrels,” S June 1922, Cary Collection, 1-2.
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Florida, for example, dropped its pay by as much as forty percent for chipping and twenty
percent for dipping. Even the Leonards’ woodsrider had his wage cut from $2 a day to SI .80.
Most naval stores workers during these years typically earned less than $1 a day. But wages rose
between 1917 and 1920 as the United States entered the war and required naval stores for
preparation. However in the 1920s wages once again fell. By 1929 six chippers and dippers
working in Washington County, Florida, earned on average around $1 a day, the pre-war wage.
The highest paid received $441.98 for the year and the lowest $238.87. In the same county a
distiller made considerably more, $75 per month. This rate was about the same as in other areas
of the turpentine South, but regional variation did occur. In 1929 wages paid to turpentine
laborers in Washington County, for example, were twenty percent lower than in Appling County,
Georgia.33
Men, women, and children received different amounts o f pay, probably because the men
performed the most physically taxing and, thus, the highest paid tasks. On one typical day in
1914, men at the Leonard Florida turpentine operation earned $1 to $1.25, women received 600,
and children 300. Dipping, the job that required the least skill and strength, consequently paid
the least. Dippers could expect to earn between 50 and 6.660 per filled bucket. But because the
wage was based on piece work, earnings varied greatly between laborers. At the Leonard

33 Clifton Paisley, “Wade Leonard, Florida Naval Stores Operator,” The Florida
Historical Quarterly 51 (April 1973): 387-388; Gavin Wright, Old South. New South:
Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 1986),
202-203; Brower and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,”
50; Otho Monroe, interview by Michael Garvey, 19 March 1975, Mississippi Oral History
Program, McCain Library and Archives, University o f Southern Mississippi, 5; F. Ray
Marshall, Labor in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 94-95; Jeffrey A.
Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers: Life. Labor, and Culture in the North Florida Timber
Industry. 1830-1930 (Macon. GA: Mercer University Press, 1997), 142; E.A. Ziegler, A.R.
Spillers, and C.H. Coulter, Financial Aspects o f Growing Southern Pine. Washington Countv
Florida (Tallahassee: Florida Forest Service, 1931), 56-57; Register, interview.
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operation, the fastest o f six chippers earned $2 in one day in May 1914, although typically he
made only between $1.12 and $1.73 a day. One o f the slowest workers, by contrast, received as
little as 350 one day that same month. Chipping, which was a much more difficult and
demanding task, paid better than dipping. The Leonards paid 750 per each one thousand faces.
In one week, one of their chippers earned $11.16. Chippers, who received payment for each chip
whether the wound yielded gum or not, had an advantage over dippers in that their pay did not
depend in large part on pine gum production, which could vary significantly between crop and
season. Chippers were assigned a quota o f faces they were to chip each week. Although each
work assignment was designed to take five days, especially diligent workers could complete it in
three or four days. No matter how many days it took them to complete the task, though, they
were paid the same.34
Very few women worked in the turpentine forests. Instead, they remained busy in the
quarters and worked at jobs both within and outside the camp. Women took care of the many
children in the camp. In Washington County, Florida, for example, families o f turpentine women
averaged between three and four children. Women also tended their households’ garden and
looked after their chickens and pigs, which they bred, killed, cured, and cooked. Evidence
suggests that the intensity o f this female-dominated domestic food production was related to the
wage level in the camp. In Washington County, where pay for turpentine was lower than in other
areas of the southeast and provided “the minimum of existence incomes,” the workers appeared
to one forester “to do a little more gardening for raising vegetables.”35 Along with raising food,

34 Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 387; Wright, Old South. New South. 202-203; Brower and
La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 50; Monroe, interview.
35 Ziegler, et al., Financial Aspects o f Growing Southern Pine. 562.
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women also cooked two meals a day, canned, nursed the sick and injured, and boiled the
hardened gum out o f stiffened overalls.36
Some women found odd jobs around the camp to earn extra income. Working in groups
of two or three and accompanied by their small children and older daughters, some women
gathered deartongue, a plant native to the southeastern pine forest and used as an aromatic, and
dried it on the tin rooftops at the camp. They then sold it by the pound to a buyer who marketed
it. Other women worked as domestics for the turpentine operations’ white owners and
employees. The women selected for these jobs reportedly considered themselves fortunate to
have the steady work. Still other women found jobs planting trees and cleaning cups at the
season’s end. In many cases women were limited to jobs at the camp because of its isolated
location. However, if other white families lived nearby, the women could find jobs as domestics
in homes outside the camp. At one less remote Florida camp, some women and older children
worked in nearby potato fields.37
Marriages at turpentine camps were encouraged but few were legal. Marriages
facilitated good camp government and economical use of housing. Therefore, producers pushed
single men and women to marry in a “commissary wedding,” not unlike those performed in
turpentine camps in the late-nineteenth century. The producers or camp managers would decide
with a couple that they should marry, assign them a cabin, and open an account for them at the
commissary. Husbands and wives generally grew up in either the same camp or in neighboring

36 Vail, “Turpentine Business,” 326; Wright, “Turpentining,” 109-112; Monroe,
interview, 4; Maguire, interview by author, Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still. C-3.
37 Vail, “Turpentine Business;” Robert N. Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t: The North
Florida Turpentine Camp, 1900-1950.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 67 (January 1989):
326; Wright, “Turpentining,” 109-112; Monroe, interview, 4; Maguire, interview by author;
Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still. C-3.
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camps. They usually married young. The camp community did not regard boys as adults until
they wed and, until then, their fathers received their pay as part o f his household’s income. If a
couple had some extra money, a rare occurrence, they might go to the county courthouse and get
a marriage license. In 1916, however, a minor scandal erupted over the informality of turpentine
camp marriages. A white northern preacher learned o f the practice of commissary weddings and
brought such intense public attention to bear on it that camp foremen were chided to get marriage
licenses for their workers. Many of the couples had been together for decades. The scandal
however, was short-lived and the practice o f commissary weddings continued.38
Couples and their families lived in clusters o f cabins called “the quarters,” which made
up part o f the camp complex. Camps were most often set in isolated locations so that workers
could live near the forest in which they labored and producers could protect their workers from
other operators hoping to recruit them away. In many camps the owner, manager, or woodsrider
lived beside the only road into the camp, usually a two-rut path, to monitor who came and went.
Usually quarters contained between twenty-five and forty houses arranged in a variety of
patterns. At some camps shanties were scattered about the woods to provide a moderate amount
of privacy. Other camps had cabins spaced according to a grid pattern. Still others lacked any
organization at all, with houses built wherever the owner happened to choose. Separate quarters
were provided for the single men away from the family cabins to prevent disruption caused by
single men flirting with married women.39 Some workers preferred to live alone in the woods.

38 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 266; Federal Writers’ Project, Florida. 37; Wright,
“Turpentining,” 113; Maguire, interview by author; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 183.
39 Maguire, interview by author; Sandra Jo Forney, “The Importance o f Sites Related to
the Naval Stores Industry in Florida,” (paper presented at the thirty-seventh annual meeting o f
the Florida Anthropological Society, Daytona Beach, Florida, 198S), 3; Wright,
“Turpentining,” 109-110; Baker, “Summerall Turpentine Still,” 7; Kennedy, Palmetto Country.
265.
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The houses, as in the nineteenth century, remained small and primitive, mere shanties.
They customarily contained only between 260 and 550 square feet o f living space. Workers with
important jobs received larger homes. A foreman at one Florida operation lived in a six-room
house. If a family grew too large for its assigned cabin, rooms were added or the producer
moved them to a somewhat larger dwelling. Evidence suggests that, despite arrangements made
for large families, living space remained cramped. At one Florida operation, for example, nearly
six people on average lived in each house. The wooden structures, with rare exception, were
unpainted and lacked running water and electricity. Despite their modest character, most houses
were reportedly neatly kept, the yards swept clean, and vegetables cultivated in backyard
gardens.40 Zora Neal Hurston explained in her novel Seraph on the Suwanee that “teppentine
[sic] shacks are not built for beauty. They are temporary shelters. In a few years usually the
woods are worked out, and the camp is moved. The houses are tom down and put up again at the
new location.”41
Camp living quarters were typically racially segregated. The black workers’ quarters
were located at one end o f the camp, and the white owners, manager, woodsriders, and their
families lived in finer homes at the other end. As a general rule, white children did not play with
black children and black and white adults did not socialize. Each race had constant contact with
the other, however. White men had close contact with the black workers, whom they managed,

40 Maguire, interview by author; Fomey, ‘importance o f Sites,” 3; Wright,
“Turpentining,” 109-110; Baker. “Summerall Turpentine Still,” 7; Kennedy, Palmetto Country.
265.
41 Zora Neale Hurston, Seraph on the Suwanee. in Novels and Stories. The Library o f
America (New York: Literary Classics o f the United States, Inc., 1995), 651.
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and the white women and children saw black men and women at work about the camp as well as
in and around their homes.42 One white woman recalled that, as a child in a turpentine camp, “I
didn’t have any fear o f the colored families. We didn’t socialize with them, but we knew them
all. They had gardens and brought fresh vegetables to my mother. We shared with them, too.”43
Commissaries continued as the principal suppliers o f the basic staples o f the turpentine
worker’s diet: meat, lard, pork and beans, and peas, most o f it sold in cans and at inflated prices.
Even if a turpentine business failed to turn a profit, producers could usually count on their
commissaries to operate in the black. In 1922 one Florida turpentine establishment had an
operating deficit of $35,527.48. The commissary, however, showed a profit o f $2,230.46. In
most moderately-sized operations the commissary opened only for a few hours, sometimes only
in the afternoons or on Fridays. Purchases were made either on credit or with scrip paid to
workers instead of cash. Some camps were located close enough to communities that workers
could trade with town merchants. Workers also supplemented purchased goods with produce
raised in their gardens and livestock that they tended. Men supplied the household with game,
some hunting with dogs and an old single-barrel shotgun and others using a sack to catch
opossum. During the weekdays men might take the opportunity at lunch to fish.44

42 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265; Monroe, interview, 3-4; Wright, “Turpentining,”
110.

43 Wright, “Turpentining,” 110.
44 Johnston McNeill Company, Report, 1922, Powell Papers; Register, interview;
Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 386; Wright, “Turpentining,” 103; Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine
Still. C-3; T.G. Willis report, 16 February 1931, Classified Subject Files, Department of
Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60,
National Archives.
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Workers ate their breakfast and lunch in the forest. Every morning they carried their
food in half-gallon lard cans and their water in gallon-sized bottles wrapped in a wet sack and
tied with baling wire to keep it cool. Arriving around daylight by wagon, or after the 1910s by
truck, workers might build a fire and eat breakfast as they waited for light. They usually used
these breakfast sites as a “hang up place,” somewhere to leave their coats, lunch buckets, and
water bottles. If the area had ants, workers employed a sapling as a “hang up tree.” Before
hanging their lunch from the small tree’s branches, they shaved six inches of bark off the trunk,
exposing the gummy wood which would trap hungry ants that attempted to raid the lunch. If the
breakfast site was inconvenient, workers might make a hang up place closer to the day’s work
area. Woodsriders and producers knew that if they needed to find a man in the forest, they need
but arrive at the hang up place around lunch time. Lunch items included black eye peas, collard
greens, slabs o f fat sowbelly, and combread or biscuits with cane syrup. Other lunch entrees
included canned salmon mixed with rice, tomatoes, and beans as well as a dish called dooby, a
mixture of meat, onions, and combread. Lunches were usually eaten cold, but in chilly weather
the workers might build a fire and heat them.45
Because o f the long daily work hours, on weekday evenings there was little time for
rowdiness. Families in the close-knit communities would visit and make their own music. On
Sundays part o f the camp community attended worship services. Some camps contained a
church which during the week might serve as a schoolhouse. If a camp lacked a church, religious
services were held in one of the cabins. In most camps a worker also served as a preacher.
Turpentine workers also filled leisure time by celebrating holidays. At at least one Florida camp
the black workers, for an uncertain reason, celebrated May 20 as “Freedom Day” by slaughtering

45 Wright, “Turpentining,” 100-101; Maguire, interview with author.
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hogs and having a large barbecue. On weekend nights, which offered the majority o f free time,
most entertainment centered around the camp juke joint, a house where men and women gathered
to dance, drink moonshine, and flirt. Men gambled, some playing skin, a popular card game.
Fights frequently broke out at the juke. A common weapon in such altercations was a three-sided
triangular file used to sharpen hack blades. It reportedly produced a cut worse than a knife in
that the skin could close, leaving the victim bleeding internally. Producers and woodsriders tried
to limit the revelry and keep the peace on weekends. Some attempted to control the amount of
moonshine that came into the camp. Others required that alt activity end at midnight on Sundays
so the men would be in fit shape for work the next morning. Some producers, although not all,
even recognized blue Mondays after the payday weekend because their workers were frequently
too hung over to manage the strenuous labor with the precision necessary for successful
operation.46 One very large Georgia operator reported that his workers refused to work on
Mondays. “If you made them go to the woods,” he explained, “they’d break a hack or go to sleep
or spend the whole day fixin’ it. They wouldn’t work.”47 Despite the time for drinking,
carousing, and gambling, turpentine workers were never free from oversight. As historian Robert
N. Lauralt explains, “whatever else the turpentiners did besides work was done within the
precinct o f work-in sight of the tall pines they bled for a living, beneath the roofs o f the

46 Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still. C-2, C-3. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine. 41;
Federal Writers’ Project, Florida. 377-378; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 9; C.R. Clark,
Florida Trade Tokens (St. Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors Publishing Co., 1980), 7-8;
Maguire, interview by author; Forney, “Importance o f Sites,” 3, 5; Kennedy, Palmetto Country.
265; Vail, “Turpentine Business,” 265; Wright, “Turpentining,” 119-120, 123-124; Monroe,
interview, 3; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 192, 158.
47 Wright, “Turpentining,” 124.
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company shanties, under the sharp eye o f the woodsrider who held a control over their lives
difficult to imagine outside o f slavery.”48
At perhaps the most notorious turpentine camp, the Cross City, Florida, camp owned by
Putnam Lumber Company, entertainment included only a juke joint and gambling, both o f which
the captain, G. Alston Brown, oversaw. With his workers under unusually intense control,
Brown reportedly encouraged and, on some occasions, even forced workers to gamble. On
paydays Brown played poker with the workers, some games lasting from noon on Saturdays till
Monday mornings at six o’clock. Workers did not enjoy playing with Brown because, no matter
what hand they were dealt, Brown took their money. Even when Brown lost he would take the
workers’ winnings, telling them he would put it toward their account. If a worker complained,
Brown beat him over the head with his pistol. Despite prohibition, alcohol was available at the
juke joint. A local moonshiner sold it to Brown, who in turn charged his workers twenty-five
cents a drink. Each week the camp consumed between five and eight gallons of whiskey.49
The monthly payday was typically a special time in turpentine camps when everyone,
including the producer and woodsriders, went to the nearby town—the workers riding in the back
o f a camp wagon or truck, some sitting on chairs. Zora Neal Hurston explained that whereas
people in the turpentine belt traveled to towns within a thirteen- to fourteen-mile radius o f the
area, “few ever dreamed of venturing any farther east or west”50 Although the camp’s visit
brought much-welcomed business to the town merchants, townspeople feared the black workers,

48 Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t,” 311.
49 John Bonyne reports, 14 November 1921,26 May 1922, 3 May 1922, Cubberly
Papers; Gary Moore, “Prisoner o f Riverside,” Folio Weekly 10 (28 May 1996): 17.
50 Hurston. Seraph on the Suwanee. 599.
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considering them wild and unruly, and thought o f the white woodsriders as outlaws.31 One
laborer reported that “when we come to town folks would clear the streets.”52 The frequent
arrests of turpentine workers provided small communities with easy revenue since producers and
mangers willingly bailed their workers out of jail, their labor too valuable to be sacrificed.33
The power o f the producer and camp manager over his workers included the laborers’
vote. A referendum on the relocation of one Wiregrass Georgia county seat in the 1910s
illustrates this point. Lumber and naval stores men who had built up their operations along a
railroad line that ran three miles from the county seat wanted the government center transferred
to a more accessible railroad town where they already conducted much o f their financial
business. The timber men planned to use the vote o f their large black labor forces to win
approval for the new site. Black votes, however, were at a premium and led to the kidnapping of
at least one turpentine producer’s laborers. After midnight on election eve supporters o f the
current county seat took the workers to an old mill shed, where they entertained them with
canned goods, crackers, and whisky. As soon as the polls opened, the kidnapped laborers
obediently voted to keep the old seat just as their abductors instructed them. When their
employer discovered the trick and protested that “every one uv them niggers is mine, and I
challenge their vote,” it was too late. Throughout the voting day other lumber and turpentine
men kept a close eye on their workers to prevent a similar occurrence. They brought their
laborers in on horse-drawn wagons, treating them to whisky along the way, and guarded them

31 Wright, “Turpentining,” 123; Maguire, interview by author.
32 Wright, “Turpentining,” 124.
33 Ibid., 123-124; Maguire, interview by author.
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once they reached the poll. With the boss at the front, the workers lined up behind him with
woodsriders on each side and in the rear, then the group approached the polls and voted
according to their employer’s wishes. Nevertheless, the lumber and turpentine men lost the
referendum by twenty-seven votes.54
Like producers who sought tight control over laborers, woodsriders believed that they
needed to rule the workers completely and harshly in order to gain their respect, maintain order,
and extract efficient work.55 One woodsrider explained that “you’ve got to get out with your
labor. If I don’t come out here, they don’t work.”56 Another remarked that he “never let one of
them know when I was cornin’ or where I was.”57 One Georgia overseer reportedly “ruled the
roost where he stayed, and if one got out of line he took a blackjack or somethin’ and
straightened him out.”58 Every morning the overseer at the Jackson Lumber Company’s
turpentine operation near the Florida and Alabama boarder entered the quarters and struck those
who moved too slowly for his liking with an ax handle. During the work day he punished
unsatisfactory work by tying laborers to pine trees and beating them with a buggy whip. The
screams o f his victims could reportedly be heard through the woods for half a mile.59 In 1915

54 J.L. Herring, Saturday Night Sketches: Stories of Old Wiregrass Georgia (Tifton, GA:
The Sunny South Press, 1978), 112-116.
55 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265-266; Wright, “Turpentining,” 119; “The
Turpentiners,” The Magnolia Monthly 7 (October 1969).
56 Quoted in Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines,” 163.
57 Quoted in Ibid., 163.
58 Quoted in Ibid., 164.
59 Ibid., 168
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one forester found that “life in the turpentine camps is often even tougher and more primitive
than in the old time logging camp, yet some o f the turpentine operators carry on their
establishment in the spirit o f the Old South.”60
One former Florida camp manager explained that the foreman had to cause fear and
instill respect in the workers: “in speaking to him they call him Capm, but among themselves
they call him The Man. And believe me, he better be a man from the ground up! If he ever
stands for any back-talk or shows a streak o f yellow he’s through, and might as well quit. For
they lose all respect for him and won’t mind him. Even though they keep up a pretense o f
respect to his face, they’ll laugh at him behind his back and gang up to make his life miserable.
They like to be ruled by an iron hand and no velvet glove.”61 Some managers did not hesitate to
use deadly force to intimidate workers. At one eastern Louisiana turpentine operation the camp
manager shot one o f a group of blacks who had come to the camp only to gamble. Another
company boss, Big Joe Watts, had seven notches on his gun by the late 1920s. Each notch
represented just the number of white people he had killed, his black victims apparently not worth
commemorating. In 1913 nine black turpentine workers were killed in the vicinity of

60 P.L. Buttrick, “Commercial Uses o f Longleaf Pine,” American Forestry 21 (Spring
1915): 901.
61 He also believed himself to be especially talented at managing turpentine workers.
“Seems like I always had a knack o f handling labor,” be explained. “Being bom and raised
with turpentine niggers 1 learned their nature. They all liked me because I was fair and firm,
and they’d do anything for me. If I quit a job and went to another, ever last nigger on the place
would follow me if I told em to.” Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265-266.
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Blountstown, Florida, by the Apalachicola River. As was typically the case, legal officials paid
little attention.62
The manager o f a camp, whether it was the producer himself, his foreman, or his
woodsrider, ruled with near complete authority, in many instances acting as the police, judge,
jury, and, occasionally, the executioner. If their laborers were jailed for violence at the juke
joint, the trouble and expense of paying the fine and retrieving them from jail on Monday
morning created a burden and expense for operators. Many camps were so isolated in the woods,
however, that law enforcement officers rarely appeared in times o f disturbance, even in cases of
murder. Few workers were arrested for killing other blacks. Producers refused to call the
sheriff, even for murder cases, because they did not want their workers sitting idly in jail. At one
camp, a murder investigation consisted o f five or six white workers interviewing all the witnesses
and writing up a report based on the information they gathered. They then submitted that report
to the coroner’s office where it was filed, ending the matter. The purpose o f the investigation
was to maintain the peace by providing the minimum response necessary to prevent the law’s
involvement. Owners and managers were interested in keeping their operation running with as
little interruption as possible. The mere appearance o f law officers could also cause a producer
to loose many o f his workers. Because a large number of the turpentine laborers had been in

62 The next year however, two especially gruesome murders outraged the whole
community to the point that the suspects were prosecuted. On October 8, 1914 the body o f a
naval stores worker was found shot. Three young and well-connected whites were arrested and
charged with the murder. Not long afterwards an employee of the turpentine operation where
the victim had worked and a material witness in the case went missing. His body was later
found with one shot in the back o f the head and another in his back. Iron weights had been tied
to his body with barb wire, and his body sunk in the deep portion o f a nearby creek. Wade
Leonard saw that justice moved quickly. He secured one of Florida’s best trial lawyers to
assist the state attorney. After a trial that lasted but one day, the three defendants were
convicted o f second degree murder and received life sentences. Monroe, interview, 6; Elwood
R. Maunder, Voices From The South: Recollections o f Four Foresters (Santa Cruz, CA: Forest
History Society, 1977), 73; Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 388-389.
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trouble with the law, just the sight o f a sheriff or his deputies could cause many laborers to leave
and start work at another camp. The relatives o f a murder victim often preferred to handle the
matter in their own way as well. They tended not to trust the authorities. Not only did many
workers have criminal records, but they knew from experience that the law would fail to take the
matter seriously.63 To escape the vengeance of his victim’s family and friends, a murderer
commonly had to run away. One camp manager explained that “we got rid of two people every
time one man was shot.”64
The turpentine operation at the town o f Fargo, bordering the Okefenokee Swamp in
southeastern Georgia, reveals the tough and lawless nature of some o f these establishments.
Fargo was an old lumber town purchased by a naval stores concern and used as the operating
headquarters for seven different turpentine camps spread out in the surrounding forests. With
ninety-six crops in the 1920s, it was probably the South’s largest turpentine operation at the time.
The company served as it own law enforcement agency over the 210,000 acres it controlled and
had agreements with the sheriffs, in whose counties its operation extended, not to come to Fargo
unless sent for. Because the company manager tolerated any activity that did not directly
interfere with the turpentine operation, an assortment of criminals on the run in Georgia and
Florida sought refuge in and around the community, which soon became known as “Bad Man’s
Fargo.” The absence o f law enforcement attracted bootleggers during the days o f prohibition.
With nineteen liquor stills hidden in the forest within ten miles of Fargo, the community was the

63 Tegeder, Prisoners o f the Pines,” 166,240-241; Maunder, Voices from the South. 7475.
64 Maunder, Voices from the South. 74.
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center of Georgia’s moonshine production. The liquor went out in trucks to as far away as
Cincinnati.65
Although an unusually extreme case, the near-absolute power exercised by G. Alston
Brown at his Cross City, Florida camp provides another illustration o f the power camp managers
and woodsriders often possessed over their workers. Brown’s guards kept an unrelenting watch
over the workers. Some o f the guards were other black workers who either earned status as
Brown’s pets by showing their loyalty or, in a few cases, were forced to serve against their will.
The guards patrolled the camp at night and reported any trouble directly to Brown. They had
orders to shoot anyone who attempted to escape and were given considerable incentive to prevent
escapes. For every worker who got away under an individual guard’s watch, the escapee’s debt
was added to the guard’s. Brown also restricted workers’ contact with the outside world. In the
woods each guard, armed with a pistol and a double-barrel shotgun, oversaw between five and
seven men. When relatives went in search of their family members, Brown prevented their
contact. He read all incoming and outgoing mail and reportedly stopped some letters from
reaching their intended receivers.66
The most common form o f punishment at Cross City, even for unsatisfactory work, was
severe beatings or whippings. Brown, however, occasionally employed even more brutal
measures. Some workers he had hanged by one thumb. In extreme instances, workers were
brutally murdered. In the first o f three known cases, the death appears not to have been
intentional. As a policy, laborers had to work even if they were sick. One worker, Washington

65 Ibid., 72.
66 John Bonyne reports, 10 June 1921, 14 November 1921,3 May 1922; Howard P.
Wright report, 9 September 1921, and E J. Cartier reports, 16 May 1922,18 May 1922,23 May
1922, Cubberly Papers.
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Menner, was too ill to work. According to the customary practice in such cases, Mose Brown,
the captain’s nephew, beat Menner to force him to work. Brown hit him with a stick, knocked
him to the ground, then beat him with a pistol grip and kicked him in the face, sides, and
stomach. Afterwards, Menner could not get up or talk. He was carried in a wagon back to the
camp, where he bled from his ears and remained incoherent until he died after a week or ten
days. The rest of the camp was threatened with the same fate if they told of the incident.67
In the second instance, the worker’s murder was unquestionably intentional and
calculated. In the summer o f 1921 James Powell, a black truck driver for Brown, took some
women to another nearby camp for a party. When they arrived, Powell quarreled with the
camp’s white boss about a piece of machinery missing from the truck. When Powell returned the
next morning to pick up a load of dip, the camp boss attacked him with a large stick. Powell,
however, took the stick and used it to beat the boss. Afterwards, Brown locked Powell in the
commissary for over a day. On a Monday night the beaten camp boss, the county judge, who
was the boss’s brother-in-law, and another man tied Powell’s hands, put him in their car and
drove off. Two days later cattle drivers found the bloody remains of Powell’s legs, arms, and
clothing in an area away from the road. To prevent the attracted buzzards from making off with
the remains, one cattleman tied them to a tree with wire. When told o f Powell’s fate, the local
sheriff showed no interest. Only after he was contacted by the governor—who had been notified
of the incident by letter—did he come to investigate. Upon inspecting the remains, which
included clothing identifying the victim as a turpentine worker, the sheriff placed them in a bag
and buried them.68

67 John Bonyne reports, 3 May 1922, 5 May 1922,23 May 1922, and Ben Doyle sworn
statement, 17 May 1922, Cubberly Papers.
68 John Bonyne report, 5 May 1922, and E.J. Cartier report, 16 May 1922, Cubberly
Papers.
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In yet another grizzly incident, Brown and a group o f men marched turpentine worker
Mose Nellem out to a secluded field. Brown carried a shotgun and rope and kicked Nellem on
the way there. It is unclear what actually happened to Nellem, but one witness reported that the
men crossed a bridge into a field, stayed an hour, and returned without Nellem. The next
morning Brown had the field plowed to erase any evidence of the previous evening’s activities.69
Women at the Brown camp were in an especially vulnerable situation. Women Brown
hired to perform domestic services were subjected to the same reduced pay and claims of debt as
the male turpentine workers. Some women arrived to visit their husbands only to find that
Brown refused to let them leave and put them to work cooking and washing for the other
workers. Many o f these ensnared women faced sexual abuse from the men at the camp. One
woman, who had come to the camp to visit her daughter, refused Brown’s advances; he had her
severely beaten. On at least one occasion Mose Brown beat a woman with his pistol and raped
her. Other women were forced into prostitution with the camp workers. As a regular practice,
male workers could engage in sexual relations with any woman in the camp, whether she was
single or married. Those who resisted were beaten until they cooperated. In the cases of married
women, their husbands were held prisoner in the stockade for the evening of the encounter. To
regulate the prostitution, Brown devised a system of “cross time slips.” Male workers paid him
between one and five dollars. In many cases the fee was charged to their commissary account.
Brown in turn gave them a cross time slip which they presented to their woman o f choice. After

69 John Bonyne report, 3 May 1922, Cubberly Papers.
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the encounter, the woman turned the slip in to Brown and received less than half o f the original
price paid for the service.70
Brown also subjected camp women to severe punishments. One woman received a
beating for accidentally dropping water on Brown’s dog and a whipping for telling another that
she wished Brown was dead. Brown also kicked and whipped a cook and wash woman for
unknown reasons.71 Another woman, Lillie Johnson, Brown’s unwilling sixteen-year-old
mistress with whom he fathered a child, received an appallingly brutal beating in the fall o f 1920
after he suspected her o f seeing another man.72 Brown had raped her when she was twelve and
continued a sexual relationship until the beating. While her mother watched, Brown had his men
drag Lillie into the woods, strip her to the waist, and administer one hundred lashes with a strap.
Then, under Brown’s orders, her hair was cut off to her scalp. That night her mother tended her
wounds and for the next three weeks Brown forced her to stay in his house.73
Many southern blacks acknowledged the difficult existence o f turpentine workers, most
of whom experienced nowhere near the agony as those laboring for Brown. Zora Neal Hurston
describes the north Florida turpentine region as containing only “scratchy plantings” o f com,
cane potatoes, tobacco, and small patches of cotton, “the people being mostly occupied in the

70 John Bonyne reports, 3 May 1922, 10 June 1921, 14 November 1921, and M.J. Cronin
and John Bonyne report, 8 May 1922, Cubberly Papers; Moore, “Prisoner of Riverside,” 16-17.
71 John Bonyne report, 3 May 1922, Cubberly Papers.
72 Her sister, Vina Lee Wright, also had a child by Brown. Brown had raped her when
she was thirteen and continued repeatedly to molest and beat her.
73 M.J. Cronin and John Bonyne report, 5 May 1922 and John Bonyne report, IS July
1922, Cubberly Papers.
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production of turpentine and lumber.” Life, she explained, revolved around the still and mill,
“then too there was ignorance and poverty, and the every-present hook worm.”74 One former
turpentine worker himself admitted that many laborers in the camps were ignorant, uninformed,
and incapable of managing their own affairs, but added that the camps brutality, lack of schools,
and economic exploitation and paternalism—all conditions created by white producers—made
them this way.75
For its part, the white community generally agreed that black turpentine workers were
different from other African-Americans, but disagreed as to whether turpentine workers were
“good” blacks or “bad.” The wife of one producer explained that “a turpentine Negro was . . .
different from all other Negroes.”76 Many had been bom and raised in the isolated camps and
knew little of the world beyond the forest. They had little education and generally lacked skills
in anything except turpentine production. When whites encountered workers on their monthly
trips to town, they appeared ignorant, crude, and indolent, despite showing the customary respect
toward whites77 One white man explained in 1910 that despite their shortcomings, black

74 Hurston, Seraph on the Suwanee. 599.
75 Maunder, Voices from the South. 36; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265; I.F. Eldredge,
The 4 Forests and the Future of the South (Washington, DC: The Charles Lathrop Pack
Forestry Foundation, 1947), 41; Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 386; Maguire, interview by author;
Register, interview; Nollie Hickman, Mississippi Harvest: Lumbering in the Loncleaf Pine
Belt 1840-1915 (University: The University of Mississippi. 1962), 146-147; Tegeder,
“Prisoners of the Pines,” 184.
76 Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still.
77 Maunder, Voices from the South. 36; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 265; Eldridge, The
4 Forests. 41; Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 386; Maguire, interview by author; Register,
interview; Hickman, Mississippi Harvest 146-147; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 184.
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turpentine laborers were bard workers. “The negro o f the pineries,” he reported, “is careless,
often brutal, always happy-go-lucky, but the men who employ him say that he works well with
right management; in fact, is the best labor that can be had for the place, and that the business
would not know what to do without him. He surely fits the scene and one would be sorry to miss
him from it.”78 Writing in the early 1920s, a naval stores man argued that turpentine workers
were the same as other blacks, who he believed were harmless when under a white man’s control.
He did not believe that “a turpentine negro is any worse than others o f his race under similar
conditions. The country at large has somehow gotten the idea that the turpentine negro is worse
than other kinds o f nergoes. This impression is an erroneous one, and one which injustice to the
turpentine negro, should be corrected.”79 A 1926 minstrel song described turpentine workers as
satisfied with the steady work that kept them fed and allowed them to enjoy the outdoors. It also
implied that they were concerned with forest fires as a potential threat to their livelihood.

De Woods o f Pine
An old dark-y sing-in’ in de woods o f pine A work-in de trees for
turpentine, My luch hit grows with the Pine-y Wood
And while pines grow my luck stays good, Food in de kitch-en and de
times ain’t hard When a man works out in God’s front yard.
Chorus:
Pay day’s com-in’ while de pine trees grow, Hits de sur-est thing dat a
a man can know De wolf am a com-ing right in de door, When de
old Pine-y Wood ain’t here no more.

78 Winthrop Packard, Florida Trails: As Seen From Jacksonville to Kev West and From
November to April Inclusive (Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, Publishers, 1910), 281.
79 Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” 104.
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List-en hon-ey if you want to farm Don’t let de Pine-y Wood
come to harm Dey’s al-ways workin for de far-mer hard Like
great big soldier men a stand-in’ guard Keepin’ way drought de
frost de bugs Oh hap-py am de farm de Pine-y Woods hugs.
Chorus
When you hear de wind a hum-min in de pine Hit makes a tune dat
sounds mighty fine De big pine trees are a makin dat sound A
talkin’ to dere ba-bies close to de ground Little pine babies growin’
down be-Iow Got-ta help dem babies if dey’s go-in’ to grow.
Chorus
When you hear de big old pine trees start to moan Dere’s fire in de woods dat
Makes dem groan De lit-tle fire kills de lit-tle ba-by trees De
grass and birds, but no ticks nor fleas Big fires kill de
big trees too, We got-ta stop de fires, what-ev-er we do.
Chorus80

Other whites believed that black turpentiners were indeed lazy and dangerous. One
Georgia producer complained that he was “short o f labor but that is the trouble with all of the
turpentine people in this part o f the state.”*1 John Casson, the president o f one o f the most
powerful naval stores factorage houses in the South, agreed that turpentine workers were lazy,
but identified this laziness as a phenomenon o f the early 1920s. Casson maintained that “Sambo
is not as strong, vigorous or healthy as he was thirty to forty years ago. Disease has made
inroads into his constitution and he cannot give the service now as then even should he so desire.
Today the producer pays exceedingly high wages for very poor work, the result being that it
takes from two and one-half men to do one man’s work and the expense o f operating the average

80 Warren Nicke and Lucille De Mert, “De Woods o f Pine,” (Chicago: De Mert and
Dougerty, 1926).
81 W.M. Sharpe to Yeoman, 7 January 1907, Wilbur M. Sharpe Papers, South
Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.
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turpentine farm is ten times more than in the period mentioned.”82 In 1905 Florida explained that
its rising crime rate resulted in part from “the rapid growth o f the turpentine and lumber
industries in Florida” which had “caused an influx o f a floating population that follow this class
of work.”83 Because many whites shared the view that turpentine blacks were dangerous, not all
communities allowed operations in their vicinity. In the early 1900s, for example, the Taylor
brothers sold their turpentine business in South Lake County, Florida, and moved about fifteen
miles northward to the community o f Mascotte to start a new operation. However, Mascotte,
which had no black residents and certainly did not want to add the likes of turpentine workers to
their population, refused to allow the Taylors to bring their workers with them. Instead, the
Taylors established their new operation a few miles to the east.84
A comparison o f American and French turpentine workers reveals the harshness of the
southern turpentine workers’ existence. Not only did French turpentine workers appear not to
have suffered such intense prejudice, they experienced a very different work situation and
apparently fared considerably better than their American counterparts in the first decade of the
twentieth century. One major difference was the size o f the average French operator’s labor
force, which tended to be considerably smaller than the dozens o f families who typically labored
for each American producer. In fact many French producers worked their own trees with no

82 J.A.G. Carson, “The Increased Cost o f Naval Stores Production,” in Naval Stores:
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 73.
83 The Eighth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner o f Florida for the Period Beginning
January 1. 1903. and Ending December 31. 1904 (Tallahassee, FL: L.B. Hilson, State Printer,
1905), 318.
84 William T. Kennedy, History o f Lake Countv. Florida. Lake County Historical
Society, Tavares, FL, 108.
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help. In the late 1910s, there were around 15,000 turpentine wood lot owners in the Landes
region, but only around ten thousand laborers. Although French chippers worked hard at similar
tasks to those of American workers, their pace appears to have been less intense. French
chippers typically worked around eight thousand to nine thousand faces a week, compared to ten
thousand for U.S. workers. Perhaps the greatest difference between American and French naval
stores workers was their manner of compensation, which allowed the French considerably more
autonomy. Where American workers received pay based on the number of individual tasks they
performed, French laborers worked the turpentine forest on shares. Workers typically received
half the value of the gum they collected and carried to the still. Some producers, however,
capped the potential amount a worker could receive if the barrel exceeded a certain value. In the
late 1910s this limit was around $11.58. Also, at certain operations the depreciation of the cups
and gutters was deducted from the workers’ half of the value. Regardless o f the restrictions and
charges, by working on shares, laborers had added incentive to produce greater quantities when
prices rose. This reaction helped prevent prices from reaching extremely high levels because, as
the supply increased, the value declined.

D f

Not only work, but the life experiences o f French turpentine laborers differed from those
in the American South. Unlike American turpentine workers whose energy was focused almost
solely on gum collection and processing, most French laborers also worked as small farmers. In
many cases their small farms consisted o f a vegetable garden, a few grape vines, and a forage
crop. In all their work these farmers/turpentine laborers were assisted by their families. French
turpentine workers also appear to have lived more comfortably than their American counterparts.

85 R. Zon, “Notes on French Turpentine Industry,” 5 December 1918, Olustee
Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4; J.F. Butler, “Production and Trade
in Naval Stores in France,” 20 July 1924, Cary Collection, 8,11; W.L.E. Barnett, “Preliminary
Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 23 August 1924, Cary Collection, 8-9,24.
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French laborers lived in small villages with a schoolhouse, imposing Catholic church, sawmill,
store, cafes, and inns. Their houses were constructed of stone, brick, or cement, and roofed with
tile. In many cases a turpentine distillery was located nearby. Unlike American turpentine
operations, in which the quarters and still would have been constructed at the same time, usually
in a sparsely populated area, the French stills were constructed near previously settled villages,
some centuries old.86
One o f the greatest factors that created better circumstances for French turpentine
workers over American laborers was the former’s labor organization. French workers
established small regional syndicates which together formed the Federation o f Syndicates of
Gum Gatherers of the Southwest. The active organization in 1906 launched a significantly
disruptive strike which forced producers to agree to their terms. Workers were guaranteed half
the price o f gum, less six francs to compensate the forest owner or lessee for transportation costs
and depreciation on the cups and gutters. Also, according to the deal, turpentine barrels were to
have a volume of 340 liters and the sale price was to be based on average market price.
Allotment of pines to workers by the owner or lessee was to be made by the first o f each year and
had to receive the approval of the Governing Board of the Union. Laborers agreed to perform
the chipping and dipping according to the producers’ instructions, however they did have the
right to make at least six to seven dippings, depending on the pine’s yield. They also agreed to
work only the trees designated by the producers. By the late 1910s producers had organized

86 Butler, “Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 8; Barnett, “Preliminary
Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 23; Zon, “Notes on French Turpentine Industry,” 4; I.F.
Eldredge, “How the French Turpentine System Looked to an American,” in Naval Stores:
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 172.
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themselves to cope not only with their workers’ demands, but with the naval stores buyers who
exercised considerable control over the market.*7
Although union organizers met with some success within the southern lumber industry,
turpentine workers were never unionized. In 1910 supporters o f the Industrial Workers o f the
World organized the Brotherhood o f Timber Workers. Its membership rapidly reached a high of
thirty thousand, most o f the members from the western reaches o f the pine belt, and its liberal
race policy resulted in high participation rates o f black workers. Turpentine workers failed to
join other timber industry workers in organizing for four reasons. First, within the highly racially
stratified industry there was a general lack of willingness among black and white workers to
cooperate; in most cases the white employees refused to join with the black majority o f the work
force. The frequent movement o f the workers prevented the establishment of a stable labor base
from which to recruit union members. Thirdly, workers were so entirely dependent on the
operators for everything-housing, food, and medical care-that striking would have seriously
jeopardize their entire livelihoods. Finally, there was little sympathy in the South for labor
organization or strikes and opposition to activity by timber industry workers developed early
with the 1906 organization o f the Southern Lumber Operators Association. All four of these
factors affected the lumber industry as well. But because the naval stores industry felt their
influence the greatest, its workers were wholly prevented from organizing while lumber workers
only saw their unionizing activity partially restricted.**

87 Barnett, “Preliminary Report for Naval Stores Commission,” 9-10,24; Butler,
“Production and Trade in Naval Stores in France,” 8.
88 Paisley, “Wade Leonard,” 387-388; Wright, Old South. New South. 202-203; Brower
and La Fontisee, “Report o f the Investigation on the Naval Stores Industry,” 50; Monroe,
interview, 5; Marshall, Labor in the South. 94-95; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers.
142; Ziegler, et al., Financial Aspects o f Growing Southern Pine. 56-57; Register, interview.
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Just as American turpentine workers live an existence unlike that of their counterparts in
France and other southern blacks, turpentine producers also worked and lived differently than
other whites in the region did. Turpentine operators and woodsriders were considered by many
southern whites as tough pioneer types. Not only did they have to maintain order in their camps,
a potentially dangerous duty, but, like their laborers, they lived in the isolated forest and moved
frequently. They lost regular contact with the outside world and, although they lived at a better
standard than their workers, the turpentine producers’ existence was not very high by the larger
white community’s standards. Their diet differed relatively little from their laborers’, and their
houses, which admittedly contained more room than anyone else’s in the camp, represented
rather primitive construction. The only church to attend was often one for the workers and there
was no school for producers’ children. School age children either had to attend a small, poorly
funded school, learn from a tutor, or attend school away from home. Frequent camp moves
challenged the access to and stability o f their education. The son o f one manager began school
when he was six years old in a small one-room log school house. Four years later the family
moved to another camp one county away where the boy had to enter the new area’s little
school.89
Wives o f producers and woodsriders faced many challenges in such isolated locations.
The experience o f Ida Willis illustrates the difficulties of white women in turpentine camps.
Mrs. Williams met her husband R. Allen Willis in the early 1910s through his sisters, with whom
she attended Columbia College in South Carolina. Willis was a young turpentiner, just two years
in the business. He worked an 11,000-acre operation twenty miles up the New River from
Carrabelle, Florida, a small community on the G ulf and south, southwest of Tallahassee. When

89 Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” 104; Kennedy, Palmetto
Country. 265; Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” 13-14, 16,24.
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they married Ida joined Allen at this location. Upon Ida’s arrival at the camp in June 1915, the
curious stares of the black workers, who rarely if ever left the area and wanted to see the owner’s
new wife, unnerved her. Moreover, the camp’s isolation and primitive nature immediately left
her troubled. The only other human habitations in the area were other turpentine camps, but even
they were a fair distance away. The journey to Carrabeile, the nearest town, required a three
hour boat trip. However, because the boat was old and broke down frequently, it was an
unreliable means of transportation. The trip could also be made by horse if the rider did not
mind swimming with the horse across the river. Ida’s house sat next to the river. It had no
running water, but had an outhouse in the yard. Once Ida settled in to her new home, she looked
forward to purchasing her china and silver with money given to her by her parents for that
purpose. The camp’s operating capital ran short, however, and her husband needed the money to
pay the workers.90
Ida’s days were spent embroidering tablecloths and napkins, cleaning the house with the
help o f a washerwoman, and preparing meals for herself and her husband. The couple’s day
began early. Allan rode into the woods on horseback to see that the men began work by daylight.
He returned for his lunch at around one o’clock and took a nap before heading back to the woods.
The Willis’ meals consisted o f a monotonous staple of cabbage, venison, pork and beans, and
poultry. A boat with supplies came once a week from Appaiachicola. Ida often bought
something extra for the meals from it Despite their isolation, however, the Willises received
mail every other day.
Ida saw little of the laborers. As was typical of turpentine camp layouts, the workers’
quarters were located far away from the owner’s house. Nevertheless, she feared the laborers.

90 Fifteen years later she was finally able to buy her wedding presents.
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many o f whom were ex-convicts. In fact just before she arrived, one had attempted to kill Allen.
She slept with a pistol when her husband was away. She also claimed that the workers stole from
her twice, once taking a spoon and on another occasion her college annual. Although there was
virtually no law enforcement in the isolated area, Allen and the distiller had no trouble
maintaining order.
After less than two years, Ida left the camp. By the time her first child was bom in 1917
she had moved to Greenwood, Florida, near the boarder of southeastern Alabama, where her
husband became a farmer, then a store clerk, and finally a bank president. He had left the
turpentine business, not out of respect for Ida’s feelings, but because price decreases had forced
him out.91
Along with turpentine producers, woodsriders, and wage laborers, leased convicts shared
the lonely rural piney woods environment, but endured working and living conditions of the most
difficult variety. Like peonage, convict leasing targeted blacks. Thinking back to this period, a
former convict supervisor recalled that “if a white man went to prison during the days of convict
leasing, he had to be pretty bad. But a nigger was sent up for anything and sometimes for
nothing.”92 The same factors that strengthened peonage around the turn of the century—a tight
labor market and the belief that blacks would not work unless compelled—made convict leasing a
vigorous practice. During the first two decades o f the twentieth century, the leasing price for
Florida convicts rose substantially, reflecting the intense demand for their labor. Once every
four years Florida leased its convicts to the highest bidder, who in turn subleased them at a profit
In 1902 the Florida Naval Stores and Commission Company leased all of Florida’s convicts for

91 Thomas, McCranie's Turpentine Still. C-l - C-4.
92 Quoted in N. Gordon Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida, 1866-1923”
(Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1964), 290.
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$ 150 a piece for a total o f four years. Four years later another bidder paid $207.70. The next
subleaser, the Florida Pine Company, won the bid in 1910, leasing between 1,400 and 1,800 the
state’s convicts for $323.84 each for four years, more than double the cost eight years earlier.
Despite the rise in leasing costs, profits from subleasing remained substantial, ranging from
$ 100,000 to $ 130,000 annually.93 Income for the state was even greater. In the four years the
Florida Pine Company held the lease, Florida received $1,293,252.20 for its convicts. During
Florida’s convict lease system’s first thirty-two years, the state received $2,722,620.14. Until
1902 the proceeds went in the state treasury’s general fund. Afrer that the state dispersed the net
proceeds to the individual counties based proportionally on their average property value. In
1903, for example, Florida’s counties received a total o f $156,687.78.
As in the late nineteenth century, convict leasing could solve many o f a producer’s labor
difficulties. A 1910 report on Florida convicts explained that convicts were employed “in the
most remote places and their labor used where free labor is hard to get or control.”94 One
reporter explained that “the convict is a very desirable workman. He can be counted on for six
days a week from dawn till dark, and that is more than can be said of any but a very few negroes,
most o f whom obey their own sweet, wayward, indifferent will.”95 Convict leasing was
especially popular among turpentine producers. In Georgia, where convicts were leased to a
variety o f businesses, it was believed their concentration was highest in the southern counties,

93 Matthew J. Mancini, One Dies. Get Another Convict Leasing in the American South.
1866-1928 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 192; Barry, “Slavery in the
South To-Day,” 484,486; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 168; Marc N. Goodnow,
“Turpentine: Impressions o f the Convict Camps o f Florida,” The Survey 34 (1 May 1915): 107.
94 Eleventh Biennial Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida
for the Period Beginning January 1.1909. and Ending December 31. 1910 (Tallahassee, FL: T.J.
Appleyard, State Printer, 1911), 567-568.
95 Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 486.
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the location o f most turpentine and lumber camps. In Florida, turpentiners were the principal
lessees of convicts. The use o f convicts in Florida turpentine operations grew from twenty-seven
percent o f the state prison population in 1899 to over ninety percent in 1910. In 1903 and 1904,
about three hundred state prisoners worked in phosphate mining and approximately eight
hundred in turpentining. In 1907 and 1908, there was an even greater divergence, nearly 160
worked in phosphate and 1,736 in both turpentine and other lumber operations, but mostly in
turpentine. Those businesses that worked the convicts found leasing very lucrative. In 1912 the
average profit for a naval stores operation working convicts was reportedly $25,000.96 The 19091910 Florida Commission o f Agriculture report explained that “as Florida produces perhaps
more than half o f the naval stores products o f the United States, and prices prevailing being high,
we are able to secure the highest prices for the labor of our prisoners o f any section of the
country.”97
An analysis o f the convict population in Florida, where leasing was most common among
turpentine producers, reveals its demographic patterns and demonstrates that it changed little
from that o f the late nineteenth century. At the beginning of 1903 Florida had 1,031 convicts.
Over the course o f the year, the states added 463 to the population and lost 372 as a result of
discharge (79 percent), parole (11 percent), death (5 percent), or escape (5 percent). Most of the

96 Clarissa Olds Keeler, The Crime o f Crimes or The Convict System Unmasked
(Washington, DC: Clarissa Olds Keeler, 1907), 11; Jeffrey A. Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine
Are Blowing: Convict Labor in the North Florida Turpentine Industry, 1877-1923,” The Florida
Historical Quarterly 72 (April 1984): 417-418, 426-427; The Eighth Biennial Report of the
Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State o f Florida. 1903-1904, 307, 309; Tenth Biennial
Report of the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida for the Period Beginning
January 1. 1907. and Ending December 31. 1908 (Tallahassee, FL: Union Label, 1909), 395,
473; Eleventh Biennial Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State o f Florida. 19091910, 567.
97 Eleventh Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture o f the State o f Florida.
1909-1910, 532.
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prisoners added to the convict population were Florida natives (41 percent), but a substantial
number were from other states: South Carolina (11 percent), North Carolina (S.7 percent),
Alabama (5.5 percent), and other states and countries (35 percent). O f the convicts, 83 percent
were black men, 13 percent white men, and 4 percent black women. Most o f the prisoners
sentenced in 1903 were between the ages o f seventeen and thirty and had been convicted of
either murder, theft, or assault. Figures from 1907 and 1908 reveal that these statistics changed
little during the early twentieth century.98
A sample o f Florida turpentine camps that employed state convict laborers in 1913
reveals that the typical camp held between thirty and fifty convicts, the majority of them black
men. Some camps contained no white convicts and the ones with the largest number of whites
held only ten percent. Only one black woman was held in a camp. However, the number of
convicts at any one camp could vary widely through the year. In 1914 the population of the
Waller Turpentine Company camp, for example, fluctuated between sixty and thirty-four
convicts. At the Belmore Naval Stores Company camp as many as forty-five convicts and as few
as thirty-four worked that same year. These camps averaged one guard for every five convicts
and one bloodhound per every twelve convicts. Each camp had one captain.99
In the mid-1910s, the number of county convicts worked at individual turpentine camps
varied widely. Some operations employed as few as seven and others as many as fifty-five,
although the typical camp appears to have worked over forty. Some contained only whites and

98 Eighth Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture o f the State o f Florida.
1903-1904, 340-345; Tenth Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of
Florida. 1907-1908.
" Provision Registers for Waller and DeLeon turpentine camps, 1914, Convict Lease
Program Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions, Florida State
Archives; F.J. Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 30 September 1913, R.R. Tomline to W.A. McRae, 31
October 1913, T.D. Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 1 November 1913, and T.D. Titeaub to W.A.
McRae, 1 November 1913, Board of Commissioners of State Institutions, Florida State Archives.
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others only black convicts, however many worked both races, with whites representing a
minority o f the prisoners. Only in exceptional cases were incarcerated black women found in
turpentine camps. The great majority o f convicts came from either the county in which they
labored or from neighboring counties.100
According to Florida state regulations, they were not to be away from the camp before or
after dark. However wardens frequently kept prisoners out much longer. Convicts worked long
hours in the turpentine forest, longer than wage-earning laborers. They left the camp at sun up
and returned at sun down. In an effort to have convicts at work by daylight, guards tended to
march them out o f the camp well before dawn. The farther the prisoners had to go to get to their
work, the earlier they rose. Prisoners also returned late to the camp if the warden wanted them to
work until sundown. Convicts went to and from the camp and the forest on foot, some at a quick
walk, others on the run. A mounted guard set the pace, and other guards brought up the rear with
drawn guns. Not all convicts could withstand the quick march, especially after a long, hard day’s
work, and many collapsed. Some guards allowed these stragglers to follow in the rear at their
own pace, while other guards meted out brutal punishment for falling behind. The guards stayed
with the convicts as they labored. The convicts were divided into squads and spread out through
the forest. When one inspector visited a turpentine camp in 1913 he only saw some of the
prisoners because the others were so scattered in the woods he could not reach them. To prevent
escape o f convicts who worked spread out through the woods, it was best for the guards to be
mounted. With probably two guards and maybe some hounds watching over them, the squads
each performed different jobs, either specializing in dipping, chipping, scraping, or boxing.

100 Inspectors’ reports, September 1913 to February 1914, Convict Lease Program
Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board of Commissioners o f State Institutions.
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Work was coordinated so that each squad completed its work to accommodate the other
groups.101
Like antebellum slave masters and free labor employers after the Civil War, turpentine
convict camp operators continued to organize work using the task system. Tasks were designed
for workers to complete them by working all day long from Monday to either Friday or Saturday
morning. Any extra time was for rest For over a century the task system was used as an
incentive to encourage rapid work. Most convicts reportedly preferred this system to gang labor,
where they worked all day every day with no hope o f extra time off no matter how hard they
labored. To complete their job during the week, convicts worked extremely hard. Some convict
camps expected convicts to reach production levels as much as fifty percent above that o f free
workers. But some convicts found their tasks more burdensome than others.102 Prisoners serving
shorter sentences, thirty days for example, reportedly were worked harder than those serving for
several years. Because a camp only had men with short sentences for a limited time, it lost
nothing by working them to exhaustion for the duration o f their sentence. Richard Barry
observed that “a convict serving a sentence o f several years would be well taken care of, his body
being as valuable a chattel as that of a horse

”103 Teenage boys also experienced special

101 C.J. Sullivan to G.J. Whitefield, 21 May 1914, Commissioner o f Agriculture to
Florida Naval Stores and Com. Company, 5 April 1902, N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April
1906, and J.D. Ferrell to W.A. McRae, 28 March 1913, Convict Lease Program Subject Files,
1889-1916, Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions; Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impressions
of the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 104; Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 487.
102 Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impressions of the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 104, 107;
Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 425; C J. Sullivan to G.J. Whitefield, May 21,
1914, Board o f Commissioners of State Institutions; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers.
170.
103 Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 487.
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hardships in meeting their assigned tasks. Despite their small size, boys were expected to dip as
much gum as grown men, fifty-two buckets each day. A thirteen-year-old boy at one camp could
only manage thirty buckets a day and consequently received daily beatings with a leather strap
for failing to meet his task.104 Even for grown men, the labor at a turpentine camp was incredibly
burdensome compared to even the other strenuous areas of production that employed convict
labor. In 1901 a group of desperate convicts, apparently just leased to a naval stores operation,
wrote the Florida governor explaining that “we the undersigned, convicts at Mr. Buttgenbacks’
Floral City camp, beg to state, that we would like to remain at the phosphate mines in preference
to going to the turpentine farms. Some of the men here have worked at both places, and they are
all unanimous in stating, that they prefer the mines.”105
Like turpentine camps that employed wage labor, convict camps tended to be found in
isolated locations. O f Florida’s twenty-eight camps employing convicts in 1903, the least remote
was two miles away from the nearest town and the most was fifteen miles from a community.
One Florida convict camp visited by reporter Marc Goodnow in 1915 was probably typical. The
camp held around forty convicts and sat near a railroad track. It consisted of a cluster of
whitewashed, rough board buildings surrounded by a high stockade o f similar construction. Two
roughly fashioned raised platforms at opposite comers o f the stockade served as guard posts.
The yard possessed no trees, grass, or shade, only hot white sand, and scattered stumps. During
particularly wet seasons, such barren yards could quickly turn into muddy quagmires. The
bunkhouse, the most prominent building on the site, was long and low and filled with individual

104 Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida,” 259.
105 John B. Kertzinger et al. to Governor Jennings, 20 May 1901, Board of
Commissioners o f State Institutions.
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iron beds which supported, what Goodnow observed to be, filthy mattresses. Goodnow does not
make clear the construction of this bedding, but the most commonly used materials o f the time
consisted o f cheap ticking stuffed with straw. Such mattresses harbored bed bugs and wore out
quickly, since their ticking split and the straw bunched up. The bunkhouse Goodnow visited had
no ceiling or finished walls. The room smelled strongly o f disinfectant, which the captain
insisted was used everyday after the floor was scrubbed in the morning. Wall decorations were
limited to the Ten Commandments, several illustrated pictures, and a list o f the state prison
authority’s rules and regulations. Next to the only door into the bunk house stood a protective
cage built o f heavy timber and furnished with a chair and heating stove where a guard kept a
nightly watch. A partition separated the sleeping quarters from the dinning room. At meals
convicts ate at zinc-covered tables while sitting on boxes and broken chairs. They ate with only
spoons; knives and forks could too easily be used as weapons. The kitchen was housed in a
separate building. During the food’s preparation two huge hogs and six to seven dogs wandered
in and out on the dirt floor through the kitchen’s open door. Other camps appear to have also had
problems with unsanitary kitchens.106 The camp Goodnow visited appears to have met the state
standards, but not all camps did. Others had severe problems with cleanliness, ventilation, and
adequate space in the bunkhouse and in dinning rooms.
Convicts subsisted on a monotonous diet that differed little from that of free turpentine
workers and dated well back to the previous century. Registers of provisions issued to convicts
in 1914 reveal that biscuits and combread made up the staples of convicts’ diets. Prisoners also

106 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 65; Goodnow “Turpentine: Impressions o f the
Convict Camps o f Florida,” 104-106; J.D. Ferrell to W.A. MacRae, 29 March 1913 and 30
June 1913, Commissioner of Agriculture to Florida Naval Stores and Com. Company, 5 April
1902, and N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April 1906, Board of Commissioners o f State
Institutions.
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received regular servings o f rice, beans, molasses, and coffee. Irregular servings o f meat,
whether it be ham, sausage, salt pork, or fresh beef or pork, were also issued to prisoners. Some
months they might receive only one serving o f meat every day and on some days none at ail.
However, there were slight variations between camps. At one, for example, convicts received
peas and sweet potatoes where another camp did not provide these. The latter, however, did
serve ham and fresh pork more often than the former. According to convicts at the camp
Goodnow visited, breakfast consisted o f three biscuits and a piece o f meat; lunch—which they ate
in the woods—was made up of biscuits or combread and meat; and supper—which was taken at
the camp—consisted o f biscuits, meat, and beans. Pork remained the typical meat. However, at
some camps in the early twentieth century, convicts complained o f being fed very poor grades of
pork and also not receiving enough food for breakfast. Some convicts supplemented their regular
menu with raccoons and possums which they caught in the woods.107
There was seasonal variation in convict diet, with more varieties o f vegetables available
during the summer months. At one camp, Irish potatoes, squash, and green beans appeared on
convicts’ plates in June. That same month at another camp convicts consumed melons, green
com, green peas, okra, squash, and fresh tomatoes. Many o f these fresh vegetables were grown
in camp gardens. Diets also changed for major holidays, the addition o f fresh meat being the
greatest deviation from standard fare. In 1913, for example, the thirty-one convicts at a Santa
Rosa County, Florida, turpentine camp celebrated July 4 with a big barbecue and picnic,
presumably with fresh pork. For the same holiday, convicts at the DeLeon camp received fresh
beef and those at the Waller camp received both fresh beef and fresh pork. For Christmas the

107 Commissioner o f Agriculture to Florida Naval Stores and Com. Company, 5 April
1902 and N.A. Blitch to N.A. Broward, 5 April 1906, Board o f Commissioners o f State
Institutions; Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impressions o f the Convict Camps of Florida,” 105-106.
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same year convicts at the DeLeon Camp enjoyed pickles, fresh beef and pork, bread, and Irish
potatoes along with their usual fare.101
Although their diet appears to have been adequate, convicts suffered health problems
associated with turpentine work and life at the camp. The relentless hard labor with heavy,
wooden-handled tools caused sore and blistered hands.109 In July and August the regular rain in
Florida brought on ague, chills, fever, and pneumonia. Daily rain caused the countryside to
flood, forcing workers to trudge through waist-high water in some places. “Dats de time it gits
yo,” one convict explained. “Mah Gawd, man, hit’s sho’ awful, standin’ in watah an’ runnin’ all
day long in the wet grass up to yo’ waist

”n0 Failure of camps to provide adequate footwear

in the wet environment appears to have been a persistent problem. At one camp in 1906 a
prisoner cut his foot and preferred to work with it wrapped in a cloth than confined in an illfitting boot. Convicts at another camp were forced to work barefoot when their shoes wore out
and the camp manager delayed acquiring new ones. In 1907 it was reported that at one
turpentine camp no convict possessed a whole pair o f shoes. There, the men had cut feet from
working among the sharp saw palmetto. Such exposed cuts became infected from continued
exposure to the forest and, in some instances, caused blood poisoning.111 Goodnow noticed that

108 F.J. Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 10 April 1913, J.D. Ferrell to W A. McRae, 28 March
1913, F.J. Titeaub to W A McRae, 13 May 1913, J.D. Ferrell to W.A. McRae, 28 May 1913,
R.R. Tomlin to W A . McRae, 31 July 1913, and De Leon Naval Stores Company and Waller
Turpentine Company, convict provision registers, 1914, Board o f Commissioners o f State
Institutions.
109J.D. Howe to W.A. McRae, 30 August 1913, Board o f Commissioners o f State
Institutions.
110 Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impressions o f the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 106.
111 N A . Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April 1906, Board of Commissioners o f State
Institutions; Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 487.
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the convicts* feet at the camp he visited were “swollen and misshapen.” “They were spread out,
broken down, cut, gouged, blistered and scratched,” he reported, “and the nails of many o f their
toes were gone ” One convict explained that when men, who were not used to the work, first got
to camp, their feet swelled so much that once in the stockade they went barefoot because their
shoes no longer fit. Syphilis was also a major problem among convicts. In 1910 the governor of
Florida estimated that seventy-five percent of black convicts suffered from various stages o f the
disease.112
Historian Jeff Drobney finds that according to official reports the annual death rate for
Florida convicts was just below five percent Diseases—especially lung infections and intestinal
problems—and inadequate medical treatment along with being shot while attempting to escape
were the most common causes. At the camp visited by Goodnow, seven convicts died in one
year from disease. According to state regulations, convict camps were supposed to receive
medical care from a doctor although the request was not always granted. One Orange County,
Florida prisoner, for example, died o f inadequate medical attention to sores on his feet.
Sentenced to labor in a turpentine operation in 1906, in a few months his feet became so diseased
he could not walk to and from work. On March 22 a doctor examined his sores and prescribed a
disinfectant wash which apparently had no effect. Over the next week his feet grew worse and a
emitted a foul odor. He was thus moved to a building outside the stockade, where he lay
unattended and very ill with his feet wrapped in pus-soaked rags. He died at the end of the
month. In an example o f how the Progressive reform measures could sometimes be enforced, the
captain and two guards were indicted for manslaughter because they failed to provide the convict

112 Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression of the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 105-106; N.A.
Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April 1906, Board of Commissioners o f State Institutions.
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with necessaiy food, care, nursing, medicine, and treatment. Found guilty by the county court,
the captain was fined him $2,500.'13
Incompetent guards, such as the ones charged in Orange County, appear to have
presented a persistent problem at convict camps throughout the period, despite state efforts to
recruit better personnel. The number of guards employed by a county convict camp roughly
reflected the number o f convicts held, but the typical camp employed between seven and eight
guards. With low pay and requirements that the guards live at the isolated camps, the job
attracted only those who could find no other employment. And although captains might have
proved overall more experienced and reliable, many o f them were shown to be inadequate as
well, despite relatively good salaries. In 1905 camp wardens made approximately S I50 a month,
or between $1,200 and $1,800 annually. In a few cases they could make as much as $2,500.
Guards, by comparison, made only $25 a month, but if they owned their own horse they could
receive as much as $35. In many cases guards were very young men, often no more than
nineteen years old.114 Goodnow described the guards he observed as “husky young men,
mounted upon horses and wearing large black slouch hats, with long barreled pistols protruding
from their hip pockets.”" 5 While on duty guarding the stockade, Goodnow explained, the

113 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 428; Eighth Biennial Report o f the
Commissioner o f Florida. 1903-1904, 251-352; Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression o f the
Convict Camps o f Florida,” 106; Commissioner o f Agriculture to Florida Naval Stores and
Com. Company, 5 April 1902, andN A . Blitch to N.B. Broward, 15 April 1906, Board of
Commissioners o f State Institutions; Carper, “Convict Lease System in Florida,” 237-239.
114 Inspectors’ reports, September 1913 to February 1914, Convict Lease Program
Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions. The Ninth Biennial
Report of the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State of Florida for the Period Beginning
January 1.1905. and Ending December 31. 1906 (Tallahassee, FL: Capital Publishing
Company, State Printer, 1907), 293; Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression of the Convict Camps
o f Florida,” 107; Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 486.
115 Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression o f the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 103.
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guards, armed with long-barreled pistols, lazily smoked cigarettes. At another camp guards spent
the night telling dirty jokes in loud voices, keeping the convicts awake. The night guard had
written “smutty poetry” and pasted it on the wall for all to read."6
Prison inspectors complained about both incompetent guards and hot-tempered
wardens.117 In 1902 the Florida Commission o f Agriculture explained that “where guards and
captains are disciplined you find good conduct, good work, cheerful prisoners, and few
complaints from prisoners.” 118 However much o f the trouble at camps, state officials believed,
resulted from guards and captains who failed to conduct themselves properly. For example,
guards commonly set their guns down on the guard stand and entertained visitors while
supposedly on watch. Captains commonly proved hot-tempered in dealing with convicts and
provided insufficient management for the guards. The problem seems to have been so pervasive
that when inspectors who encountered a camp where “the captain controls his guards and
prisoners well” considered it noteworthy. Because the captain was an employee, hired by the
actual lessee to manage the camp, the state encouraged lessees to keep a close eye on their
facilities, observe the guards and captain in the execution o f their duties, and occasionally
discuss camp conditions with the prisoners. Nevertheless, many lessees apparently neglected
their responsibility.119

116 Ibid., 104; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 425.
1,7 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 423.
118 Commissioner o f Agriculture to Florida Naval Stores and Com. Company, 5 April
1902, Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions.
119 Ibid.
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Camp discipline, administered largely by incompetent guards, rested squarely on a
system o f punishment that centered on the strap. A whipping boss usually administered the licks.
He ideally used the strap in moderation and carefully recorded each whipping for state records.120
And some wardens appear to have held to this philosophy. The captain in charge of the camp
visited by Goodnow claimed that “‘tisn’t necessary to handle the men roughly except when they
get incorrigible or commit some act that requires punishment

Yes, we use a strap; but not

very much. I don’t have much trouble.”121 Others had different ideas. The Florida
Commissioner o f Agriculture report for 1903 and 1904 explained that new convicts, especially
those from larger towns, required considerable punishment. “They have never learned the lesson
of obedience, are indisposed to labor and are more insolent,” the report stated. “For a time they
disturb the temper o f those who are working smoothly. Nothing but corporal punishment,
sometimes repeated and more severe, will have any effect on them. Some prisoners could bear
severe punishments and never show the effects, while others with light punishment, will bear the
marks plainly.” Despite the acknowledged heavy use o f the strap, the report maintained that “it
is seldom a prisoner receives more severe punishments than is merited.”122 Each convict camp
was required to keep a monthly prison punishment record to be submitted to the Board of
Commissioner o f State Institutions and the Commissioner of Agriculture in Tallahassee. For
each punishment, camps were to provide the prisoner’s number, name, and the date on which the
punishable offense occurred. They were also to note the number o f licks the prisoner received,
whether the convict’s skin was lacerated from the beating, whether it was that individual

120 Ibid., Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 171.
121 Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression o f the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 106.
122 Eighth Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Florida. 1903-1904,302.
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convict’s first or second offense, who performed the whipping, and who recommended it. The
punishment reports submitted to the state of Florida reveal that approximately ten percent of the
convicts were whipped each month an average o f nine licks. The number o f licks, however,
depended on the convict’s offense and varied among camps.123
An analysis of three different turpentine camps’ punishment reports from 1914 illustrates
the types of offenses captains found punishable in the early twentieth century and the severity of
the whipping for each offense. Because different camps had different standards and different
ways of categorizing offenses, it is necessary to look at each camp separately. At the Lemon Bay
Turpentine Company camp in Sarasota County, Florida (then Manatee County), the most
common punishable offense was for “bad work.” Fifty-nine percent o f all whippings were
administered for this violation and an average o f 7.5 licks were given. “Laziness,” 21 percent,
and “missing task,” 12 percent, represented the next most common offenses, both resulting in an
average of 7.8 licks. Convicts also received beatings for “fighting,” “refusing to work,”
“sassing,” “bunching timber,” and “disobedience,” each transgression receiving 8 to 10 licks.
Escaping, obviously a more serious offense, brought 15 licks. At the Noma Naval Stores
Company camp in Holmes County, 50.5 percent o f punishments were for “not working,” 18.7
percent for “bad work,” and 15 3 percent for “impudence.” Each of these offenses carried an
average price of 7.6, 6.8, and 8.7 licks respectively. Other convicts were punished for
“disobedience,” “breaking tools,” and pretending to be sick. The penalty for these ranged
between 6 and 8 licks. The apparently more grave offense of “slipping out mail” carried a

123 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 430; Lemon Bay Turpentine
Company, Prison Punishment Report, 1914, Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions;
Drobnev. Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 170.
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penalty o f 10 licks. At the Waller Turpentine Company camp most whippings, 61.6 percent,
were for “not working.” Workers there received an average o f 5.2 licks for malingering.
Gambling made up 11.6 percent o f offenses and brought an average o f 8 licks. Other offenses
included “sassing guard,” “idleness,” “disobedience,” “bad conduct,” “fighting,” “cursing,” and
even “selling hat.”124
Although each camp demonstrated somewhat different punishment policies, closer
analysis reveals common patterns. Although poor work precipitated the great majority of
discipline, this infraction was among the most lightly punished. Disruptive behavior, whether
classified as “sassing,” “disobedience,” or “impudence,” was also not tolerated. But although
punishment for these violations occurred far less frequently than for work-related offenses,
convicts received more licks for them. Fighting was a common, if not pervasive, problem among
all camps. Gambling was permitted in some camps, but others, such as the Waller Turpentine
Company camp, considered it a moderately serious offense. Lacerations were surprisingly
reported to have occurred only three time out of the total of 251 punishments for 1914 at all three
camps, a rate just over one percent and so low that it calls into question the accuracy o f the
punishment reports with respects to the severity o f whipping.123
Despite the punishment reports’ goal o f regulating and limiting whippings, excessive
punishments appear to have remained far from uncommon. At a camp in Manatee County,
Florida, the inspector found that convicts received beatings too frequently and o f too severe a
nature. The convicts, consequently, appeared to be in poor condition. The inspector recommend

124 Lemon Bay Turpentine Company, Noma Naval Stores Company, and Waller
Turpentine Company, Prison Punishment Reports, 1914, Board o f Commissioners o f State
Institutions.
125 Ibid.
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that either the captain or the whipping boss be removed. At another camp in an Orange County
when the inspector had the convicts strip for observation, he found that seven o f the forty-five
convicts in the camp showed signs o f the strap. Two possessed extremely large scars. The
inspector provided the excuse that the prisoners had received a beating when the strap which was
supposed to be soft, had been used after it was left in a pool of water overnight, had dried hard,
and had not been rubbed back into shape. The inspector believed that in addition to the strap’s
lack o f conditioning, it was too heavy and he insisted the captain get another one. At some
camps, convicts reportedly received random beatings for no offense and at others they were
beaten so severely they could not work.126
Aside from beatings with a strap, spontaneous and brutal forms of punishment occurred
as guards attempted to force convicts to work at a quicker pace in the forest. One convict, for
example, experienced difficulty carrying his dip bucket in his sore, raw hand, but could not work
rapidly enough while carrying it on his arm. A guard threatened him with death unless he
worked to standard and, when he failed, the guard shot and killed him. The guard claimed he
acted in self-defense, but he was not believed by the camp manager and subsequently discharged
and black listed. In another incident, three convicts persisted in dipping inadequately after
receiving warnings from the captain. Two submitted to punishment, but the third drew his hack
and threatened the captain. The captain responded by striking him on the head with a tree limb.
In yet another instance a convict fell from exhaustion on the march back to camp. The other
convicts found him too heavy to carry. Ordering the other convicts on, the guard tied the
exhausted prisoner to his saddle and dragged him for three miles along the road. The convict

126 N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 6 March 1906 and 5 April 1906, Board o f
Commissioners o f State Institutions; Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 486; Carper,
“Convict Lease System in Florida,” 290.
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died the next morning. Evidence suggests that such brutality occurred more frequently at camps
employing county convicts. In his 1903 and 1904 report, the Florida Commissioner of
Agriculture explained that seventy-five percent o f the reports o f cruel and inhumane treatment
originated in the county convict camps.127
Convicts often tried to escape from turpentine camps, and their relatively high success
rate did nothing to discourage others. Because prisoners were not shackled while they worked
and labored in woods which obstructed the guards’ view o f the activity, prisoners could, with
relatively little difficulty, clear the range of the guards’ rifles. One deterrent from escape
reportedly was the prisoners’ fear o f the bloodhounds. When an escape occurred, bloodhounds—
trained to track convicts during mock escapes attempts—began searching for the escapee’s trail
while mounted guards followed. On average, county camps kept four dogs for tracking escapees
but that number too varied considerably. One camp kept none and another maintained eleven. If
the camp guards and bloodhounds failed to capture a criminal within a few hours o f escape, the
likelihood o f ever finding him dropped to less than thirty percent. In 1913, for example, two of
the eighteen convicts leased by a Washington County turpentine operation successfully escaped.
The lessee had them moved to the camp before the stockade was completed, allowing the two to
slip out o f the camp after making it through the roof of the bunkhouse. Later that year a convict
at Wakulla County turpentine operation escaped while working in the forest. He dodged shots
fired at him by guards, survived a four-mile chase through the woods, and finally crossed the St.
Marks River by boat. At yet another camp two years later, nine convicts broke out o f the back of
the stockade while a partially-deaf guard tended to other camp duties. The convicts were on the

127 J.D. Ferrell to Park Trammell, 30 April 1913, Board o f Commissioners o f State
Institutions; Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 487; Eighth Biennial Report o f the
Commissioner of Florida. 1903-1904,308.
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run for three hours before their absence was detected. The camp hounds picked up their scent,
but were unable to catch up to them.12*
Despite efforts, Florida’s recapture rate was only about fifty percent In 1903, foe
example, most escapees (58 percent) were recaptured. In 1912, there were 96 escapees among
the 1421 state convicts. O f these, 47 were captured. In some cases prisoners were able to slip
away only to be captured a short time later. Some escapees were caught within a matter o f days,
but remaining on the run for half or a whole year was more common. One convict even eluded
authorities for four years before recaptured. Others were prevented from making successful
escapes with deadly force. When one convict attempted to run from the work squad in 1906, he
was ordered to stop then shot in the abdomen and arm. He died five days later at the state
convict hospital in Ocala.129
Most escapees had been convicted o f theft, although some were sentenced for murder.
The majority were in their teens and twenties. Although whites made up 13 percent o f the
prisoner population, they represented only 7.5 percent o f escapees. This skewed racial
representation may be explained by the white prisoners’ much greater ability to obtain pardons
compared to blacks. Whites received the greatest number of pardons (55 percent) despite making

128 Inspectors’ reports, September 1913 to February 1914, Convict Lease Program
Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions. Goodnow,
“Turpentine: Impression of the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 104-106; Eighth Biennial Report of
the Commissioner o f Florida. 1903-1904, 330; Ninth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner of
Agriculture of the State of Florida. 1905-1906,285; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are
Blowing,” 424; J.D. Ferrell to W.A. McRae, 29 March 1913, and R.R. Tomlin to W.A. McRae,
31 July 1913, Board o f Commissioners o f State Institutions.
129 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 424; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log
Sawyers. 162; Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression o f the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 106; F.J.
Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 28 February 1914 and N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April 1906,
Board o f Commissioners of State Institutions; Eighth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner of
Florida. 1903-1904, 347-350.
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up only a small minority o f prisoners. A convict was reportedly more likely to try escape during
his first three to four months in the camp. The hard work and tough living conditions made them
sullen and entertain thoughts o f getting away. But after a few months they grew more
accustomed to convict life and resigned themselves to their new state.
Despite the long hours o f hard work and the less-than-ideal living conditions, convicts at
some camps found time for recreation. Despite state rules forbidding card playing and profane
language, Florida convicts amused themselves with games of poker, dirty jokes, dancing, and
singing. During Goodnow’s camp visit, he witnessed convicts singing and telling jokes in the
dining room. While he was there, the convicts entertained him with an original skit, “The Old
Plantation.” The main character, old Uncle Eph, donned fake whiskers, a cane, corncob pipe,
and straw hat, and returned to his home plantation after forty years absence to see “de mammy
and the chillun,” the latter he refereed to as “big hunks o’ midnight.” A young black man played
Mammy Liza with a bandanna tied around his head and falling over his shoulders. As part of the
skit, Uncle Eph sang “Pickin Cotton” while seven prisoners danced. After the skit another group
of convicts sang “plantation and camp-meeting songs and hymns.” The convicts, according to
Goodnow, ran through the routine often and had made money by performing for visitors the
previous Christmas. One early afternoon Goodnow also witnessed a camp baseball game. Under
the watchful eye o f armed guards, the convicts played a six-inning game. “It was crude, of
course, but full of life,” Goodnow explained, “each side bantering and joking with the other over
an error or a ‘strike-out.’” The catcher and the first baseman used gloves fashioned of hemp
sacking stuffed with straw. The other men used their bare hands.130

130 Eighth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner o f Florida. 1903-1904, 330, 347-350;
Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impression of the Convict Camps o f Florida,” 105-106; Drobney,
“Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 425.
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During the first decades of the twentieth century, relatively little changed in the lives of
turpentine workers. Debt peonage remained an important labor practice and, except for the job
of hanging cups which replaced boxing, the work routine o f turpentine laborers continued
virtually unaltered from the late nineteenth century and even the antebellum period. The labor
force remained predominantly black and was supervised by white woodsriders who ruled over it,
seldom relying on outside law enforcement. Camps remained rough and isolated places where
workers lived in clusters o f small shanties. Unbridled revelry at the juke joint and an occasional
trip to the nearest town broke the monotony but, for convicts, the work demand was greater and
conditions at the camps even bleaker than those o f wage laborers. Despite small physical
improvements in camp buildings and a limited rise in diet quality and variation, brutality and
abuses continued. The difficult lives of workers compelled to labor under either the peonage or
convict lease systems continued through much o f the early twentieth century despite the efforts
of Progressive reformers who attacked both institutions during the period.
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Chapter Eleven
Forced Labor Attacked:
Reformers Target Peonage and Convict Leasing

In the first decades o f the twentieth century, a series of attacks on the systems of forced
labor that supported the naval stores industry succeeded in ending convict leasing and seriously
threatened peonage. At the same time that states tightened labor laws to strengthen debt
servitude, the United States Department of Justice began investigations of suspected producers
for violation o f the Thirteenth Amendment. The press coverage o f the investigation focused
national attention on the widespread use of peonage and spurred public outcry that drove the
institution underground. With the same zeal, reformers also attacked convict leasing. Although
not as widely practiced by the naval stores industry as peonage, convict leasing proved less
capable of withstanding organized opposition.
Just as southern states began strengthening their labor legislation and incorporating
whites in the grip of peonage, the United States Justice Department began efforts to end the
system of forced labor, charging it was unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment At
the turn of the century, Fred Cubberly, the Department’s Commissioner for the northern district
of Florida, noticed a large number of arrests under the state’s “false provision law” of 1891. At
the request o f employers, local officials had charged workers with obtaining goods and money
and refusing to deliver the labor promised under their contact. None o f these cases ever went to
trial; instead compromises were worked out under which the laborer agreed to return and work
off his debt and the cost o f his arrest Cubberly also learned that some employers enforced the
law without help from officials, making their own arrests and holding their own courts.
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In February 1901, Cubberly witnessed this extralegal action firsthand at a turpentine
distillery in Meredith, Florida, in Levy County. While speaking with the owner, a Mr. Meldon,
another naval stores operator, J.O. Elvington from Otter Creek—about eleven miles southwest of
Meredith—who had just arrived by train, asked whether a white man named Higgins, his wife,
and six year old daughter had come to the area the day before. Higgins, who was indebted to
Elvington for forty dollars, had come from South Carolina to Elvington’s Florida operation to
work as his cooper. When he arrived, however, he had to dip turpentine instead, and he and his
family had to live in a shelter that formerly housed horses and mules. He had tried to work off
the debt but the longer he stayed the more indebted he became. Meldon informed Elvington that
they had arrived, he had employed the man to run his operation, and they were in a nearby house.
Within a few minutes there was loud talking, screaming, and profanity, and the family ran from
the house with Elvington, apparently armed with a pistol, chasing them. While Mrs. Higgins
pleaded for their freedom, Elvington cursed them, ordered them to gather their daughter, and
begin the fifteen mile journey back to his operation on foot. Meldon loaned them a team of
horses which Elvington permitted only the girl and her mother, who was ill, to ride, and they all
set off for Otter Creek. Back in his Bronson, Florida, office, Cubberly studied the issue and
approached the U.S. Attorney o f the Northern District with the suggestion that a test case be tried
under the federal peonage statute o f 1867, which outlawed all debt slavery. With the attorney’s
approval Elvington was indicted. After Secret Service operatives located missing witnesses in
190S, Elvington plead guilty to the peonage charge and received a one thousand-dollar fine.1

1Frederick C. Cubberly to H.L. Anderson, 17 August 1906, Cubberly’s description of
Clyatt case, 17 August 1906, and Frederick C. Cubberly to Alexander Irvine, 31 January 1907,
Frederick C. Cubberly Papers, Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries,
University o f Florida; N. Gordon Carper, “Slavery Revisited: Peonage in the South,” Phvlon 37
(1976): 87.
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Soon after observing the incident with Elvington and Higgins in Meredith, Cubberly
witnessed an even more egregious example of peonage. While waiting for a train in Gainesville,
he saw three armed men in the waiting room on their way to Bronson, Florida, in search o f
escaped workers. A few days later a naval stores producer named J.R. Dean contacted him about
the illegal arrest o f some laborers at his camp, coincidentally by the same men Cubberly had met
at the train depot. According to Dean, a prominent Tifton, Georgia, citizen, Samuel M. Clyatt,
served warrants for the arrests o f five black workers—who had left his employment and gone to
work at Dean’s camp near Rosewood, Florida—charging them with gambling. When Clyatt
arrived in Levy County he turned his Georgia warrants over to a Florida deputy, who reportedly
did not read them. The deputy dutifully arrested the four men whom Clyatt pointed out. Clyatt
eventually released two o f them but retained the others, Mose Ridley and Will Gordon. To
Dean’s protest, Clyatt responded that the men owned him money and that he was taking them
back to Georgia to serve as examples to others who might try to leave. After Clyatt rejected
Deen’s offer to pay what the men owed him, Clyatt forced one of Dean’s team drivers to take
him and his men, along with Gordon and Ridley in leg chains, to the railroad. The men then
went directly back to Georgia, with no court proceedings in Florida.
Cubberly quickly set to work. He arrested the deputy. After gathering the facts from
him, Cubberly summoned Clyatt as a witness and had him arrested when he returned to Florida.
Cubberly faced considerable obstacles in building his case, however. Despite efforts by the
Secret Service, the two victims, Gordon and Ridley, were never found. Also, the case created
considerable interest in the South, and by the time o f the trial, $90,000 had been raised for
Clyatt’s defense, $5,000 o f which was raised in a single night by the Georgia-Florida Sawmill
Association. Nevertheless, Clyatt became the first person tried and convicted for violating
statutes outlawing peonage. Local papers, by inaccurately reporting that most of the jurors were
black, argued that the trial was unfair. In March 1905, the Supreme Court overthrew the Clyatt
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conviction, arguing that the defendant’s intentions were clear, but that the government had failed
to establish Gordon and Ridley’s indebtedness before their abduction. At the same time it upheld
the federal peonage statute and ordered that Clyatt be retried. The Justice Department, however,
was unable to secure the necessary witnesses to make its case. Clyatt went free; Gordon and
Ridley were never heard from again.2
Cubberly was not alone in his fight against peonage. As immigrants who escaped the
institution in the South made their way back to New York, reports about the brutality in the
southeastern turpentine camps spread through the ethnic communities. By 1906, Russian Jews,
Hungarians, Italians, Greeks, as well as some native New Yorkers contacted Mary Grace
Quackenbos about male family members held against their will in southern lumber and
turpentine camps. An economically independent, reform-minded woman with legal training,
Quackenbos ran the People’s Law Firm in Manhattan, which helped immigrants adopt to life in
the United States. With a three hundred dollar grant from S.S. McClure, publisher o f McClure’s
Magazine, and additional funds from the Jewish Aid Society, she assumed her maiden name,
Winterton, and traveled through Florida posing as a reporter. She reported her shocking findings
to the Department of Justice and received its support for an investigation.
As a result of her pressure, F J. O’Hara, a partner in the lumber and naval stores business
at Buffalo Bluff and Maytown from which Fink and his colleges escaped, along with some of
O’Hare’s supervisors, were tried for peonage. The trial took place in Jacksonville, headquarters
of the Turpentine Operators Association, home office of the United Grocery Company, which

2 Authorities had made an attempt in 1899 to enforce the peonage law only to have a
judge dismiss the indictment. Afterwards, no further action was taken until the Clyatt case.
Frederick C. Cubberly’s description o f Clyatt Case, 17 August 1906, Frederick C. Cubberly to
Russell, 18 December 1906, and Alexander F. Irvine to Roosevelt, 1 December 1906, Cubberly
Papers; Carper, “Slavery Revisited,” 87-88; “Peonage in the South,” The Independent 55 (9 July
1903): 1618; Michael D. Tegeder, “Prisoners of the Pines: Debt Peonage in the Southern
Turpentine Industry, 1900-1930” (Ph.D. diss., University o f Florida, 1996), 90-99.
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supplied turpentine camp commissaries, and home o f the Florida Times-Union. a major
newspaper sympathetic to producers. All three institutions opposed the peonage investigations
and created an environment that made conviction difficult. Moreover, the defense attorney in the
case was W.M. Toomer, president o f the Turpentine Operators Association, and the jury
foreman, C.B. Rogers, served as president o f United Grocery Company. After a nine-day trial
the jury took just seventeen minutes to find all parties innocent.3
Other peonage cases in the piney woods South ended with similar results. Not only were
local juries unsympathetic to the plight o f workers held in peonage, but, as the U.S. Attorney
General was informed, “it is extremely difficult to get evidence in cases o f this kind. The guilty
parties are white men, and, in nearly every instance, the persons held in peonage are negroes.”4
In many instances the local prosecutors were slow to act on peonage complaints. One anti
peonage activist, who clipped newspaper articles dealing with peonage and sent them to the
Justice Department, complained in October 1906 that the department continued to refer him to
the district attorneys where the abuses occurred. These officials, he argued, were as likely to act
on the peonage cases as the labor lords themselves since ‘‘these attorneys are motivated by
southern people ruled by democratic office-holders and reign—some o f these sheriffs hold office
for twenty-five years—until they have enough to live comfortably the rest of their days.”5

3 Jerrell H. Shofner, “Mary Grace Quackenbos, A Visitor Florida Did Not Want,” The
Florida Historical Quarterly 58 (January 1980): 275-279; “Verdict o f Acquittal Ends First o f the
Peonage Cases,” Jacksonville. Florida Times-Union. 25 December 1906.
4 John M. Chevey to United States Attorney General, 21 April 1906, Correspondence,
Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department
of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
5 Professor Livingston to Lock, 14 October 1906, Correspondence, Classified Subject
Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice, Record
Group 60, National Archives.
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The Justice Department began having better success with its prosecutions once sounder
cases appeared. One victory came in the 1907 trial o f the Graham brothers. In the spring o f that
year, a black man named James McCants and his wife Rosa left the Grahams’ Flomation,
Alabama, turpentine camp and moved ten miles south into Escambia County, Florida, where
James began work for a Mr. Mayer. On the afternoon o f May 17 the Graham brothers and their
driver arrived at Mayer’s camp. The Grahams refused to accept Mayer’s offer to pay McCant’s
debt and forced him back to their operation. When the brothers returned later for Rosa, an
argument broke out, shots were fired, and the Grahams’ retreated. When the McCants swore out
a warrant against the Grahams, the husband and wife received death threats, prompting them
both to go into hiding until the trial began. In November 1907, both brothers were convicted of
peonage in Pensacola, one sentenced to the state penitentiary and the other to the county jail.6
Although the attack on peonage was certainly fueled by the same reformist zeal that
initiated attacks on child labor, illiteracy, and convict labor, it was also probably a response to
the increase in the practice o f forced labor.7 Given the labor climate, it is not surprising that
instances of peonage rose after 1900. William Cohen maintains that the fact that opposition to
the practice came at the same time that racism was on the rise indicates that peonage was
becoming more widespread. “Had peonage and other forms of involuntary servitude been
constant across the decades,” he explains, “it would be far more likely that white southern
opposition would have surfaced earlier, rather than in 1903, when racism was at floodtide.”8 But
because the practice tended to be well-hidden and involved the informal use of law enforcement,
6 Charles W. Russell, Report on Peonage (Washington, DC: Department o f Justice,
1908), 7.

7 Pete Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery: Peonage in the South. 1901-1969 (Urbana:
University o f Illinois Press, 1990), 9-10.
8 William Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for
Racial Control. 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 292.
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no documentation with which to quantify its frequency exists. Assistant Attorney General
Charles Russell admitted in 1908 that the government had no idea how many workers were held
in peonage. He explained that “how many cases are in existence is the same kind of a question
as though the crime were pension fraud, or counterfeiting, or public land fraud, or fraud on the
revenue. Where we have found several cases we may conclude that there are, or have been, or
are likely to be, others; but this is speculation.”9 In fact, the Justice Department most certainly
prosecuted only a tiny portion o f the peonage violations. Most workers were unable to complain
to Department officials and, when they did hear o f possible violations, attorneys often lacked
sufficient evidence to prosecute because o f threats, intimidation, and disappearance of
witnesses.10
In the early twentieth century, the national press published exposes on peonage and the
difficulty o f trying the cases, outraging Progressive northern readers who then supported
intensified attacks on the system. Reporters went to great lengths to expose the evil. One went
undercover as a worker but became exhausted from the hard manual labor and returned home.11
In July 1903, The Independent, a nationally-read magazine, informed readers that “we find the
South relapsing into a state of virtual slavery, in which the negro and the poor white man find
their condition worse than that of the average slave o f ante-bellum days.”12 Such writers
appealed to desires for law and order by explaining that the institution flew in the face of the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and that both producers and corrupt authorities employed
extralegal measures in their attempts to return escaped workers. In an appeal reminiscent o f

9 Russell, Report on Peonage. 8.
10 Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 213,215-216.
11Alexander Irvine to Frederick C. Cubberly, 13 April 1907, Cubberly Papers.
12“Peonage in the South,” 1617.
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abolitionists’ claims o f a slaveholders’ conspiracy, readers were informed that tyrannical labor
lords ignored the federal laws against peonage, viewing it as an infringement on their rights.
Reporters also explained how a small but powerful interest group—turpentine producers-exerted
undue power to have its way.13
Five months after the one in The Independent another article told of how twenty-six
indictments for peonage had been returned by a federal grand jury against seven o f Georgia’s
most prominent citizens, three o f them members o f the McCree family o f Valdosta. One o f the
McCrees, Edward, plead guilty to thirteen charges and was fined one thousand dollars. The
article implied that, as a wealthy and powerful man who owned 37,000 acres in south Georgia
and served as a member of the state legislature, Edward McCree had received a light sentence.14
The article described how the Turpentine Operators Association raised thousands o f dollars with
which to defend the forced labor practices. It also appealed to the Progressive era’s concern for
family by explaining how the families lived in the camps and that if a worker ran away, his wife
and children were detained. In one case, the piece added, an employer withheld “young children
from both father and mother for the purpose o f forcing the payment of a debt.”15 In case such
stories failed to draw sympathy because the victims were black, writers recounted such stories as
one of “a whole family o f white persons, including young children, forced at the muzzle of a gun
to leave their home and return to the swamp labor camp of the father’s former employer some
miles distant, there to remain until a small indebtedness due the employer was worked out by the
father at wages which the employer arbitrarily fixed.”16

13 Ibid., 1616-1618.
14 “Peonage in Georgia,” The Independent 55 (24 December 1903): 3079-3080.
15 “Peonage in the South,” 1617.
16 Ibid., 1618.
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Another, more shocking article, appeared in Cosmopolitan in 1907. Entitled “Slavery in
the South To-Day,” the article by Richard B any jolted readers by claiming that northern
businessmen, not southerners, were the root o f the evil and that “whites are better and more
dependable workers, and therefore in the enslavement process are preferred prey.”17 Barry
assured readers that he did not use the term figuratively but rather described “the actual physical
slavery that keeps men worse than animals.” In fact, he argued, this early-twentieth century
“slavery” was far worse that the antebellum version. “Where in negro slavery,” he explained,
“there was often sentiment, a marked exchange of affection between master and slave, there is
nothing in this new form except the basest and most cold-blooded calculation joined with an
indifference to human life which transcends anything that has gone before it.”18 Barry candidly
admitted that the peonage employers had erred when, in their arrogance, they strayed across the
racial divide and targeted whites. As long as only blacks fell victim to producers’ greed, few
whites cared, but when members of their own race, even if most were recent immigrants, became
caught in the system, whites demanded action.19 In 1911, readers of The American M ag azin e
were likewise informed that “under the guise o f a contract for labor many negroes and, indeed,
some white men have been held-and illegally held—in a form o f peonage not essentially different
from slavery.”20
Reports of peonage in popular magazines never failed to emphasize the abomination of
whites held in “slavery.” Richard Barry argued that the recent inclusion o f whites resulted from

17 Richard Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” Cosmopolitan Magazine 42 (March
1907): 482.
18 Ibid., 481-482.
19 Ibid., 483; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 104.
20Ray Stannard Baker, “A Pawn in the Struggle for Freedom,” The American Magazine
72 (September 1911): 608.
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a dearth o f adequate labor for the new businesses entering the area. He maintained that black
workers were too few and lazy and that whites could not be attracted to the region because they
could not endure the climate. Desperate employers, according to his interpretation, therefore
resorted to keeping whites in debt peonage to support their fortunes.21 The authors themselves
drew a distinction between how whites and blacks fell into debt bondage. Black workers were
usually described as getting themselves into peonage because o f their innate tendencies to be
lazy, steal, and suffer from what reporter Herbert Ward called a “borrowing mania.” Whites, in
contrast, became victims o f peonage despite their diligence and hard work, because the corrupt
system trapped them. Ward’s account o f Bob English from Coffee County, Georgia, proved
typical. He described English as a poor white man who rented a small farm on which he grew
cotton. In the spring of 1903, his landlord’s son started a fire in a honey tree to smoke out the
bees. After the fire smoldered for a number o f days, the landlord ordered English to extinguish
it. English, busy with his cotton crop and as a cash renter under no obligation to do his
landlord’s bidding, forgot A small fire started and burned some o f the owner’s turpentine trees,
causing fifty dollars worth o f damage. The landlord had English and his two grown boys
arrested and charged with criminal negligence. For their release they agreed to work for the
owner to repay the damage. “Thus Bob signed himself and his two boys into slavery.” After
three months o f work during which they received scant rations, they had only worked off $3.28,
by the owner’s accounting. The three peons broke out of the stockade where they were kept and
walked five nights until they reached the Florida state line eighty miles away. The landlord was
indicted for peonage.22
21 Bany, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 484.
22 Similar stories appeared describing like situations in other piney woods industries. In
September 1907, for example, The Independent told the story o f Mike Trudies, a twenty-four
year old Hungarian peasant who immigrated to New York and was duped by a labor agent into
accepting a job at an Orlando-area sawmill, which was advertised as paying $1.50 a day but
turned out to be a $1 a day jo b in a remote timber camp. Workers there were subjected to long
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Like northerners, southern blacks supported the peonage investigations and aided the
fight. Peonage victim, Jack Richburg, wrote the U.S. Attorney General explaining his plight and
requesting the Justice Department’s assistance. In late summer o f 1908, Richburg reported, he
escaped from the Taylor Company turpentine operation near Perry, Florida. He made his way as
far as the next county, where he was arrested and carried back to Perry. There he stayed in jail
for six days before his new employer came, bailed him out, and apparently took him back with
him. The new employer attempted to pay Richburg’s debt, only to be told by the camp’s
manager that “he did not want the money but he wanted the damn negro.” If not for his new
employer’s willingness to put up the bail, for which Richburg was enormously grateful, he would
have been forced back to the turpentine camp or put on the county chain gang while he awaited a
court appearance. Richburg called on the Attorney General “as a legal advisor of the government
for protection,” to conduct a comprehensive investigation in the area, and to assure him that there
were many cases in the area like his that could result in prosecutions.23 In April 1909, a group of
black petitioners from Polk County, Florida—located in the center o f the peninsula—also asked
the Attorney General to investigate “the way colored people are mistreated and Odious
Impositions and Severe punishment Imposed on the Colored Race and also Some White People.”
They felt sure that the county officials were taking action outlawed by the Constitution and
added that the county’s jail and convict camps were full o f African-American people who could

days o f backbreaking work and inadequate shelter. Mike and other workers attempted to escape
only to be tracked with blood hounds, captured, forced to return to camp at a quick march, and
then beaten. Abuses at the camp continued until the boss was tried for peonage in November
1906 and convicted. “The Life Story o f a Hungarian Peon,” The Independent 63 (5 September
1907): 559-563; Herbert D. Ward, “Peonage in America,” Cosmopolitan Magazine 39 (August
1905): 427.
23 Jack Richburg to United States Attorney General, 10 September 1908,
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records
o f the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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provide evidence. The petitioners offered to assist in any investigation.24 It is unclear what
became of the group’s offer.
Even a few white southerners attacked the institution of peonage. In 1905, The
Independent charged that “the best people of the South are opposed to the peonage system and
condemn it in unmeasured terms. Many employers are opposed to it, but have been compelled to
lean toward it in self defense, the local courts as a rule not protecting the laborer, and in some
instances the officials receiving compensation from one employer for annoying and harassing
other employers.”25 In the Florida state legislature, a Representative Reese led opposition to that
state’s 1907 contract labor bill arguing, as the Tallahassee Morning Sun explained, that “the
measure is unconstitutional and would give the unscrupulous employer an opportunity to
intimidate and bind an employee to servitude against his will, which practically amounts to
peonage, or imprison for debt.”26 Not even all those involved in the naval stores industry
supported peonage. One turpentine man believed that, although peonage legislation was
originally intended to serve the honest purpose o f protecting the employer’s advances, in practice
the legislation had become a curse. Writing with twenty years of hindsight, he argued that the
laws had left employers with such a feeling of legal protection that they had made more generous
advances than earlier, resulting in huge debts among the workers that could never be paid off.
Turpentine producers who were desperate for labor, however, would sometimes pay the debt to

24 O.C. Buey, et al. to United States Attorney General, 22 April 1909, Correspondence,
Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department
of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
25 “Peonage in the South,” 1618.
26 Few legislators listened to Reese’s argument. The measure passed by a vote o f fortyfour to eight. “‘Pernicious Measure’ Passed in House,” Tallahassee. Florida Morning Sun. 7 May
1907; Mary Grace Quackenbos to United States Attorney General, 18 May 1907,
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records
of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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gain the laborers’ services, thus greatly increasing their production costs.27 The turpentiner’s
explanation o f why he opposed peonage testified to the wide variety of motives that led
southerners to oppose the practice. Some white critics focused on the institution’s inclusion o f
their own race. The Attorney General learned from one southerner that “peonage is a species o f
slaveiy that is endangering the liberties o f the people. At first only colored men were subjected
to it-but now it operates without regard to race or color.”28 Other whites opposed the practice
because o f the harm it caused its victims. They sometimes helped provide legal assistance for
blacks who where trapped in peonage. In 1907, a convict camp guard was arrested and placed
under $ 100 bond after Ed Williams, a black turpentine worker, declared before a judge that the
guard had brutally beaten him for failing to perform his assigned work. The word o f a black
worker against a white guard probably would not have stood, except that Williams was
“supported in his case by a number of humane people who believed his story.”29 The next year a
white man wrote a letter to the Justice Department on behalf o f a Sam Taylor, a turpentine
worker who owed his employer a debt. The operator held Sam’s wife Jamie in peonage at
Albrin, Florida.30
Some critiques o f peonage, both from within and outside the region, blamed the rise of
the practice on certain classes o f southerners. The New South business class appears to have
27 Albert Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” in Naval Stores:
History. Production. Distribution and Consumption, ed. Thomas Gamble (Savannah: Review
Publishing and Printing Company, 1921), 104.
28 E.W. Reeves to United States Attorney General, 6 June 1907, Correspondence,
Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department
of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
29 “Convict Camp Guard is Charged With Assault,” Tampa. Florida Tribune. 28 June
1907.
30 Neil Sinclair to Department o f Justice, 20 May 1908, Correspondence, Classified
Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department of Justice,
Record Group 60, National Archives.
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been a favorite target. Herbert D. Ward began his 1905 Cosmopolitan piece by arguing that
“peonage is neither a race nor a negroe problem any more than astigmatism [sic] is. It is purely a
labor question.”31 And it was a product of the post-war South. The planters and their
descendants, he maintained, had not created debt peonage. Rather men who practiced peonage
descended “from the very slave-driver, or from the white brute whose degenerate poverty put him
on a par with the colored freemen, and who hated the negro as one hates a rival. He it was who
by chicanery, cheating the negro, and oppressing him, gradually acquired possessions and so
wielded an almost baronial local power. The South is full o f such slimy upstarts whose influence
and wealth are the great menaces o f the South’s prosperity.”32 Writing in the same publication
two years later, Richard Barry agreed that peonage was the product of “this ambitious new blood
[that] has ousted the ancient aristocracy that once gave Florida the distinction o f age and
chivalry. Ready to the hand were great forests in which slept turpentine and lumber, and deep
mines from which could be disgorged great wealth in phosphate.”33 He also blamed northern
capitalists, the railroad and lumber trusts, for imposing peonage on the region in their attempt to
exploit both black and white southerners. Still other critics blamed the lower classes. Writing
from St. Petersburg, Florida, in 1912, a minister placed blame for the system on the heads of
“good-for-nothing, ignorant Florida ‘Crackers’” whom he witnessed arresting over a dozen white
and black men who had traveled from the north seeking employment.34

31 Ward, “Peonage in America,” 423.
32Ibid., 425.
33 Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 484.
34 Ibid., 482-483; Rev. Leon Ray Livingston to United States Attorney General, 6 March
1912, Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the
Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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Although some southerners did in fact oppose peonage, the loudest voices that arose
from the region either denied its existence or supported its practice, especially after 1906. That
year the conviction o f five officials o f the Jackson Lumber Company, which manufactured naval
stores among its other timber products, shook the southern pine belt. It was the largest business
of its kind in the United States, and its general manager was well-connected, wealthy, and held in
high regard in his community. Months later, in early 1907, three other events outraged the
Florida political and business power structure. Recently appointed U.S. Attorney General
Charles J. Bonaparte announced his intention to continue his department’s attack on peonage.
Mary Grace Quackenbos was appointed Assistant U.S. Attorney to help in prosecuting peonage
cases. And Richard Barry’s expose o f peonage, focusing on Florida, appeared in Cosmopolitan
and another version in the New York Evening Journal.
In the wake o f high-profile convictions and renewed investigations, Florida business and
political leaders denied that peonage existed in the state and began a campaign to discredit the
federal officials who had brought the charges. The Turpentine Operators Association, United
Grocery Company, the Georgia-Florida Sawmill Association, and newspapers across Florida,
especially the Jacksonville Florida Times Union, began a campaign to convince the public that
peonage investigations amounted to nothing more than unfounded accusations and commotion
stirred up by trouble-making outsiders who threatened the area’s labor system.35 At a 1907
meeting of the Florida Board o f Trade, one participant complained that “if this practice [of
investigating] is to continue, if this principal is to prevail, no man’s liberty is safe.”36 A
newspaper article complained that lazy and conniving blacks would accept advances from an
35 Charles Russell to United States Attorney General, 24 November 1906, Classified
Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department of Justice,
Record Group 60, National Archives; Shofher, “Mary Grace Quakenbos,” 277-278.
36 “Ask Congress for Peonage Investigation,” Jacksonville. Florida Times Union. 21
February 1907.
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employer and then attempt to work so poorly that the boss would release him. Under the cloud
of the peonage investigations, the paper complained, if their plan fails “the debtor-workman of
the negroe race runs hot-foot to the nearest United States court and calls out; ‘peonage.’”37
Florida’s political establishment rushed to address the peonage accusations. U.S.
Congressman Frank Clark of Florida came to his state’s defense in Washington. Clark denounced
the Attorney General on the House floor and in February 1907 drafted a resolution requesting
that the House investigate the peonage investigations and that the Attorney General disclose how
much money his department had spent on the Florida cases. Clark also wanted the Justice
Department to explain Quackenbos’ connection to the Department—what official position she
held, what salary she drew, and what her official duties were. He further demanded an
explanation for why the Department used special attorneys to prosecute peonage cases instead of
the regularly appointed U.S. Attorneys in Florida’s two judicial districts. Shortly thereafter the
Florida legislature passed a resolution condemning Richard Barry and his publisher, William
Randolph Hearst for articles in Cosmopolitan and the New York Evening Post.38 Then in April
the Florida Times Union thanked both Clark and the Florida legislature for their defense o f the
state and assured its readers that the Barry articles amounted to nothing more than “false,
malicious, and defamatory libel.”39

37 Untitled peonage article, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of
Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National
Archives.
38 Shofner, “Mary Grace Quackenbos,” 277,279; Representative Clark, House
Resolution No. 886 Submission, 25 February 1907, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files,
Department of Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record
Group 60, National Archives.
39 “Strong Resolutions Adopted Condemning Barry and Hearst,” Jacksonville. Florida
Times-Union. 4 April 1907.
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On January 6, 1908, Clark submitted yet another resolution to the House Judiciary
Committee to form a House Committee on Peonage, which he believed would dispel any further
accusations. The resolution called for the Speaker of the House to appoint a committee o f five to
investigate the peonage allegations, the activities of Quakenbos, and the Justice Department’s
manner of prosecuting the cases.40 The resolution charged that national media reports o f peonage
at turpentine operations, railroad camps, and lumber camps had frightened away prospective
settlers to the region. Clark also complained that the Justice Department ignored the U.S.
District Attorneys already in the region. Furthermore, he argued that “numbers o f innocent men
have been indicted upon the testimony of prejudiced witnesses, and put to great expense in
defending themselves against charges that prove upon trial in open court to be entirely
groundless.” Despite such serious allegations the committee apparently rejected the resolution.
Later that month, the Tampa Chamber o f Commerce complained to the U.S. Secretary o f State
that recent magazine articles were filled with “the basest untruths” which misrepresented “the
good people of the South.” Floridians especially, he claimed, had suffered from the “injustice”
of Quackenbos long investigations and “‘trumped-up charges’” brought by “such disinterested
sleuths.” One o f the most scurrilous slanders reportedly made in the media came from a “Negro
woman . . . who declares that white girls are worked side by side with negro convicts in our
turpentine farms.”41
In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt the peonage system and its defenders a serious but
by no means fatal blow when it ruled in favor of Alabama peon Alonzo Bailey. In 1908, Bailey,

40 Representative Clark, House Resolution No. 115 Submission, 6 January 1908,
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records
of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
41 C. Fred Thompson to Elihu Root, 28 January 1908, Correspondence, Classified
Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice,
Record Group 60, National Archives.
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a black farm laborer, contracted to work for Riverside Company o f Montgomery, Alabama. He
received a fifteen-dollar advance, which he agreed to pay back at $ 1.25 a month for a year of
service. After only one month, however, he left the farm without paying his debt. Once captured
Bailey received no hearing and the only witness against him was his employer, but he was found
guilty under Alabama’s false pretenses law, which presumed he intended to defraud his employer
from the beginning. He was sentenced to 136 days hard labor and ordered back to work for
Riverside, where legal charges and court fees were added to his debt to be worked off. On
appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court he lost. But the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the state
decision, arguing that the law’s presumption o f guilt violated the federal Peonage Act of 1867
and the Thirteenth Amendment. The court also found that a state could only impose involuntary
labor sentences as punishment for a crime. No man could command another to labor for the
payment of debt.42
Although the Bailey case declared unconstitutional one o f the important legal
underpinnings that supported the peonage system, the practice persisted in the South. A
collection of new state laws and the failure of local law enforcement to uphold the ruling
conspired to perpetuate debt servitude. In the same year its prima facie law was overturned,
Alabama replaced it with one that continued to uphold peonage but returned the burden of proof
to the employer. The next year South Carolina took similar action, and North Carolina’s
Supreme Court ruled against the false pretenses clause but found nothing wrong with the rest of
that state’s peonage statute. Georgia’s high court let its statute stand, prima facie clause and all,
noting that the Bailey decision did not apply to them because Georgia had no law restricting
rebuttal testimony in such cases. In 1913, Florida also passed legislation that omitted false
pretenses, but in 1919, the legislature enacted another statute that reinstated it. Until 1944, when
42 Carper, “Slavery Revisited,” 92-93; Baker, “A Pawn in the Struggle for Freedom,”
608-609; Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 43.
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the U.S. Supreme Court once again ruled against false pretenses, both Georgia’s and Florida’s
laws remained in force. But whether a state had a prima facie peonage statute or not, its
enforcement at the local level enabled the practice to continue unchanged. The fact that Georgia
and Florida, the two most important turpentine-producing states, retained the clause made it
much easier for officials in those states to maintain debt servitude.43
The perpetuation o f peonage following the 1911 Supreme Court ruling also rested in part
on producers’ heightened efforts to control workers as the southern labor market grew tighter
with the outbreak o f the First World War. The end o f the flow of European immigrants into the
United States created a labor shortage in the North, which forced employers to recruit black
southerners. Northern black newspapers encouraged southern African-Americans to leave the
repressive South for the relatively freer North.44 In a report on 1918 naval stores production, the
U.S. Department o f Agriculture’s Bureau of Chemistry found that “most o f the producers had
experienced so much trouble in securing and holding labor, and getting the work done only
partly, and poorly at that, that many o f them were inclined to underestimate their total
production.”45 The Turpentine Operators Association, the Georgia-Florida Sawmill Association,
boards of trade, and civic and political leaders urged local governments to require northern labor
agents to pay costly license fees to operate in the Southeast. They also encouraged officials to
harass and threaten both the agents and black workers who attempted to leave.46

43 Cohen, “Negro Involuntary Servitude,” 44; Carper, “Slavery Revisited,” 93.
44 Gavin Wright, Old South. New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the
Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 19-20.
45 “Turpentine and Rosin Production Reported for Season of 1918,” 1918, Austin Cary
Memorial Forestry Collection, Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries,
University of Florida, 2.
46 Jerrell H. Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests, 1880-1950,” Journal o f Forest
History 25 (January 1981): 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

536
Despite intimidation efforts, such a large number o f blacks moved that the resulting
demographic shift caused problems in both northern and southern communities. Prominent black
southerners offered assistance in remedying the crisis in the region. R.R. Robinson, a black
leader in Jacksonville, held meetings with other blacks, white employers, and even the governor,
explaining that improved working conditions and better wages, not repressive labor laws, would
keep blacks from leaving Florida. To aid in black resettlement and make the most efficient use
of labor for the war effort, the U.S. Department o f Labor created the Division o f Negro
Economics and sent agents to the states to ease the difficulties. The Department appointed W.A.
Armwood, a prominent member o f Tampa’s black community, as its agent in Florida. Armwood
spoke to groups of both races around the state about the need for cooperation, hard work, and
production for the war. But to many white Floridians, the black federal agent hearkened back to
the perceived atrocities o f Reconstruction. When Armwood refused to discourage black workers
from joining unions, the Turpentine Operators Association and the Georgia-FIorida Sawmill
Association came to see him as an enemy agent who encouraged African-Americans to leave
their camps and mills. These producers subsequently lobbied the Department o f Labor to
dismantle the Division, a goal they achieved through the efforts o f an influential northern-owned
lumber company representative.47
Once the war ended, the strong pull o f black workers northward subsided but tight labor
conditions persisted—as did the practice of peonage as a remedy. Some turpentiners, like Frank
Rose of South Georgia, were forced out o f the business in the 1920s because labor was so hard to
find.48 Those who remained in the business continued to use debt to force workers to remain

47 Ibid., 19-20; Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine: A History o f Florida Naval
Stores. 1528 to 1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993), 26-27.
48 Wright, Old South. New South. 207; Becky Vail, “Old Timer Remembers ‘Hard Old
Days’ in Woods,” Newsclipping file, Lowndes County Historical Society, Valdosta, GA.
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with them. In 1921, one turpentine man complained that “now it costs, in accounts that have to
be paid, recruiting expenses, and transportation, probably two hundred dollars per head for each
head of family he brings in, and sometimes in addition to this a lawsuit and a heavy court fine for
violation of a ‘Labor Law.’”49 In 1923, three partners in a Calhoun County operation, two of
them county commissioners, were charged with keeping workers in debt and using a whip and
sweat box to enforce their control.30 In 1929, Oscar Bailey, a black worker at a turpentine
operation in Appling County, Georgia, escaped and made his way as far as the adjacent county,
where his employer tracked him and had the sheriff arrest and lock him up without a warrant.
The next day the sheriff returned Bailey to Appling County and jailed him in the county seat of
Baxley. To hide the obvious peonage violation, four days later the employer had his brother and
silent partner swear out two warrants against Bailey for misdemeanor liquor possession. Soon
afterward the producer paid the Appling sheriff for costs and forced Bailey back to work in the
woods. Reportedly, as in Oscar Bailey’s case, it was still common for “the turpentine men who
work many negroes in this vicinity [to] have a way o f taking out some kind o f warrant in addition
to their warrant for debt and holding them in jail trying to force a settlement of debt or o f forcing
the laborer to go back to work.”31 In another case an operation in southeastern Georgia’s Long
County was said to hold three hundred men in peonage in 1930. Workers were forced to
purchase all their food through the company at twice the normal price despite the availability of
local produce venders eager to sell in the quarters.32
49 Pridgen, “Turpentining in the South Atlantic Country,” 103.
50 Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 22.
31 H.J. Lawrence to United States Department o f Justice, 1 July 1929, Correspondence,
Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record
Group 60, National Archives.
32 Letter to United States Department of Justice, 16 December 1930, Correspondence,
Department of Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record
Group 60, National Archives.
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It is difficult to gauge how widespread such practices o f peonage were in the 1920s.
Complaints were fewer than in the first two decades o f the century and a higher level o f black
migration indicates that workers were freer to move as they chose. William Cohen maintains
that the trend in lynching can serve as an indicator of peonage’s extensiveness. Because
intensive racism underlay each, he argues, it can be assumed that as lynching declined so did the
occurrence of peonage. Investigators in the isolated naval stores areas, however, reported
peonage remained widespread. A drop in cases brought by the Justice Department may indicate
its care in selecting cases rather than a decline in the practice. At one turpentine operation near
Hotopaw in Osceola County, south o f Orlando, two workers attempted to escape and one was
shot to death. The Justice Department refused to act, claiming it lacked enough evidence for
conviction. As was not uncommon in such cases, the local authorities took no action on the
murder.53 In late 1930, the Justice Department also refused to investigate the poor treatment of
the Union Turpentine Company workers in south Georgia because “it does not appear from the
facts stated that the persons in question are being held on account o f a debt, and as this is an
essential element o f the peonage law, the same must be present to afford a basis for Federal
Action.”54
That the most egregious peonage case occurred in the early 1920s lends strong support to
the argument that the practice continued after the flurry of investigations and trials of the
century’s first two decades. The case centered around W. Alston Brown, manager o f the Putnam
Lumber Company’s turpentine camp at Cross City, Florida, about forty-five miles west of

53 Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge. 292-293, 297; Pete Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery:
Peonage in the South. 1901-1969 fUrbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 148; Shofner,
“Forced Labor,” 22.
54Nugent Dodds to Frank Brown, 30 December 1930, Correspondence, Department of
Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National
Archives.
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Gainesville. The region and the turpentine operation there developed simultaneously. Around
1920 the area surrounding the company’s 300,000 acres became Dixie County, splitting off from
Lafayette County, and Cross City, an unincorporated community o f only a few hundred residents,
mostly black, and accessible only by railroad, became the county seat. Brown in fact served as
one of the county commissioners. He had begun his employment in the turpentine business as a
crew boss when northern-owned timber firms moved into the area just before the turn of the
century. Within two decades he was working for Putnam Lumber Company, a business whose
reputation for treating laborers unfairly Brown developed to new heights.55
Brown’s notoriously brutal camp at Cross City, Florida, relied on systematic violence
and intimidation to hold all the company’s workers in debt peonage. Brown sent labor agents to
Savannah, Jacksonville, and other southern cities and convinced workers to come to Cross City
by the promise o f good wages. Once in Brown’s clutches, however, they were forced to labor all
day long every day, even on Sundays and holidays, rain or shine, sick or well. Brown maintained
absolute control over his camp. At night all the workers were locked behind a high barbed wire
fence. Everything they needed had to be purchased from the camp store owned by Brown.
Brown forbade them to leave, claiming all the workers owed him money, usually between twenty
and three hundred dollars. But the debts for which Brown kept his employees as prisoners were
fabrications. Brown took money from each worker’s weekly pay and also skimmed money from
the cash laborers gave him to pay off their alleged debts. Workers who successfully slipped out
of the camp stockade were tracked down by Brown and forcibly returned, often with the aid o f
Dixie County law enforcement officials. One o f Brown’s standard tactics was to have the
runaway workers convicted o f a crime and fined. Brown paid the fine, making the worker
obligated to him for labor to work off the amount Brown secured the desired legal rulings by

55 Gary Moore, “Prisoner o f Riverside,” Folio Weekly 10 (28 May 1996): 15-17.
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forcing workers to testify falsely. On many occasions he brought the captured workers before
the judge, sometimes in the evening at his home, and instructed the judge o f the crime and the
sentence. Brown typically had his escaped workers charged with assault and battery in the event
that a conviction for violation o f labor contract did not hold. Because Brown also worked
convicts, he sometimes had workers put on the county chain gang and work for him in that
capacity. Except for different clothing, it mattered little whether one worked for Brown as a
convict or peon.56
In 1921, Fred Cubberly discovered the widespread peonage practiced at the Brown camp,
and the Bureau of Investigation began an extensive inquiry during June o f that year. Putnam
Lumber Company denied any knowledge o f the atrocities at Cross City. It knew that Brown’s
camp never lacked for labor while others had problems, but apparently company officials never
bothered to inquire as long as production continued efficiently. As the investigation began the
general manager of Putnam Lumber Company in Jacksonville terminated Brown and instructed
the company’s representative at Cross City to prevent any undesirable visitors, especially Brown,
from entering the camp. The manager claimed to have fired Brown for “business reasons,”
which probably surrounded Brown’s theft o f money generated by the juke joint.57
Although the company cooperated with federal efforts, local officials worked to impede
the investigation. The county judge not only evaded an agent, but delayed handing over copies
of records. Even more damaging to the case, Dixie County law enforcement officials intimidated
witnesses, who consequently proved far less than fully cooperative in the investigation. One

56 John Bonyne Reports, 14 November 1921,3 May 1922, 3 June 1922, E.J. Cartier
Reports, 16 May 1922, 18 May 1822,23 May 1922, Howard P. Wright Report, 9 September
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Report, 18 May 1922, Cubberly Papers, 3.
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evening in early July 1922, for example, a car of three witnesses returning from Gainesville
broke down two miles outside of Cross City. The sheriff arrived and asked each man his name
and if he had been to Gainesville to give evidence against Brown. All three denied that they had
and no other action was taken, but the incident greatly frightened the men and they reported it to
government agents. Three nights later a deputy appeared at the home o f one witness.
Frightened, the worker ran out the back door and the deputy shot at him five times. The witness
was unharmed but the incident understandably intimidated all the camp workers.38
Brown, for his part, denied the charges against him, claiming that he maintained a strong
labor force because o f his kindness toward workers whom, he claimed, actually begged to work
for him. He blamed the investigation on competing employers in the Cross City area who feared
that their laborers would leave and come to work for him. The grand jury apparently accepted
Brown’s explanation. Despite the generally consistent testimony of over forty witnesses who
bravely testified against Brown in the face o f threats, the grand jury refused to indict him.39
A few years later another more successful case developed from peonage charges at Mood
Davis’s turpentine camps, one in Calhoun County and the other in Bay County, Florida. At these
camps, laborers found it impossible to work themselves out o f debt Davis threatened that if they
left he would force them to return and beat them, tn an act o f desperation, four men, two o f them
accompanied by their wives, escaped. After leaving the women at a relative’s house, the four
men continued through the forest Davis’s search patrol discovered the women, who were then
held in custody in the community o f Wechalahka where the runaway men were soon found.
After one member o f the search patrol threatened to take them up on a bridge and shoot them,
Davis ordered one escapee to whip the other three. With a pistol shoved in his side, the runaway
38 M.J. Cronin Report, 9 June 1922 and Charles R. Jordan to Howard P. Wright, 9 July
1922, Cubberly Papers.
39 “Peonage Charge is Erroneous Declares W. Alston Brown,” Cubberly Papers.
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worker was forced to deliver such savage licks that he tore the skin off o f the others’ backs. All
four were then returned to their camps and threatened with death if they attempted to leave again.
Within days, however, Justice Department investigators descended on the Davis operations and
collected evidence that eventually resulted in peonage charges against Davis. The four runaways
and eight other witnesses were kept in protective custody in Pensacola. Their ordeal resulted in
the conviction of Davis. But despite such successes, the peonage investigations failed to end the
institution. Instead, by the late 1920s, producers began practicing debt servitude with greater
caution in an effort to disguise the labor system’s reality.60
Although peonage and convict labor each represented an entirely different method of
forced labor, in places lines between the two systems blurred. At some camps convicts and
peons worked together and occasionally lived together. Some peons were threatened with the
chain gang if they misbehaved. If paid workers complained or tried to escape from their
employer, the latter could have them charged for a petty crime, pay their fine, and thus gain legal
rights to their labor while they worked off the debt. In some counties where the turpentine
operators were especially powerful, they could have their workers arrested on trumped up
charges and, once they were convicted and sentenced, lease them as convict labor. When given a
choice, peonage was the logical preference over the latter option. Peonage at least allowed the
worker to remain with family and friends and permitted him relatively more autonomy at work
and in the quarters. Peonage and convict leasing were also linked in that both depended on the
collusion o f local officials and large employers. When in the first part o f the twentieth century,
Florida passed an act making it a misdemeanor to accept money or goods for labor and fail to
perform the work, the violation carried a $500 fine. Thus, workers charged with violating labor
contracts faced stiff fines, as well as court costs which were far too high for them to pay and

60 Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the Pines,” 202-215.
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would lead them further into indebtedness with their employer or into a convict work camp. In
1907, for example, twenty-percent o f the Florida convicts working on county farms or turpentine
camps had been sentenced for violating labor contracts. By 1913 the blending o f peonage and
convict leasing continued only in the three states—Alabama, Florida, and Georgia—where leasing
persisted and naval stores represented a major industry61
At the same time that peonage came under national attention and attack, convict leasing
attracted widespread outrage. The authors o f exposes focused on the same issues they used
against peonage. Richard Barry informed the readers o f Cosmopolitan that the leasing system
rested on political corruption. In Florida, for example, all the state’s 1,200 convicts were leased
to one man in 1906. No other bidder came forward because all understood that state politics
ensured that they had no chance. Readers also learned that Floridians in the neighborhoods o f
turpentine camps were outraged at the tales o f cruelty that came out of nearby camps.62 As with
peonage, one of the most shocking facets o f convict leasing for many reformers was that, as one
put it, “many hundreds o f white men, women + children (minor boys) are at present working out
under the most revolting conditions imaginable.”63 Progressives were outraged to learn of the
experience of one nineteen-year-old white man arrested while walking down a highway and

61 Matthew J. Mancini, One Dies. Get Another: Convict Leasing in the American South.
1866-1928 (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1996), 196; Carper, “Slavery
Revisited,” 97; Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 20-22; William Alonzo Register, interview, tape
recording, Florida State Archives; E.V. Meadows to John E. Wilkie, 5 September 1906 and A J .
Hogh to United States Attorney General, 4 February 1907, Correspondence, Classified Subject
Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record
Group 60, National Archives; “Peonage in the South,” 1617; Barry, “Slavery in the South ToDay,” 488-489; John Bonyne Report, 3 May 1922, Cubberly Papers; Tegeder, “Prisoners o f the
Pines,” 223, 109; Drobnev. Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 172.
62 Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 484,486; Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 19.
63 Reverend Leon Ray Livingston to United States Attorney General, 1 May 1912,
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records
o f the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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convicted of vagrancy. Leased to a state senator to work off a six-month sentence at his
turpentine camp, the white man endured almost daily beatings and whippings because he could
not do as much work as the experienced black hands with whom he served. In 1903, the readers
o f The Independent discovered the plight o f black children ensnared in the convict lease system.
In one instance, two young black boys were sent to a camp for seven months after being
convicted of stealing a watermelon. In another case a black girl languished in a camp from late
spring to the early winter for her inability to pay a bogus fee charged for an overnight stay in
Valdosta. She was released only after her mother located her and paid fifteen dollars for her
release.64
To convey the cruelty of the convict lease system, writers used analogies to other, more
commonly-recognized atrocities. In a 1907 pamphlet, reformer Clarissa Olds Keeler explained
that, in the southern portion of Georgia where turpentine operators were most prevalent, “there
are the stockades, the blood-hounds, the whipping post and every adjunct o f the slave trade.”65
She went on to claim that in Florida “stories told of the ill-treatment o f convicts working on
railroad construction, and at turpentine culture in pine forests, would compare favorably with the
torture practiced during the Spanish Inquisition”66 An expose of peonage and convict labor in
Georgia argued that leasing was “a system which is in some respects a worse disgrace than
Lynching, because it is created and protected by law.”67 In an effort to induce guilt in reformminded readers, Marc Goodnow asked them to recognize that “when you cut or bum your finger
and run to the medicine cabinet for a bottle of spirits o f turpentine, you seldom stop to think o f

64N. Gordon Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida, 1866-1923” (Ph.D. diss.,
Florida State University, 1964), 362; “Peonage in Georgia,” 3080.
65 Keeler, Crime of Crimes. 11.
66 Ibid., 13.
67 “Peonage in Georgia,” 3080-3081.
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the way in which this medicine is gathered; how much more o f pain it involves than the pain
which you seek to allay by its use; what bodily and mental travail; what cost in human life; what
degradation of a great and beautiful state merely for the sake o f a few paltry dollars—the
continuation, in fact, o f a slavery even blacker in its sin than before the war.”68
In response to wide public criticism, Florida, in the early 1900s, enacted new standards
for convict treatment. Regulations required employers to provide insulated and ventilated bunk
houses rather than the crude shacks they had been using. Prisoners were to sleep in individual
beds instead of sleeping together on long platforms and the night chain was to be replaced by a
guard. A building was to be set aside for use as a hospital and a physician was to be called to
tend the sick. Also, lessees were to maintain an office for transacting business between their
company and the state. Some regulations focused on sanitation. Each convict was required to
wear a state prison uniform at all times and to have two suits o f cloths, one hat, and one pair o f
boots. They were also to receive night-shirts and bedding. They were required to have a bath
once a week, and a sanitary system had to be installed in their bunkhouse. Employers were to
provide separate rooms for sleeping and eating, both to be swept clean each morning. Once a
68 Goodnow also asked his readers to “just look through the glass walls o f that small vial
of turpentine in your medicine cabinet and recall the story o f the liquid particles. See those
hundreds o f ebony faces, burnished by the seat of fever and disease; the striped bodies wet to the
waist with dead and stagnant waters half-running at their tasks from the rising o f the sun till the
falling o f night; the swollen misshapen clubs that once were feet and that probably will never
again rest within a shoe that fits the prone black figure writhing under the biting lash of a leather
thong! See them dance and sing, more like puppets than human beings! Above all, watch the
half-dozen, blood-hungry hounds beating and baying through the pine woods in Sunday morning
pursuit!” But even when expressing sympathy for black men, who comprised the greatest
segment o f the convict population, Goodnow, as other Progressive reporters, expressed the racist
sentiments of his day. For example, in describing the concluding moments o f a horrifying scene
in which a black convict was forced to run through the forest in order that camp blood hounds
could practice tracking, he explains that “with an agility surprising to see in a body seemingly
spent from long pursuits, the black arms shot up, the legs came up under the thick trunk, and the
Negro in one giant, primitive spring, had landed six or seven feet up the stock o f a virgin pinestraddling it as a gorilla would a grapevine—and ‘shinned’ on up to a place well beyond the reach
of the dogs.” Marc N. Goodnow, “Turpentine: Impressions o f the Convict Camps o f Florida,”
The Survey 34(1 May 1915): 103, 107-108.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

546
week the dinning room floor was to be scrubbed. The state required closer scrutiny and
restriction o f convict activity as well. Convicts were to be accompanied by guards whenever
they left the stockade and they required the warden’s permission to speak to anyone from outside
the camp. No gambling was permitted of any kind. Florida also wanted detailed records kept on
the treatment o f convicts. Lessees were to keep a daily record o f food issued to convicts. All
information regarding a prisoner’s death was to be sent to the state. Only a designated person
was to administer punishments and a report of punishments was to be kept each month. The state
too regulated certain areas of camp management. During the hottest time of the year, June 15 to
September 16, convicts were to be given at least one and an half hours at noon for rest and lunch.
Before a lessee removed a captain, he had to receive the supervisor’s consent and the supervisor
had to be notified before the transfer o f convicts from one camp to another. Finally, these rules
had to be posted in a visible place at the camp.69
In response to criticisms o f poor morality within camps, Florida required that a minister
preach to convicts once a month. In most cases their sermons, prison administrators believed,
reinforced camp discipline and improved moral. But “occasionally we have noted where a
minister has unwittingly made use o f expressions at the camps that were not calculated to aid
discipline. So many o f our prisoners being of the negro race, they are ready to catch at every
straw of sympathy dropped by a visitor or minister and to use the same as meaning that they are
to be much pities on account of being placed in prison by the cold, harsh requirements o f law.”70
The state also provided $375 to buy reading material, especially a Bible, for each camp.71
69 Jeffrey A. Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing: Convict Labor in the North
Florida Turpentine Industry, 1877-1923,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 72 (April 1984): 422;
Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 160; The Eighth Biennial Report of the Commissioner
of Florida for the Period Beginning January 1. 1903. and Ending December 31. 1904
(Tallahassee, FL: L.B. Hilson, State Printer, 190S), 385-388.
70 Tenth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner of Agriculture o f the State o f Florida for
the Period Beginning January 1. 1907. and Ending December 31. 1908 (Tallahassee, FL: Union
Label, 1909), 422.
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In addition, Florida made efforts to oversee the quality of guards at camps. Not only was
turnover high, but, as the Commissioner of Agriculture explained in 1907, “with some
exceptions, those who will follow as a business the work o f guarding convicts are not o f that
class who have much ambition in life.” Before, lessees maintained no record of guards, and an
unfit guard could be discharged from one camp and find employment at another without his new
employer’s knowledge o f his background. With the introduction o f a new guard application and
record system, the Commissioner o f Agriculture’s office in Tallahassee could check the
background o f all camp guards. In another safeguard against unsatisfactory camp personal, the
state required that former guards have a letter from their previous employer stating their
qualifications before they could be hired by another. State regulations also prohibited hiring as a
guard anyone “addicted to any kinds o f stimulants,” had relatives in the state prison system, or
had been discharged for unseemly conduct. In an effort to attract more competent guards, the
state also demanded that they be paid from $18 to $25, plus room and board, per month.
Florida’s efforts to secure more qualified guards, however, apparently met with little success.72
In the first decade o f the twentieth century Florida also imposed regulations to reduce the
chances of convict escape. State legislation required lessees to employ one guard for every five
prisoners, to ensure that at least one o f the guards was mounted for every twenty-five prisoners,
and to keep two trained bloodhounds. In the event that a convict did escape, Florida formulated
procedures to facilitate capture. Lessees were to keep a photograph and description of each
convict. If one escaped, his picture and description were to be sent to the local sheriff and police

71 Ibid., 423.
72 Eighth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the States o f Florida.
1903-1904,303-307; The Ninth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner o f Agriculture o f the State
o f Florida for the Period Beginning January 1. 1905. and Ending December 31. 1906
(Tallahassee, FL: Capital Publishing Company, State Printer, 1907), 295.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

548
and the lessee was to post a $ 100-reward for his capture. In 1906, Florida also had a book of
photographs and descriptions made of all escapees over the previous ten years.73
In the 1910s, the state offered still more reforms. In 1910, the state required that female
convicts be kept separate from the men. Before this time they had been housed in the same
camps as the men, where both male convicts and guards sexually abused them. Pregnancy was
not an uncommon result. In 1911, the state purchased 15,652 acres in Bradford County in the
northern peninsula to be used as a prison farm, and after 1914 the state sent to it all female
convicts as well as male convicts unfit for hard labor under the lease system.
Florida also improved its inspection system to ensure these new requirements were met.
In 1899, Florida employed its first supervisor o f state convicts, whose job was to enforce
regulations set by the Board o f State Institutions. At the Commissioner of Agriculture’s
suggestion, in 1902, precautions were taken to avoid using prisoners’ names in reports to prevent
the prisoner from suffering retribution. By 1910, Florida had four investigators who inspected
all the camps monthly and submitted reports to the Commissioner o f Agriculture. They tried to
ensure that prisoners were not tortured and that they received adequate food, shelter, and
clothing. The supervisors had the authority to send sick or injured convicts to the state convict
hospital.74
It appears that the state convicts’ condition received far greater scrutiny than that of
those leased out by individual counties. At best counties maintained a minimal involvement in
their convicts’ oversight. Gadsden County, for example, funded a guard at one naval stores camp

73 Ninth Biennial Report o f the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State o f Florida.
1905-1906, 282-284.
74 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine Are Blowing,” 421-423,431-432; Drobney,
Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 159-160; Commissioner o f Agriculture to Florida Naval Stores
and Com. Company, 5 April 1902, Convict Lease Program Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board of
Commissioners o f State Institutions, Florida State Archives.
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that leased its convicts and, in Osceola County, one of the county commissioners paid a monthly
inspection visit to the turpentine camp that leased its convicts. In the 1900s, Florida requested
that the Clerks of Circuit Court report to the state how many convicts their counties leased, for
whom the convicts worked, and the monthly price paid for use o f the convicts. But unless a
county created its own system of inspection, no one looked out for the prisoner’s welfare.75
A comparison o f state and county camp inspection reports reveals that when Florida did
begin oversight of county convicts, they received far less attention than those leased by the state.
The state had information on the general condition of camps leasing its convicts and, if there
were problems, what they were. Camps employing state convicts still received a rating of “good”
if there was a problem with no pillows or night shirts and “fair” if the cells needed cleaning. If
there was no problem it was noted. At some camps, however, inspectors found a multitude o f
problems. At the Daniel brothers, camp there was no mounted guard in the woods, the guards
were incompetent, the captain unstable, and three women were apparently being abused.
Another camp had an unsanitary kitchen, no hospital, and a captain with a hot temper who
punished the convicts severely. County camps apparently received far less scrutiny. They were
usually listed as being in “good condition” or “good shape” with no details added. One inspector
did note receipt of a complaint of severe punishment but claimed he found no evidence to
support it. The lax oversight of county convicts supports historian Matthew Mancini argument
that state regulations were not always enforced and actually served the system’s defenders more
than the convicts by supplying the appearance o f greater change than actually occurred.76

75 Mitchel to Jennings, May 18, 1903, John M. Lee to M.S. Jennings, 18 May 1903, C.M.
Knott to N.B. Broward, 18 August 1905, Walter F. Hancock to M.A. Brown, 11 August 1905,
John C. Calhoun to M.A. Brower, 11 August 1905, and John M. Lee to M.S. Jennings, 20 May
1903, Convict Lease Program Subject Files, 1889-1916, Board of Commissioners o f State
Institutions; Barry, “Slavery in the South To-Day,” 486.
76 Commissioner o f Agriculture to Florida Naval Stores and Com. Company, 5 April
1902, N.A. Blitch to N.B. Broward, 5 April 1906, T J. Titeaub to W.A. McRae, 1 November
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Where some reformers pushed for improvements to the convict lease system, other
Progressives called for the practice to be replaced by state chain gangs and prison farms.77 The
reform opposition to the convict lease did not imply a belief that convicts should not work hard.
Progressives typically believed that the region’s economic sluggishness could be corrected with
better infrastructure and offered little challenge to southern race or class relationships. Most,
like the writer o f a Florida newspaper piece who wanted “to see the convict lease system
abolished” because it was “a disgrace to the state and age,” felt the convicts should labor for the
direct benefit o f the state. Some suggested that convicts work at a state farm, the proceeds going
to hire expert labor to build good roads.78 Other progressives wanted convicts themselves to
work on state roads. The plan satisfied Progressives in two ways; it offered not only improved
transportation infrastructure but allowed for well-ordered social control by placing the convicts
under the direct supervision o f the state where their work and treatment could best be monitored.
The movement toward a program of state chain gangs began in North Carolina and was soon
followed in Florida at the urgency of the Florida Good Roads Association.79 Alex Lichtenstein
explains that “the substitution o f the public chain gang for the private convict lease did not bring

1913, and R.R. Tomlin to W.A. McRae, 28 February 1914, Convict Lease Program Subject Files,
1889-1916, Board of Commissioners of State Institutions; Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 64.
77 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 431.
78“The Everglades and State Convicts,” attached to Leon Ray Livingston to United
States Attorney General, 6 March 1912, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f
Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National
Archives; James C. Cobb, Industrialization and Southern Society. 1877-1984 (Chicago: The
Dorsey Press, 1984), 30.
79 Alex Lichtenstein, “Good Roads and Chain Gangs in the Progressive South: ‘The
Negro Convict Is a Slave,’” The Journal of Southern History 59 (February 1993): 87-91;
Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 172-173; Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 17.
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about the demise o f these antimodem tendencies in the region but rather reconciled them with the
advent of modernity.”*0
The increasing expense o f leasing convicts also helped erode the practice. Matthew
Mancini has shown that the end o f the lease system in Georgia coincided with a reduction in its
profitability. When the state permitted subleasing, market demand drove up the price o f convict
leasing. Where producers could work a convict for $225.52 a year in 1904, by 1907 the cost had
nearly tripled to $670, an amount not much different from a free worker’s wage. That year, the
Panic of 1907 make convict leasing especially unprofitable. As market prices sunk, producers
found they were stuck with unneeded work crews whose fee they had already paid and who
continued to require food, clothing, and the oversight o f hired guards. Once cheap, convict labor
had now become an economic burden. Finally, in 1908, Georgia’s General Assembly’s Convict
Investigating Committee recommended an end to leasing. The governor and legislature agreed
and with the expiration of the last contracts in 1909 the practice ended in that state.81
Nearly a decade later Florida began similar action. By this time, many Floridians had
joined the national outcry against leasing in their state. Newspaper editors, civic leaders, the
Florida Humane Society, and national muckraking periodicals focused on the abuses o f leasing.82
In 1917, Florida, which wanted to build good roads to boost tourism, sent three hundred convicts
to the state roads department. With the completion o f a new penitentiary at Raiford, Florida,

80 Lichtenstein, “Good Roads and Chain Gangs,” 110.
81 Mancini, One Dies. Get Another. 224-227.
82 Southern criticism o f convict leasing was not new. In 1884, one year before he left his
native South for exile in New York, George Washington Cable condemned convict leasing,
explaining that convicts received long sentences for minor crimes as a means of providing forced
labor to certain southern businesses. His broader message, however, was that prisoners should
not have to pay for themselves. George W. Cable, “The Convict Lease System in the Southern
States,” The Century Magazine 27 (February 1884): 583-594; Drobney, Lumbermen and Log
Sawyers. 173; Shofner, “Forced Labor,” 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

552
ended its leasing program and sent its convicts to work on its roads under the highway
department’s jurisdiction. Matthew Mancicni explains that such a change represented a
reallocation o f forced convict labor from the private to the public sector. But even after Florida
dismantled state convict leasing, county prisoners continued to labor in privately-owned work
camps, including those producing turpentine.83
In 1923, national publicity surrounding the death of a young North Dakota man in a
Florida county convict timber camp helped to finally bring an end to the system. In the fall of
1921, twenty-one year old Martin Tabert left the Munich, North Dakota farm, where he lived
with his parents, to see the country. His strategy o f working part-time while moving from place
to place succeeded until he arrived in Florida and found he could not sell his labor in a market
that preferred cheap forced black labor. Out of money, he hoboed his way across the Florida
panhandle on a train until, on December 15,1921, he reached Leon County where a deputy
sheriff arrested him. A jury found him guilty of vagrancy and fined him twenty-five dollars.
Unable to pay, he received a sentence o f ninety days and like all Leon County convicts, was
turned over to the Putnam Lumber Company, which leased the county’s prisoners for twenty
dollars each per month. Tabert’s family sent him the money for the fine, but because he had
already left the county jail for the work camp, the sheriff returned the letter.
Two months later, the Putnam Lumber Company sent his family a letter saying Martin
had died February 1. Only after the Tabert’s attorney and a North Dakota state attorney
investigated the incident and witnesses came forward did the whole story unfold. Martin, like
other convicts at the Putnam camp, rose at four o’clock in the morning and boarded a flatcar,

83 The lease continued in Alabama where virtually all convicts labored in coal mines.
Alabama finally ended the practice in 1928. Drobney, Lumbermen and Log Sawyers. 174;
Mancini, One Dies Get Another. 105, 116, 196,221; Jerrell H. Shofner, “Postscript to the Martin
Tabert Case: Peonage as Usual in the Florida Turpentine Camps,” The Florida Historical
Quarterly 60 (October 1981): 161, 163; Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 433;
Drobney “Forced Labor,” 69.
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which they rode for fifteen miles through swamps. When the car stopped, they had to walk
another several miles, sometimes through hip-deep swamp water. Martin’s feet swelled, and the
swamp water caused an infection which his ill-fitting, tight shoes made worse. His request for a
larger pair of shoes was ignored. By late January, Martin was very ill. He suffered from
headaches and occasional fever and had developed swollen areas in his groin so severe that one
inflammation had to be lanced. When he grew too weak to keep up with the demanding work,
Tabert received regular beatings. On one occasion, in fiont o f eighty-five to ninety convicts, he
was beaten forty-five to fifty times with a four-foot long whip made o f three-ply leather and
weighing seven and a half pounds. By then Martin ate very little. He wasted down to 125
pounds and his back was covered with cuts and scabs. Blind with fever by late-January, he lay in
a stinking bed with his own froth coating his pillow. The doctor only saw him a few times before
he finally died. Martin was buried in a runaway convicts old cloths in an unmarked grave in
Perry, Florida, of which no one could seem to remember the location. Putnam Lumber Company
reported that his death was due to malaria and Martin’s refusal to take his medicine.
At the North Dakota legislature’s request, the Florida legislature began an investigation
of the incident that eventually lead to a trial. Testimony revealed that the Leon County sheriff
used his office to supply convict labor for Putnam Lumber Company. In the seven months before
the sheriffs deal with Putnam, he had arrested only twenty men for vagrancy. In the same period
after the deal, 154 men were arrested on the same charge. With no defense attorney present, the
sheriff typically instructed the suspect to plead guilty at a sham trial which sometimes occurred
late at night in front o f drunken officials. At the trial that resulted from the Florida legislature’s
investigation, the camp’s whipping boss was found guilty o f second degree murder and sentenced
to twenty years. However, he was acquitted on a technicality at a new trial ordered by the
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Florida Supreme Court. For its part, Putnam Lumber Company settled with the Tabert family for
twenty thousand dollars and received public absolution of blame.*4
Although the Florida legislature’s Investigating Committee focused most of its efforts on
uncovering the facts o f the Tabert case, its efforts also revealed evidence o f abused and
overworked convicts laboring in turpentine camps owned by state senator T J . Knabb. The wife
of a local postmaster informed state investigators that guards had killed nine convicts at the camp
as well as a woman and her daughter. The most sensational story to come out o f the Knabb
inquiry was that o f Washington, D.C., native Paul Revere White, who ended up in Knabb’s camp
after an arrest for vagrancy. Because White could not perform the expected turpentine work, he
was kicked, beaten, and whipped almost daily. By the time the state convict supervisor removed
him from the camp, the skin was rubbed off his hands, deep ulcers had developed on his legs, at
least one o f his ribs was broken, and he had narrowly escaped freezing to death while trying to
sleep in eighteen-degree temperatures with no covering.85
The Tabert case and evidence of convict abuse at other camps forced the issue of county
convict leasing to the forefront in Florida.86 National publications detailed the tragedy of
Tabert’s demise and the efforts by crooked county officials and the Putnam Lumber Co. to
conceal camp abuses. The Literary Digest covered the affair in a piece carrying the eye-catching
title of “A Victim o f Convict Slavery.”87 The article noted that the citizens o f Florida had
believed that convict leasing had ended in 1919, when the state abolished the hiring out o f its

84 “A Victim o f Slavery,” The Literary Digest 77 (21 April 1923): 41-43; N. Gordon
Carper, “Martin Tabert, Martyr o f an Era,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 52 (October 1973):
116-126.
85Carper, “The Convict-Lease System in Florida,” 126-127.
86 Drobney, “Where Palm and Pine are Blowing,” 434.
87 “Victim o f Convict ‘Slavery,’” 40-46.
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prisoners. The piece explained that the leasing o f county convicts had continued, despite efforts
by the governor, because the people o f Florida had no knowledge o f the practice. It also
reminded readers that Putnam Lumber Company, the company at the center o f the Tabert case,
was owned and operated out o f Wisconsin, and that Florida newspapers were calling for justice
in the case. As newspapers and organizations across the country campaigned for the system’s
end, the Florida legislature agreed that it should be abolished and, in April 1923, voted to end
county convict leasing. In less than a month, it approved another bill ending corporal
punishment in the prison system. The governor signed both acts.8* Newspapers across Florida
echoed the Pensacola News’ self-congratulatory refrain that “the name of Florida has been
cleared from the charge o f willfully being party to this crime against humanity, through the
action o f the Legislature in the abolition o f peonage and the flogging of convicts.”89
Despite such erroneous claims about the demise o f peonage, the practice of convict
leasing did in fact end. After two decades o f reform efforts, the hiring out o f convicts
succumbed to public pressure, the growing expense of leasing, and the demand for chain gang
work on state projects. Although closely associated with the practice of convict leasing, peonage
survived an even more substantial attack. As southern states strengthened peonage legislation
with false pretense and vagrancy laws and employers started drawing whites into the system, the
Department of Justice began investigations and trials of employers for violating the Thirteenth
Amendment However, despite intense national interest and the practice’s apparent wide-spread
use, only a relatively small number of producers were tried for peonage and fewer still convicted.
Although the fear o f prosecution drove the practice out o f full public view, peonage continued
into the 1940s.

88 “Victim o f Convict ‘Slavery,’” 43; “Florida ‘Comes Clean’ By Ending Convict
Camps,” The Literary Digest 77 (16 June 1923): 38-40; Carper, “Martin Tabert,” 128; Carper,
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Chapter Twelve
Government Aid to the Rescue:
Federal Assistance Supports the Naval Stores Industry

Where federal involvement in the first decades of the twentieth century proved a mixed
blessing for operators, helping them improve production techniques but at the same time
attacking their labor practices, during the 1930s and 1940s help shifted decidedly in the
producers’ favor. Over these decades, government assistance for the naval stores industry
increased over what it had been earlier in the century, both in terms o f research and direct
financial support, and interference with labor relations subsided. The aid became so great, in
fact, that it temporarily sustained the struggling business as it teetered on the edge of collapse.
Previous government efforts to reverse forest depletion began to pay off by the early 1930s, and,
with it, federally-funded research intensified. The government studies led to significant
advancements in harvesting, refining, and marketing. Most important, federal economic
assistance programs substantially subsidized gum naval stores production, enabling the weak
industry to weather the ravages o f the Great Depression. But as turpentine producers enjoyed
heightened government support, they sought to deprive their laborers o f similar aid in the form of
New Deal worker benefits.
The southern forests’ failure to regenerate remained a concern in the early 1930s. A
survey at the time estimated that of the fifty-two million acres in the naval stores belt, fourteen
million acres lay as cutover waste, over thirty-five million acres had only second-growth trees of
various growth stages and sizes, and virgin pine growth covered only three million acres. The
largest portion o f this new growth was young and not o f sufficient size to use. Nevertheless,
desperate land owners attempted to squeeze any profit they could from the saplings. By 193S,
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fifty-six percent o f all turpentine trees were smaller than seven inches in diameter, prompting one
forester to complain that the naval stores industry continued at the expense o f its future well
being. What it needed, he argued, was a scientific plan to preserve the timber and thus sustain
the industry. Another forest industry observer complained that in Florida “the forest had been
treated as a mine.” The time was not distant, he warned, when Florida would require its
diminishing stands for its own needs. If timber owners did not encourage and protect second
growth trees, Florida would become a timber-importing state. The saplings that were emerging,
however, offered a chance for reforestation. In the early 1930s, thirteen thousand ten thousandcup crops of turpentine were produced on thirteen million o f the thirty-five million acres of
second growth forest. If folly stocked with trees, protected from fire, and worked conservatively,
it was estimated, the existing second-growth stands could in a few years support seventy
thousand crops. And if the fourteen million acres o f cutover waste area were replanted and
protected, in forty-years they would add an additional twenty-eight thousand crops.1 If producers
took these measures, a factor concluded, “there would appear then to be no danger of a future
shortage in Naval Stores.”2
In the 1930s and 1940s, reforestation efforts did indeed quicken as success with rapidly
growing second growth forests demonstrated that the turpentine industry, if it wisely used its
resources, could survive on such stands. Several factors contributed to the southern forest’s
resurrection. First, many cutover acres proved inadequately fertile to serve as farmland and

1R.E. Benedict, “The Naval Stores Industry,” Austin Cary Memorial Forestry
Collection, Department of Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f
Florida, 1; W.G. Wahlenbere. Loneleaf Pine: Its Use. Ecology. Regeneration. Protection.
Growth, and Management (Washington, DC: Charles Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1946),
9-11; Lenthall Wvman. Experiments in Naval Stores Practice (Washington. DC: United States
Department o f Agriculture, 1932), 4; E.A. Ziegler, A.R. Spiders, and C.H. Coulter, Financial
Aspects of Growing Southern Pine. Washington Countv Florida (Tallahassee: Florida Forest
Service, 1931), 5-6, 16.
2 Benedict, “Naval Stores Industry,” 1.
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remained available for reseeding. Second, despite some continuation o f regular burning, the
practice diminished as foresters’ persistent sermons against it began to win converts. Finally,
there was also a reduction in the use of small timber as the gospel o f conservation began to take
hold. The first plantings o f any significance began, in 1924, by timber owners in southeast
Georgia. They and the landowners who followed their example in the late 1920s transferred
slash pine seedlings lifted from low-lying areas where the young trees had volunteered. By the
1930s, federal, state, and private nurseries grew pines for restocking. Trees were best planted
during their dormant season from December 1 to March 15 and at spaces of around ten feet by
ten feet or twelve feet by twelve feet, when the ground contained moisture. Once the pine
branches began to touch each other after ten to fifteen years, the stands were thinned. Between
1935 and 1936 foresters and landowners planted six million seedlings, mostly slash pine, in
Florida. The project cost land owners around $ 1.50 per acre. The Civilian Conservation Corps,
which, in 1936, operated twenty-four camps and employed 4,776 workers in Florida, assisted in
planting the stock. Administered by the U.S. Forest Service, much of the CCC’s reforestation
efforts took place in four national parks that together contained over one million acres.
Reforestation also began in Mississippi during the 1930s, but made its greatest strides there after
1940 when the state legislature revised the state tax code to encourage the growth and protection
of young trees.3
3 By the late 1930s the growth of the southern pulpwood industry led to expanded efforts
to replant cutover forest land. By this time pulpwood production had surpassed the naval stores
industry in capital investment, value added to products, and payrolls. It was organized on the
idea o f growing timber as a crop, a unique distinction at the time. The industry’s appetite for
both slash and loblolly pine led landowners to plant their land in these species rather than
iongleafs. Some believed that with the rise o f the pulpwood industry, the seemingly-stabilized
naval stores industry, and the region’s remaining sawmills, timber industries might offer a new
and sustainable economic base to replace the cotton economy which appeared to be fighting a
certain death during the 1930s. “These days the South is talking and thinking o f itself in new
economic terms,” University o f Georgia forestry professor P.L. Buttrick argued in 1939. “It is
saying that cotton is at long last an uncrowned king, to be retired on a pension by the AAA, and
it is preparing to crown king pine from whom all blessings are to flow, chiefly in the form of
paper pulp products.” In the late 1930s a Tift County, Georgia turpentine operator had good
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By the early 1930s, Florida producers harvested eighty percent o f their product from
second-growth trees and twenty percent from old growth. O f all the stands used, longleaf
represented sixty percent and slash forty percent. But because most o f the old-growth pines were
longleaf and the second growth was primarily slash, turpentine producers more and more turned
to the latter. To their delight they found favorable results. Experiments conducted in the first
half of the 1930s indicated that slash pine actually yielded twenty-five percent more gum than
longleaf. Studies found that chipping affected the trunks of slash pine more than it did longleaf
and led to greater resin duct formation above the face, which resulted in greater gum production.
Unlike longleaf, slash pine did not put forth the largest amount o f gum the first day after
chipping, but extended the flow more evenly across the seven-day interval between chippings,
yielding its greatest portion on the second day. Because the streaks on slash pine oozed gum
longer than those on iongieafs, their optimal chipping interval was longer, requiring fewer
chippings and thus lowering labor costs. And because slash pine gum ran more freely than
longleaf, a lower portion of its yield was in the form o f scrape. Since scrape contained less

results with gum harvested of trees planted in 1924. He had planted the trees 140 to the acre on
abandoned farm land. Adequate space and management had allowed them to grow to eleven
inches in diameter in only about fifteen years. In another case a stand o f eight-inch diameter
pines were tapped in 1946 just fourteen years after their planting. “Welcome,” (presented at the
annual meeting o f the Georgia Forestry Association, Savannah, Georgia, 8 May 1942), Georgia
Forestry Association Papers, Special Collections Division, The University o f Georgia Libraries,
University o f Georgia, 5-6; “The First Forest,” Southern Forest Institute Papers, Special
Collections Division, The University o f Georgia Libraries, University o f Georgia, 4; A.R.
Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores (Athens, GA: Georgia Agricultural Extension Service,
1946), 36-38; Lenthall Wvman. Florida Naval Stores (Tallahassee: State o f Florida Department
of Agriculture, 1929), 43; Federal Writers’ Project, Florida: A Guide to the Southernmost State
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 32; Robert S. Maxwell, “The Impact of Forestry on
the Gulf South,” Forest History 17 (April 1973): 35; Robert S. Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine: A
History o f Florida Naval Stores. 1528-1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993),
45; P.L. Buttrick, “The Hopes and Dangers in the South’s New Forests,” (presented at the annual
meeting o f the Georgia Forestry Association, Savannah, Georgia, 19 May 1939, Georgia Forestry
Association Papers, 1, 8-9; R.D. Forbes and R.Y. Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and
Turpentining Practices in the Southern Pine Region (Washington, DC: United States Department
o f Agriculture, 1930), 2.
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spirits and produced a lower quality of rosin than soft gum, its lower percentage o f the harvest
made the slash pine a more lucrative species to work.4
By the late 1930s relieved industry observers believed that the current rate o f
reforestation could sustain the gum naval stores industry. The pine forest remained only a
fraction o f its original size, but what remained appeared to be stabilizing. Florida, for example,
in 1939 possessed only a fourth o f its original supply of marketable lumber, including young
growth, but pine land still covered roughly twenty-five percent o f Florida’s 58,560 square miles.
Over 5.4 million acres were under the protection o f the forest conservation agencies.5 Yet
despite such a reduction the industry continued. One naval stores researcher remarked in 1938,
that “during the past several decades one o f the oldest and most picturesque of American
industries has waited with rather hopeless appreciation for its raw material to give out. But at
last a new day has dawned for this unique industry.”6 Some problems remained, however. One
forester admitted that the new forests were not o f the same quality as the older ones; their stands
usually being thin. Most supported half the number of trees they potentially could and some
grew no more than thirty percent7

4 A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, The Naval Stores
Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau of Economic and Business Research, College o f Business
Administration, The University of Florida, 1934), 27; Austin Cary, “Studies on Flow o f Gum in
Relation to Profit in the Naval Stores Industry: A Condensed Account o f Experiments Conducted
from 1920 to 1931,” Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4, 12, 15;
V.L. Harper and Lenthall Wyman, Variations in Naval Stores Yields Associated with Weather
and Specific Days Between Chippings (Washington, DC: United States Department o f
Agriculture, 1936), 20, 22, 29.
5 Florida Writers’ Project, Florida. 31-32; Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine. 24-25.
6 V.L. Harper and T.A. Liefeld, “A New Day in the Naval Stores Industry,” Journal of
Forestry 36 (November 1938): 1128.
7 Buttrick, “Hopes and Dangers,” 2.
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Because during the 1930s and 1940s turpentiners began turning to second-growth stands
that covered previously-worked acres, the naval stores industry began a new trend; ending its
characteristic mobility, it anchored itself in the areas where it had dominated in the early years of
the century. The bulk o f production continued to come from south Georgia and north Florida,
the two areas claiming eighty percent o f the United States’ annual production. Despite the
challenges posed by deforestation, the region contained the best soil and climate for turpentine
forests, the greatest concentration o f equipment and trained workers, and the most convenient
and available access to distribution through factorage houses. Georgia, having retaken the
position as top producer from Florida during the 1920s, manufactured around fifty-seven percent
of turpentine and rosin made in the U.S. Florida produced around twenty-six percent o f the
national naval stores production, somewhat less than twenty percent of the world production, and
employed 14,000 men, most o f them black. Alabama manufactured the third largest quantity,
just over ten percent, far less than Georgia or Florida. Other southern states—South Carolina,
Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and even North Carolina—made only small quantities, a combined
total o f just over six percent. Tar production persisted in scattered areas o f the Southeast: eastern
North and South Carolina, south Alabama and Mississippi, south Louisiana, and east Texas. By
the second World War, however, its manufacture, arguably the oldest form o f manufacturing in
America, ended.8
The pattern of naval stores trade activity at southern ports reflected the end o f the
industry’s regional migration. Through the 1930s, the same ports that became well-established in
the handling o f naval stores in the early twentieth century remained the principal exporters. As

8 Benedict, “Naval Stores Industry,” 1-2; Florida Writers’ Project, Florida. 88, 378; F.P.
Veitch and C.F. Speh, “Second Annual Naval Stores Report on Production, Distribution,
Consumption, and Stocks o f Turpentine and Rosin of the United States,” American Turpentine
Farmers Association Papers, Georgia Agrirama, 2; John K. Cross, “Tar Burning, A Forgotten
Art?,” Forests and People 23 (Second Quarter 1973): 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

562
Georgia was the largest naval stores producer, its ports handled the bulk o f the product’s trade.
Savannah remained the greatest naval stores port, although it had briefly surrendered its position
to Jacksonville between 1905 and 1923. Not only was Savannah closest to the largest naval
stores-producing area, but it also enjoyed an excellent regional transportation system that
included five railroad lines that linked it to the interior forests. The city boasted a number of
large distilleries capable o f processing substantial quantities of crude gum and six factors to
service producers. Finally, the presence in the city o f the Savannah Board o f Trade, which
continued to oversee the U.S. naval stores market, strengthened the ports’ hold on the business.
Although it never approached Savannah’s importance in the naval stores trade, Brunswick
became an important outlet for turpentine and rosin produced in extreme southeastern Georgia.
Having risen to prominence as a naval stores market around 1890, the Brunswick port, which
was serviced by several railroads and steamship lines, enjoyed a steady business in naval stores,
most o f it exported directly to Europe. Although its market was closed to all but one dealer,
Downing Company, the port offered a large rosin yard and two turpentine storage tanks. It was
also the home o f the Hercules Powder Company’s steam distillation plant, the largest such
facility in the world.9
Jacksonville, the United States’ second-most important naval stores port and the largest
handler o f products in Florida, offered as wide a range o f services as Savannah but, by the 1930s,
served a less active area o f production than it had earlier in the century. Adequate railroad

9 By 1950 the Savannah Board o f Trade’s job o f setting prices and collecting and
reporting statistics was assumed by the Department o f Agriculture. As the major steamship lines
established direct connections with southern ports, New York played less o f a role in naval stores
export activity. Some products, however, continued to arrive in New York via coastwise trade
for reexport and in that respect New York remained important in naval stores purchasing
activities for all over the world. Campbell, etal., Naval Stores Industry. 14-15, 18; Richard C.
Davis, ed. Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores;” For figures related to turpentine production by
state see Appendix A.
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service and especially an excellent road system linked the Jacksonville port to producers in the
northeastern portion o f the panhandle and peninsula. By the early 1930s, seventy-five percent of
Florida’s production reached market by truck. The St. Johns River also serviced the port, but the
amount o f naval stores arriving by water was much less than in previous years. With several
steam distillation plants, Jacksonville could easily process the delivered raw gum, and its many
factorage houses and dealers could see to the sale and distribution of the refined product. The
Jacksonville naval stores yard, the largest in the world and owned by the city, covered over fifty
acres on the St. Johns River and offered storage room for 250,000 barrels o f rosin and over
130,000 o f turpentine. A covered turpentine shed eight hundred feet long and one hundred feet
wide could shield seventy-five thousand barrels of turpentine from the sun. Four steel storage
tanks were capable o f holding another twenty thousand barrels. Storage space at nearby
Commodore Point offered room for an additional thirty-six thousand barrels. Jacksonville’s
docks could accommodate at one time five large ocean-going vessels with thirty-foot drafts. By
the early 1930s, naval stores was Jacksonville’s most important export, followed by lumber and
cotton.10
Although it ranked fourth in volume behind Savannah, Jacksonville, and Brunswick,
Pensacola continued to handle naval stores produced in Alabama and Florida’s western
panhandle. The city enjoyed good railroad connections with most important interior towns from
which naval stores could be collected for shipping. However, the port had a closed market with
only one factor and one dealer handling sales and distribution. Although its gum exports

10 A loosely woven wire cage which conducted lightning away from the flammable
turpentine casks covered the sheds. By the 1930s, twelve electric trucks provided quick transfer
of turpentine and rosin to the docks, replacing the old labor-intensive method o f rolling the
barrels. Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 15-16, 51; A. Stuart Campbell and Alvin Cassel,
The Foreign Trade o f Florida fGainseville. FL: Bureau o f Economic and Business Research,
College o f Business Administration, University of Florida, 1935), 73-74, 51, 82; Federal Writers’
Project, Florida. 189.
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remained relatively small, the location and operation o f the Newport wood naval stores plant in
Pensacola added greatly to the port’s export value. With a facility' covering forty acres, the plant
could store up to 300,000 gallons o f turpentine and 290,000 gallons of pine oil. Along with
Pensacola, Panama City handled a small quantity of naval stores produced around the western
area o f Florida and Mobile, and New Orleans exported the tiny amount manufactured in
southwestern Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.11
By the early 1930s, a sophisticated quality-control system involving both federal and
state inspectors improved the handling and grading o f the rosin and turpentine that flowed
through the ports and thus helped strengthen trade. At the state level, inspectors, none of whom
could be financially connected with the industry and all o f whom worked under an appointed
supervisor, used the USDA grading system. Once the gum arrived at market, inspectors weighed
and graded it by visual inspection. They then determined both the grade of gum and the yield of
turpentine and rosin that various grades would produce once distilled. The inspectors determined
yield by the percentage o f chips, bark, trash, dirt, sand, and water present in the gum, usually as
the barrels were emptied into large vats. If the gum was not dumped, inspectors pushed a pole to
the bottom o f the barrel and pulled it out to inspect the amount o f foreign matter that adhered to
the stick. Once the grade was determined, factors assigned its price. Although most inspectors
worked at the market, some graded products at the stills. Supervising inspectors regularly visited
each naval stores yard in their states, examining the stock, sampling the barrels, and examining
the books. The owner o f the product paid the inspectors’ fees, 60 per barrel o f rosin and 90 per
barrel o f turpentine. The supervisor received .50 for each barrel o f naval stores inspected in his

11 It appears that small naval stores handlers charged a greater percentage o f the value to
market it. Larger naval stores ports like Savannah, Jacksonville, and Brunswick charged 4.75
percent to 7.5 percent in marketing fees where producers shipping through Pensacola and Mobile
paid 10 and 12 percent respectively to market naval stores. Campbell, et al., Naval Stores
Industry. 17-18, 51; Campbell and Cassel, Foreign Trade o f Florida. 73.82.
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state, the fee shared equally by the buyer and seller. In compliance with the 1923 U.S. Naval
Stores Act, which prohibited the domestic and foreign trade o f adulterated or mislabeled rosin
and turpentine, federal inspectors performed the same procedures as their counterparts at the
state level. Because most naval stores products left the south, nearly all received two
inspections.12
Those producers caught violating the inspection laws faced stiff penalties. Anyone
attempting to market adulterated naval stores had the product confiscated and sold to the highest
bidder, half the proceeds going to the informant and the other half to the state. The inspector
received none o f the reward. Attempting to produce, sell, or ship uninspected naval stores could
bring a five-hundred-dollar fine and/or three months imprisonment. For altering the inspector’s
grade or false markings by the inspector, the guilty party could receive a five-hundred-dollar fine
and/or six months imprisonment. Fraudulently packing naval stores or grading by anyone other
than a licensed inspector carried a one-hundred-dollar fine and/or three months imprisonment.13
Not only did government inspection and enforcement strengthen quality standards,
during the 1930s naval stores research intensified with federal support. The Naval Stores
Research Division o f the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau o f Agriculture and Industrial
Chemistry stepped up research into production, grading, and new uses. Whereas the Forestry
Service focused attention on broad issues affecting woodland and forest products industries
across the country, the Naval Stores Research Division concentrated exclusively on improving
the turpentine industry. Its agents working for the division demonstrated pioneering methods and
new still equipment in the field. The Division also distributed helpful literature to producers

12 Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 30; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry.
81-83; Production o f Naval Stores (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture,
1942), 6.
13 Campbell et al., Naval Stores Industry. 83-84.
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through the mail and offered individual assistance upon request. It also collected statistics on
naval stores production, both stock on hand at the stills and ports and that held by dealers and the
consuming industries. The Division’s ability to assist producers intensified with the opening of
the Naval Stores Experiment Station, built in the Olustee National Forest in Florida on ten acres
donated by the Forest Service and with $40,000 appropriated by Congress. The Olustee forest
contained a equal mix o f longleaf and slash pines and was accessible to producers from the most
productive naval stores regions in Georgia and Florida.14 It thus offered convenient research
opportunities on both of the most common species used in turpentining. When the station
opened in 1932, it consisted o f a fire still, auxiliary buildings, and a physical plant building that
housed chemicals and processing equipment. Three years later a chemical laboratory was added.
As the world’s first naval stores research station, the Olustee facility worked in cooperation with
the Bureau o f Forestry’s naval stores research laboratory in Washington, which studied the
composition and properties o f pine gum and better ways to prepare, use, handle, and transport
naval stores. By the late 1930s, the Naval Stores Division operated on a budget o f nearly
$80,000, split evenly between experiments on improved production practices and studies of
chemical composition and use. In 1943, the Division headquarters was moved from Washington,
DC, to New Orleans, and eight years later, to Olustee. From 1953 until its termination in 1973,
research at Olustee continued under the Agriculture Research Service.15

14Competition for the station’s location was stiff with ten communities in Georgia and
Florida offering free sites and facilities; For figures related to naval stores consumption see
Appendix A.
15 The naval stores industry benefited indirectly from the Southern Forest Experiment
Station, established in 1921 with its base in New Orleans and substations in Ashville, North
Carolina, McNeill, Mississippi, and Starke, Florida. Its studies o f fire damage, wood growth,
soil conservation, and the effects o f animal grazing on forest restitution assisted all forest
products industries. Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 76,79-80; Sandra Jo Forney, “The
Importance o f Sites Related to the Naval Stores Industry in Florida,” (paper presented at the
annual Florida Anthropological Society meeting, Daytona Beach, Florida, 1985), 6-7. “Locate
Naval Stores Station in Osceola Forest of Florida,” Turpentine newsclipping file, Forest History
Society, Durham, NC; G.E. Hilbert, “Twenty Years o f Research by the Naval Stores Station,”
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Government studies produced considerable advances in turpentining techniques. One
improvement was a better understanding o f burning practices. Burning away underbrush
exposed seedlings to frost in cooler months, excessive heat in warmer ones, and rapid drying o f
the soil. Given this understanding, conscientious producers had begun intensive fire suppression
efforts. For example, one operator in the early 1930s built his own seventy-foot high fire tower
which he had manned from eight in the morning to five in the afternoon. Because the tower had
no telephone, the watchman had to climb down and ride a mile on horseback to headquarters to
report the fire. To fight blazes, the same producer employed an old army surplus jeep with a
water tank mounted on its back. By the 1930s, progressive producers had joined efforts with
Forest Service to suppress fire in their forests. In 1939, around 125 Florida operators protected
approximately one million acres of turpentine forest, about a fourth of the state’s total protected
lands. As a result of their efforts, less than three percent o f these lands were burned over as
compared to fifty-five percent of the unprotected areas.16
Research conducted in the 1930s and 1940s demonstrated that the issue o f burning was
actually more complex than originally believed. Researchers agreed with earlier experts who
found that even small, low-burning fires could damage trees, especially if they swept through the
forest in the late spring and summer. Severe fires were capable o f consuming a tree’s entire

The AT-FA Journal 15 (January 1953): 6; “25 Years of Help.” Naval Stores Review: 13-14;
“Gum Naval Stores,” The Papers of Theodore Bilbo, Archives and Manuscript Department,
McCain Library and Archives, University o f Southern Mississippi. The Naval Stores Research
Lab supported by the AT-FA also continued efforts to find new uses for gum turpentine and
rosin. Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 476. “Report of
President to the Georgia Forestry Association,” (presented at the annual meeting o f the Georgia
Forestry Association, Savannah, Georgia, 18-19 May 1939), Georgia Forestry Association
Papers, 4.
16 Forbes and Stuart, Timber Growing and Logging and Turpentining Practices. 7;
Freeman Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” Wakulla Area Digest (September 1996):
24; Florida Writers’ Project, “The Story o f Naval Stores . . . , ” Florida Highways 11 (July 1943):
32.
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crown and so badly scorching its trunk that it soon died. Fire also caused partial deforestation,
reduced the rate o f wood growth, and even devoured a large portion of the soil nitrogen to a
depth o f forty-five inches, thus reducing its fertility. But by the 1940s, after over a decade of
diligent fire suppression, researchers realized that an accidentally-set blaze in an area fixe o f fire
for several years might be even more damaging than frequent bums. With fire suppressed, debris
built up to deep levels on the forest floor, providing enough fuel to turn any unintentional fire
into a roaring and extremely destructive conflagration. In 1934, for example, the effect of a
forest fire which burned through 15,000 acres in southeast Georgia varied greatly between
previously-burned and unbumed plots. In areas where light, frequent burning had been
permitted, none o f the turpentined slash and longleaf died and only a few o f the round secondgrowth pines perished. In another part, protected from fire for fifteen years, fifty percent of the
turpentine trees and eighty percent of the young second-growth pines died. Studies also showed
that whereas fire could damage pines in different ways, it also improved growing conditions.
Although fire consumed soil nitrogen, it added nutrients through ash that leached into the ground
with rain. Moreover, the removal of forest floor debris exposed soil to the direct rays of the sun,
increasing its temperature. Rises in soil temperature increased a pine’s ability to absorb water
and thus raised gum production. Moreover, the absence o f dead plant material and low-growing
vegetation increased the chances that pine seeds would reach the soil where they could sprout.
Once the seedlings emerged, fires lowered the threat o f brown spot needle disease and reduced
competition from grass.17

17 Cary, “Studies on Flow of Gum,” 4; V.L. Harper, Effects of Fire on Gum Yields of
Longleaf and Slash Pines. (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1944), 79, 12-15, 18,21-22,26-27; Campbell, etal., Naval Stores Industry. 32; Wahlenberg, Longleaf
Pine. 201-202; Norman R. Hawley, “Burning in Naval Stores Forest,” in Proceedings. Third
Annual Tall Timbers Fire Ecology Conference (Tallahassee, FL: Tall Timbers Research Station,
1964), 87; Howard E. Weaver and David A. Anderson, Manual o f Southern Forestry (Danville,
IL: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1954), 233.
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Thus foresters, by the mid-1940s, recommended carefully controlled burning over none
at all. Producers could manage the intensity and spread o f fire by plowing fire lanes and burning
between sundown and eight in the morning, when the wind was less likely to shift to a new
direction. It was also best to bum during the winter months and following rain and to confine the
fire to smaller, more easily-controlled areas. For stands intended for new production, producers
enjoyed optimal results of burning just before the installation o f cups. Operators were also to
follow a rotation pattern so that plots were burned every three to five years raking around the
trees before each firing.18
Because free range cattle and other livestock herders were responsible for much o f the
burning in the southern forest, researchers tried to coordinate forest and range research. As late
as 1950, livestock herders considered it their right to practiced free-range grazing year-round
with very little supplemental feeding and minimal control over the number o f cattle or the season
in which they used a given area or the number o f cattle feeding there. Very little planning went
into their forest burning practices either. Foresters showed that herders were harming their own
interests with their haphazard burning. Studies found that the South’s best forage lands were
indeed in the southern pine belt, but that between July and early March grazing was poor and
could not be improved by burning. Researchers also showed that burning commonly killed an
area’s Bermuda grass, which offered the best grazing, and left only weeds and wiregrass, the
latter two required from seven and a half to thirty acres to sustain one cow for the five-month
grazing period. Such findings contributed to the decline o f free-range grazing in the piney
woods.19

18 Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 40-41.
19 Weaver and Anderson. Manual of Southern Forestry. 155, 158-161, 175; Florida
Writers’ Project, Florida. 32.
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Government researchers also thoroughly examined factors affecting gum yield.
Scientists already had a general understanding that crown size influenced yield, but new research
revealed that this quality became more important in the third and subsequent years o f harvesting.
Trees possessing less than forty percent crown greatly decreased their gum production in their
later years. Experiments also showed that rapidly-growing trees with large crowns had the least
decline in yields from year to year and that second-growth trees tended to make more than oldgrowth o f the same diameter because they usually possessed more foliage. Researchers also
found that temperature influenced gum yield. If temperatures dropped below forty-five degrees,
little or no gum flowed. When temperatures rose to around fifty-two degrees, both slash and
longleaf pine required nearly six days to yield ninety percent of their yield for the week. But
with average temperatures hovering around eighty-two degrees, as they usually did in the
turpentine belt during the summer, longleaf produced its weekly yield in the first forty-eight
hours after chipping and slash pines in the first ninety-six hours. Thus, it was profitable to chip
more frequently during the warmer summer months than in the spring and fall in order to
encourage a perpetual gum flow. Researchers assured producers that the heavy summer chipping
schedule would not harm the tree. They also showed that intense turpentining did indeed provide
a twenty-five percent larger yield in the first year than conservative turpentining, but in all
subsequent years the trees gum production experienced drastic declines. Likewise, an advanced
streak made approximately thirty days before the chipping season brought good early season
yields, but after the first eight weeks yields declined in proportion to the early rise. Experiments
also showed that backfaces produced approximately fourteen percent less gum than the front
face.20

20 Wahlenberg, Longleaf Pine. 200-201,205; T.A. Liefeld, “Relation of Naval Stores
Yields to Frequency o f Chipping,” Journal of Agricultural Research 64 (15 January 1942), 92;
Ralph W. Clements, Manual: Modem Gum Naval Stores Methods (Asheville, NC: Southeastern
Forest Experiment Station, 1960), 2-4,9,24; 10-11.
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Through their efforts, forestry researchers were able to make more precise conclusions
regarding the effect of turpentining on tree growth and forest depletion than were previously
known. Growth reduction proved more related to the size and number o f faces on a tree than the
actual volume o f gum extracted. Wide and multiple faces slowed tree growth. The
recommended average-size single face caused about a twenty-five percent reduction in wood
formation. With healthy, rapidly growing trees with large crowns, however, the slowed rate
could be as little as five percent. Discoveries concerning the rate o f tree depletion led to better
recommendations regarding the pattern with which pines should be turpentined and harvested.
Earlier suggestions recommended long rest periods between the conclusion of work on the front
face and the start o f harvesting from the back. This lengthy interval, foresters discovered,
permitted pitch-soaking, rot, and insect damage to work their way up the truck above the face.
Foresters thus began recommending the rapid working of trees, using safe methods, and cutting
the stands promptly with the end o f chipping.21
By far one o f the greatest industry advancements made by government researchers
working at the Naval Stores Research Division was the design o f a central distillery developed at
the Olustee station. Costing between $20,000 and $250,000, depending on size and
sophistication, central distilleries employed the most up-to-date and efficient methods to produce
standardized naval stores of a higher quality and at a lower cost than did old-style copper fire
stills. Because these outfits had storage capacity for up to fifty thousand barrels o f crude gum,
the product could be refined and marketed year-round, reducing the annual fluctuation in market
prices.22

21 Cary, “Studies on Flow o f Gum,” 14; Clements, Manual. 10; R.P. True and R. D.
McCulley “Defects Above Naval Stores Faces Are Associated With Dry Face,” reprint from
Southern Lumberman (15 December 1945), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama,
Tifton, GA, 1-3.
22 Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 477; Donald
Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f the
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With central distilleries, producers could enjoy the advantages o f better and cleaner
equipment operated by highly trained specialists, all at a lower cost than running their own stills.
Operators delivered the gum to an unloading deck at one o f the large facilities. The raw
turpentine arrived in sealed barrels that were weighed before proceeding to a receiving area.
Here workers turned the barrels up-side-down over receiving vats to drain. After the gum
stopped oozing from their containers, steam jets directed into each barrel melted the last bit o f
gum which ran out into the vat. Barrels were then returned to the unloading deck to be
reweighed in order to determine the gum’s net weight. From the bottom o f the vat, raw
turpentine was pumped into another chamber, where it was melted with steam before proceeding
through two sets of screens that removed such trash as insects, dirt, bark, and straw. The filtered
gum then entered a wash tank were it was cleaned of water-soluble contaminants. Once cleaned,
a carefully measured amount o f gum entered the still. In the still, which could hold from one
hundred to two hundred barrels o f gum, heat was applied with submerged steam coils.
Technicians carefully regulated the distillation process until the water-turpentine flow from the
condenser reached a rate o f nine to one. At that point the molten rosin was pumped from the still
and packaged. Central distilleries processed between one thousand to two thousand barrels o f
crude gum each week. By comparison, a fire still could manage only a maximum of 180 barrels
a week.23
The introduction o f central distilleries coincided with several developments that made
their success possible. First, road improvements in the naval stores region and the wide
availability o f motorized trucks enabled producers to haul their gum many miles to a large
American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942), xiv,
227-228; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 97-98.
23 A.J. Panshin, E.S. Harrar, J.S. Bethel, W.J. Baker, Forest Products: Their Sources.
Production, and Utilization (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962): 454; Shirley,
Working Trees for Naval Stores. 34; Hilbert, “Twenty Years o f Research,” 8.
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distillery more cheaply than operating a badly equipped and poorly run fire still themselves.
Second, an increasing number o f new gum producers, many of whom could not afford their own
still, created a demand for such facilities. Third, stricter marketing requirements, which the
central distilleries could meet more easily than fire stills, enhanced the former’s popularity.
Finally, competition from wood naval stores producers, who were growing more and more
capable o f producing finer, standardized product grades, necessitated that gum producers turn to
specialized distillers able to refine similar products. All four factors, combined with the central
distilleries clear economic advantages, led to their rapid construction across the Southeast in the
1930s and 1940s.24
Large naval stores producers and consumers built most of the government-designed
central distilleries, with factorage houses playing little role in their construction. Several were
built around Jacksonville, but most were located in Georgia. In 1936, Glidden Company built the
first central processing and distillation plant in Jacksonville, Florida, and later one in Valdosta
and Collins, Georgia. A group o f large operators organized Filtered Rosin Products Company,
which, by 1942, operated stills in Brunswick, Baxley, Douglas, Valdosta, and Jacksonville. The
Langdales o f Valdosta began construction o f a plant late during the Second World War, after
they received authorization to acquire the steel and brass necessary for the project. Their
distillery opened July 1, 1945, at the cost o f $75,000. Employing the latest designs and
equipment, it was the third such distillery erected in the southeastern Georgia community.
Located just outside of town adjacent to the Georgia and Florida and the Georgia, South, and
24 Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 476-477; Shirley,
Working Trees for Naval Stores. 30,33-34; I.F. Eldgredge, The 4 Forests and the Future of the
South (Washington, DC: The Charles Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1947), 21; Nelson
Courtlandt Brown, Forest Products: The Harvesting. Processing, and Marketing o f Materials
Other Than Lumber. Including the Principal Derivatives. Extractives, and Incidental Products in
the United States and Canada (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1950), 185; Naval Stores
Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington. DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1956), 1-2;
Elliott Maguire, interview by author, tape recording, S t Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996.
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Florida Railroad lines, it replaced the roughly twenty-five stills the Langdales operated at their
own operations and also served other producers in South Georgia and northern Florida.
Approximately fifty miles to the southeast o f Valdosta in Lake City, Florida, the Newton family
opened a similar facility not quite two months later. For three generations the Newtons had
produced naval stores, beginning in North Carolina and spreading geographically until, by 1945,
they were engaged in the business in all the pine states but Texas. Billed as the most modem
processing plant between Jacksonville and Valdosta, the Newton facility competed with the
Langdales for producers’ business.25 By the mid- to late-1940s, approximately thirty central
distilleries were in operation in the naval stores region, processing close to eighty percent o f the
crude gum. Whereas approximately 1,300 fire stills were operating throughout the southern pine
region in the mid 1930s, by 1950 only around sixty-three fire stills remained in operation in the
South, most running on an irregular basis. The shift from independent distillation to central
facilities was so rapid that, by 1948, economist Joseph B. Hosmer observed that “the gum
segment has changed from a sprawling industry characterized by twelve or thirteen hundred
small wood-fired stills (‘fire stills’), which creaked at the joints and leaked profit at every gasket,
to a compact group of thirty to forty efficient distillation plants.”26 Thus, in the 1940s, gum
naval stores producers returned to the status operators before the mid 1830s in that they became
gum harvesters who relied on large distilleries to process their turpentine.

25 Harley Langdale, Jr., interview by Harold K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, 9;
“Langdale’s New Processing Plant Will Open July 1st,” The AT-FA Journal (June 1945): 5;
Carroll B. Butler, Treasures o f the Longleaf Pines. Naval Stores (Shalimar, FL: Tarkel
Publishing, 1998), 91; M.E. Henegar, Slash and Longleaf Pine Growers Handbook: Practical
Information and Suggestions for Growing. Protecting, and Realizing Maximum Utilization (Lake
City, FL: The Newton Company, Incorporated), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia
Agrirama, Tifton, GA, i, iii.
26 Joseph B. Hosmer. Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: State
Engineering Experiment Station, Georgia School o f Technology, 1948), 1.
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Even as central distilleries gained popularity, the Olustee Station researchers also
assisted producers with improvements to the old fire still design. Their new still used fuel more
economically, heated the kettle more evenly, provided better fire protection, proved easier to
regulate, and consequently produced better results than the previous design, which had remained
virtually unchanged for a century. The new fire still’s fumace was designed with thick walls,
allowing the maximum fire protection and durability. The redesigned flue and fire path allowed
for more even distribution o f heat, the still structure itself was constructed o f heavy gagged
copper and thoroughly welded together, and the size and strength of the worm, condensing tub,
and the foundation it rested upon were increased. A thermostat provided automatic control o f the
temperature and water flow into the condenser tub. Rosin strainers were enlarged to handle the
still’s entire content without workers having to check the flow as it drained. The strainers were
lined with aluminum and fitted with a hydraulic lift to raise the vat high enough for its contents
to run into barrels, eliminating the need for workers to dip it out.
In the early 1930s, one Baxley, Georgia, producer began construction of what was
probably one o f the first o f the improved stills. The Baxlev News Banner informed the curious
that it was located close enough to the highway for passersby to see it work. During the first
several years of the 1930s, ninety such stills were reportedly built in Florida. By 1934, around
fifteen percent of stills in the South were o f the government design and another eight percent
employed some of its features. Only a large operation could afford a still o f such quality so most
stills in operation at the time used none of the improvements. An estimated seventy-eight percent
of fire stills continued to use sound rather than the recording thermometer to regulate the process.
As late as the 1960s some o f these primitive facilities continued to operate. Many other
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producers abandoned the use o f their existing fire stills or, when constructing new camps,
decided against building stills and instead relied on the central distilleries to process their gum.27
Intensified wartime government research resulted in yet another advance in turpentine
production, the use o f acid spray to increase chipping efficiency. In the early 1930s, Germany
and Russia began studies into the use of an acid solution to stimulate gum flow. U.S. studies
followed in 1936 at the Olustee Experimental Forest as a cooperative effort between the
Southern Forest Experiment Station and the U.S. Forest Service. Few resources were initially
allocated to the project since surplus of naval stores and low prices in the late 1930s reduced
interest in methods to increase production. When the Second World War increased naval stores
demand, research into acid treatment accelerated. The studies showed that a fifty percent water
and sulfuric acid solution would collapse the wood cells lining the resin ducts, thus enlarging
their openings and allowing for a longer period o f gum flow. Moreover, the acid held the resin
ducts open for two weeks, after which new streaks and acid were necessary. Thus, labor costs
could be cut because workers needed to visit trees only half as often. Another benefit was the
faces’ slowed movement up the trunk. By 1946, researchers announced the method ready for the
industry’s adoption.28

27 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 80; Wyman, Florida Naval Stores. 28; “Crosssectional View of Turpentine Fire Still Layout at the Naval Stores Station,” (Olustee, FL: Naval
Stores Station), Bilbo Papers; Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 33; “Ten Mile Notes,”
The Baxley News Banner 3 February 1932; “Before Tourism-Turpentine,” Southern Living
(October 1986), St. Augustine Historical Society Research Library, St. Augustine, FL; Butler,
Treasures o f the Longleaf Pines. 79; Jo Meldrim, interview by author, tape recording, St.
Augustine, FL, 19 August 1996.
28 Carl E. Ostrom and Worden Waring, “Effect of Chemical Stimulation o f Gum Flow on
Carbohydrate Reserves in Slash Pine,” Journal o f Forestry 44 (December 1946): 1076; Panshin et
al., Forest Products. 443; Kenneth B. Pomeroy, “Modem Trends in an Ancient Industry,” Journal
of Forestry 50 (April 1952): 297; Peter Koch, Utilization o f the Southern Pines (Washington,
DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1972), 1479-1480; Norman R. Hawley, “A
Summary o f the Histoiy o f the Naval Stores Conservation Program,” in Historical Background o f
the Naval Stores Conservation Program. Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama,
14; C. Dorsey Dyer, “History o f the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” The AT-FA Journal 25
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Government researchers studied other industry issues as well. They examined a wide
range of naval stores packaging methods: dip barrels, turpentine storage and shipping containers,
and rosin packages. It investigated the composition and derivatives o f resin, rosin, and spirits.
And it studied the industrial uses o f naval stores, the origin and composition o f the color o f rosin,
the causes o f deterioration of turpentine in storage, and statistics o f the production, consumption,
and stocks o f naval stores.29
Thanks to government-sponsored studies, turpentining techniques, by 1950, were vastly
improved from what they were in 1900 and considerably different from just twenty years earlier.
In the 1930s and 1940s, bark chipping, acid treatment and the introduction o f two-quart cups
transformed the practice of harvesting gum, significantly reduced the damage to trees, lowered
labor requirements, and increased yields. Producers also had a variety o f cup design options
from clay to elongated metal to conical-shaped metal cups. New double-headed nails made nails
easier to see and remove, solving the problem o f saw blades striking them. With the introduction
o f central distilleries, producers were no longer burdened with the expense o f distillation. Start
up costs included only cups, gutters, and the tools required to work the trees.30
Despite advances, however, the Great Depression hit the naval stores industry hard (fig.
12. I). Lack o f restraint on the part o f producers in the late 1920s resulted in over extension and
overproduction, making operators wholly unprepared for the sudden economic downturn. The
United States’ high protective tariff worsened the Depression’s impact on the naval stores
industry, since in raising the price o f imported goods, the government crushed foreign trade and
(January 1963): 8; Clements, Manual. 11; M.D. Mobley and Robert N. Haskins, Forestry in the
South (Atlanta: Turner E. Smith and Co., 1956), 157.
29 “Gum Naval Stores,” Bilbo Papers, 3.
30 Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 477; C.S.
Schopmeyer, “Labor Requirements for Working Turpentine Faces,” Naval Stores Review 64
(April 1954): 17; “Naval Stores Equipment,” The Forest Farmer 9 (September 1950): 8-10.
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made it impossible for other nations to purchase American goods, including naval stores.
Producers, attempting to remain in business, responded with desperate measures. Turpentiners
slashed operating expenses as much as possible by lowering wages to bare subsistence levels and
refusing to replace worn out equipment. They also reduced their overall level o f production,
although in many cases not by choice. Producers either lost the means to operate on the scale
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Figure 12.1. Net Cash Proceeds Per Fifty Gallons o f Spirits o f Turpentine, 1920-1939
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
338.

they once had or went broke and saw factors foreclose on their operations. Many producers
worked their reduced number o f crops intensely in an effort to extract as much gum as possible
over the short term. Despite increased forest exploitation, the drop in the number o f producers
(fig. 12.2) resulted in the 1932/33 crop year being the smallest in the previous thirty-five years.
Although the economy began to crawl slowly toward recovery, in 1933 the growing use o f
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competing solvents, especially wood naval stores and mineral spirits, lessened the benefits of the
increased business activity for the remaining gum naval stores producers. Combined with this
increased competition, the economic dip of 1937-38 dealt the industry another blow, causing
turpentine prices to drop further and still more operators to quit.31
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Figure 12.2. Number of Gum Naval Stores Establishments, 1921-1939
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects of the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 11; For figures related to chart see
Appendix B.

31 A 1933 policy, however, served turpentine producers as a partial counter-measure to a
slump in world naval stores demand. By going off the gold standard, the U.S. towered its
currency value in the world market resulting in lower naval stores prices than the French could
offer. Despite stagnation in world naval stores consumption, American producers were able to
export more o f their product at the expense o f the French. Martin, “An Historical and Analytical
Approach,” 144, 195; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 22, 89-90. As the naval stores
industry suffered, so did transportation companies and especially the equipment manufacturers
who serviced producers. J.E. McCaffrey, interview by Elwood R. Maunder, Oral History
Collection, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 92; I. James Pikl, A History o f Georgia Forestry
(Athens: Bureau o f Business and Economic Research, University o f Georgia, 1966), 34; Robert
M. Newton to P.N. Howell, 25 September 1937, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers, Special
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi State University.
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To make conditions worse for naval stores producers, just as the Depression was
reaching its worst levels, a severe drought hit the southern pine belt. Problems began in 1930
with persistent warm winds and high temperatures, part o f a weather pattern that contributed to
the Dust Bowl in the plains states. Although rainfall remained relatively normal that year, the
winds, heat, and low humidity caused rapid evaporation and a reduction in moming dews, all of
which strained vegetation. Then, over the next two years, rainfall amounts dropped sharply.
With drought conditions technically beginning when precipitation drops off fifteen percent o f the
average, parts o f the pine belt saw declines o f from twenty percent to thirty percent The lack of
rain caused soil moisture to decline to 2.11 percent at a depth of three inches and 2.32 percent at
a twelve inch depth when it rarely dipped below four percent and, then, only for brief periods.
Under these extreme conditions, trees began dying. Longleaf pines, with their deep tap root,
faired better than slash pines, yet even the former’s mortality rate shot up. Overall tree loss
amounted to 9.4 percent, or ten times higher than normal. Death rates were the highest in
crowded stands and those on soils with high sand content. With pines under considerable stress,
gum yields declined, even in stands worked conservatively and for only a few years. Overall, the
faces yielded twenty percent less gum in 1932 than they had the year before. As desperate
turpentiners continued working the strained trees, the incidents of dryface and ips beetle attack
increased. Partial defoliation, combined with enormous quantities o f debris contributed by dead
pines greatly, increased the risk o f fire.32
Some producers began sideline businesses as means to raise extra cash with which to
weather the economic and environmental devastation. Some raised cattle and farm crops such as
sugar cane, sweet potatoes, com, and hay. Those who owned their forests attempted to market
32 John C. Hoyt, Droughts of 1930-34 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f the
Interior, 1936), 2, 11; “Report,” Southern Forest Experiment Station, 11 May 1932, Cary
Collection, 2; “Effect o f 1931-32 Drought,” Cary Collection, 1-7; “Report on Survey of
Conditions o f Timber in a Portion of the Naval Stores Belt,” Cary Collection.
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their previously-turpentined trees to lumber mills. But trees scarred with eight- and ten-foot
faces produced at most only a few saw boards. Such pines’ pitchy bottom sections, however,
could be cut and sold as ties and poles. Because only a few pulpwood mills dotted the South in
the 1930s, there was a limited market for the principal product of a turpentined trees, wood
chips.33
Many producers recognized that then new federal initiatives aimed at helping farmers,
not sideline enterprises, offered their best chance for survival. Where earlier in the century the
United States Justice department’s peonage investigations had led turpentiners to condemn
federal involvement as a menace, the clear benefits o f government-backed studies during the
191 Os and 1920s, which in no way threatened the industry’s labor system, led operators to view
Washington’s actions as beneficial. Before their petitions for funding under the farm assistance
programs stood a chance, however, producers needed to convince government officials that the
naval stores industry was, in actuality, agriculture. When the 1923 Naval Stores Act, which
established product grades, passed Congress, it mentioned nothing about the status of naval
stores as either industrial or agricultural products. The act gave the Secretary of Agriculture the
duty o f overseeing its enforcement only because his department administered the Forestry
Service and naval stores, no one denied, were forest products. But when producers requested
relief under the federal Agricultural Marketing Act o f 1929, which sought to stabilize farm prices
through cooperatives that received low interest federal loans and through sales to foreign
countries, officials rejected them, ruling that turpentine and rosin were not defined as agricultural
products under the legislation. Gum naval stores operators then began a campaign to reclassify
their business as agriculture, a task that required them to differentiate themselves from wood
naval stores producers, who, with large, heavily capitalized, and mechanized plants employing

33 Benedict, “The Naval Stores Industry,” 2.
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hundreds of workers, clearly represented a form o f industry, but produced the same product as
gum turpentine manufacturers.34
Gum producers pointed out that the typical operator required relatively little capital to
run his business, compared to wood naval stores operations, and that, unlike the technologically
sophisticated wood naval stores industry—whose large plants and elaborate equipment permitted
them to run year-round—gum producers used primitive methods and operated on a seasonal cycle.
Where wood naval stores were produced by only a few large operations widely scattered across
the South, gum naval stores were made by around 2,200 relatively small-scale operators. Also,
they maintained, a significant percentage o f gum producers cultivated crop land in conjunction
with their turpentine business, raising cotton, com, tobacco, peanuts, pecans, with the same
workers. Producers further argued that they, like farmers, were subject to hazards such as
uncooperative weather and seasonal over-production and they compared turpentining to maple
syrup production, which was itself classified as agriculture.35
Once producers presented their reasonably valid case that gum collection was
agriculture, they faced the slightly greater challenge o f maintaining that distilling the gum, which
many operators continued to do themselves, did not represent industry. Producers cleverly
argued that, like changing any agricultural product from its “originally produced” state to its
“first processed” state, distilling did not change turpentine and rosin’s nature as agricultural
commodities. Converting a raw material into a primary raw material fit for future manufacturing
purposes, like processing food products into a less-perishable form, producers argued, did not

34 A.L. Brogden, Memorandum, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; Martin, “An Historical
and Analytical Approach,” 149-150.
35 Leon Henderson to T.F. Dreyfus, 1942, Bilbo Papers; “Gum Turpentine and Gum
Rosin: Supporting Brief Filed by Producers Committee that Gum Naval Stores Are Agricultural
Commodities,” 20 November 1933, William M. Colmer Papers, Archives and Manuscripts
Division, McCain Library and Archives, University o f Southern Mississippi, 2,4-6,9.
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transform the essence of the product. Therefore, according to their logic, distilling gum was no
more an industry than ginning cotton, curing tobacco, or boiling maple syrup. Like these
processes, distilling added and took away nothing from the gum. It caused no transforming
chemical process, but merely separated spirits and rosin. In distilling, producers were merely
preparing the gum for market. Furthermore, they maintained, naval stores products’ ultimate use
for industrial purposes changed nothing about their nature as an agricultural commodities. Flax
and linseed oil, for example, were agricultural commodities with industrial uses.36 As one
industry observer explained “the turpentine gum farmer is in exactly the same [class] as other
American farmers. His residence, his terminology, his business, his standard of living and mode
o f thought places him in the same category as the producers of other agricultural commodities.”37
The gum producers succeeded in persuading the government o f their arguments validity.
Senator Walter George of Georgia exercised considerable influence in the revision of the 1929
Marketing Act to include naval stores producers.38 In 1931 Congress amended the act to include
as an agricultural commodity “crude gum from a living tree, and the following products as
processed by the original producer o f the crude gum from which derived gum spirits of
turpentine and gum rosin as defined in the Naval Stores Act approved March 3, 1923 ”39 The
amendment made gum naval stores producers eligible for loans through the Federal Intermediate
Credit Bank set up as part o f the Federal Farm Board.40
36 “Gum Turpentine and Gum Rosin,” Colmer Papers, 6-10; Martin, “An Historical and
Analytical Approach,” 17.
37 “Gum Turpentine and Gum Rosin,” Colmer Papers, 10.
38 “Memorandum Concerning Senator George and Naval Stores,” 29 June 1938, Colmer
Papers, 1-2.
39 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 150; R.H. Crosbey to Howell, 31
March 1939, Colmer Papers; Memorandum, A.L. Brogden, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers.
40 Soon after receiving federal recognition, the principal naval stores-producing states
enacted their own legislation designating naval stores as agricultural commodities.
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With their new official definition, turpentiners immediately set to work to stabilize the
naval stores market. In 1931, they attempted to raise prices by forming a cooperative association,
the Gum Turpentine-Rosin Marketing Association, which would use federal loans to purchase a
large portion o f the output With around one thousand operators, who accounted for seventy
percent of total production, as members, the Association received government loans through the
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank o f Columbia, South Carolina. By July, after just three months
of activity, the Association stockpiled 62,000 barrels o f spirits and 260,000 barrels or rosin. At
this point, the Association had exhausted their $2.5 million loan and, in the face o f world
industrial decline, had failed to raise naval stores prices significantly. Over the next four years
supplies accumulated by the Association depressed the naval stores market even further until the
surplus was fully disposed of.41
Although the Gum Turpentine-Rosin Marketing Association’s efforts failed, the
producers’ success in including naval stores as an agricultural commodity enabled them to
benefit from the Agriculture Adjustment Administration, which the Roosevelt administration
created in 1933. The AAA sought to help the farm economy by reducing production and
bringing supply and demand into balance. Its goal was to achieve parity, a point where farm
products had the same purchasing power that they did from 1909-1914, when agricultural
commodities presumably had a fair exchange value for non-farm goods. Turpentine producers
petitioned the AAA for a reduced-acreage plan whereby, like cotton, wheat, and tobacco farmers,
they would be paid for land taken out o f production. Given Congress’ recent reclassification of
naval stores, the Department o f Agriculture ruled that turpentine was indeed an agricultural

Memorandum, A.L. Brogden, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores
Industry. 76.
41 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 150-151; Campbell, et al., Naval
Stores Industry. 88; Butler, Treasures o f the Loneleaf Pines. 248.

i tla i.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

585
commodity and eligible for a marketing agreement with the Agency. But because turpentine and
rosin were not basic commodities like other crops, the Department decided that gum naval stores
producers were not eligible for reduced production compensation. The government did not
control this marketing agreement; instead it was run by a control committee elected by the
producers. In the election for representatives, producers received one vote for each unit of naval
stores produced in the preceding year. Thus large producers easily controlled decisions.
Operators from all the naval stores-producing states were represented, as were factors, dealers,
and industrial consumers. Producers from Georgia and Florida selected three members from
each state and Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas each
chose one.42
Factors, concerned over the agreement’s limited focus on industry problems and its
exclusion of anyone but gum producers, made their own recommendations to the AAA. Because
environmental problems persisted, factors requested that as part o f the agreement, producers be
restrained from harvesting from trees too small to handle the stress. Factors also believed that
part of the plan’s administrative fees should go toward research. They strongly felt that factors
should have a say in the plan since they had so much invested in production. Moreover, they
pushed for all sectors of the industry to work together. Factors argued that they, distillers, and
wood naval stores producers should be included in the program if the entire industry was to pull
itself out of its slump. To include all areas o f the industry, they recommended the creation o f a
nine-member executive committee made up o f three producers, two factors, two distillers, two
42 Gilbert C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More: Southern Agriculture. 1865-1980 (Lexington:
The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 128; “Proposed Marketing Agreement for GumTurpentine and Gum-Rosin Processors,” 13 November 1934, Cary Collection; Campbell, et al.,
Naval Stores Industry. 84,90; Memorandum, A.L. Brogden, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; R.H.
Crosbey to Howell, 31 March 1939, Colmer Papers; Kenneth H. Thomas, Jr., McCranie’s
Turpentine Still. Atkinson Countv. Georgia: A Historical Analysis o f the Site. With Some
Information on the Naval Stores Industry in Georgia and Elsewhere (Atlanta: Georgia Institute o f
Community and Area Development, 1975), 8.
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wood naval stores manufacturers. The factors were worried that the plan would hurt the small
producers if the larger ones had a more powerful vote. They also feared that foreign producers
would use the advance notification o f reduced U.S. production to increase their output, thus
negating any benefits o f the plan.43
Approved by the Secretary o f Agriculture in February 1934, the marketing agreement
provided for a compulsory restriction o f output to prevent over-supply and increase prices and
financial gains for producers. The agreement drawn up by the control committee proposed to
reduce the 1934/35 crop by ten percent from the previous year in an effort to raise prices to the
1909-1914 level o f sixty cents per gallon for turpentine and thirty-eight dollars for three and a
third barrels o f rosin. Through the program, individual operators were allotted a production
quota based on their previous four-year production averages. The committee supplied each
producer with a number o f tags equal to his allotment for the year plus additional tags equal to
the naval stores owned by him on December 31, 1933. Beginning January 1, every package of
gum turpentine or gum rosin shipped by the original producer was required to have a tag. Each
tag had a number indicating the producer, the tag’s serial number, year o f production, and the
contents: crude gum, clean gum, turpentine, or rosin. The control committee kept a record of
information related to each tag. By October 15 o f each year, the committee would estimate the
amount of turpentine and rosin that would be available on December 31 and determine the
volume of naval stores to be marketed in the coming year. Based on this figure, the committee
would allot each producer a percentage of the quantity determined to be marketed in the
forthcoming year. Operators unsatisfied with their allotment could petition the committee for
more tags. When a producer sold or leased any part or all of his timberland, a proportionate
share of his allotment accompanied the transfer, provided the new owner or lessee could prove to

43 Antwerp Naval Stores Company, et al. to W.F. Holtsman, 20 October 1933, Cary
Collection.
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the committee his ability to fulfill the allotment. So as not to exclude new producers, each year
the committee reserved three percent of the total allotment for operators beginning in the
business. However, no new producer’s allotment could exceed one thousand barrels o f raw
turpentine. As the factors had wished, restrictions were placed on the size o f pines to be
harvested. Under the plan, operators agreed not to harvest from trees less than nine inches in
diameter four and one half feet from the ground or to work two faces in a tree less than fourteen
inches in diameter. To maintain the program, producers paid to the committee assessed charges
approved by the Secretary o f Agriculture. At its inception, the plan called for a fee o f fifteen
cents for each barrel of turpentine and five cents for rosin. Any funds remaining after
administration costs would be used for industry research or product advertisement. The wood
naval stores industry created a similar agreement which became effective in May 1934. As a
designated industry, however, wood naval stores production fell under the jurisdiction o f the
National Industrial Recovery Administration.44
Despite its promised benefits, producers were unsatisfied with the allotment program.
They wanted the same price support payments that farmers received under the AAA. Using
arguments similar to those made in 1931, turpentiners successfully asserted that gum naval stores
were agricultural products and, in the second half o f 1935, they were added to the list of
commodities that benefited from price support. Thus producers became entitled to funds
collected under customs laws for the purpose o f encouraging exports and domestic consumption,
and, most importantly, price adjustments. No sooner had the turpentine producers won this
privilege, however, than the U.S. Supreme Court found the AAA unconstitutional.45

44 Proposed Marketing Agreement for Gum-Turpentine and Gum-Rosin Processors, Cary
Collection, 8-10, 27; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 84-92.
45 A.L. Brogden, Memorandum, 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; Blount, Sprits o f
Turpentine. 29.
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In the face o f this enormous setback, efforts to bring control to the naval stores market
intensified under the powerful leadership of Judge Harley Langdale of Valdosta, Georgia, the
world’s largest gum naval stores producer. Langdale’s turpentine empire grew from a modest
sized operation his father started in the late nineteenth century. Bom in South Carolina in 1860,
the Judge’s father, John Langdale, moved as a young man to Statesboro, Georgia, then to
Council, on the edge o f the Okefenokee Swamp where he had begun turpentining by 1894. Until
his death in 1911, John Langdale produced gum naval stores, crossties, lumber, and cattle, which
he grazed on the open range. His estate, consisting o f eighteen to twenty-thousand acres of
property in south Georgia, was divided among his six children upon his death.46
Harley Langdale, bom in 1888, graduated from Mercer University law school the year
after his father’s death and began practice in Valdosta some forty miles to the west of the family
home. Harley’s law practice progressed rapidly, and he was soon elected a municipal judge. But
he retained an interest in naval stores production, having helped his father in the business since
he was ten. In 1922, he began purchasing timber land around Valdosta and, over the next few
decades, expanded his holdings in Lowndes, Ecoloes, and Clink Counties. During the 1930s, he
further increased his pine acreage by purchasing large quantities of reforested cotton land
available at low prices following the boll weevil’s destruction. Langdale relied on partners for
efficient management o f his far-flung operations. When beginning a new establishment,
Langdale would find the most competent partner available, whether he could finance part of the
venture or not, then borrow the money from a factor and set up the operation. By the late 1930s,
Langdale, either by himself or in partnership with other operators, worked approximately 315

46 “Histoiy o f Gum Naval Stores,” American Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers, 2;
Harley Langdale, Jr. “Brief Facts on the Langdale Company,” Lowndes County Historical
Society, Valdosta, GA, 1; Downing Musgrove, “A Tribute to Judge Harley Langdale, Sr.,” in
Historical Background o f the Naval Stores Conservation Program. Olustee Experiment Station
Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1; Jane Twitty Shelton, Pines and Pioneers: A History of
Lowndes Countv. Georgia. 1825-1900. (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1976), 184-185.
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crops (3,150,000 faces) on nearly three million trees. His twenty-five camps and stills, which
were scattered from the Carolinas to Florida, produced approximately 14,000 units (one cask of
spirits and three and a third barrels o f rosin equaling a unit) o f naval stores, over 2.5 percent of
the naval stores manufactured in the U.S. As the chairman o f the board o f Langdale Companies,
which produced naval stores and processed and dealt in gum turpentine products and production
supplies, Langdale held a powerful position not only in the naval stores industry but in Georgia
and the South as well. Guests for deer hunts on his vast property included Senator “Cotton Ed”
Smith o f South Carolina, Georgia Senator Walter George, and Georgia governor and later senator
Richard Russell. When producers met in Washington in the mid-l930s to secure financial help
from the AAA, Langdale was among them, flexing his political muscle.47
What individual producers, including Langdale, continued to fear were low prices, everrising debts, and increased competition from substitute products. Langdale and other influential
turpentiners understood that industry cooperation offered the only hope that the Depression
would not swallow both large and small producers. In 1936, one producer argued that “if all of
our fanners will cooperate now and from now on we will come into our own but it must be done
now or we are sunk and will never get another chance.”48 They also recognized that, in a buyers’

47 Langdale was greatly involved in a variety o f organizations. During his lifetime he
was a member o f the First Baptist Church; Rotary Club; Shriners; Valdosta County Club; Sons o f
the American Revolution; 4-H Club Advisory Group; Valdosta and Georgia Bar Association;
Honorary Life Member o f American Forestry Association; Herty Foundation Laboratory;
Georgia Game and Fish Commission; a director of the Citizens and Southern National Bank, the
Valdosta Times, and 4-H Club Foundation; Chairman o f the Board o f Lowndes County-Valdosta
Hospital Authority; President o f the American Turpentine Farmers Association and Valdosta
Chamber o f Commerce; member o f the Board of Trustees o f Mercer University; and Honorary
Kentucky Colonel. Mary Beth Arceneuax, “Captains o f the Naval Stores Industry,” Naval Stores
Review 90 (September-October 1980): 8-9; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,”
232-233; Langdale, “Brief Facts on the Langdale Company,” 1; Shelton, Pines and Pioneers.
185; Musgrove, “A Tirbute to Judge Harley Langdale, Sr.,” 1; Harley Langdale, Jr., interview, 1;
Antwerp Naval Stores Company, et al. to W.F. Holtsman, 20 October 1933, Cary Collection, 6.
48 Frank W. Boykin to Aaron A. Lowenstein, 11 July 1936, Colmer Papers.
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market in which they competed for customers with wood naval stores products, improved
products, tailored to meet the needs o f the consumer, represented the only way to remain
competitive.49
With the end o f the AAA and the marketing agreement it had overseen, Langdale in 1936
founded the American Turpentine-Farmers Association, whose mission was to unify gum naval
stores producers into a cohesive force that could work to stabilize the market and industry.
According to its charter, the AT-FA sought to provide improvements in production and
marketing of gum turpentine and rosin and their byproducts. It also hoped to achieve more
economical production and orderly marketing and distribution. The AT-FA promised to act on
its members’ behalf with government and business and to cooperate in the planting and
conservation of pines. It also claimed the power to purchase and store any surplus turpentine in
an effort to control prices and to borrow money with which to make advances to members.50
The association was administered by a board o f directors elected by producers to serve
one-year terms. For purposes of representation, the naval stores-producing states were broken
down into districts. The state of Georgia was one district and elected four o f the nine directors.
Another district, consisting of Florida and Alabama, contributed three directors. A third district
made up of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and a fourth representing the Carolinas, elected
one director each. The association proved very conservative in changing leadership. Langdale,
for example, served as its president until 1966. Membership was open to both races and
reportedly some blacks did join. Blacks even served on some of the committees, but none held

49 J. Lundie “A Few Words o f Appreciation,” 20 April 1966, American TurpentineFarmers Association Papers; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 280.
50 Arceneaux, “Captains o f the Naval Stores Industry,” 8; Martin, “An Historical and
Analytical Approach,” 155, 157; Downing Musgrove, (paper presented at the Naval Stores
Breakfast, 31 October 1961, Washington, DC), 1 and Charter, American Turpentine-Farmers
Association Papers; Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine. 29.
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positions as officers or directors. To fund the association, members paid no more than five cents
for each unit o f naval stores they produced annually.51
Members received their money’s worth and then some. The association had a significant
effect in improving the market It successfully encouraged the federal government to conduct
research into improved processing and new uses for gum naval stores which could keep the
products in demand. One o f the greatest changes it brought was the marketing of turpentine in
small containers. In the late 1930s, only five percent of gum turpentine was sold in small bottles
or cans for individual household use. Most consumers simply took a bucket to a store where they
drew the spirits from a barrel. In 1939, however, the AT-FA began a $200,000 national
campaign to promote the consumption o f turpentine in association-approved containers which
carried the “AT-FA Seal o f Approval.” By 1959, eighty percent of gum turpentine was sold in
bottles and cans. The AT-FA also actively supported research. In 1937, the association
contracted with G & A Laboratories Inc. o f Savannah to develop new uses for naval stores. For
the project it retained Charles Herty, the pioneer of the American cup and gutter system, as an
advisor. The Association too promoted efforts to reduce damage to trees caused by harvesting
and provided members and their employees with group life and hospitalization insurance at about
half the cost o f individuals. Members received issues of its trade journal and invitations to its
annual convention held each year in April.52

51 General Counsel and Assistant to the President [of the AT-FA] to John Slusser, 12
April 1966, American Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers; Davis, Encyclopedia of American
Forest and Conservation History. 476.
52 By 1943 the convention featured the Miss Gum Spirits Competition. Each AT-FA
director chose a girl from his district to compete for the title. Wearing pine needle skirts and
suntops decorated with pine cones, the girls stood on a stage at the Valdosta 4-H camp while
Langdale, whom it is believed conceived o f both the contest and costumes, judged the winner.
There was no talent competition. The winner not only enjoyed recognition Miss Gum Spirits for
a year, but she received a scholarship and was featured in a photograph standing beside a tree
scarred from turpentining in the next year’s Association calendar. Martin, “An Historical and
Analytical Approach,” 279-280, xiii; A.R. Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores Long Linked With
Industrial Development” Valdosta. Georgia Daily Times. 18 November, 1959; Maguire,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

592
Perhaps the association’s greatest achievement came immediately after its formation,
when it succeeded in having the benefits o f a new government support program extended to
include gum turpentine producers. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision declaring the
AAA unconstitutional, Congress repealed the legislation that created the administration and
within six weeks replaced it with a new agricultural support plan, the Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act, which substituted processing taxes and acreage quotas with benefit
payments for soil conservation. Crops were taken out of production to be replaced with grasses
and legumes, which could add fertility and stop erosion. On March 25, 1936 Georgia senator and
Langdale friend Walter George, two other senators, several House members, and representatives
of the AT-FA met to convince Department o f Agriculture officials that turpentine was entitled to
assistance under the program. The AT-FA argued that the Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act afforded the naval stores industry the opportunity to adopt improved methods.
According to their contrived argument, more conservative harvesting practices would facilitate
greater tree growth, which in turn would provide a regular, yearly supply o f needles on the forest
floor that would decompose and restore soil fertility. In making the naval stores industry healthy,
the Soil Conservation Service would, in turn, create a healthy forest. The AT-FA proposed that
twenty percent o f the then roughly 7,340,000 turpentined acres be removed from production and
that the Service reimburse producers for their loss. In late June 1936, Congress passed a bill
appropriating funds for gum naval stores price support under the Soil Conservation Act.53
interview by author; Harley Langdale to Secretary o f Agriculture, 13 October 1947, Colmer
Papers; Sherrie Farabee, ‘“ Miss Spirits’ Graced Turpentine Calendar,” Valdosta. Georgia Daily
Times. 28 June 1989.
53 Although they occurred thirty to fifty years earlier, the technological and marketing
improvements o f the Louisiana sugar industry bear a strong resemblance to those o f the naval
stores industry. Like nineteenth-century turpentine production, the late-antebellum sugar
industry enjoyed a favorable market, the latter compliments o f the 1842 tariff which raised the
tax on imported refined sugar. As long as sugar prices were high and competition virtually
nonexistent, historian John Heitman explains, “no edge in the market place as necessary.” Some
producers consequently made no efforts to improve their product or increase manufacturing
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During the first few years of government financial assistance, turpentiners received aid
through two separate programs. The first was o f a price support program administered by the
AT-FA. The Association used support loans to stabilize the market at a base price by purchasing
and stockpiling naval stores surpluses when prices weakened. The program ended the violent
price fluctuations that had persistently plagued producers, especially the smaller ones. Langdale
considered this market stabilization to be the AT-FA’s greatest achievement. The second
program provided financial support to operators who reduced their production. The Naval Stores
Conservation Program, which began July 16,1936, was hastily formulated. It called for a
twenty-five percent overall reduction in worked faces and the adoption of some moderate
conservation practices. Participation was voluntary, and only around 924 producers, about sixty

efficiency just as with the American naval stores industry, which until the early twentieth century
was unchallenged by foreign producers. Another characteristic that sugar production shares with
turpentine operations pertains to the development o f industry improvements. A dependence on
slave labor discouraged the sugar industry horn adopting scientific technology. Not only did
producers believe that more complicated methods were beyond their slaves’ mental capacities,
but they feared that if slaves did manage to master new sophisticated production technology, they
could then use their skill as leverage against their masters, question the masters’ authority, and
possibly revolt. Also, neither the federal nor state governments, nor the unorganized sugar
industry, allocated the resources required for scientific and technological innovation. In the
postbellum period, however, competition from other countries, especially from large and
sophisticated sugar refineries in Britain and France spurred Louisiana sugar producers to attempt
changes. In 1877 the Louisiana Sugar Planters Association formed with the goal o f gaining
control o f the increasingly complex market and promoting technological research leading toward
industry improvements. To these ends the Association set rules and regulations regarding the
sale and delivery o f sugar, established standards o f weighing and grading, and provided relief to
those producers unable to fulfill their contracts. With the assistance o f the United States
Department o f Agriculture, the Association encouraged research into improved methods, much
of the ideas borrowed from German and French inventions. Like the sugar industry, naval stores
producers formed an association and encouraged scientific research with government aid, only
when faced with serious competition from more advanced foreign producers and the threat of
deforestation. John Alfred Heitman, The Modernization of the Louisiana Sugar Industry. 1830J910 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 3, 35, 38-40,44,48, 50,96, 137,
266, 143; George B. Tindall, The Emergence o f the New South. 1913-194S (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 404. Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,”
157; Robert M. Newton, ‘Statement from American Turpentine Farmers Association to
Agricultural Adjustment Administration” and “Memorandum Concerning Senator George and
Naval Stores,” 29 June 1938, Colmer Papers; A.L. Brogden, Memorandum, 10 August 1940,
Bilbo Papers.
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percent, signed up. Those who did adopt the plan were forbidden from cupping trees that
measured smaller than nine inches in diameter four and a half feet from the ground and from
placing more than one cup on trees smaller than fourteen inches. (That year thirty percent o f
worked trees were smaller than nine inches.) Producers who followed these guidelines were
permitted to drop up to forty percent o f their total faces from production and receive
reimbursement for their toss. They were paid twenty-five cents for each face no higher than
sixty-six inches from the ground. This amounted to $2,500 per crop. The next year, however, in
response to improved naval stores prices, many producers opted to keep their trees in production.
Only 664 turpentiners representing just a third of the crops in operation participated. However,
the increased production and a renewed economic recession drove prices lower in 1938 and
participation consequently rose to 1,799 operators, or seventy to seventy-five percent o f total
faces. Many new participants were small producers who worked less than two crops. Payments
for participation were substantial and often paid for stands with low profitability. In 1938, for
example, one producer removed 1,356 faces, which had been badly burned the preceding fall,
and 5,291 one-year-old boxes which were so scattered they scarcely justified working. For these
unproductive boxes he received $444.74.54
After 1938 the two different programs merged into one. In the spring of 1939, naval
stores prices dipped to a near forty-year low, and the AT-FA successfully applied for a loan to
keep the summer production off the market. However, only members o f the AT-FA and

54 Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores Long Linked; A.R. Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores and the
American Turpentine Farmers Association Cooperative,” American Turpentine-Farmers
Assertion Papers, 4-7; Arceneaux, “Captains of the Naval Stores Industry,” 8. Dyer, “History of
the Gum Naval Stores Industry,” 8; Frank E. Fulmer, ‘“ The First Voice Ordered: ‘Shoot Them.’
Then the Bullets Started!’,” in Historical Background o f the Naval Stores Conservation Program.
5; Martin, “An Historic and Analytical Approach,” 158-160,202; Koch, Utilization of the
Southern Pines. 1478; Norman Hawley, “A Summary o f the History o f the Naval Stores
Conservation Program,” in Historical Background o f the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 14.
Newton Naval Stores Company to P.N. Howell, 22 January 1940, Dantzler Company Papers.
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participants in the conservation program could benefit. After the crisis, the loan and
conservation programs remained combined. Operators had to participate in the conservation
program, removing from fifteen to thirty percent of their faces from production, for which they
were reimbursed, to enjoy the benefits o f the price support program. The number of participants
rose from 1,799 in 1938 to 2,511 in 1939 to 2,785 in 1940, and to 4,264 the year after that.
Those involved in the program enjoyed a better chance o f operating profitably (figs. 12.3 and
12.4)55

Profit or Loss Per Gum Unit for Naval Stores Firms Not Participating in
Government Conservation Programs
1931-1940
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Figure 12.3. Profit or Loss Per Gum Unit for Naval Stores Firms Not Participating in
Government Conservation Programs, 1931-1940
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1942),
340.

55 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 159-164; “Memorandum
Concerning Senator George and Naval Stores,” Colmer Papers, 3; Thomas, McCranie’s
Turpentine Still. 8; For figures related to production costs and the government support program’s
ability to end violent seasonal price fluctuation see Appendix A.
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Profit or Loss Per Gum Unit for Naval Stores Firms Participating in
Government Conservation Programs
1931-1940
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Figure 12.4. Profits or Loss Per Gum Unit for Naval Stores Firms Participating in Government
Conservation Programs, 1931-1940
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
341.

The U.S. Forest Service had the sometimes difficult task o f ensuring that producers did
indeed remove the promised faces from production and that they did not excessively face trees.
Oversight was organized out o f the Service’s regional office in Atlanta and coordinated with
smaller district offices in Savannah, Jacksonville, and Pensacola. A supervisor and two assistant
inspectors staffed each of the district offices. (Later these three offices were combined into a
single office centrally located in Valdosta.) Around forty men worked in the field for all three
districts. The job o f inspecting attracted men between twenty and forty years of age who wanted
steady, relatively well-paying jobs funded by the federal government during the Depression.
Some inspectors had previously held jobs with the Forestry Service, especially through the
Civilian Conservation Corps. Others had some experience with trees, either as workers in their
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father’s naval stores operations or as college students studying forestiy. One had even worked as
a tree surgeon in Kent, Ohio. After a short course in gum naval stores production at the Oiustee
experiment station, inspectors were assigned to NSCP offices, mostly in rural communities from
North Carolina to Mississippi.56
The inspectors faced the daunting task o f winning the trust o f rural producers who had
never had a Forest Service agent on their land and continued to distrust government interference
despite its benefits. Smaller producers in the more rural areas especially resented someone
coming onto their property and telling them what to do. While taking a tree count at one
operation in August 1936, for example, two inspectors working out o f Vidalia, Georgia, were
met with gunfire and forced to run for their lives from the forest. The government vehicles
assigned to inspectors did nothing to make their jobs easier. Many were worn out cars
confiscated by the Revenue Department. Many were riddled with bullet holes, said to be
evidence o f the kind o f welcome some inspectors received when they attempted to perform their
job. One inspector found that producers in his assigned area distrusted him because he drove a
government car, a sure sign that he was in fact a revenuer looking for their still. Once the
inspector explained his true mission to the sheriff, who himself ran a still, word circulated and
his inspections proceeded more smoothly. Inspectors also found difficulty in convincing

56 Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine Still. 8; Arthur G. Steedly, ‘“ Doctors, Lawyers,
Teachers, Merchants, and Widows, Call to Ask Advice.,” in Historical Background o f the Naval
Stores Conservation Program. 12; Charles T. Shea,
. . The Ones on the Northside Are
Northern Reds and the Ones on the South Are Southern Reds,’” in Historical Background o f the
Naval Stores Conservation Program. 11, 16; Arthur A. Murphy, “‘Good Forestry Has Advanced
25 Years, I Believe, Because o f NSCP.,”’ in Historical Background o f the Naval Stores
Conservation Program. 7; John K. Cross, “‘Without a Doubt the Naval Stores Program Has Had
a Profound Influence . . in Historical Background o f the Naval Stores Conservation Program.
4; E.O. Powers, “‘With Pearl Harbor Our World, o f Course, Turned Upside Down,”’ in
Historical Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 8; Jim A. McArther, “‘During
the War, I Trained 22,000 German Prisoners-of-War to Work Naval Stores and Cut Pulpwood,’”
in Historical Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 6; Fulmer, “‘The First
Voice Ordered: ‘Shoot Them.’", 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

598
operators and their woodsriders to keep the proper records, which would allow the inspectors to
evaluate the operation’s compliance with the program. Although the inspectors themselves
gained the trust o f some producers in the NSCP, many were won over only after witnessing the
success of more prosperous producers who followed the program. The inspectors’ gentle but
persistent push for conservation practices combined with the government’s financial support
propelled the wise-use practices well ahead of where they stood before the program began.57
Although the AT-FA actively sought government assistance for its members, it worked
hard to deny turpentine workers the benefits o f federal programs. The Social Security Act, when
originally passed in 1935, excluded farm workers and domestics but not turpentiners. Langdale—
who believed that the control of adequate labor was paramount for the industry’s success—and
the AT-FA argued to federal officials that the m a j o r i t y o f gum turpentine producers also grew
such agricultural commodities as cotton, com, and tobacco, and commonly used the same labor
in the fields that they used in the pine forest. The AT-FA further pointed out that state and
federal legislation already recognized gum turpentine production as agriculture and, as such, it
received price support loans and crop reduction payments. But because no decision was made by
the time the program began in 1937, some operators began paying the tax, although others
refused. Government investigators looking into producers who refused to pay discovered
workers too frightened to cooperate, and investigators who entered camps without warrants
found themselves in jail for trespassing. Finally in November, a District Court judge in Georgia
ruled that gum turpentine “is an agricultural pursuit and the labor employed by complainants
57 Fulmer, “‘The First Voice Ordered: ‘Shoot Them.’", 5; McArther, “‘During the War, I
Trained 22,000 German Prisoners-of-War,” 6; Powers, “‘With Pearl Harbor Our World,” 8;
Steedly, “‘Doctors, Lawyers, Teachers, Merchants, and Widows,” 12; Marion W. Ruffin, ‘“ . .. I
Had No Office, No Adding Machine, No Typewriter, and No Maps . . in Historical
Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program. 16; Gay Goodman Wright,
“Turpentining: An Ethnohistorical Study of a Southern Industry and Way o f Life,” (M.A. thesis,
University of Georgia, 1979), 92; J. Lundie Smith, “A Few Words o f Appreciation,” 20 April
1966, American Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers, 7.
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therein is agricultural labor.” Turpentine workers who had received their social security cards
only six months earlier now found themselves excluded from the program. The Social Security
Board contested the ruling. In April 1940, the Fifth Circuit Court o f Appeals in New Orleans
ruled in favor o f the producers, stating that turpentine workers were indeed engaged in
agriculture and therefore not covered by the act. The AT-FA also met success in its efforts to
exclude the industry from the Fair Labor Standards Act o f 1938. The law’s minimum wage and
overtime provisions would have sounded the death knell for the piece work payment method
used since the end of slavery and driven wages to prohibitively high levels. Thus naval Stores
operators built exactly the relationship with the federal government for which they had hoped;
the received financial assistance with minimal disruption o f their labor practices.1*
The AT-FA’s efforts to secure government assistance for themselves and deny it for their
workers led to vigorous opposition from the gum turpentine producers’ rival, the wood naval
stores industry. Wood naval stores producers complained throughout the 1930s and 1940s that
the government’s support of the gum naval stores industry placed them at a disadvantage as
manufacturers of the same products. First, they argued, gum turpentine production was in no
way a form o f agriculture. Unlike farmers, turpentiners grew nothing, but only collected gum
from trees already growing. Also, very few producers owned the timber they worked and, in a
large number o f cases, lessees were not individual producers but large concerns that operated on
an industrial scale and processed the gum at central distilleries, some as large as small wood

58 Memorandum Relating to Status of Turpentine Farmers, 27 May 1938, Colmer Papers;
Prince K. Reed, interview by author, 19 August 1996, St. Augstine, FL; A.L. Brogden,
Memorandum. 10 August 1940, Bilbo Papers; Stetson Kennedy, Palmetto Country (New York;
Duel), Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 263; Shelton, “Pines and Pioneers,” 184; Campbell, et al., Naval
Stores Industry. 92; Decision o f George L. Shelton, et al. vs Marion H. Allen, 16 November
1937, Bilbo Papers; Gene Burnett, “To Bum in a Turpentine Hell,” Florida Trend (October
1976): 102; Butler, Treasures o f the Lonaleaf Pines. 174; John W. Langdale, interview by Harold
K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, 12; American Turpentine-Farmers Association
Resolution, passed 20 April 1938, Bilbo Papers.
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naval stores plants themselves. Like the gum naval stores producers, wood naval stores
manufacturers reported their production to the Department of Agriculture, which also graded
their products by the same standards used to grade gum naval stores.59 “If the gum naval stores
people are agriculture,” wood naval stores manufacturer R.H. Crosby argued, “then we should
certainly be classified as agriculture, as well as every saw mill in the South.”60
Second, the wood producers claimed, the classification o f gum naval stores as agriculture
represented nothing more than dirty politics. With over half of the wood naval stores plants
located in Mississippi, they alleged, the congressmen from Georgia and Florida—in an effort to
help their constituency at the expense o f wood producers outside their states—made political
bargains with congressmen from the Northwest to support their tax bill in exchange for the votes
declaring gum naval stores agriculture. As a result o f the government price support, gum
producers received considerably more in return for their product than did wood naval stores
producers, causing the former to produce greater quantities at a profit while the latter languished
in a stagnant market. With such price divergence, the wood naval stores producers claimed they
struggled to keep afloat. To make matters worse, no large consumers stocked up on rosin. They
instead waited in anticipation of the government unloading large quantities of its stock on the
market, a move it would almost certainly have to make to rid itself o f supplies stored in wooden
barrels that succumbed to weathering and decay after two years. The wood naval stores industry
estimated in the late 1930s that an estimated fifteen to twenty million dollars in plant investment
was bringing no return. Some of the smaller industrial operations shut down while others
reduced production by half, causing layoffs and hurting landowners by reducing stump prices.

59 Continental Turpentine and Rosin Company to William Colmer, 30 December 1939,
R.H. Crosbey to William Colmer, 7 June 1949, R-H. Crosby to Robert M. Newton, 25 May
1946, and R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 25 February 1939, Colmer Papers.
60 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 28 June 1940, Ibid.
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Wood naval stores producers desired that either the price supports end so the two branches of the
industry could compete in a fair market or that wood and gum naval stores prices be
supplemented equally.61
Third, wood naval stores producers argued that gum producers constituted a drag on the
economic development o f their region by hurting the environment and engaging in unfair labor
practices. Where the wood naval stores plants used stumps and waste wood to manufacture their
product, they put forth, the gum producers harvested from living trees, severely damaging and
retarding their growth. Moreover, wood naval stores plants paid their workers according to
federal wage and hour legislation and paid the Social Security tax, from which the gum naval
stores producers were exempt.62
Finally, the wood naval stores producers argued that the government’s policy merely
represented the unfair use o f tax money to hurt them. Rather than a loan, they argued, the NSCP
amounted to nothing more than the government purchase of gum naval stores at inflated prices.63
So frustrated was one Mississippi wood naval stores producer with Democrats and the Roosevelt
administration over the NSCP that in the November 1940 election he planned “to vote a split
ticket,” one vote for Democratic Representative William M. Colmer and the other for Republican
presidential candidate Wendell Willkie. “I hate like hell to have to vote for Willkie,” he
commented, but believed it was his “ last resort against New Deal unfair competition.”64 Like
61 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 25 February 1939 and 1 March 1939, Continental
Turpentine and Rosin Corp. to William Colmer, 30 December 1939, V.A. Anderson to William
Colmer, 17 September 1943, R.H. Crosby to Robert M. Newton, 25 May 1946, R.H. Crosby to
William Colmer, 7 June 1949, R.H. Crosby to Robert M. Newton, 25 May 1946, and Robert M.
Newton to Harold Crosbey, 23 May 1946, Ibid.
62 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 25 February 1939, Colmer Papers; “Naval Stores
History.” Naval Stores Review 100 (March/April 1990): 8.
63 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 1 March 1939, 25 February 1939, and 7 June 1949,
Colmer Papers.
64 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 15 July 1940, Ibid.
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this wood naval stores manufacturer, other such producers resented what they perceived as a
contrived argument to use federal tax money to prop up a primitive business that brought no hope
of economic development and all at the expense o f an industry that did indeed promise
advancement.65
Where federal assistance failed to reach the wood naval stores industry and gum naval
stores laborers, it found its way to producers. Government-funded forestry efforts began to pay
off by the early 1930s with the stabilization o f timber resources. Because producers turned
increasingly to the government-planted and protected second-growth stands in areas already
damaged by turpentining, the industry’s migration, which had characterized it for centuries,
ended. Turpentine producers settled firmly into south Georgia and north Florida. Intensified
federal research into burning practices, gum yield, harvesting methods, and distillation further
aided producers by demonstrating the most efficient use of second-growth stands. Most
significantly, the federal government provided economic assistance as the weakening industry
faced collapse during the Great Depression. After several failed efforts by producers to gain
financial support, the new and powerful American Turpentine-Farmers Association won both
low interest loans to stabilize the market and price support payments to those individual
producers who practiced conservation methods. But as the AT-FA secured federal assistance for
its member operators, it worked to deny turpentine workers the benefits of federal aid, a
contradiction that the gum producers’ rival, the wood naval stores industry, argued was not only
unjust, but retarded economic development. Such a persistent pattern o f labor exploitation
ultimately helped undermine gum turpentine manufacturing.

65 R.H. Crosby to William Colmer, 1 March 1939,25 February 1939, and 7 June 1949,
Ibid.
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Chapter Thirteen
The Industry Withers:
Labor Conditions and the Decline of Gum Naval Stores Manufacturing

The new role o f government and resulting scientific advancements did not change the
gum naval stores industry’s continued use o f exploitative labor practices, and primitive
manufacturing methods, both o f which ultimately spelled the businesses demise. The lives and
work routines of naval stores workers and producers’ labor management techniques remained
relatively unaltered during the 1930s and 1940s from what they were decades earlier. Such
continuing practices as low wages, debt peonage, brutality, and close worker oversight did little
to attract laborers to the business, especially after the United States’ entry into World War II.
That conflict and post-war developments challenged the industry by encouraging an increased
demand for lumber, loosening the binds of peonage, and creating a labor scarcity, conditions that
prevented gum turpentine producers from effectively competing with the highly-mechanized
wood naval stores industry. By the 1950$, large industrial plants, not independent operators,
manufactured the great majority o f American naval stores.
The improved methods developed by government researchers required that workers
change the older harvesting practices to which they were already accustomed. Bark chipping
proved especially difficult for some workers to master. Whereas traditional chipping removed a
thick strip of bark and wood from the trunk, bark chipping only took off the rough outer and
white inner bark to expose the surface o f the wood. The procedure caused less drain on the
tree’s vitality, resulted in greater gum flow and reduced incidents of diyface. Although it was
less physically taxing than traditional chipping, workers used to the older methods required
thorough retraining to master bark chipping. Seasoned chippers, who had for fifteen or twenty
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years cut into the trunk hard enough to remove pieces o f wood, often found it challenging to
begin cutting lightly. Workers who persisted in swinging the bark hack with great force could
damage the blade, which was not designed to endure such pressure. Producers reported that, in
many cases, it was easier to train laborers who had never used the regular hack before to bark
hack rather than reteach experienced hackers.1
Another innovation, acid spray, required that workers pay especially careful attention to
their task. When first introduced, the technique, required workers to spray acid by blowing
through a mouth piece into the spray container. Workers greatly disliked this method, and
researchers quickly replaced the blow sprayer with a plastic squeeze bottle. For best results,
workers needed to follow a regular fourteen-day chipping schedule using a sharp bark hack and
spray bottle with a clean nozzle capable of discharging a spray o f acid. Laborers first chipped
only enough bark to expose the wood. Then, holding the sprayer at a forty-five degree angle,
workers aimed the acid at the top o f the streak with the nozzle one to two inches below the top of
the streak and one to two inches away from the tree. Moving the sprayer across the streak in a
single steady motion, they sprayed the top of the streak and under the overhanging bark.2 Only
enough acid to wet the streak completely was to be applied, but not enough to drip down the
face. Proper applications allowed the solution, over fourteen days, to penetrate one-half to threequarter inches above the streak. Over-application resulted in excessive tissue loss. Because in

1 Ralph W. Clements, “The Bark Hack: Techniques of Using This Efficient Method,”
reprint from Naval Stores Review (January and March 1953), Olustee Experiment Station Files,
Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA.
2 The exact distance o f the nozzle from the streak depended on the individual bottle’s
spray pattern. Poor treatment resulted if a worker incorrectly adjusted his technique to the
stream delivered by a particular sprayer. Another potential problem occurred if the bottle was
tilted too far downward, causing the nozzle to discharge a stream rather than a fine spray. When
a stream hit the face, the force caused it to spatter and a large portion ran down the face and into
the cups and gutters corroding them. If the worker held the sprayer too close to the tree, he could
not see if he was correctly directing the acid and, if he held it too far away, his the aim could be
poor.
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such cases double streaks were required to reach living wood, excess acid use caused the face to
be used up too quickly, reducing the period in which a tree could be worked and thus lower
yields.3
To facilitate effective treatment o f higher faces and reduce the risk o f acid falling back
on workers as they sprayed upwards, researchers developed a spray-puller. The device,
essentially a bark puller and acid sprayer in one, held a supply o f acid in a plastic bottle located
at the lower end o f the aluminum stock. Workers had to exercise considerable skill and patience
to use the spray puller accurately. Holding the puller stock firmly and placing the blade and
nozzle at the precise angle, a worker squeezed the plastic bottle while cutting the new streak. By
the sixth year o f working a face, which required a sixty-inch long puller, accurate placement of
the chip and spray was especially difficult.4
Although acid treatment brought overall benefits to the industry, problems did arise.
Some workers misapplied acid, either providing inadequate and spotty application or spraying
too much, the latter leading to the corrosion o f tin and metal cups. Because so much could go
wrong with acid sprayers, foresters emphasized the necessity o f proper labor supervision to
producers. “Success or failure o f the bark chipping and acid treatment,” one researcher found,
“can usually be traced to the amount and thoroughness of supervision given laborers in the
turpentine woods.” Workers required adequate instruction and constant supervision until they
3 Prince K. Reed, interview by author, tape recording, 19 August 1996, St. Augustine,
FL; Ralph Clements, “Field Supervision Important When Using the Bark Chipping-Acid
Stimulation Method,” Naval Stores Review 61 (June 1951): 24-26; Ralph W. Clements, Manual:
Modem Gum Naval Stores Methods (Asheville, NC: Southeastern Forest Experiment Station,
1960), 13-15; H.L. Mitchell, “Information on the Use of Chemical Stimulants to Increase Gum
Yields.” Savannah Weekly Naval Stores Review and Journal o f Trade 55 (7,14, 21 April 1945),
Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA; M.D. Mobley and Robert N.
Hoskins, Forestry in the South (Atlanta: Turner E. Smith and Co., 1956), 159-161; A.R. Shirley,
Working Trees for Naval Stores (Athens. GA: Georgia Agricultural Extension Service, 1946),
25-29.
4 Clements, Manual. 22-23; Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 25-29.
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mastered the technique. For optimal performance producers were also instructed to frequently
inspect and promptly repair the equipment5
Acid use also posed both a real and perceived work hazard. Rumors associated with its
use provoked fear among some producers as well as workers. It was said that acid not only
attracted lightning to treated trees, but the sprayed areas sprouted mushrooms that were fatal to
cattle. Word also spread that acid runoff turned swamp water black and imbibed it with
properties that burned the feet and legs of workers who had to wade through it on their rounds.
One worker expressed the reservations that many laborers held when he concluded that “anything
that will eat the parts off a man will surely kill a tree or a cow. And I bet it will give you cancer
too.”6 While all these rumors proved unfounded, acid bums did pose actual risks to laborers.
Under normal circumstances there was vety little worker contact with the acid. However, a
nozzle improperly screwed onto a bottle or a bottle punctured by the sharp edges of gutters or by
hack blades could ooze acid onto workers hands.7 Producers were given the obvious advice to
“never assign a leaking gun to a laborer. Good laborers can be kept longer this way.”8 If
producers did not supply their workers with spray pullers, forcing them to use regular bottles and
hacks instead, acid could easily blow down on a worker’s head and clothes. Laborers usually
tried to make a quick pass with the spray in an effort to escape the drift, usually resulting in poor

5 Clements, “Field Supervision Important,” 24-26; “Naval Stores Equipment,” The Forest
Fanner 9 (September 1950): 9-10; Shirley, Working Trees for Naval Stores. 25-29.
6 Gay Goodman Wright, “Turpentining: An Ethnohistorical Study o f a Southern Industry
and Way o f Life,” (M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, 1979), 103.
7 Carl E. Ostrom, “Gum Yields Affected by Quality o f Acid Applied to Streak,” The ATFA Journal (June 1945): 6; John K. Cross, “‘Without a Doubt the Naval Stores Program Has Had
a Profound Influence . . . , ” in Historical Background of the Naval Stores Conservation Program.
Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4; “Naval Stores Equipment,”
9.
8 “Naval Stores Equipment,” 9.
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coverage of the streak. Exposure to the acid was not especially harmful if the area o f contact was
washed immediately, but in the forest that was often impossible. If not immediately removed,
acid ate through clothing and seriously burned skin. Such incidents were apparently all too
frequent. At one St. Johns County, Florida operation, workers had to buy their own soda to treat
acid bums. Another Florida laborer known as “Red Eye” had seriously-reduced vision from
exposure to acid on his face.9
Despite the innovations o f bark chipping and acid spraying, the basic seasonal pattern of
turpentine work continued (fig. 13.1) and the tasks remained as challenging as ever. Since labor
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Figure 13.1. Number o f Wage Earners in the Gum and Wood Naval Stores Industries by Month,
1937
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 13.

9 Clements, Manual. 22; Mobley and Hoskins, Forestry in the South. 160-161; Stetson
Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide: The Wav It Was (Boca Raton, FL: Florida Atlantic University Press,
1959), 139.
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was paid by piece work, experience was required to perform the tasks rapidly enough to make a
living. Experienced workers knew how to cover their task efficiently by taking the shortest and
quickest route from tree to tree. But by the mid 1940s, tending the trees apparently required
more walking than previously. Many o f the second-growth stands had been burned and cut,
creating stands so thin that workers spent as much as two-thirds o f their time in the woods
walking from tree to tree. They then had time to tend only five thousand faces a week, half of
the number that had been expected of workers for well over a century. Experienced turpentine
workers sometimes refused to work in such scattered stands where the piece work system
ensured they would receive less pay.
Workers were expected to chip a certain amount each week which required most workers
to labor all day, Monday through Friday, and half a day Saturday. But if rain during the weekday
prevented work, laborers had to work all day Saturday and even on Sunday to catch up. Some
camps had workers known as utility people who did not have a crop of their own but performed
chipping in crops where certain workers got behind. As they maneuvered about the forest,
workers faced several challenges and hazards. If the woods were not burned, as was frequently
the case during the 1930s, the thick undergrowth made it extremely difficult for workers to move
about. It took a full year for workers to beat down paths to facilitate easier movement. Snakes
made travel through some areas potentially treacherous. On one pine-covered Florida island, for
example, rattle snakes were so numerous that a worker who was promised a dollar for every one
he killed quickly earned ninety-six dollars.10
10 Reed, interview; Clements, “Bark Hack;” Kathy Hawk, “Turpentine: An Ancient
Technology Almost Tapped Out in S t Johns County,” St. Augustine. Florida Ancient Citv
Beacon (25 June 1982): 1; Keith W. Dorman, “High-Yielding Turpentine Orchards: A Future
Possibility,” The Chemureic Digest 4 (29 September 1945): 293-295; Freeman Ashmore,
“Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” Wakulla Area Digest (September 1996): 36; Robert M.
Newton to P.N. Howell, 15 October 1937, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers, Special
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi State University; Florida Writers’ Project,
“The Story o f Naval Stores . . . , ” Florida Highways 11 (May 1943): 36.
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Woodsriders remained an integral part o f turpentine operations; they continued not only
to keep the tally o f piece work, but made sure that tasks were completely and carefully executed,
and that tools were maintained in good condition. Most woodsriders were white, around ninetyfive percent by one estimate. At particularly large operations, woodsriders during the period
relied on subordinates called underriders who supervised twelve to sixteen individual workers.
Once a week the woodsrider checked on the underrider. Although most underriders were white,
some were black. As a rule, woodsriders seldom interfered in workers’ family matters or
quarrels, but they would exercise their power to end a fight. The manager of a Georgia
turpentine camp, in the 1940s, described his occupation as a fifteen-hour job. He hauled laborers
to the woods, checked their work, took the sick to the doctor in Valdosta, paid their delinquent
debts to local merchants, managed the commissary, and maintained law and order. The standard
of living for most woodsriders probably fell below the median standard of southern whites. In
1932, for example, one woodsrider received a fifty dollar monthly salary and a house that he
found infested with mosquitoes and without indoor plumbing.11
Woodsriders apparently continued to resort to brute violence to force unwilling workers
to remain at their tasks. In the early 1930s, the manager and woodsrider at a turpentine camp in
the Perry, Florida, area beat two black men, one severely, for refusing to work. To escape
punishment for their brutality, they determined to remove the beaten men from the area. During
the ride northward the car in which the men were riding overturned. The two black workers were
so badly beaten, by one of the white accomplice’s admission, that “they could not lift a thing”
111.F. Eldgredge, The 4 Forests and the Future of the South (Washington, DC: The
Charles Lathrop Pack Forestry Foundation, 1947), 42; Reed, interview; Elliott Maguire,
interview, Oral History Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, St.
Augustine, FL; Florida Writers’ Project, “Story o f Naval Stores,” 36; Zora Neal Hurston,
“Turpentine Camp—Cross City” in Writers Program, Florida, “Turpentine Camp at Cross City,”
Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida, 4;
William P. Langdale, interview by H.K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, 4-5;
Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” 24.
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and were unable to help right the vehicle. Once more on the road, the party made it as far as
Valdosta, Georgia, around sixty mites from Perry, where the black men were left with fifteen
dollars each.12
As was the case since colonial times, producers, in the 1940s and 1950s, relied on cheap,
black labor which they believed to be inherently unreliable. Almost all chippers, dippers,
coopers, and ordinary still workers were black. Even as late as the 1930s, one investigator
explained that for “generation after generation they have followed its [the naval stores industry’s]
southward migration, and the majority of those engaged in it today are descended from a long
line of turpentine workers.”13 A 1943 report by the Florida Writers Project explained that “the
naval stores negro is in a class by himself. He knows his business and feels at home in the open
woods, enjoys the free and easy atmosphere o f his quarters remote from the city temptations that
frequently got him messed up with the law.”14 One industry observer expressed the prevailing
view held by whites, in the 1930s, when he explained that “the workers for the woods operation
in naval stores production are almost entirely negroes, as the work is too severe and pay too
small for white laborers. Too there is a feeling among the white workers that such disagreeable
work is negroes work and that white men would demean themselves by doing it.”IS “The negroes
are a shiftless class,” he complained, “and it is estimated that 3/4 o f them are constantly in debt.
Without any motive they frequently leave one producer and go to work for another, usually

12 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 23 December 1936,
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records
of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
13 Stetson Kennedy, Palmeto Country (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 261.
14 Florida Writers’ Project, “The Story o f Naval Stores,” 14.
15A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, The Naval Stores
Industry (Gainseville, FL: Bureau o f Economic and Business Research, College o f Business
Administration, The University o f Florida, 1934), 32.
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leaving an unpaid debt behind.”16 He recommended that producers establish a central agency to
maintain records on the whereabouts of naval stores laborers as a means of limiting their
movement.17
Although the labor force in the gum naval stores industry remained predominantly black,
more whites working in the pine forests during the 1930s than in previous decades. The number
of small, white producers who performed their own labor rose, as did that of poor, backwoods
farmers who engaged in turpentine production to supplement their meager incomes. The latter
group constituted around four or five percent o f the work force and performed the same tasks and
received the same pay as black laborers. During the depths o f the Depression, some unemployed
whites, desperate for any work, threatened black turpentine laborers with death if they did not
give up their jobs. After several hundred white men lost their jobs in 1932, for example, a group
of six of the unemployed entered a turpentine camp and told the black workers that if they did
not leave they would be shot the next night. Twelve to fourteen blacks fled for their lives and
never returned.18
Workers continued to be paid by piece work, not by the hour, and wages remained low.
They were paid only once a month but could charge merchandise at the commissary throughout
the period. At the end o f the month, the woodsrider or camp manager would calculate how much
work had been done and then deduct the amount owed the commissary. If their accounts were in
16 Ibid., 32.
17 Ibid., 98.
18 Reed, interview; Robert Cook, “Photographing the Turpentine Industry at Cross City,
Florida” in Writers Program, Florida, “Turpentine Camp at Cross City,” Department of Special
Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University o f Florida, 1; Florida Writers’ Project,
“The Story o f Naval Stores,” 14; Robert N. Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t: The North Florida
Turpentine Camp, 1900-1950.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 67 (January 1989): 315;
Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 42; E.F. Dean to Department o f Justice, 1 June 1932, Correspondence,
Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department
o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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the black, workers received the difference in cash. During the Depression, however, wages fell
to levels that allowed only the most frugal laborers to remain debt-free (fig. 13.2). Whereas
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Figure 13.2. Average Weekly Gum Naval Stores Wages Per Wage Earner, 1924-1940
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
339; For figures relates to chart see Appendix B.

workers could expect $1.25 for chipping a thousand faces in 1927, by 1933 they received
between 500 and 700. In an effort to attract the best chippers and thus receive the best output,
some producers paid more to workers chipping virgin faces. By the time the face reached waisthigh, the pay went down and regular chippers were used. Dippers, who in 1927 had made $1
from each barrel dipped, only earned between 400 and 600 in 1933. Workers could fill two to
five fifty-two gallon barrels a day, depending on the worker’s speed and the trees’ density.
Rapid laborers usually did not quit early, opting instead to accomplish more and receive more
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pay. At these rates, turpentine workers made only $30 a month at the same time a common
laborer earned $40.19 Even John Langdale, Judge Langdale’s son, admitted that, in terms o f pay,
the naval stores laborer was on the “bottom o f the totem pole.”20
Almost all workers continued to languish in debt. Even hard workers could become
deeply indebted to the commissary during periods of rainy weather or market downturns when
work slowed and income dropped while commissary-purchasing continued. If a worker moved
from one camp to another, whether both camps belonged to the same operator or not, he incurred
a charge, sometimes as much as ten dollars. But if the worker remained at the job for a year, the
moving charge was removed from his account. Older workers were especially susceptible to
indebtedness. As aging laborers grew less physically capable, and their work pace slowed, their
income, based on piecework, declined accordingly. Older workers were, however, reportedly
permitted to continue charging groceries and supplies even though producers knew they had no
chance o f paying their debt. Sick workers also grew deeply indebted, not only because they were
unable to work, but because the cost o f medicine and doctor visits were charged to the operator,
who paid the bills and added the amount to the worker’s accounts.21 When a member o f the
camp died, the burial expenses created even great debt. Upon a death, everyone in the camp,
including the boss, donated money, but rarely enough to cover the full costs. In at least one
instance a dead man’s family was unable to afford the funeral homes’ fifty-dollar charge and
opted to bury their relative themselves. Despite the challenges posed by a low standard o f living

19 Reed, interview; William P. Langdale, interview, 4, 6; Clifton Paisley, “Wade
Leonard, Florida Naval Stores Operator,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 51 (April 1973): 390;
Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 31.
20 John W^Langdale, interview by Harold K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society,
Durham, NC, 6. '
21 Workers, however, did not always resort to these expensive measures. Herb remedies
and magic were common substitutes.
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during the Depression, turpentine laborers found their situation less desperate than that o f some
sharecroppers. Unlike these poor farmers, who found themselves turned off the land as a result
o f New Deal agriculture programs, turpentine workers could at least depend on receiving food,
clothing, and shelter—even though it was sparse and resulted in greater personal debt. For many,
the period offered no better option.23
The plight o f Depression-era turpentine workers was the subject o f Georgia-bom blues
singer Tampa Red’s (Hudson Whittaker) 1932 recording “Turpentine Blues.”23

Turpentine is all right providing that wages are good
Turpentine is all right providing that wages are good
But I can make more money now out somewhere chopping cord wood
Turpentine business ain’t like it used to be
Turpentine business ain’t like it used to be
I can’t make enough money now to even get on a spree
I ain’t gone work no mo, I tell you the reason why
I ain’t gone work no mo, tell you the reason why
Because everybody wants to sell, but nobody wants to buy
You can work in the fields, you can work at the sawmill too
You can work in the fields, you can work at the sawmill too
But you can’t make no money at nothing you try to do

22 Maguire, interview, St. Augustine Historical Society; Federal Writers’ Project,
Florida: A Guide to the Southernmost State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 452;
Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Correspondence,
Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department
o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 261; John W.
Langdale, interview, 6, 13-14; Reed, interview; Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” 36;
W.J. Kelly and A.L. Brogden to Our Turpentine Farmer Friends, 12 April 1940, Andrew D.
Popped Papers, Florida State Archives; Elliott Maguire, interview by author, tape recording, St.
Augustine, FL, 5 June 1996; Becky Vail, “Old-Timer Remembers ‘Hard Old Days’ in Woods,”
Newsclipping file, Lowndes County Historical Society, Valdosta, GA; Gavin Wright, Old South.
New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1986), 15,199; Hurston, “Turpentine Camp-Cross City,” 2.
23 Lawrence Cohn, ed., Nothing But the Blues: The Music and the Musicians (New York:
Abbeville Press, 1993), 164-165.
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So Lawdy please tell me what we turpentine people are gone a do
Lawdy please tell me what we turpentine people gone a do
We may work one week, but we got lay off a mon or two
Turpentine is like dying, shoot you up on the loose
Turpentine is like dying, just shoot you up on the loose
That’s the reason why I’ve got those turpentine blues24

The example o f distiller Jim Byrd, who worked for a large Florida operation in the
1930s, reveals how even a worker in a relatively high position in the gum naval stores industry
could find his opportunities at once limited and better than most other alternatives. Byrd, a sixty
year old black man, was originally from Bainbridge, Georgia. When he was young, he had
helped his widowed mother with farm work so he received very little education. He started work
in turpentine as a scraper in Georgia making $1.25 a day. By the 1930s, he made $15.00 a week
as a distiller, but his salary barely paid for the basic necessities—rent, food, clothing, medical
care, and life insurance. Although he received satisfaction from knowing that his employer
valued his work highly, Byrd wished to become a farmer. He stayed in turpentine, however,
because borrowing the money to farm would set him back too far financially and, as a distiller,
he was able to support his family, better than if he took whatever work he could get as a common
day laborer.25
Turpentine workers like Byrd continued to make most o f their purchases from the
commissary. At one commissary workers could buy such meat products as sausage and bologna,
but fresh meats came from local farms. If commissaries lacked a needed item, it could be
obtained by filling out an order. At one camp workers could even acquire suits this way.
However, women sewed most clothes with cloth they purchased by the bolt from the
24 Tampa Red, “Turpentine Blues,” Legends o f the Blues, vol. 2, audiocassette,
Columbia Records.
25 Hurston, “Turpentine Camp—Cross City,” 1-4.
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commissary. In many cases, commissaries remained a practical necessity, the nearest town was
usually fifteen to twenty miles away from the camp. However, in areas where commissaries took
business away from merchants, resentments flared. In 1940, for example, Florida merchants
unsuccessfully demanded that a judge order turpentine commissaries to pay the state sales tax
required o f all other retailers in the state.26
Commissary prices remained typically higher than those at ordinary retail stores,
between ten and one hundred percent more. According to one estimate, commissaries made a net
profit o f twenty percent at a time when retail stores earned between five and eight percent
Producers justified the inflated prices in different ways. One maintained that “we weren’t in the
grocery business. We just wanted to make up for bad debts.”27 Another explained that “of
course we have to charge the niggers more, but they save in the long run. Just think how much it
would cost them to drive thirty miles into town for vitals if they had cars.”28
Workers’ eating habits persisted with little changed from earlier periods and women
continued to dominate food cultivation, purchases, and preparation. Staples of the turpentine
workers’ diet remained pork—mostly fat back-com—usually prepared as combread—sweet
potatoes, beans, peas, collards, mustard greens, eggs, chicken, and occasionally beef. Along with
the goods and produce purchased at the commissary and grown in family gardens, workers
continued to supplement their diet with small game and birds men hunted in the woods, and fish,
especially brim and perch, caught by women and children. According to one report, however,

26 Commissaries used a variety of methods to register worker purchases—tokens, check
cards, and coupon books—which were advanced to workers and charged to their accounts, or they
simply kept a tab. Reed, interview; Maguire, interview by author; Vail, “Old-Timer
Remembers;” Wright, Old South. New South. 15, 199; Hurston, “Turpentine Camp-Cross City,”
2.
27 Wright, “Turpentining,” 114.
28 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 259.
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during the depths o f the Depression, some turpentine workers subsisted on a diet o f bread, sugar,
and water. Workers’ wives prepared their breakfasts in time for them to get to the woods early in
the morning, usually around 4:00 or 4:30. Wives also had to make their husband’s lunch and
pack it in any available container. At one camp, an empty one-gallon syrup bucket served as a
common lunch pail. At least once a brutal Cordelle County, Georgia woodsrider beat a worker’s
wife who failed to have her husband’s breakfast prepared in time.29
Workers continued to live in isolated quarters during the 1930s and 1940s. Most
contained around fifteen cabins housing forty to sixty people. Camps built during this period
consisted o f more substantial two- and three-room cabins with exterior painted pine boards.
Some had glass and screened windows and painted interior walls. A few possessed electric lights
and running water. Women did not typically work in turpentine but did live in the quarters with
their families. Although single men lived two or three to a cabin, nuclear families each had their
own dwelling. Families usually kept their houses neat and swept their yards clean o f all debris
and vegetation, save for a few flowers. Backyard garden plots yielded collards and yams. Many
families also kept a few chickens and a coon dog. But not all workers lived in the quarters.
Because automobiles and paved roads provided easier access to local communities than in
previous periods, an increasing number of workers lived in adjacent towns and commuted to
work.30

29 Harley Langdale, Jr., interview by Harold K. Steen, 1991, Forest History Society, 13;
Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t,” 324; Ashmore, “Looking Back: The Woodsrider,” 24. Reed,
interview; Florida Writers’ Project, “Story of Naval Stores,” 14-15; Kennedy, Palmetto Country.
263; Kennedy. Jim Crow Guide. 139.
30 Maguire, interview, St. Augustine Historical Society; Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 43;
Florida Writers’ Project, “Story o f Naval Stores,” 14; Jo Meldrim, interview by author, tape
recording, St. Augustine, FL, 19 August 1996; Kenneth H. Thomas, Jr., McCranie’s Turpentine
Still. Atkinson County. Georgia: A Historical Analysis o f the Site. With Some Information on the
Naval Stores Industry in Georgia and Elsewhere (Atlanta: Georgia Institute of Community and
Area Development, 1975), 34; Nelson Courtlandt Brown, Forest Products: The Harvesting.
Processing, and Marketing o f Materials Other Than Lumber. Including the Principal Derivatives.
Extractives, and Incidental Products in the United States and Canada (New York: John Wiley
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Although workers had increasing access to towns, the camp church and especially the
juke joint remained the principal forms o f distraction from the monotonous work routine. One
worker explained o f turpentine laborers “thats all they got to do beside work—go to church and
drink shine.”31 Camps usually contained a small church where either a visiting preacher or a
worker led services every Sunday. At some camps, Baptist and Methodist preachers conducted
worship on alternating Sundays. On weekdays after work a few laborers held prayer meetings on
weekends after work. Turpentine workers who were religious tended to be very devout but a
larger number o f laborers still reveled at the juke joint, particularly on Saturday nights.
Typically operated by an entrepreneurial worker, jukes provided a place for laborers to drink
moonshine, dance, and gamble. A few establishments also sold food such as hamburgers and
fish. Along with food, sex could also be purchased at some o f these establishments. Prostitutes
roamed from camp to camp, usually arriving on payday. The juke on Saturday night retained its
character as a violent place where fights and even murders were not uncommon. When revelry at
the juke continued through Sunday, many workers were too hungover to work the next day. On
such occasions one innovative woodsrider administered his own hangover medicine consisting o f
a mixture o f moonshine, 666 (a cold tonic), Raymond’s Little Kidney Pills, Black Drought (a
strong laxative), and any other medicine he had handy. The combination probably only
exacerbated a hangover, but the woodsrider claimed it left his laborers folly recovered for work
the next day.32

and Sons, Inc., 19S0), 186; Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City” in Writers Program, Florida,
“Turpentine Camp at Cross City,” Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers
Libraries, University o f Florida, Gainseville, FL, 6.
31 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 263.
32 Reed, interview; Florida Writers’ Project, “Story o f Naval Stores,” 14-15; Kennedy,
Palmetto Country. 263; William P. Langdale, interview, 4-5.
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Despite child labor laws, throughout the 1930s and 1940s children performed a limited
amount o f work at turpentine operations. Most commonly they dipped to support their families’
income. Producers even issued different sizes o f nail kegs as dip buckets to correspondinglysized children. Children, along with women, also labored in nearby potato and cabbage fields,
hundreds working at one time.33
Although not available to children at all turpentine camps, schools did become more
accessible during this period. By the 1940s, some camps had one-room schoolhouses, but most
commonly the church served as a classroom during the weekdays. Whether supported by the
producer or the local county government, camp schools were notoriously underfunded. At a
camp in MacClenny, Florida, in the late 1930s, one teacher was responsible for fifty-two children
crammed into one room. At another camp, 250 students and 8 teachers were crowded into a
church. In many cases teachers were traveling instructors who visited several camps during the
week. Only six to nine grades were available and children were usually able to achieve a basic
level o f literacy at best. If, in the unusual case, a county school was nearby, children walked or
were driven by a worker. No buses provided transportation.34 At some camps, however, no
school o f any kind was available within an accessible distance. Even where schools were
available, several factors still discouraged regular attendance. When the weather grew warm
enough for gum to run, attendance rates dropped thirty percent as children began assisting with
dipping. During cold weather, some children failed to attend because they lacked warm clothing.

33 Reed interview; W.W. Barber to Newton, 14 April 1945, Dantzler Lumber Company
Papers.
34 Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t,” 325; Florida Writers’ Project, “Story of Naval
Stores,” 15; A. Philip Randolph to Homer Cummings, 5 March 1937, Correspondence, Classified
Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department o f Justice,
Record Group 60, National Archives; Hurston, “Turpentine Camp-Cross City,” 15; Wright, Old
South. New South. 113-114; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 262; Reed, interview; Meldrin,
interview.
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Along with limited educational opportunities and poor living conditions in camps,
decades-old labor practices persisted. Worker recruitment continued in the tight labor market
despite a gentlemen’s agreement among producers to refrain from such activity. Even in the late
1940s, a camp manager would leave for a nearby community carrying moonshine and a black
worker who knew other men in the area who might be persuaded to change employers. After
giving a recruit some drinks and bragging about the superior working conditions at his camp and
the availability of jobs, a manager would bring the new worker back to the camp. In some cases
cash advances were required to coax workers from their employers. Typical advances amounted
to twenty-five dollars or less, although during the periods o f greatest labor scarcity advances
could rise as high as five hundred dollars.35 Some recruiters employed more creative means o f
attracting laborers. One black Florida voodoo practitioner employed magic to attract labor for
his employer. On a recruiting mission to Georgia when prospective workers proved unwilling to
accept his offer, he rubbed two pebbles together, glared at the men, and threatened to hex them if
they did not return with him. The prospective workers then obediently climbed into his waiting
truck. No matter the means used to hire workers, the following Monday morning, as was
common, the manager would arrive at the recruited worker’s former camp, collect his
belongings, and pay off his account.
Turpentiners attempted to control their labor by closely monitoring their quarters, an
activity made possible by the camps’ continued isolation in the pine wilderness. As had been the
case since the antebellum era, many were located between twelve and twenty miles from the
nearest road and could be reached only by a company road winding through murky swamps and
dense forests to an inaccessible spot. One member of the Florida Writers Project found the area
35 William P. Langdale, interview, 3; Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide. 137; Federal Writers’
Project, Florida. 377; Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 12 November
1936, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General
Records of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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between Cross City and the Gulf, where many camps were scattered, to have no towns, the open
pine flats broken only by small cypress swamps and hardwood hammocks, and the region
penetrated by only a few long dirt roads. Turpentiners and free-range hog and cattle raisers were
commonly the only inhabitants in such regions. Many producers wanted to know the business of
ail who visited the camp and any details o f outsiders’ discussions with workers.36 One
investigator o f forced labor practices succeeded in gaining access to a camp in Front Cove,
Florida, only after he told the manager he was there to record folk songs. Once the songs were
recorded and the satisfied boss left, the investigator began his interview. With the white boss
gone, one worker admitted that “the only way out [of the turpentine camp] is to die out

”37

Some turpentine producers went to considerable lengths to protect their precious labor
force. In the summer o f 1936, for example, Bunnell, Florida, turpentine producer George Allen
had the local sheriff detain three young men whom he feared were recruiting his workers. Two
turpentine laborers in Allen’s employment had sent word requesting employment with another
producer, W J. Ward, of Baldin, Florida, approximately fifty miles to the northeast. But when
Ward’s two sons, Kevin and Leslie, and a black man named Giles arrived at Allen’s quarters they
were ambushed by Allen’s men who forced the three into a car and drove them to the county seat
o f Bunnell. There the sheriff and Allen locked them in the jail on the charge of “being
unlawfully in the quarters of Mr. Allen’s camp.” The sheriff released them with Allen’s
approval only after they spent a week in jail and vowed never to return to the area nor attempt to
recruit any more o f Allen’s turpentine workers.38

36 Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t,” 327; Cook, “Photographing the Turpentine Industry
at Cross City, 5; Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City,” 1,4; Federal Writers’ Project, Florida.
376; Maguire, interview, St. Augustine Historical Society.
37 Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide. 136; Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 262-263.
38 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 12 November 1936,
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records
o f the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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This example o f restricted labor movement and further evidence suggests that peonage
remained a common practice in the 1930s. An investigator with the Workers Defense League
found that “peonage is nothing unusual in Florida. There are several sections in which it
flourishes but these are veritable ‘no-man’s lands’ where one must tread softly if wishing to
live.”39 When one turpentine worker, James Day, escaped from a turpentine camp in Manioh,
Georgia, the owner falsely claimed that Day owned him two hundred dollars and held his four
small children as ransom for his return. After unsuccessfully appealing to the U.S. District
Attorney and the FBI, Day went to court for the return o f his children only to be jailed for
abandoning them. The sheriff offered to release Day only if he agreed to return to the producer
for work. In another instance, Lige James Johnson, a black turpentine worker for Charles A.
Gaskins near Wewahitchka, Florida left his job free of debt for employment in Panama City. But
in 1938 Gaskins alleged that Johnson owed him thirty-five dollars and forced him to return to the
turpentine camp for four more months of work. Three years later Gaskins claimed, after
examining his books, that Johnson still owed him twenty-two dollars and wanted him to return to
the camp. This time Johnson resisted, a struggle ensued, and Johnson was forced into Gaskins’
car. During the thirty-mile long ride back to the camp, Johnson jumped from the car and ran into
the woods. Gaskins’ subsequent trial for peonage attracted the attention o f the American
Turpentine-Farmers Association. Fearing that Gaskins’ conviction might disrupt the industry’s
labor practices, the association lent the services o f its own attorney to the defense. Despite their
efforts, however, Gaskins was convicted o f peonage. But on appeal, the U.S. District Court in
Pensacola overturned the conviction, citing that Johnson had escaped from the car before

39 Jerrell H. Shofner, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case: Peonage as Usual in the
Florida Turpentine Camps,” The Florida Historical Q u a rte r ly 60 (October 1981): 169.
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returning to work at the camp. Thus Gaskins had attempted but not succeeded in placing
Johnson in debt servitude and consequently was not guilty of a crime.40
Two powerful institutions historically associated with the naval stores industry—
factorage houses and the criminal justice system—helped perpetuate the peonage system. Factors
would only advance capital to producers whom they trusted to manage an operation profitably.
The secret to success, as one former producer explained, “was that if you could handle the labor,
most all turpentine labor was black, if you could handle those and knew how to get the work out
o f them, well then you could get along with the factors pretty good because you could operate.”41
Although the official leasing o f convicts had ended in the early 1920s, the practice continued to
be sustained by the criminal justice system. If a worker left an operation, his employer could
have him charged with a crime, taken to court, convicted, and then sentenced to the worker’s
choice of either twelve to eighteen months in prison or a fine. Workers typically chose the latter.
The employer then paid the fine, obligating the convicted worker to labor for him to pay off the
debt. The sheriff usually threatened the worker with the chain gang if he left again.42
The absence o f labor union activity in the gum naval stores industry allowed such abuses
to go largely uncontested. Although many of the white laborers, who dominated the skilled
positions at pulp and paper mills were organized, the majority o f black workers involved in
harvesting timber and stumps and virtually all o f the gum naval stores were not.43 A. Philip

40 Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide. 40; Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 171172; Jerrell H. Shofher, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests, 1880-1950,” Journal o f Forest
History 25 (January 1981): 24.
41 Reed, interview; Harley Langdale, Jr., interview, 7.
42 Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 164-167; Reed, interview; Pete
Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery: Peonage in the South. 1901-1969 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1990), 180.
43 Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 43.
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Randolph believed that black workers were exploited “because there is no labor organization in
the South that has the strength and power to prevent the exploitation of Negro and white
workers.”44
The investigation and trial o f turpentiner Will Knabb demonstrates the degree to which
peonage and brutality persisted among some producers. On October 13, 1936 three black
turpentine workers—Ed Backer, his son-in-law Arthur Smith, and Alfred Smith-decided to quit
work for Knabb to find better wages. They came to R.T. Boyd’s residence in Coleman, Florida,
and requested work at his still. They also asked that a truck be sent to MacCIenny, Florida, to
move their belongings and that Boyd pay their accounts. The next day Boyd and a worker named
William Simpson went to MacCIenny to move the three men and their families and settle their
debts. Boyd first settled the account o f Alfred Smith for $9.22 at a separate camp under the
management o f Knabb’s son Earl, for which Boyd received a receipt. He then loaded Smith’s
household goods onto his truck and proceeded to MacCIenny to Camp 17 to settle the other
accounts and load the other two workers’ belongings. But upon entering the Camp 17 office,
Boyd found the owner Will Knabb, his woodsrider Fred Jones, and Earl Knabb, who had
proceeded them to MacCIenny, all armed with pistols. Knabb refused to let Boyd take the three
workers and accused him of recruiting his labor, at the time a crime in Florida.43 The three men
cursed and threatened Boyd. Laying his hand on his pistol, Knabb informed Boyd that he could
not leave the office until he accepted the return o f the $9.22 he had paid Earl on Alfred Smith’s

44 A. Philip Randolph to Homer Cummings, S March 1937, Correspondence, Classified
Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records of the Department o f Justice,
Record Group 60, National Archives.
43 The Florida statute read that “whomever shall entice or persuade by any means
whatsoever any tenant, servant or laborer, under contract with another, whether written or verbal,
to violate such contract, or shall employ any servant or laborer, knowing him or her to be under
contract or aforesaid, shall be punished by imprisonment not to exceed sixty days or $100.00
fine.” C.B. Winstead, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 19 March 1937, Ibid.
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account. Knabb also claimed that Arthur Smith owed between thirty and forty dollars for
burning part o f a forest. The three man forced Boyd to unload Alfred’s belongings at Camp 17.
In the mean time, Knabb called Alfred and Arthur into his office and asked if they were trying to
leave. Upon replying in the affirmative, they were threatened with severe beatings, a response
reported to be typical of Knabb when disciplining workers who attempted to leave.
Several days after the incident, Ed Baker escaped and made his way to Boyd’s camp, but
his wife, daughter, and belongings remained with Knabb. Knabb warned the two women that he
would have their shack guarded and if they left he would have them arrested. Knabb also
prevented the Smith men from leaving the camp, and they continued work in the woods.46 In an
effort to at least get Alfred and Arthur out, Ed sent word for them to meet him in Baldwin,
Florida early one morning and rendezvous with Boyd’s truck on its run to Jacksonville with a
load of turpentine and rosin. According to the plan, the Smiths left the camp at night, walked
along the highway, and reached a depot by daylight. But before the Boyd truck passed, Ed Hall,
one of Knabb’s woodsriders, drove up. When Hall instructed Arthur to get in his truck he
complied. But when he approached Alfred and explained, “boy, Mr. Knabb sent me down and
told me to bring you back,” Alfred refused. When Hall then approached him with a gun, he ran
for cover behind a box car. Because a group of whites were watching, Hall retreated to his truck
and left with Arthur. Alfred, however, failed to meet the Boyd truck, returned to Knabb’s camp,
and went back to work.47
A few days later the FBI Jacksonville Bureau Office received a letter from Boyd
describing the experience surrounding his attempt to remove the three workers from Knabb’s
employment. On October 23, 1936, Boyd, Simpson—who had accompanied Boyd to Knabb’s
46 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936 and 13
December 1936, Ibid.
47 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Ibid.
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camp—and Ed Baker all visited the Jacksonville office and related the story in person. A week
and a half later, Will and Earl Knabb, Fred Jones, and Ed Hall were subsequently charged with
peonage violations and taken into custody by Bureau agents and U.S. Marshals. All three men
pleaded not guilty and were each released on one-thousand-dollar bonds. Once the Knabbs were
arrested, Arthur and Alfred Smith and Baker’s wife and daughter were all moved to Boyd’s
camp, where they became his workers.48
The inquiry and trial drew considerable attention from the press and concerned
organizations. By the fall of 1936, newspapers across the country carried stories o f Knabb’s
operation. The NAACP and Workers Defense League sent investigators o f their own. The
NAACP urged the Justice Department to thoroughly investigate and prosecute the Knabb men.
AFL president William Green demanded that Florida governor David Sholtz lend his state’s full
resources to the investigation. When the AFL sent its own agent to inspect conditions, he
experienced first-hand the intimidation that made the labor system work. Fearing for his own
safety after an informer notified the manager of his presence and a small group o f white men
gathered, the agent left the camp after two hours.

The president of the Federation’s

Jacksonville branch submitted a report on the plight o f Knabb’s laborers.49 Boyd hoped that the
AFL would “continue to make efforts to clean up the situation which now exists in not only
Florida but possibly other places.”50

48 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Federal
Grand Jury Indictment o f William Knabb, Earl Knabb, Fred Jones, and Edward Stuart Hall,
February 1937, and Brien McMahon to Herbert S. Phillips, 7 November 1936, Ibid.
49 Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 168-170; W.G. Boyd to Dave Sholtz,
1 December 1936, Walter White to Attorney General, 8 December 1936, and A. Philip Randolph
to Homer Cummings, 5 March 1937, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of
Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National
Archives.
50 W.G. Boyd to William Green, 1 December 1936, Correspondence, Classified Subject
Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record
Group 60, National Archives.
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According to workers interviewed by the NAACP, all o f Knabb’s four hundred black
laborers were held in peonage. Workers labored from sunup to sundown and received from sixty
cents to one dollar per day, although a few received $ 1.25. It was rumored in the community
that, although Knabb kept accounts o f wages owed to workers, they received smaller amounts
than they were due on payday and met with serious consequences if they complained. Workers
were forced to make all their purchases from the commissary, where prices were one hundred
percent higher than at retail stores. Thus their low wages had only half the buying power they
would have with area merchants. For example, white bacon or fatback, which cost 15 cents in
Tampa, cost 25 cents in Knabb’s commissary and six pounds o f flour, which cost 24 cents
elsewhere, cost 40 cents if purchased from Knabb.51 One woodsrider, in fact, discontinued his
employment with Knabb after two years because he did not approve o f the way the camps were
operated. He admitted that “the general feeling of people acquainted with the turpentine industry
is that the Knabbs are unfair to their employees, and that they are hard to get along with,
especially Will Knabb.”52 Knabb ran his various turpentine operations like small police states.
He had all roads leading to the quarters watched, and two spies lived among the workers, even
crawling under the shanties to discover dissatisfaction or escape plans. If workers attempted to
leave, Knabb threatened their lives and had them beaten. Because labor was so scarce, it was
Knabb’s policy to punish workers but not dismiss them. When one o f Knabb’s woodsriders

51 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, A.
Philip Randolph to Homer Cummings, 5 March 1937 and Aron S Gilmartin to Homer T.
Cummings, 24 November 1936, Ibid.; Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 168.
52 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation Report, 23 December 1936
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records
o f the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives.
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dismissed a worker for calling him a liar, an unhappy Knabb explained that it was “all right to
whip them, but not to run them o ff.. . ,”53
The Knabb case illustrates the difficulty prosecutors found in securing convictions in
peonage cases. When questioned about the fear o f peonage charges, Knabb responded with
sarcasm and arrogance that “there isn’t any such thing in Florida. I have been doing that for 19
years and there hasn’t been any charge of peonage made against me, and nobody has tried to stop
me.”54 Knabb’s powerful friends, including state senators, reportedly sought to interfere with the
case. Will Knabb’s brother, T.J. Knabb, had been a state senator and turpentiner and had
himself been the subject o f an earlier peonage investigation. Another brother who was
associated with Will in the turpentine business was the president o f the Bank o f MacCIenny.55
Knabb’s supporters made efforts to tamper with government witnesses, actions that Boyd
explained were “very easy when negroes are offered money or either intimidated to forget what
they know.”56 A local doctor who believed that the Knabbs were capable o f practicing peonage,
thought that they considered themselves “to be the cock o f the walk” in Baker County.57 Boyd
wrote to the governor requesting help as well as to the U.S. Attorney General explaining the
seriousness o f the case.58 “I do know,” he proclaimed, “that if the Federal Government fails in

53 C.B. Winstead, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 10 March 1936, Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Ibid.;
Shofher, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 168.
56 W.G. Boyd to J. Edgar Hoover, 28 December 1936, Correspondence, Classified
Subject Files, Department o f Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice,
Record Group 60, National Archives.
57 Richard E. Smith, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 12 November 1936, Ibid.
58 W.G. Boyd to Homer S. Cummings, 1 December 1936 and W.G. Boyd to Dave Sholtz,
1 December 1936, Ibid.
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this attempt at this time to bring about justice what will take place hereafter in the turpentine and
operation of same, slavery and servitude here in Florida. It will show that the Knabbs not only
control the territory surrounding McCIenney (sic) but that they are bigger than the Federal
Government as they have often made their braggs.”59
The trial’s outcome did nothing to disprove Boyd’s claim. Earl Knabb was dismissed
from the case by the District Attorney, who decided the evidence did not involve him. Before the
trial the defense attorney argued that the indictments reference to “a condition of peonage” was
vague and uncertain to the degree that the defendants did not know the nature of the charges
against them. Once the trial was under way, the defense argued that the peonage charge
represented nothing more than a rivalry between turpentine operators and had grown from
Boyd’s frustrated efforts to recruit labor from Knabb’s camp. The defense also intimated that the
lawyers representing Boyd had demanded $16,000 in “hush money.” Even after listening to this
implausible defense, the jury deliberated for less than thirty minutes before acquitting Knabb and
his men of all federal peonage charges.60
Not all camp managers fit the mold of Will Knabb. At one Cross City, Florida operation
a group of Federal Writers Project workers, which included Zora Neal Hurston, encountered a
thirty-two year old widow serving as vice president and overseeing production. They described
her as a “brunette, not bad to look at—by no means. Not the business girl, nor the athletic type,
nor the purely feminine kind, but something of all this. Beyond that, she knows her business.
Dons blue riding breeches, boots, striped shirt and bandanna neckerchief and goes right to work.
. . . She seems more capable and intelligent than she knows herself.” She also appeared to be

59 W.G. Boyd to Homer S. Cummings, 1 December 1936, Ibid.
60 Motion to Quash and “Witness Arrested As Peijurer, 2nd Held For Contempt,”
newsclipping, Ibid.
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decent, agreeable, and completely unaware that her business practiced peonage and violently
mistreated its employees.61
Not only did forced labor practices continue into the 1930s and 1940s, so did the timber
lease. The majority of producers, around seventy-three percent, leased the crops they worked.
Leasing was most common in South Carolina, where 81.5 percent o f the crops were not owned,
and practiced the least in Alabama where producers leased only 65 percent o f their crops.
Evidence suggests that leased tracts became more available in the 1930s. Lumber companies
dramatically reduced their output, in some areas by as much as two-thirds, and grew more willing
to lease their forests to turpentine producers. Lease prices, however, do not appear to have
declined substantially. Because producers commonly controlled their leases for four years, those
who made agreements in early 1929 faced pre-Depression lease prices through 1932. But even
for those turpentiners negotiating leases in 1933, the rate had dropped by only sixteen or
seventeen percent from the late 1920s. Land owners had to charge at least enough to pay the
property tax, keeping lease prices elevated.62
Provided the lessee used conservation methods, timber owners could make more money
by leasing their timber before cutting it than leaving it to grow undisturbed. In most cases the
mortality rate among turpentined trees was not noticeably different from that o f round trees. And
because improved methods reduced growth by only five percent over four years, landowners still
profited by working their stands for turpentine despite the lost wood growth. But leasing timber
continued to pose some risks. Beetle infestation could bring serious destruction to turpentined

61 Lauriault, “From Can’t to Can’t,” 326-327.
62 Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current
Problems of the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University of North
Carolina, 1942), 236; Elwood R. Maunder, Voices From The South: Recollections o f Four
Foresters (Santa Cruz, CA: Forest History Society, 1977), 88; I. James Pikl, A History of Georgia
Forestry (Athens: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Georgia, 1966), 2;
Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 27-89.
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timber no matter how carefully a lessee worked it. Timber owners also ran the risk o f serious
tree damage if they leased to sloppy and unscrupulous producers. In the late 1930s and early
1940s, one owner, for example, leased to an uncooperative and careless operator with disastrous
results. The latter’s violation o f approved practices included cupping trees smaller than 9.S
inches in diameter, failing to properly rake around the trees at the end o f the season, running
chipped faces together without leaving any strip o f live wood to sustain the tree, and using a
large hack which produced deep and broad cuts. Worst of all, he failed to remove all nails and
aprons from the stands that he had finished working. Once at the mill, saws repeatedly hit nails
embedded in the wood, causing considerable damage to the blades and seriously endangering the
workers.63 Landowners worried that even the most informed producers would harm their timber
with fire. In 1936, one consultant informed a landowner that even though the lessee was “a
member of our Forestry Commission and favorable to protecting young timber from fire, it is just
as natural for a turpentine man to want to bum woods where he is operating as it is for a canary
to sing, and unless some restriction with reference to the use of fire is inserted [in the lease],
great harm is liable to be done young timber and seedlings.”64 Turpentiners resented the
stereotype, arguing that it was illogical for them to incinerate that from which they made their
63 Nails in turpentined trees had been a persistent problem for the mill. Between 1938
and 1942 a saw struck nails a total of 1,713 times, causing a total o f $4,343.21 in damage. When
confronted, the producer would only admit to chipping accidentally too deeply and claimed the
nails were left from the turpentining of the same timber years before. The angry landowner
considered halting turpentining but feared the producer would leave his equipment mounted on
the trees in retaliation. With so much equipment in the forest and labor scarce, the timber owner
had no way of removing it without lessee’s cooperation. Shirley, Working Trees for Naval
Stores. S; Clifford S. Schopmeyer, “Gum Yield and Wood Volume on Single-Faced Naval Stores
Trees,” reprinted from Southern Lumberman (IS December 19SS), Olustee Experiment Station
Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA; P.N. Howell to W.W. Barber, 14 March 1943, W.W.
Barber to Newton Naval Stores Company, 23 February 1942, Newton to L.N. Dantzler Lumber
Company, 24 April 1943 and 7 August 1942, and P. N. Howell to E J . Ford, 3 April 1943, and
W.W. Barber to P.N. Howell, 13 January 1941, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers.
64 P.N. Howell to L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company, 23 November 1936, Dantzler Lumber
Company Papers.
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living, yet some o f them feared that their laborers would accidentally set blazes with camp
fires.65

Thus, many conditions long associated with turpentine production persisted, the timber
lease and threat o f fire among them. Producers continued to organize labor according to the task
system and pay by piece work. The low-paid black men who dominated the labor force
continued to work in rough terrain under the watchful eye of woodsriders who considered
violence and brutality necessary measures for labor management. Workers lived in isolated
camps where they remained indebted to the commissary. Driven from the open by U.S. Justice
Department investigations, peonage continued as did efforts by producers to recruit or “steal”
workers from one another.
Not all industry patterns continued, however. The number o f small producers rose
rapidly beginning in the late 1930s, due in large part to the growth o f central distilleries. These
large gum processors eliminated the need for capital to own and run a fire still and made it
possible for owners o f small timber tracts to enjoy a greater return by working their trees for
turpentine themselves rather than leasing to large producers. Small owners thus began working
their own pines, commonly employing their sons as laborers, and marketing the gum at the
nearest central distillery. Men who possessed no land occasionally found timber owners willing
to let them work land on shares for turpentine. Blacks made up a substantial portion of these
new share producers. Unlike black turpentine wage earners, share workers labored
independently and, because their production expenses were low, did not need to rely on advances
as did agricultural share croppers. During the Depression and especially the Second World War,
out of pocket expenses for small producers were low enough and naval stores prices sufficiently
high to bring an attractive profit. Their rapid entry into naval stores production greatly altered
65 P.N. Howell to L.N. Dantzler Lumber Company, 23 November 1936 and Robert M.
Newton to P.N. Howell, 15 October 1937, Ibid.
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the industry’s makeup. In 1934, the typical turpentiner worked nearly ten crops and employed
thirty workers in gum production and just over two in distilling. Eighty percent o f these
producers had their own still which, on average, produced 435 units annually. But from the early
1930s to the mid 1940s the number of turpentiners grew from six hundred to between four and
five thousand, seventy percent working less than one crop o f faces.66
In yet another change, the factorage houses entered a decline during the 1930s. In the
early years o f the decade, around eighty percent o f naval stores were marketed through factors as
they had since at least the early nineteenth century. One southeastern Georgia producer’s factor,
for example, loaned him operating capital, marketed his product, and sold him supplies and
equipment. In another instance o f the factors’ power over operators, in the early 1940s one
Jacksonville factor strongly recommended that a producer not invest in a new centrifugal pump
for his still, directing him instead to have the Glidden Company central distillery refine it. This
factor also reminded its clients o f the importance o f working within the guidelines o f the NSCP
to remain eligible for benefit payments. Consolidated Naval Stores Company remained the
largest factor in the United States with a tangible net worth, in 1935, o f eight million dollars, or
seventy-five percent of all the other ten houses combined.67
66 Martin, “An Historical and Analytical Approach,” 223, 231-232; General Counsel and
Assistant to the President to John Slusser, 12 April 1966 and J. Lundie Smith, “A Few Words o f
Appreciation,” 20 April 1966, American Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers, Georgia
Agrirama, Tifton GA; Herbert L. Kayton, interview by Roy White, 7 October 1959, Forest
History Society; Richard C. Davis, ed. Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation
History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), s.v. “naval stores;” Brown, Forest
Products. 86; I.F. Eldgredge, interview by Roy R. White, 9 July 1959, Forest History Society,
Durham, NC; Reed, interview.
67 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 26, 51; Hulda Summerall Baker, “Summerall
Turpentine Still,” Museum o f Coastal History, Coastal Georgia Historical Society, St. Simons
Island, GA, 11-13; Turpentine and Rosin Factors, Inc. to A.D. Popped, 31 January 1940,
Turpentine and Rosin Factors, Inc. to Our Customers, 1 March 1940 and March 26, 1940,
Popped Papers; Antwerp Naval Stores Company, et al. to W.F. Holtsman, 20 October 1933 and
Commercial Reports of Naval Stores Factors, 20 October 1933, Austin Cary Memorial Forestry
Collection, Department o f Special Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of
Florida; Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 20.
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By the late 1930s, however, growing dissatisfaction with the factorage system developed
among producers. They complained that factors and dealers did not initiate any consumer
marketing strategy, but instead just took orders for what was available instead. Because gum
turpentine producers had competition from wood naval stores, producers demanded more
aggressive efforts to retain their market share. They also alleged that factors encouraged over
production because they benefited from commissions on the extra sales, regardless o f the
resulting low naval stores prices, and profited from the investment in additional loans and
equipment sales. Producers especially resented the recent vertical integration of factorage houses
like Consolidated, which controlled not only the marketing o f products and the supplying of
investment capital, but also manufactured the equipment, marketed the groceries needed to stock
the commissaries, and even competed with producers by running their own operations. Another
complaint was that factors were expensive at a time when economic efficiency mattered more
than ever. The factor charged two and a half percent commission for each transaction, with eight
percent interest for all capital advances. Harley Langdale, Jr., the Judge’s son, likened factors to
loan sharks. Some producers even began questioning the factors’ honesty, suspecting that they
conspired with bankers and exporters to manipulate prices for their own profit. Although
producers resented the paternalistic relationship between themselves and their factors, most
considered them necessary evils. They had, after all, helped many operators begin their
businesses at a time when they had nothing at all. Judge Langdale, who himself had experienced
great difficulty working his way out from under his factor, saw them as a necessary, stabilizing
force in the industry.68

68 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 90-91. The factor, it must be admitted, had to
borrow much o f his capital, including the funds he lent to producers, from local banks and
especially large northern financiers. Harley Langdale, Jr, interview, 7-9; Downing Musgrove,
(paper presented at the Naval Stores Breakfast, 31 October 1961, Washington, DC), American
Turpentine-Farmers Association Papers, 2-4; Jane Twitty Shelton, Pines and Pioneers: A History
of Lowndes County. Georgia. 1825-1900. (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1976), 185.
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With the government’s entrance into market regulation and the rise o f centralized
distilleries, however, producers found it somewhat easier to loosening ties to their factors. The
factor was now no longer the principal voice in an operator’s production practices. Under the
Naval Stores Conservation Program, turpentiners needed to satisfy the Forest Service’s requests
just as much as their factor’s, although both parties were usually in agreement on
recommendations. In the American Turpentine-Farmers Association producers also had a new,
powerful voice with considerable political clout and capable o f influencing national policy. But
the shift from processing gum in fire stills to centralized distilleries undermined factors the most.
Producers could now sell their gum directly to the central distillery and not wait for the factor to
find a buyer or pay a handling fee. Moreover, in reducing the operating expenses by eliminating
the need for each producer to run his own still, the central facilities decreased producers’ reliance
on factors. The entry o f new types o f producers spurred by the central distilleries also weakened
the factors’ position. The many new small operators harvested gum largely with their own labor
and had very low production costs that did not require the factor’s financial services. Smaller
producers were usually able to secure loans from banks, relieving themselves o f any need for a
factor. Not only was the region’s banking industry better developed by the 1940s than at any
other time, but small producers tended to own their own timber, which banks accepted as
collateral. They also required only small loans, just enough to cover the cost o f the hardware
needed to place their trees in production.69
Surprisingly, factors failed to lead the industry’s construction of central distilleries. The
uncertain business climate o f the 1930s caused their hesitation to invest in these expensive and
technologically revolutionary facilities. By the time very large producers and consumers

69 Kayton, interview, 4-5; Eldredge, interview, 9-10; A.R. Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores
Long Linked With Industrial Development” Valdosta. Georgia Daily Times. 18 November, 1959.
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constructed enough o f these plants to prove their profitability, the region was well on its way
toward containing as many facilities as its gum producers could keep in business. Desperate to
have part o f the market share, by the early 1940s such companies as Turpentine and Rosin
Factors o f Jacksonville and the giant Consolidated Naval Stores Company, bought interest in
existing stills, but they were too late to gain any control in the processing.70 Because factors
failed to adapt to changes in gum naval stores processing and marketing, their businesses rapidly
declined and, by the second half of the 1940s, played a minor role in the business.
Although the great majority o f producers gladly accepted the weakened role o f factors,
associated with government intervention in production and development o f central distilleries,
not all makers welcomed the changes. In 1939, the AT-FA faced a temporary challenge from a
rival organization frustrated with industry trends. Organized in Vidalia, Georgia, the Gum
Turpentine Farmers Cooperative Association believed that the AT-FA had failed to address
circumstances that reduced the operators’ control of the industry. The Cooperative opposed what
its organizers charged were exploitativly high interest rates and commission charges by factors as
well as the trend toward central distillation, which they argued lessened the operators’ control of
the industry by reducing them to the status o f mere gum producers, not manufacturers o f spirits
and rosin. Organizers were also dissatisfied with what they considered the AT-FA’s failure to
promote cooperative processing and marketing strategies. The Gum Turpentine Farmers
Cooperative Association’s efforts and organization were short-lived, however. Most producers
were happy to rid themselves o f the expensive and troublesome task o f distilling their gum and
many could already foresee decline in the factors’ industry position, making any new program to
curb their power unnecessary. Moreover, the government already administered satisfactory
marketing and production regulation programs71

70 Martin, “Historical and Analytical Approach,” 226-227,273.
71 Ibid., 283.
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Whereas such developments as an increase in small producers and decline of the
factorage houses’ represented significant changes during the 1930s, the Second World War set in
motion circumstances that transformed the entire business. When it began in Europe in 1939, the
war created uncertainty in the gum naval stores market. Although many European buyers
clamored for the products, interruption in shipping traffic made export difficult (figs. 13.3 and
13.4). In the winter o f 1940, for example, the Continental Turpentine and Rosin Corporation o f
Laurel, Mississippi, had difficulty receiving British Navicerts, commodity passports required to
accompany goods aboard neutral ships. Because o f the resulting shipping delays, the company’s
barrels o f rosin sat at port, drawing charges for storage and insurance. When shipments were
finally possible, the company had to pay astonishingly high freight charges.72
With American entry into the conflict, wartime demand for rosin industry transformed
supplies o f that product from surplus to shortage, and the Naval Stores Conservation Program,
whose initial mission had been to reduce production, shifted to encourage naval stores
manufacture for the war effort73 Such companies as Filtered Rosin Products attempted to recruit
new producers with a booklet explaining the basics of gum naval stores production and by
offering assistance to anyone desiring to enter the business. The company assured operators that
“crude gum production for turpentine and rosin is a vital necessity for victory. Produce more o f

72 Continental Turpentine Company and Rosin Corporation, Incorporated to Cordell
Hull, 13 February 1940, William M. Colmer Papers, Archives and Manuscripts Division,
McCain Library and Archives, University o f Southern Mississippi; For figures related to the
volume o f naval stores exports by country and the value o f United States naval stores exports see
Appendix A.
73 Arthur G. Steedley, “‘Doctors, Lawyers, Teachers, Merchants, and Widows, Call to
Ask Advice.,” in Historical Background o f the Naval Stores Conservation Program. Olustee
Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 12; Thomas, McCranie’s Turpentine
Still. 8.
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Figure 13.3. United States Turpentine Exports, 1930-1940
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems of
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
327.
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it and buy victory bonds with your larger income.”74 The Newton Company circulated a similar
publication to help producers realize the maximum yield from their faces.73 NSCP foresters, for
their part, put on “Naval Stores for Victory Shows” to encourage production expansion. With a
few musicians, a truck foil o f war equipment, and one or two wounded servicemen, they
preached the message that “no ship can sail, no plane can fly, and no soldier can eat or fight
without naval stores.”76 By 1942, the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that o f the
approximately thirty million acres o f pine in the naval stores region, sixty percent was in
production and 400,000 people depended, at least partially, on the products manufacture for a
living. But despite these large numbers, turpentine and rosin demand exceeded production
throughout the war. With a goal o f 350,000 units, the industry could only supply 250,000.77
An increased demand for lumber and puipwood relative to naval stores created part o f
the difficulty. From 1939 to 1942 lumber production in Georgia nearly doubled, from 1.09
billion board feet to 2.07 billion board feet. Pulp and paper industries were attracted to the
South’s rapidly growing second-growth forest, cheap labor, and good transportation systems. By
1939, forty-seven paper mills operated in the South, representing an investment o f two hundred

74 M.E. Henegar, Gum Naval Stores Timber Land Use: Information and Suggestions
(Brunswick, GA: Filtered Rosin Products, Inc.), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia
Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 6.
75 M.E. Henegar, Slash and Loneleaf Pine Growers Handbook: Practical Information and
Suggestions for Growing. Protecting, and Realizing Maximum Utilization (Lake City, FL: The
Newton Company, Incorporated), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton,
GA.
76 E.O. Powers, ‘“ With Pearl Harbor Our World, of Course, Turned Upside Down,”’ in
Historical Background o f the Naval Stores Conservation Program. Olustee Experiment Station
Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 8.
77 Production o f Naval Stores (Washington, DC: United States Department o f
Agriculture, 1942), 8; Albert G. Snow, Jr., “Research on the Improvement o f Turpentine
Practices,” Economic Botany 3 (October-December, 1949): 380; Pikl, A History o f Georgia
Forestry. 39.
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million dollars. With a growing market for smaller timber, landowners were more willing to sell
their trees untapped than risk part o f its value to the sometimes unreliable work o f turpentiners.
Indeed, even if producers used the most conservative techniques, owners could still lose part o f
their timber is value.78
An acute labor shortage, however, explains most o f the difficulty in meeting wartime
demands for naval stores. With workers willing to chip and dip already scarce, the labor
shortage further intensified once the United States government requested that operators increase
production by fifty percent for the war effort. In November 1941, Harley Langdale insisted to
Washington officials that operators must greatly increase wages in order to retain their present
workers and attract others who had already left for better-paying jobs. He explained that where
fanners could rely on machinery to increase production, gum turpentine producers relied
completely on man power.79 The following year a producer lamented that he was making all he
could, but because o f the labor shortage his production was less than fifty percent of its potential.
He complained that the army was drafting his turpentine workers, but worse, a “large part o f our
turpentine labor, both white and black are on W.P.A., and so far, my efforts to get them back in
to the turpentine business has been a failure.”80

78 Production o f Naval Stores. 8; Snow, “Research on the Improvement of Turpentine
Practices,” 380; Pikl, A History o f Georgia Forestry. 39, 41; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening o f
the South: The Recovery o f Land and Forest (Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky,
1984), 115-116; George B. Tindall, The Emergence o f the New South. 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 467; Albert G. Snow, “Turpentining and Poles,” reprint
from Southern Lumberman (15 December 1948), Olustee Experiment Station Files, Olustee
Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 1.
79 Harley Langdale, Memorandum Regarding Gum Naval Stores, 10 November 1941,
Colmer Papers.
80 Cliff Dees to Theodore G. Bilbo, 26 February 1942, The Papers o f Theodore Bilbo,
Archives and Manuscript Department, McCain Library and Archives, University of Southern
Mississippi.
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Problems securing adequate labor persisted throughout the war. The federal
government’s wartime Office o f Price Administration set prices o f naval stores so low that
producers were reportedly unable to raise wages to attractive levels without incurring a loss. Nor
could the industry successfully compete for workers with other forest product industries in the
naval stores belt or with the war industries that lured rural workers to the cities. Under the wage
rates set by the War Labor Board, naval stores workers earned around seventy-five percent o f the
minimum standard of $28.60 per week. Despite the federal government’s request for greater
gum naval stores production, its manufacture continued to drop through the war years because of
inadequate labor supplies. To remedy the crisis, turpentine producers recommended that the
government raise the price o f naval stores by $ 18 per unit, or $ 1.33 1/3 per one hundred pounds
of rosin. Eight dollars o f the SI 8-increase would be applied to chippers’ wages, S2.80 to
dipping, and $7.20 to other labor. Opponents o f raising the price ceiling admitted that wages in
gum naval stores production were substandard and that the basic obstacle to production increases
was a manpower shortage. But they doubted a price adjustment would remedy the situation since
there was no guarantee that producers would use the increased returns to raise wages. No
minimum wage standard existed in the business to compel them to do so. And even if wages did
rise, they still might not attract a significant number of additional workers. Moreover, the severe
shortage o f gum rosin, they alleged, was not solely the result o f a labor shortage, but partially
caused by speculative withholding o f stocks in anticipation of profits once the price increase was
granted. Despite such warnings, in early May 194S, the War Food Administration recommended
that the maximum price for base-grade gum be increased by at least ninety-five cents per one
hundred pounds. At this time the price ceiling was already 254 percent over that o f the 19391940 season and even 143 percent above that o f the previous season."
81 The Labor Board set wages at 550 per hour plus time and a half for over-time. Forty
hours at 550 equaled $22 plus eight hours at 82.50 equaled $6.60 or $28.60 per week. Jay Ward
to Theodore G. Bilbo, 9 May 1945, Claude Pepper to Chester Bowles, 11 May 1945, Robert M.
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As severe as the labor scarcity was, it could have been much worse. Changes in die
industry had already eliminated the requirement for two historically important classes of
laborers, coopers and distillers. The need for coopers gradually declined as the manner in which
turpentine and rosin were packaged changed. By 1930, most producers purchased factory-made,
tightly-constructed spirit barrels, which were made o f oak. Coopers still had to coat the barrels’
inside with glue to properly seal them. Glue was purchased in a brick form, melted on a small
stove, and, once liquefied, poured into the bung hole. The cooper then rolled the barrel until the
inside became evenly coated. Distillery workers poured spirits in only after the glue dried. At
some operations coopers continued to construct wooden rosin barrels from machine-cut staves.
Wooden barrels become prohibitably expensive. Moreover, the metal barrels did not possess
several problems associated with wooden ones. Unless the staves were well-seasoned, wooden
barrels shrank as they dried and allowed the rosin to leak. Wood barrels used to hold the NSCP
loan stock could not endure more than two years in storage before decay required rebarreling at
considerable expense. Wide weight variation in wood barrels made it difficult to determine
prices and central distilleries had a harder time sampling resin from wooden barrels. During the
1930s producers, therefore, began to use metal rosin barrels, which arrived either ready-made or
in two sections that had to be crimped together. More and more smaller producers shipped rosin
in metal drums to larger processing plants, where it was pumped in its liquid form into insulated
tank cars and delivered hot to the consumer. By 1941, all 130,503 barrels o f rosin in storage
were held in metal barrels. A small percentage o f naval stores was packed in four to six ply
paper bags weighing one hundred pounds. Few producers employed coopers by the Second

Newton to Office o f Price Administration, 2 May 194S, and William H. Davis, 28 May 1945,
Bilbo Papers.
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World War. As with coopers, the number o f distillers declined as producers ended their use of
old fire stills and began shipping resin to central distilleries.*2
Despite the decreased need for coopers and distillers, turpentiners still lacked a sufficient
work force; they reacted to the labor crisis in several ways, among them the continuation o f
peonage. In 1942, the FBI received a letter from one young man’s desperate mother and aunt
requesting help in rescuing him from peonage. The two women wanted “to see if there is enny
wat(y) o f getting you to get my boy out o f the Hills o f MacHenry - Miss Sippie. he have been
there Six mears this coming September the First and I just heare from him now and then, he is
on a tearptine Farm ant, that is a out Law Place and I am asking you for help if you Please. I
want to see my Dear sun if there is enny possible chance enny more in life.”*3 The Justice
Department, at J. Edgar Hoover’s recommendation, decided not to investigate the case. In yet
another incident in the 1940s, a family of dippers was recruited by another producer who sent
them bus tickets. Their employer, however, stopped them on their way to town with their

82 Wood naval stores plants shipped most of their product intended for the domestic
market in 6,000- to 10,000-gallon-sized railroad tank cars. For dealers and export trade they
barreled it in fifty to fifty-five gallon casks. Because ninety-two percent o f gum turpentine was
sold through retail paint, hardware, and drug stores, most was packaged in four ounce to fivegallon-sized containers. For the small number o f distillers that remained, the old practice o f
regulating the stills through sound, the hazard o f explosions, and the pattern o f training through
apprenticeship continued. As one Florida Writers Project participant discovered, “the still
workers are probably the elite o f a turpentine personnel.” The technique had gone virtually
unchanged for a century, retaining its primitive and dangerous nature. Maguire, interview by
author; Hurston, “Turpentine Camp-Cross City, 12-14; Robert S. Blount, Spirits of Turpentine:
A History o f Florida Naval Stores. 1528-1950 (Tallahassee: Florida Agricultural Museum, 1993),
43-45; Carroll B. Butler. Treasures o f the Longleaf Pines. Naval Stores (Shalimar. FL: Tarkei
Publishing, 1998), 114; Florida Writers’ Project, “The Story of Naval Stores . . . , ” Florida
Highways 11 (July 1943): 31; Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 32-34; Shirley, Working
Trees for Naval Stores. 35-36; Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores
Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of Technology, 1948), 23; Martin, “Historical and Analytical
Approach,” 32; Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City,” 4.
83 James Houser, 7 July 1942, Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of
Justice Central Files, General Records o f the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National
Archives.
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belongings and forced diem to return. After the father went to the new employer by himself his
former one, with whom his family stayed, went to retrieve him only to be punched and held at
gun point until the sheriff arrived. The three-hundred pound sheriff shook the producer until he
agreed to let the family move to Florida. Three days later a truck arrived to move the family, and
the driver delivered a check to pay off their account. After an FBI investigation the producer
narrowly escaped peonage prosecution because o f the leniency o f a sympathetic Superior Court
judge in Tifton, Georgia.84 At the same time a convention o f Georgia Baptists concluded that
“peonage or debt slavery has by no means disappeared from our land. There are more white
people involved in this diabolical practice than there were slaveholders. There are more Negroes
held by these debt slavers than were actually owned was slaves before the war Between the
States. The method is the only thing which has changed.”85 Also, a Florida Writers Project
participant found that turpentine workers “are the lowest strata o f legally free humans” and a
social worker remarked that “a negro who is foolish enough to go to work in a turpentine camp is
simply signing away his birthright.”86
Producers as well responded to their labor shortage in more innovative ways than
peonage. The state o f Georgia paroled convicts to provide workers in rural areas. The program
was begun in the spirit o f patriotism on the argument that crop products were more essential to
victory than road construction by chain gangs. The employers were to see to the ex-convicts’
upkeep and to pay them the current rate for rural help, but if the parolee left the camp, he was to
be arrested and returned to prison to complete his sentence. Whereas many parolees went to

84 John Edgar Hoover to Wendell Berge, 1 August 1942 and Wendell Berge to Director,
Federal Bureau o f Investigation, 12 August 1942, Ibid.; William P. Lagdale, interview, 5-6.
85 Stetson Kennedy, Southern Exposure (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company,
Inc., 1946), 48.
86 Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City,” 6. Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 261.
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farms, some found themselves in turpentine camps. In one instance a member o f the governor’s
staff, who operated a large turpentine operation in Patten, Georgia, employed a dozen parolees,
both white and black. They all lived together in a bam. At least one such worker objected to the
turpentine work and complained that he was not adequately compensated. O ther operators
employed released Florida convicts. In the 1940s, Florida apparently freed prisoners, even
murders, if they promised not to return to the state. Many took jobs at Georgia turpentine
operations.87
German prisoners o f war who worked at many jobs in the South—in agriculture,
pulpwood, and at army bases—also labored in the naval stores industry. Foresters helped to train
twenty-two thousand prisoners o f war, many of them captured from Rommel’s army, for
harvesting turpentine and cutting pulpwood at Blountsville, Florida. Turpentiners apparently so
valued and jealously guarded the use of these German workers that, upon repatriation following
the war, they sought assurance that their prison workers would not be withdrawn at a rate faster
than in other businesses.88
The naval stores producers’ effort to hold onto their prisoner laborers as long as possible
resulted from the challenging situation that the Second World War presented them; at the same
time the war drove product demand to dizzying heights, it sapped the supply o f low-cost workers
on whose shoulders the labor-intensive business rested. Producers’ concern therefore shifted
from managing surplus quantities o f turpentine and rosin to securing adequate timber supplies

87 J. Carlton Gatner, Federal Bureau o f Investigation Report, 7 January 1943,
Correspondence, Classified Subject Files, Department of Justice Central Files, General Records
of the Department o f Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives; Maguire, interview, St.
Augustine Historical Society; William P. Langdale, interview, 5; Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine.
29.
88 Jim A. McArther, ‘“ During the War, I Trained 22,000 German Prisoners-of-War to
Work Naval Stores and Cut Pulpwood,”’ in Historical Background o f the Naval Stores
Conservation Program. Olustee Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 6; John
W. Snyder to William Colmer, 29 May 1946, Colmer Papers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

646

and workers to meet government requirements for increased supplies. But the military, federal
work programs, and war-time industries, all o f which paid higher wages than work in turpentine,
siphoned off the laborers needed to harvest gum. Operators responded through continued efforts
to hold workers in peonage and even by resorting to innovative forms o f convict labor.
With the war’s end, the gum naval stores industry entered a rapid decline. As long as the
war continued, naval stores demand exceeded supply and the industry persisted despite its
shortcomings. Because nothing about the gum naval stores industry changed over the course of
the conflict, as forest researcher Keith W. Dorman observed, the “outlook for the future is not
bright for the competitive position of gum naval stores . . . than it was before the war.”89 Gum
producers continued to suffer from labor shortages. The hard, low-paying work required laborers
to toil in the summer heat while fighting bugs and snakes and attracted few black southerners
who, with the rise of small manufacturing facilities in local communities, could now find betterpaying and less physically-demanding jobs. By the early 1960s, the expansion o f minimum-wage
laws to cover agricultural workers, including those in naval stores production, forced operators to
abandon the piece work system for hourly wages.90 In 1949, forest researcher Albert Snow, with
the Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, explained that “the naval stores industry must
compete with newer industries for manpower, and its products must be marketed in competition
with those o f modem chemical industries.”91

89 Dorman, “High-Yielding Turpentine Orchards,” 295.
90 “Firm Provides Constant Cash,” Valdosta. Georgia Daily Times. 26 June 1977; Davis,
Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 477; E.W. Carswell, “‘Naval
Stores’ Industry Came to Northwest Florida in 1883,” Pensacola Florida News-Joumal File,
Pensacola Historical Resource Center, Pensacola, FL.
91 Snow, “Research on the Improvement of Turpentine Practices,” 375.
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Just as alternative job opportunities began attracting workers away from the gum naval
stores industry, widespread peonage diminished, although the practice by no means ended.92
First, two Supreme Court rulings in the first half of the 1940s found both Georgia’s and Florida’s
labor laws, which continued to support peonage despite previous court decisions against similar
statutes, unconstitutional, thus removing the legal underpinnings for the practice in those states.
Second, as roads improved and cars became more accessible, community grocery stores began to
attract the business o f turpentine workers, undermining the role o f the commissary, the linchpin
of worker indebtedness.93 In 1943, one Florida observer found that “low-price cash and chain
stores in nearby towns, improved transportation facilities and the fact that with few exceptions
present-day camps are no longer isolated communities, have reduced commissary stocks to staple
groceries, work clothes, tobacco, and soft drinks.”94 In some cases, however, producers relied on
country stores in place o f the commissary, opening accounts in the worker’s names, paying their
bills, and then deducting the balance from their monthly pay. Finally, the increasing availability
of cars made escape easier and the telephone put workers in better contact with legal assistance.93
The workers who continued in the business had grown up in it, had little or no education,
and knew only that trade. They had no way o f leaving the industry, no one to intercede for them,

92 An investigation o f peonage begun by the Workers Defense League in the second half
of the 1940s uncovered potential forced-labor practices in turpentine camps. The League found
that “more forms of forced labor are more widely practiced in Florida than in any other state.”
And as late as 1949 the Workers Defense League found fourteen turpentine camps in Alachua
County, Florida alone where peonage was openly practiced. Brown, Forest Products. 186;
Duncan, “Report on Trip to Cross City,” 5-7; Kennedy, Southern Exposure. 49; Shofner, “Forced
Labor in the Florida Forests,” 24; Shofner, “Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case,” 172.
93 Daniel, Shadow o f Slavery. 185; William Cohen “Negro Involuntary Servitude in the
South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis,” The Journal o f Southern History 42 (February
1976): 52; Shofner, “Forced Labor in the Florida Forests,” 24-25; Blount, Spirits o f Turpentine.
30.
94 Kennedy, Palmetto Country. 259.
95 Wright, “Turpentining,” 115.
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and had no choice but to accept whatever they were given.96 Wages in the naval stores industry
remained so low that, as John W. Langdale, the judge’s son, explained “they could make as much
on welfare as they could working the pine trees to get gum.”97 But as this work force aged, no
one replaced them. In 1959, one retired forester explained that “today blacks don’t want to work
in turpentine. They can go to a little town and work at a manufacturing plant and make more
money with shorter hours.”98 Many o f the few producers who continued worked on a very small
scale, laboring with their families to harvest gum. In some cases, white women replaced black
men in the forest. On one occasion an NSCP inspector came across a producer and his wife
preparing trees for installing cups. The wife held a broad ax while her husband hit it with a
maul. The same inspector also discovered a widow, whose livelihood depended on naval stores
using a hack after her chipper left Such cases were reportedly not uncommon.99
Resumption of foreign naval stores production after the Second World War also hurt the
American gum naval stores industry by decreasing export demands. Before the war, nearly half
of all U.S.-produced rosin and close to forty percent o f turpentine was exported. In the mid
1930s, for example, the U.S. made 57 percent of the world’s naval stores and France, ranking
second, manufactured 22 percent (fig. 13.5). Spain, Russia, and Portugal followed with 8.57
percent, 4.29 percent, and 3 percent respectively. Greece, Mexico, and India contributed small
quantities to the world market. And as European gum naval stores production rose in the 1940s

96 Reed, interview; Kayton, interview, 5; Dwight Wilson, interview, Oral History
Collection, Research Library, St. Augustine Historical Society, S t Augustine, FL; Blount, Spirits
of Turpentine. 30.
97 “Langdale Company Sells Gum Process Machinery,” Valdosta. Georgia Daily Times.
27 August 1975.
98 Kayton, interview, 5.
99 Ibid.; Meldrin, interview; McArther, “‘During the War, I Trained 22,000 German
Prisoners-of-War,” 7.
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with the stabilization of the European economies, American exports fell. By the late 1940s, less
than a quarter o f rosin production was sold overseas. U.S. production continued to outpace
exports, however, causing price declines. In 1947, the U.S. exported 95,000 barrels o f turpentine
and 570,000 drums of rosin. But in 1948,453,000 barrels of turpentine and 975,000 drums o f
rosin were available to fill foreign orders. The loan program’s stocks began to rise as only a
small portion o f gum naval stores left the country.100
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Figure 13.5. World Gum Turpentine Production, 1935
Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
324.

Over the 1930s and 1940s, the gum naval stores industry’s losses were the wood naval
stores industry’s gains (figs. 13.6 and 13.7). By the late 1930s, the American gum naval stores

100 Campbell, et al., Naval Stores Industry. 19, 36-37,92-93; Martin, “Historical and
Analytical Approach,” 193, 196-197; Harley Langdale and E.E. Holdman to Office o f
International Trade, United States Department of Commerce, 6 May 1948 and Harley Langdale
to Secretary o f Agriculture, 13 October 1947 [38], Colmer Papers.
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industry was responsible for ju st 53.67 percent o f world naval stores production, down from 80
percent ten years earlier (fig. 13.8). The greatest part o f the decline was the result o f increases in
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Figure 13.6. Production o f Turpentine by State, Selected Years 1931-1944
* Texas figures for 1931, 1934, and 1938-1944 are included in Louisiana figures.
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School of
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 8; For figures related to chart see
Appendix B.
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Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 9.
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Figure 13.8. Turpentine Production by Method, 1930-1950
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture,
1956), 8.

American wood naval stores production. In 1933, Phoenix Naval Stores Company acquired and
reopened the Yaryan wood naval stores plant at Gulfport which Hercules had earlier shut down
with the completion o f its Hattiesburg facility. Three years later the Crosby Naval Stores plant
began operations in Picayune, Mississippi, and the Alabama Naval Stores Company started
production in Mobile. In 1938, the Chemical Products Company plant opened at Laurel,
Mississippi. Newport Company, based in Pensacola, remained active during the period and, in
1939, opened a new plant. By the late 1940s, naval stores plants went up in western Louisiana.
A Crosby plant opened in DeRidder in 1946 and, one year later, a Newport plant started
operations in Oakdale. By the end of the 1940s, the South contained thirteen wood naval stores
plants: one in Georgia, one in Florida, three in Alabama, six in Mississippi, and two in Louisiana.
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One Mississippi plant held die distinction as the largest in the world. Although, in 1940, gum
naval stores operators manufactured the majority of products, 60.7 percent o f U.S. turpentine and
53.6 percent of rosin, the domestic wood naval stores output that year was the largest on record
while gum naval stores production had shrunk to one o f its lowest levels of production in half a
century. With the rise in demand during the Second World War, wood naval stores increased its
share of the world market. As their customer base continued to expand, by 1945, wood naval
stores exceeded gum naval stores in production. Over the 1950s gum naval stores manufacture
declined by nearly sixty-five percent (figs. 13.9 and 13.10). In 1950, gum naval stores accounted
for forty percent of the total production o f naval stores products. By 1960, it reached close to
twenty percent, around sixteen percent in 1965, and, in 1970, less than half of a percent.101 One
industry observer remarked that, despite all of the gum naval stores industry’s government
support, “the steam solvent industry due to its efficient operation, competes with the gum
industry and produces a better product at less cost, and is on a sounder financial and industrial
basis.”102
But just as gum naval stores production declined and wood naval stores manufacturing
experienced impressive growth, the latter’s consumption o f huge quantities o f stumps threatened
to exhaust the supply, ju st as gum turpentine had nearly consumed the living pine stands
101 R.E. Price, “Naval Stores in Southwest Louisiana,” The McNeese Review 2 (Spring
1949): 10-11; Janice Croft, “A Twin Success Story: Pensacola and Newport,” Pensacola
Historical Resources Center, Pensacola, Florida, 9; Charlotte Wittwer, “Stumpwood to Resins—
Oldest Pensacola Industry,” Pensacola. Florida News-Joumal File, Pensacola Historical
Resources Center, Pensacola, Florida; Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC:
United States Department o f Agriculture, 1956), 2-3; Martin, “An Historical and Analytical
Approach,” 21, 182, 186-188; “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” Olustee
Experiment Station Files, Georgia Agrirama, Tifton, GA, 4; Shirley, “Gum Naval Stores;”
“Waste Stumps from Dixie Cut-Over Land Become Hundreds o f Products at Plant,” Pensacola.
Florida News-Joumal. 2 October 1949; Peter Koch, Utilization o f the Southern Pines
(Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1972), 1477; Naval Stores Statistics.
5.
102 “Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” 5.
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generations earlier. In total, the thirteen wood naval stores plants had a capacity of nearly four
thousand tons o f stumps per day, requiring two hundred boxcars or five hundred trucks full to
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Figure 13.9. Turpentine Production by Method, 1950-1974
* 1950-1954 figures do not include destructively distilled turpentine.
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture,
1956), 8; Naval Stores: A Summary o f Annual and Monthly Statistics. 1955-74 (Washington,
DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1977), 5.

keep them supplied.103 Although the southern pine belt contained hundreds o f thousands o f acres
o f cut over land from which stumps were available, the growth in demand outpaced the
replacement o f the supply, especially since not all pine stumps made suitable processing
material. Because they contained most o f the heartwood, the stumps from old-growth longleaf

103 During the 1930s, wood stump usage at the Pensacola Newport plant rose from 70
tons per day to around 1,100 tons per day following the plant’s expansion. The Crosby plant in
southwestern Louisiana consumed 750 tons of stumps per day, a quantity that required around
five hundred men working in the field to supply. Using bulldozers, they uprooted the stumps,
then chopped them into pieces and transported them an average distance o f thirty-five miles on
trucks to the plant.
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were the most profitable to process. Like the virgin longleaf pine stands themselves, the number
of stumps was finite.
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Figure 13.10. Rosin Production by Method, 1950-1974
*TaIl oil figure for 1950-1956 not available.
Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture,
1956), 8: Naval Stores: A Summary of Annual and Monthly Statistics. 1955-74 (Washington.
DC: United States Department o f Agriculture, 1977), 5.

Wood naval stores plants went to great lengths to secure adequate stump supplies. They
purchased them from landowners who granted the companies a certain amount of time in which
to remove them. In 1942, for example, Phoenix Naval Stores Company purchased from the
Dantzler Lumber Company o f Mississippi all its old dead lightwood pines, all surface and
turpentine pine lighter wood, and all lighter stumps on the company’s property in George
County. They had four years to complete the removal. The sale o f stumps provided landowners
with extra income and cleared their cutover property for pasture, agricultural use, or
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reforestation. Some companies not only gathered up as many stump purchase agreements as they
could, they also purchased the property on which the stumps and wood lay. In late 1946, the
Crosby plant owned about 100,000 acres o f land and had contracts for stumps on another
400,000 acres in the vicinity o f DeRidder. The supply was estimated to last the company
between twenty and forty years.104
Beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through the 1950s, the wood naval stores
industry suffered not only from a decline in available stumpage but, most importantly, because of
new, more efficient production techniques developed by the pulpwood industry. At the South’s
increasing number o f pulpwood plants, trunks were debarked, chipped, and cooked in a weak
sulfuric acid solution to extract the wood’s cellulose for paper. During the process, turpentine
spirits were released and, once condensed, formed sulfate turpentine. While the spirits vaporized
from the cooked solution, rosin was emitted in the form of tall oil, a frothy substance that
materialized on the top o f the mixture and could be skimmed off after cooking. During the early
years o f the pulpwood industry, no process existed to refine the tall oil into its usable component
parts and it had to be discarded or burned as fuel. But in the late 1940s, the Arizona Chemical
Company, after a decade o f research, developed a fractional distillation process whereby tall oil
could be separated into fatty acids, rosin, and pitch. With this discovery, the sulfate naval stores
industry, a division o f the chemical/pulpwood industry, quickly moved to conquer production.
Sulfate naval stores could be made more cheaply than comparable gum or wood products. By
1955, sulfate turpentine production exceeded that of gum turpentine and over the next thirteen

104 Croft, “Twin Success Story,” 8; Price, “Naval Stores in Southwest Louisiana, ” 10-11;
“Naval Stores History We Never Knew ’Til Now,” 4; Sale o f pine stumps to Phoenix Lumber
Company, 14 January 1942, Dantzler Lumber Company Papers; “Newport Division Welcomes
You,” Pensacola. Florida News-Joumal File, Pensacola Historical Resources Center, Pensacola,
FL; Eldredge, The 4 Forests. 21.
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years, almost completely replaced all other methods.105 Although many wood naval stores
companies went out o f business, a few innovative producers, such as Newport Company, began
construction o f tall oil processing plants. In the late 1940s, Newport built a facility at Bay
Minette, Alabama and later enlarged its capacity ten times. In the early 1960s, it erected another
such plant in Oakdale, Louisiana.
By the early 1950s, many larger producers and businesses that supported the gum naval
stores industry phased out production and turned to other activities. Foreseeing the industry’s
continued decline, producers like the Maguire family began selling their St. Johns County,
Florida, timber for pulpwood in the early 1940s and started a timber land management company
that remains in operation today. The Langdales continued to prosper by consolidating their naval
stores operation and simultaneously branching out into a wide range of businesses. In the mid1940s, the Langdale turpentine operation consisted of eighteen to twenty separate partnerships,
but, in 1947, the judge consolidated these different enterprises into the Langdale Company with
he and his sons as equal shareholders.106 They then began buying out the partnerships. At the
same time, they built a central distillery and a wood-treating operation. Through the 1960s, the
Langdales remained a powerful force in Georgia and what little remained of the gum naval stores
industry. The judge continued as the AT-FA president until 1966. While a Georgia state
congressman from 1949 to 1951, his son John sponsored an unsuccessful bill on behalf of the
AT-FA to change Georgia from the Peach State to the Turpentine State.107 Over the next few

105 Davis, Encyclopedia o f American Forest and Conservation History. 477-478; Koch,
Utilization o f the Southern Pines. 1477; Snow, “Research on the Improvement o f Turpentine
Practices,” 380; Carswell, ‘“Naval Stores’ Industry Came to Northwest Florida in 1883;” Blount,
Spirits o f Turpentine. 30; Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954. 3; Croft, “Twin Success Story,” 9.
106The judge had built his empire by joining with a partner who actually saw to the dayto-day operation o f the enterprise.
107At that time South Carolina was the country’s largest peach producer and Georgia the
largest gum naval stores producer. In March 1998 the Georgia House of Representatives passed
a resolution eulogizing John W. Langdale following his death earlier that year.
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decades, as the gum naval store industry continued to decline, the Langdales shifted their
financial resources into other lines of business. When the Judge died in April 1972 at the age o f
eighty-four, another son, Harley Jr., became the head of Langdale Company while yet another,
son Billy, took on responsibility for organizing timber for the Langdale mills. Harley Jr. served
as chairman o f the Valdosta Savings and Loan and as the chairman of the board o f Georgia’s
state university system. In the mid-1970s, Langdale Company sold its gum turpentine processing
plant, which had operated continuously since 1945, to a Guatemalan concern. By the 1980s,
their businesses in and around Valdosta included a sawmill, a building supply company, a
Sheraton Hotel, a Ford car dealership, a tire company, a fuel company, and an insurance
company. Outside o f the Valdosta area, they owned a fence post processing plant in Homerville,
Georgia, a pole pealing operation and pole yards in both Chauncy and Blackston, Georgia, and a
wood processing plant in Sweetwater, Tennessee.108
Companies supplying turpentine equipment also had to reorient their focus or go out of
business. The Lerio Corporation o f Valdosta, for example, began as a manufacturer o f metal
turpentine cups. Founded by the family patriarch who had been in the naval stores industry since
the turn o f the century, the company produced its last cups in the early 1960s. The business
continued, however, because a decade earlier the Lerios had the foresight to diversify and began
manufacturing ice cans, draft beer pumps, garden hoses, and oil breather caps. By the late 1970s,
their largest-selling product was metal containers used by nurseries for growing plants. Not all
companies made such a successful transition. Consolidated Naval Stores Company, the
vertically-integrated gum industry giant, kept its factorage business during the Depression, but

l0>John Langdale, interview, 1,7,10-11,15,21-22; Mary Beth Arceneuax, “Captains o f
the Naval Stores Industry,” Naval Stores Review 90 (September-October 1980): 9; Georgia
House o f Representatives, Resolution Honoring John W. Langdale, 6 March 1998, SR 723;
“Langdale Company Sells Gum Process Machinery.”
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closed its subsidiaries. With the increasing popularity o f central distilleries, it acquired a twentyfive percent interest in Filtered Rosin Producers, which operated five plants in south Georgia and
north Florida. Unsatisfied with the arrangement, Consolidated divested itself within only a few
years. By 1948, only forty operators used their factorage services. With such little demand for
its services, Consolidated closed its factorage business at the end of 1949.
A very few gum turpentine producers continued after the 1960s. Not only did operators
face the challenge o f low prices and high production costs, but the end of government support.
In 1967, the government began liquidating its stock pile o f gum naval stores held as part o f the
NSCP and, in 1972, it shut down the program. One year later the Olustee Experiment Station
ended naval stores studies and began agricultural research. Remaining producers faced the
difficulty o f finding a still to process the gum. As the central distillation plants closed, operators
were forced to truck their gum further and further away. In 1961, twenty central distilleries
operated, but fifteen years later, only seven plants remained. By the late 1970s, just two gum
distilleries operated in the Valdosta area. Today only one facility, built in Baxley, Georgia in
1949, continues to serve the very small number of remaining gum naval stores producers. Most
naval stores are supplied by pulpwood plants using the sulfate method.109
The demise o f the gum naval stores industry in the post-World War II South ultimately
represents the defeat o f a poorly-capitalized, technologically-primitive, and labor-intensive
business by a well-funded, sophisticated, and highly-mechanized one. Retaining the basic
characteristics it possessed as far back as the colonial era, the gum naval stores industry, despite
significant government support, found itself unable to compete in the South’s mid-twentieth-

109 Karen Harvey, “Maguire Bom Into Turpentine Family: Industry Once Had Major
Impact on County,” The Compass. 26 April 1990,9; Hawk, “Turpentine: An Ancient
Technology,” 12; “Quality Product, Good Service Key Lerio Success,” Valdosta Daily Times.
26 June 1977; Robert S. Blount, “Spirits in the Pines” (M.A. thesis, Florida State University,
1992), 100; Butler, Treasures o f the Longleaf Pines. 166; Davis, Encyclopedia o f American
Forest and Conservation History. 477.
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century business environment. Change began slowly with the gradual rise of wood naval stores
plants in the early 1900s and rapidly accelerated during the 1940s as changing labor conditions
denied the industry an adequate supply o f cheap workers. Gum naval stores producers could
therefore not successfully compete with their rival, which offered far more attractive employment
and produced a superior product at a lower price. With its failure to modernize, the gum segment
o f the naval stores industry fell victim to an advancing economy.
During the 1930s and 1940s, the labor conditions o f naval stores workers remained
remarkably unchanged from what they were many decades earlier. Although new gumharvesting technology required workers to adopt new techniques, the routine and labor
conditions changed little. Producers persisted in their reliance on cheap, black labor and debt
peonage and woodsriders continued to monitor workers closely and employed violence to
maintain control. Moreover, workers lives remained centered on isolated camps where education
was scarce. Hard work, low pay, and poor living conditions offered little to encourage workers’
retention once greater employment opportunity rose in the World War Q and postwar South. As
employment related to the war effort attracted black men, naval stores producers found little
means o f encouraging or even forcing them to stay. The economic development and associated
transportation and communication improvements that continued to sweep the South after the war
further widened worker options and greatly eroded operator control of turpentine camps. As the
pool o f cheap and reliable black labor vanished, the wood naval stores industry grew at the
expense o f its gum counterpart. Just as wood naval stores production made impressive gains,
however, a newer, even more efficient method rose to take its place. Most gum naval stores
producers diversified into other businesses leaving only a few very small operators who
employed family labor. The American gum naval stores industry rapidly disintegrated into a
minor business. Today large industrial plants supply the demand for naval stores.
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Conclusion

This study, in its effort to determine what southern development looks like through the
lens o f naval stores production, first establishes the industry’s colonial and antebellum
characteristics as a baseline by which to compare developments after the Civil War. In the lateeighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, naval stores languished as a marginally-profitable
business with which no state, save North Carolina, would bother, North Carolina lacked any
other staple it could produce profitably. Planters grew tobacco in the colony’s fertile
southeastern river bottom land, and rice in the coastal region near Wilmington, but most areas
had to rely on their pine forests for income. North Carolinians were able to produce some
lumber from their pine forests, but scarcity of water power for sawmills and the difficulty and
high cost o f transporting the heavy product made tar and pitch more profitable. Thus, North
Carolina achieved its distinction as the Tar Heel State because it had to settle for the manufacture
of a commodity that no one else wanted.
By the 1830s, however, new uses for turpentine as a solvent in the growing rubber
industry, as an principal ingredient in the most widely-used lamp oil o f the day, and as an
essential element in the manufacture o f paints and varnishes resulted in increased demand for
turpentine, even greater than that for tar, and brought prices high enough to make gum and spirit
production an appealing alternative to cotton cultivation. The same types of producers who
dominated colonial production remained in the business. Poor whites, who lived in relative
isolation and primarily practiced subsistence agriculture in the pine barrens, either harvested
small quantities of gum, which they sold for finished goods or food, or labored on an irregular
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basis for larger producers. Yeoman farmers worked on a somewhat more regular schedule to
produce larger amounts o f turpentine for the market, sometimes with the help o f several slaves.
Another type o f producer, however, entered production in the 1830s. With access to capital
resources and the control o f large, slave labor forces, new entrepreneurs each invested in
thousands, even tens o f thousands o f acres of previously undesirable pine land, constructed their
own distilleries, and began production on a grand scale. At the same time, a transportation
revolution in North Carolina—improvements in river navigation and construction of plank roads
and then railroads—facilitated the industry’s expansion into areas earlier too remote to permit
profitable manufacture. Unlike the piney woods whites most of these large producers did not
reside in isolated areas, but near small population centers or at least major transportation routes.
Their lives more closely resembled those of large agricultural plantation owners than small naval
stores producers.
Slaves performed the vast majority of work at these large turpentine operations. The
various procedures involved in harvesting gum, the size and location o f the pine forests, and the
ways that these three factors affected slave management practices created distinct work patterns
and manners o f life for slaves in the naval stores industry. Environmental factors also played an
important role in shaping their lives. Given the size o f the pine forests and the methods of
harvesting resin, producers could not permit workers to labor in groups. Instead, slaves were
forced to spread out widely through the forest, where they worked alone and their tasks were
closely monitored by overseers who patrolled the forest on horseback. The migratory nature of
the industry discouraged producers from constructing substantial cabins to house their workers.
Instead, laborers could take refuge only in crude lean-tos that could be easily dismantled, moved,
and reconstructed. The natural setting o f the turpentine orchards also contributed to poor
conditions. Most owners found it unfeasible to raise food at the camp sites. Instead, producers
hauled provisions into the forests and tended to keep rations at a subsistence level. Unlike many
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plantation slaves, turpentine laborers lacked the opportunity to supplement their diets with food
raided from local smokehouses, chicken coops, and cornfields or gathered from their own garden
plots. Analysis o f turpentine slaves’ experiences finds that they lived lives similar to those of
bondsmen involved in other areas o f manufacturing in that they tended to labor for absentee
producers, were worked excessively hard by overseers, and received food, clothing, and shelter
of an inferior quality to agricultural slaves.
Slave laborers were not the only victims o f exploitation by the burgeoning naval stores
industry. By the 1850s, destructive gum-harvesting methods led to severe depletion o f the North
Carolina longleaf pine forests, causing the industry to begin a southward migration in search of
fresh stands. The practice o f cutting quart-size gum collection cavities, or boxes, in the trees’
bases seriously weakened their stability and left them vulnerable to decay and disease. The
process of weekly chipping an inch-thick streak o f bark and wood from the trunk to maintain
gum flow interfered with the movement of nutrients from the trees’ roots to the top o f their
trunks. Fire, usually deliberately set to clear away underbrush and debris, often scorched the
flammable scarred trunks and boxes, especially in worked out and abandoned stands where
hardened gum coated the old wounds and flammable debris carpeted the trees’ bases. The
weakened pines were left susceptible to insects which invaded the trees’ bark and sapwood,
nibbling at the live wood until too little was left to support its life. As North Carolina’s mature
longleaf pines yielded to windfall, rotting, fire, and insects, stands failed to regenerate. A
relatively slow-growing but fire-tolerant species, the longleaf pine required frequent, Iowintensity blazes to prevent other trees from overtaking them in the early years. The cessation of
regular burning in used-up tracts allowed other tree species to shade out the longleaf seedlings.
Those which managed to begin vibrant growth were usually consumed by wild hogs who found
i.

the pines’ starchy taproots especially tasty. As their longleafs disappeared, many North
Carolinians abandoned the turpentine industry for agricultural production, which new fertilizers
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made possible in the eastern counties’ sandy and infertile land. Other producers, determined to
continue in the business, purchased fresh pine tracts in South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and
Alabama, and moved their operations, including their slaves, to the new locations, persisting in
the same destructive harvesting practices that had forced them from North Carolina.
The antebellum naval stores industry’s trends—large-scale production, primitive
harvesting methods that led to environmental degradation, and reliance on forced laborcontinued after the Civil War. The war devastated the turpentine market, interrupted the
industry’s southward movement out of North Carolina, and freed the slaves on whose labor
production had relied. But the business recovered rapidly. The New South’s railroad building
boom provided access to more and more previously-isolated longleaf pine tracts, just as had the
antebellum transportation improvements in North Carolina. The old harvesting process, which
dated back to colonial times, persisted and, consequently, destruction o f the turpentined timber
stands continued as well. The unchanged practices and their effect on the forest perpetuated the
industry’s transient nature, ultimately forcing almost all turpentining out o f North Carolina.
Throughout the industry’s postbellum migration, North Carolinians and their descendants
continued to dominate production. By the beginning o f the twentieth century, these Tar Heels
were firmly established in south Georgia and north Florida where they pioneered a middle-class
business community in the thinly-settled pine forest into which they introduced a more marketoriented economy. Some turpentiners and their children not only established naval stores
operations, but also began sawmills, custom distilleries, general merchandising businesses, and
banks in the small towns whose numbers remained few but began to dot the piney woods South
in the late nineteenth century.
Along with the southward migration and domination by an entrepreneurial group,
reliance on various forms o f unfree black labor represented further continuation o f the industry’s
antebellum characteristics. Producers moving into the more southerly areas o f the pine barrens
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faced two interrelated challenges: first, securing an adequate number of workers and, second,
maintaining a reliable labor force at tasks well-known to be more physically exhausting and less
well-paid than agriculture. Because little antebellum plantation agriculture existed in the piney
woods, the area contained only a small native black population. Its white population, also
relatively sparse, viewed turpentining as “black” work and refused to have anything to do with
the difficult and low-paying occupation. Turpentine operators who left die Carolinas and formed
the backbone o f the industry in Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama attempted to remedy
the scarcity o f available labor by bringing their workers with them. Indeed, through the end o f
the nineteenth century, the typical turpentine laborer in Georgia remained an African-American
native of North Carolina. The influx of turpentiners and their workers into the pine region grew
so great that they dramatically altered the area’s demographics. In the Georgia counties most
active in naval stores production, the black population grew at a rate that surpassed both the
increases in the state’s white population and the overall rise in the black population, resulting in
the more than doubling o f African-Americans as a percentage o f the turpentine region’s
residents.
As before the war, producers relied on forced labor and employed various tactics to
ensure that workers remained in the business. Convicts leased to turpentiners, especially in the
state of Florida, provided cheap and reliable labor. But as part o f the overall naval stores work
force, however, their number was small, between 1880 and 1910 only seven to eight percent.
The great majority o f turpentine workers lived in a state somewhere between freedom and forced
labor. Whereas some workers were free to sell their labor on the market, enticement, emigrant
agent, and vagrancy legislation limited their movement, casting them into a gray area of semifTee
labor. Others languished in debt peonage whereby they were coerced to work to repay what they
owed their employer. The naval stores industry’s dependence on various degrees of unfree labor
reinforces recent scholarship that argues that forced labor proved compatible with southern
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industrial development. It offered the turpentiners the ability to pay low wages in a tight labor
market and still enjoy a relatively reliable labor supply. The intensive work routine involved in
naval stores manufacture and the laborers’ daily existence in the isolated pine forest camps also
persisted.
The industry’s characteristic elements survived largely unchanged through even
Progressive Era reform efforts. Around the turn o f the century, as southern states strengthened
peonage legislation with false pretense laws and expanded vagrancy statutes and employers
began drawing whites—particularly recently-arrived immigrants—into the system, the Department
of Justice investigated and tried employers for violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The
national press coverage o f the cases focused public attention on the use of forced labor and
spurred public outcry. But despite intense national interest and peonage’s apparent wide-spread
use, only a relatively small number of producers were ever tried and fewer still convicted. With
the same zeal but more successful results, reformers also attacked convict leasing. Not as widely
practiced as peonage, convict leasing proved less capable of withstanding opposition pressure.
The combination of public attack, the growing expense of leasing, and the demand for chain gang
work on state projects, finally brought convict leasing to an end. Peonage, however, survived.
Although the fear of prosecution drove the practice out of full public view, it continued beyond
the 1930s.
Despite the attacks on the naval stores industry’s labor practices during the first decades
of the twentieth century, relatively little changed in the lives o f workers. The labor force
remained predominately black and was supervised by white overseers. Camps remained rough
and isolated places where workers lived in clusters of small shanties. For convicts, conditions
did grow more tolerable with small physical improvements to camp buildings, a limited increase
in diet quality and variation, and the institution o f a better record system of convict treatment.
But brutality and abuses continued until convict leasing’s demise.
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Although the Progressive efforts failed to alter significantly the lives o f turpentine
workers, they did bring successful efforts to adopt less destructive harvesting methods than had
been employed since the naval stores industry began in the American colonies two centuries
earlier. Researchers pioneered two new practices, shallow scarring of the tree trunk to make gum
run and the attachment o f a clay cup to collect it, methods that not only produced a higher-grade
gum than the older practices o f deep chipping and boxing but also caused less harm to the tree.
The industry’s efforts to alter production methods resulted from the coinciding o f two significant
events, the near total loss o f the southern pine forest and the emergence o f scientific forestry in
the United States. The success of these new techniques fostered a more receptive environment
for forestry among many producers, which allowed for further refinement o f improved methods
and ultimately greater involvement o f forestry in the South. In this more cooperative atmosphere
the federal Bureau o f Forestry and the Bureau of Chemistry were able to pioneer other
improvements that aided the industry. But despite all these advancements, the basic system of
production persisted. In fact, the innovations were intentionally designed to alter techniques as
little as possible to minimize labor complications. Even so, although many operators, especially
large turpentiners, embraced the new methods to save the industry, not everyone was converted.
Many producers continued to view forestry as a meddlesome and intrusive movement and
persisted in production practices little changed from the eighteenth century.
Unlike destructive production methods, turpentiners faced business challenges during the
Progressive Era that federal efforts did not address. Despite a stabilization o f timber resources,
due largely to forestry efforts, pine acreage remained relatively scarce and expensive, especially
after lumber companies, fearful of a timber depletion, began buying up remaining stands. Other
production costs, particularly labor, rose during this period, the greatest jump occurring during
the First World War as African-Americans began migrating to northern cities. Both higher
timber and labor costs strained turpentine producers’ ability to operate profitably. Competition
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from two new rivals, the wood naval stores industry and foreign gum naval stores production,
posed another serious threat to operators. Wood naval stores production involved the highlymechanized and technical process o f extracting turpentine and rosin from ground pine stumps,
and was thus very different from the gum naval stores industry. Wood naval stores
manufacturing enjoyed an advantage over gum naval stores production in its ability to provide
superior products possessing specific qualities for individual consumers’ needs. Foreign gum
naval stores producers, especially the French, grew capable o f supplying European consumers
with quality gum turpentine and rosin thus cutting into the U.S. naval stores export market
The persistence o f these challenges, combined with the economic and social changes that
affected the South in the 1930s and 40s, finally brought the gum naval stores industry to virtual
collapse and the wood naval stores industry took its place. However the transition occurred only
after considerable efforts by producers and the federal government to save the dying industry.
With the creation o f the American Turpentine-Farmers Association in 1936, operators demanded
federal assistance, especially after successfully arguing that they were in fact agriculturists, and
began receiving the benefits o f New Deal crop support payments. But despite price subsidies
and increased government research, producers were unable to operate without cheap labor and as
the supply declined, so did gum naval stores production. Although their new status as farmers
provided operators with a temporary reprieve from minimum wage and social security
legislation, New Deal work programs and especially the influx o f young black men into the
military during the Second World War drained available labor. Moreover, though peonage
survived into the 1940s, improvements in transportation and communication made naval stores
camps far less isolated than in earlier periods and significantly reduced the control exercised by
producers over their workers. The wood naval stores industry, which did not rely on intensive
labor but rather heavy mechanization and a small number o f well-trained technicians, made gains
at the expense of the gum industry. By 194S, wood naval stores production exceeded that of gum
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and, ten years later, outpaced it by two and a half times, only to be replaced itself by the
manufacture o f naval stores at pulpwood plants during the 1960s. Thus, naval stores production
did not fully industrialize until the Second World War.
Analysis o f naval stores production, one o f the most representative o f southern
industries, provides a different picture o f southern economic development than scholars, who
concentrate on cotton cultivation and textile manufacturing, typically offer. It reveals that
antebellum southerners possessed an intense interest in manufacturing and, although they
admittedly poured the majority o f their resources into agricultural pursuits, they did indeed invest
in such enterprises as turpentine operations, especially in areas which failed to support plantation
agriculture. Turpentine production, typical of antebellum southern industry, was closely linked
to agricultural production, operated in rural areas, required relatively little initial capital
investment, and employed forced labor in the form o f slavery. Further examination of naval
stores manufacturing in the postbellum era reveals that these characteristics persisted well after
the Civil War and thus demonstrates a considerable degree o f continuity between the Old South
and the New. The postbellum turpentine industry continued to rely on primitive production
techniques, which in many ways resembled agricultural methods and work cycles, operated in
isolated rural areas, and continued to employ forced labor in the forms o f convict leasing and
debt peonage. With minor changes, these characteristics carried on into the twentieth century
and only ended when the New Deal and the Second World War created an environment in which
gum turpentine production could no longer profitably operate. Thus, the naval stores industry
shows that a significant portion of post-Civil War southern development represented a
continuation of antebellum patterns and suggests that the Old South was not so old nor the New
South quite so new.
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Value o f Naval Stores Produced
Southeastern United States
1850-1860
NC
1850 $
1860 $

FL
MS
SC
GA
AL
LA
TN
2,476,252 S 235,836 $ 55,068 $ 29,671 $ 17,800 $ 19,680 $ 1,750 $
5,311,420 $1,096,974 $236,111 $100,676 $642,114 $ 1,700 $ 20,750
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the Returns o f the Seventh Census (Washington. DC, 18S0), 116; United States Department o f
the Interior Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 186S), 2-14, 57-82,
168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579.
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SC
785
1,576

40
95

FL
14
13

AL
5
5

MS
4
37

TN

LA
5
1

1
1

1
—

United States Department o f the Interior Abstract o f the Statistics o f Manufactures. According to
the Returns o f the Seventh Census (Washington, DC, 1850), 116; United States Department o f
the Interior Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82,
168-204, 285-294, 420-438, 552-579.
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Number o f Hands Employed in Naval Stores Production
Southeastern United States
1850-1860
NC
1850
1860

SC
2858
3775

GA
220
1422

FL
202
307

AL
82
127

LA

MS
33
614

33
4

TN
3
26

3
0

United States Department o f the Interior Abstract o f the Statistics o f Manufactures. According to
the Returns o f the Seventh Census (Washington, DC, 1850), 116; United States Department o f
the Interior Manufactures o f the United States in 1860 (Washington. DC: 1865), 2-14, 57-82,
168-204, 285-294,420-438, 552-579.

Value of Naval Stores Produced
1870-1900

1870
1880
1890
1900

NC
SC
GA
FL
AL
MS
LA
$2,338,309 $ 774,077 $ 95,970 $ 26,116 $ 280,050 $
8,550 $
—
$1,758,488 $1,893,206 $1,455,739 $ 295,500 $ 372,050 $ 97,000 $
—
—
$1,705,833 $1,524,100 $4,242,255 $ 191,859 $ 131,266 $ 282,066 $
$1,055,695 $ 787,656 $8,110,486 $6,469,605 $2,033,705 $1,772,435 $115,324

United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry
o f the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington IX : 1872), 627; United States
Department o f the Interior, Census Office Report on the Manufactures o f the United States at the
Tenth Census (June 1. 18801 ('Washington. DC: 1883), 89-103, 106, 141, 161, 174; United States
Department o f the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part III (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States
Department o f Commerce and Labor, Bureau o f the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part III
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652.
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Number o f Hands Employed in Naval Stores ProductioB
1870-1900
NC
1870
1880
1890
1900

GA

SC
876
4,619
2,243
886

959
1,798
1,747
400

FL
18
589
484
15,073

138
2.743
9,911
19,199

MS

AL
602
724
285
3,716

LA
—
—
—

27
53
645
2,288

302

United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry
o f the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 627; United States
Department o f the Interior, C ensus Office Report on the Manufactures o f the United States at the
Tenth Census (June 1. 18801 (Washington, DC: 1883), 89-103,106,141,161,174; United States
Department o f the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part in (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States
Department o f Commerce and Labor, Bureau o f the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part in
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652.

Naval Stores Establishments by State
1870-1900

NC
1870
1880
1890
1900

GA

SC
147
184
194
174

54
192
201
132

FL
4
84
228
524

MS

AL
2
10
15
366

12
26
7
152

LA
1
It
24
145

0
0
0
10

United States Department o f the Interior, Census Office The Statistics o f the Wealth and Industry
o f the United States. Ninth Census. 1870 (Washington DC: 1872), 627; United States
Department o f the Interior, Census Office Report on the Manufactures o f the United States at the
Tenth Census (June 1.18803 (Washington. DC: 1883), 89-103,106, 141,161,174; United States
Department o f the Interior. Census Office, Report on the Manufacturing Industries in the United
States at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part HI (Washington, DC: 1895), 308-309; United States
Department o f Commerce and Labor, Bureau o f the Census, Manufactures. 1905. Part m
(Washington, DC: 1908), 650-652.
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Average Weekly Gam Naval Stores Wages Per Wage Earner
1899-1930
1899
1904
1909
1914
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

$ 3.86
$ 4.83
$ 4.56
$ 4.74
$ 11.63
$ 10.50
$ 6.67
$ 9.00
$ 8.65
$ 8.75
$ 9.93
$ 9.50
$ 8.60
$ 8J8
$ 7.20
$ 5.75

Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
339.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

724
Total Barrels o f Gam Turpentine and Gum Rosin
1897-1933

1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933

Gum Turpentine Gum Rosin Total
500,000
2,165,000
1,665,000
525.000
2,309,000
1,784,000
2,317,000
535,000
1,782,000
620,000
2,685,000
2,065,000
600.000
2,000,000
2,600,000
581,000
2,516,000
1,935,000
545,000
1,815,000
2,360,000
2,600,000
600.000
2,000,000
2,554,000
590,000
1,964,000
588,000
2,546,000
1,958,000
585,000
1,948,000
2,533,000
750,000
2,498,000
3,248,000
2,600,000
600,000
2,000,000
2,662,000
615.000
2,047,000
660.000
2,858,000
2,198,000
715,000
3,096,000
2,381,000
675,000
2,923,000
2,248,000
560,000
2,425,000
1,865,000
2,295,000
530,000
1,765,000
2,642,000
610,000
2,032,000
520,000
2,251,000
1,731,000
1,472,000
340,000
1,132,000
1,732,000
400,000
1,332,000
2,273,000
525,000
1,748,000
500,000
2,165,000
1,665,000
2,251,000
520,000
1,731,000
2,446,000
565,000
1,881,000
2,295,000
530,000
1,765,000
2,079,000
480,000
1,599,000
510,000
2,210,000
1,700,000
2,815,000
650,000
2,165,000
2,425,000
560,000
1,865,000
625,000
2,706,000
2,081,000
2,600,000
600,000
2,000,000
500,000
2,165,000
1,665,000
1,690,000
390.000
1,300,000
1,950,000
450.000
1,500,000

A. Stuart Campbell, Robert C. Unkrich, and Albert C. Blachard, “The Naval Stores Industry,”
Studies in Forestry Resources in Florida 1 (May 1934): 39.
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Total Cost Per Unit o f Gam Naval Stores
1919-1930
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

$
$
$
$
$
$
S
$
$
$
s
$

98.80
93.03
66.60
76.05
73.32
73.15
82.39
81.45
74.49
73.01
67.75
60.19

Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
340.
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N et Cash Proceeds Per Fifty Gallons o f Spirits ofTurpentine
1907-1930
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930

$
$
S
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

18.78
20.68
30.52
28.20
19.92
17.00
20.54
19.05
19.80
20.20
20.66
26.80
64.14
60.94
28.74
54.28
38.24
38.96
45.33
39.32
24.15
23.37
22.45
18.33

Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
338.
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Season Average Prices of Gum Spirits and Gnm Rosin
1900-1930
Gum
1900 $
1901 $
1902 $
1903 $
1904 $
1905 $
1906 $
1907 $
1908 $
1909 $
1910 $
1911 $
1912 $
1913 $
1914 $
1915 $
1916 $
1917 $
1918 $
1919 $
1920 $
1921 $
1922 $
1923 $
1924 $
1925 $
1926 $
1927 $
1928 $
1929 $
1930 $

Rosin
—

0.610
0.740
1.050
1.300
1.830
1.960
1.930
1.460
2.240
2.610
2.970
3.000
1.960
1.830
1.760
2.540
2.580
4.920
7.490
6.070
1.830
2.260
2.030
2.440
4.830
5.300
3.630
3.600
3.280
2.180

Gum
S
S
$
$
s
$
s
s
$
$
$
$
$
$
s
s
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
s
s
$
s
$
s
$

Spirits
0.359
0.283
0.414
0.454
0.465
0.570
0.556
0.490
0.331
0.423
0.617
0.481
0.359
0.327
0.388
0.370
0.370
0.358
0.508
1212
1.393
0.556
1.138
0.892
0.753
0.907
0.776
0.454
0.445
0.423
0.333

Naval Stores Statistics. 1900-1954 (Washington, DC: United States Department o f Agriculture,
1956), 22-23.
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A u r a l Average Number o f W age Earners
in the Gnm Naval Stores Industry by State
1909-1919
FL
1909
1919

GA

LA

AL
12,787
7,078

18,143
11,748

3,519
3,014

SC

TX

MS
1,688
2,604

2,573
2,495

NC

—

—

—

1,018

84

26

Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph J ). diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
316.

Number o f Naval Stores Establishments with Wage Earners by State
1900,1909,1919
AL
1900
1909
1919

FL
152
175
174

LA

GA
366
493
452

524
592
441

MS
10
23
33

NC
145
64
45

TX

SC
174

132

—

—

—

—

14

22

10

Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
317.
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N et Cash Proceeds Per Fifty Gallons o f Spirits o f Turpentine
1920-1939
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1936
1937
1938
1939

S
$
$
S
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
s
$
$
$
$

60.94
28.74
54.28
38.24
38.96
45.33
39.32
24.51
23.37
22.45
18.33
17.43
17.65
19.67
21.59
17.33
14.64
9.38
11.89

Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
338.

Number o f Gum Naval Stores Establishments
1921-1939
1921
1923
1925
1927
1929
1931
1933
1935
1937
1939

1,062
1,203
1,007
1,149
1,183
953
843
895
933
755

Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School o f
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 11.
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Average Weekly Gum Naval Stores Wages Per W age Earner
1924-1940
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

S 8.75
$ 9.93
$ 9.50
S 8.60
$ 8.38
$ 7.20
$ 5.75
s 4.95
$ 3.75
$ 4.03
$ 4.00
$ 4.60
$ 5.00
$ 5.30
$ 5.00
$ 5.00
$ 5.20

Donald Fraser Martin, Jr., “An Historical and Analytical Approach to the Current Problems o f
the American Gum Naval Stores Industry” (Ph.D. diss., University o f North Carolina, 1942),
339.
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Production o f Turpentine by State in Gallons
Selected Years from 1931-1944
GA

AL

FL

LA

MS

N C AND
SC

TX
*

1931
1,847,880

636,301

567,534

12,523,749

7,802,435

971,125

14,440,650

6,885,000

2,226,150

451,350

247,350

951,150

13,772,500

7,070,800

2,281,850

502,250

236,650

882,650

298,350

13,834,050

6,229,250

2,553,850

554,000

112,250

762,600

103,300

14,790,450

6,842,300

2,501,500

798,650

103,250

791,450

33,350

15,289,550

7,443,500

2,236,500

832,600

193,050

719.350

*

1934
1935
1936
1937
1938

95,100
*

1939
11,373,450

5,172,550

10,910,100

4,328,000

9,476,600

3,366,100

1,434,850

565,200

153,600

439,400
*

1940
1,172,200

393,500

91,000

302,000
*

1941
884,850

265,450

79,450

180,050
*

1942
1,000,700

226,000

11,169,650

3,450,900

9,931,850

3,272,250

829,500

176,400

8,376,900

2,881,200

698,650

160,400

50,800

198,450
*

1943
46,000

163,100

33,350

109,200

*

1944

* Texas figures for 1931, 1934, and 1938-1944 are included in Louisiana figures.
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School o f
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 8.
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Production o f Rosin by State in Barreto
Selected Years from 1931-1944
GA

FL

MS

AL

LA

NC and SC

TX

1907

4,261
657,202

993,647

234,358

142,972

70,754

136,426

673,713

1,081,984

250,269

155,514

109,650

114,258

1908
1909

16.050
*

506,240

868,000

173,600

108,080

93,520

75,040

347,931

733,772

165,099

154,115

150,793

22,294

41,639

234,690

486,432

120,839

115,984

112,900

7.636

60,179

467,349

556,355

133,702

139,159

116,912

23,701

12,360

627,305

660,009

151,641

162,231

145,223

30,231

1914
1919
1922
1923
1924

---

655,512

604,260

121,255

310,039

29,700
♦

---

1925
679,915

570,837

192,339

102,775

13,447
♦

33,000
•

1927
953,923

711,852

144,381

117,688

93,601

50,368
♦

1929
1,002,446

623,188

123,798

81,683

70,580

73,936

* Texas figures for 1931, 1934, and 1938-1944 are included in Louisiana figures.
Joseph B. Hosmer, Economic Aspects o f the Naval Stores Industry (Atlanta: Georgia School o f
Technology, State Engineering Experiment Station, 1948), 9.
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He attended private schools in North Carolina and Virginia, graduating from Virginia Episcopal
School in Lynchburg, Virginia, in 1985. He received his bachelor o f arts degree in history and
anthropology from Wake Forest University in 1989 and his master o f arts degree in history from
Appalachian State University in 1991. As a doctoral student in history at Louisiana State
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